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In my dissertation, I investigate Martin Heidegger’s “topology of language” and examine 
the relationship between being, language, and place through the question of “dwelling”. 
Despite its critical implications, Heidegger’s “topology of language” has been neither 
examined nor discussed in a systematic fashion in his own scholarship. My main purpose 
is to offer a coherent interpretation of his place-oriented thinking on the meaning of 
dwelling in language by tracing his writings between the 1920s and 1960s. While my main 
focus is in Heidegger’s later thought, I also aim to provide a perspective through which we 
can compare his later and earlier thought in terms of the topic of dwelling in language. 
My hypothesis is as follows: viewing language as the “onto-ethical” dwelling-
place of human existence can awaken us to consider what it means to be situated in the 
“world” and understand our “place” in the kosmos. Heidegger’s explorations of the “onto-
ethical” nature of our situated essence within the boundaries of language helps us identify 
the “question of language” as an interrogation on the meaning of “place” and “dwelling-
place”. This distinguishes Heidegger’s thinking from the traditional “philosophies of 
language” that examine the linguistic structure of language(s). Looking into the issue 
topologically, which means by engaging the question of “being” and problematizing our 
poetic relation to place; I argue that language is not a mere space of meaning, or a tool of 
communication, but the “open bounded” site of existence that requires us to journey its 
different regions, following the movement of the emergence and disappearance of the 
“words”. Therefore, we need to consider the relationship between limit, space, and place 
in understanding the “taking place” of language.  
My two-fold thesis is thus an attempt at addressing the following: 1) Asking the 
question of language in terms of “dwelling” can help us problematize how we can undergo 
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a poetic experience with language rather than merely objectifying it. 2) This requires us to 
understand the threefold connection between the meaning-truth-place of being. In arguing 
for the view that language is the site of the unfolding of the meaning of being, I critically 
engage with the recent Capobianco-Sheehan discussion, while remaining in a dialogue 
with Malpas and Ziarek’s topological ideas on the issue. I also trace Heidegger’s 
philosophical journey between the Ancient Greek and the Far Eastern thinking, as I bring 
into view his attempt to leave behind the metaphysics of presence in explicating the 
threefold link between place, nothingness and language. 
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sözüg kim tüketür neçe sözlese 
aka tınmaz erter bulaklar ara 
[Who can exhaust the speech – try as one might 
The word streams between sources –of silence– with no halt] 
(Yusuf Balasaguni, Kutadgu Bilig) 
Und die Sage selbst? Ist sie etwas von unserem Sprechen Abgetrenntes, dahin erst eine 
Brücke geschlagen werden müßte? Oder ist die Sage der Strom der Stille, der selbst seine 
Ufer, das Sagen und unser Nachsagen, verbindet, indem er sie bildet? 
[And Saying itself? Is it separated from our speaking, something to which we first must build a 
bridge? Or is Saying the stream of stillness which in forming them joins its own two banks –the 
Saying and our saying after it?] 




shibashi tote koso 
tachidomaritsure 
[By the roadside 
a crystal stream flowing 
in the shade of a willow 
‘Just a moment’, I thought 
Yet I’ve lingered long] 




My thinking on the relationship between language, place and dwelling began in 2007, 
during the Old Turkish Language course by Professor Emine Yılmaz at Hacettepe 
University in Ankara, Turkey. At the time I did not know about the 20th century German 
thinker Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, as I did not yet have an academic background in 
philosophy. The etymological explanation that Professor Yılmaz provided about the word 
konuşmak, which is the infinitive form of the reciprocal verb “to speak, discourse, 
converse, talk” in Turkish, indicates that the verb is derived from ko(n)mak, meaning to 
lay, situate, land on, settle. The same verb is also related to the noun komşu meaning 
“neighbour”. Accordingly, konuşmak implies situating oneself in the nearness of another 
person, as well as the common situatedness and correspondence of a group of people. This 
etymological introduction into the relationship between konuşmak and komşu, (two of the 
most ordinary and simple words of colloquial Turkish), was my introduction to a 
topological mode of thinking.  
When I first took up Philosophy as an undergraduate in 2007, I started reading the 
history of ontology and passed through the mazes of ancient Greek thought, Kant and 
German Idealism. Though, as a Turkish language and literature major, my encounter with 
existentialism via Sartre, Nietzsche and Camus was what really fascinated me, due to the 
dialogue between “thinking and poetizing” that was embodied in their writings. In fact, I 
happened to read Heidegger only by way of reading Nietzsche after following the 
suggestion of a dear friend of mine. The first text that I read from Heidegger was not his 
Being and Time, but an excerpt from Overcoming Metaphysics. This is how I slowly 
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started to familiarize myself with Heidegger’s thought on the question of being and 
language. Heidegger’s etymological explorations, unique style of writing, and poetic 
sensitivity in thinking stimulated me to engage with him, not only from a philosophical 
perspective, but also from the viewpoint of literature and philology. In a nutshell, situated 
at the intersection of philosophy, philology, and literature, a truly comparative reading of 
Heidegger has been pivotal in my topological understanding from the very beginning.  
When Thomas Sheehan writes, “As has been said of Hegel, so too here: when it 
comes to Heidegger, there are no experts, only varying degrees of ignorance”1, I think he 
deliberately points out the difficulty of covering Heidegger’s thought in its entirety. 
Heidegger’s writings extend over five decades, providing detailed and unusual 
interpretation of the works of various philosophers, poets, sculptors, architects, and 
painters. That said, inasmuch as Heidegger’s conceptual explorations and findings cannot 
be ignored, I think the more significant contributions of Heidegger’s thought must be 
sought in his endless efforts to motivate a change in our relation to thinking and language. 
As Powell remarks, the 20th century has been a “century of language” with many thinkers 
across disciplines examining the nature of language from diverse perspectives.2 What 
makes Heidegger’s thought of language stand out is his invitation to embark on an 
adventure of thinking with language, urging us to let language speak us, before we come 
to scientifically examine it as an object standing over and against us. If we overlook this 
crucial aspect of his explorations, we would be missing the whole point of his thought. 
This is why reading Heidegger requires one to develop a phronesis of and for language. 
The origin of Heidegger’s philosophy concerns the ground and horizon of the 
question of being. It asks about that which makes it possible for phenomena to make sense 																																																								
1 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2015), xix. 
2 Jeffrey L. Powell, “Introduction” In Heidegger and Language (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2013), 1.    
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to human understanding and experience. The answer to that question lies in the 
“correspondence” that takes place “between” being and human being. The thesis that I 
defend is that dwelling means to be situated within the boundaries of language where our 
understanding and experience of being occurs. In other words, language is “the between” 
of being and human being, the very site of dwelling as “cor-respondence” [Ent-
sprechung]. In that line of thinking, if we focus on the significance of the notion of 
dwelling, we can have an appropriate understanding of what language means for 
Heidegger. Likewise, with an appropriate understanding of language, we can appropriately 
“dwell” in the world. In that regard, I set out to examine the trifold relationship between 
being, language and place by mainly focusing on his later thought in order to show the 
topological link between language and dwelling. In this context, the following passage 
from Heidegger’s Le Thor seminars is very significant: 
 
With Being and Time . . . the “question of Being” . . . concerns the question of 
being qua being. It becomes thematic in Being and Time under the name of “the 
question of the meaning [Sinn] of being.” Later this formulation was given up in 
favour of that of “the question of the truth of being,” and finally in favour of that 
of “the question concerning the place or location of being” [Ortschaft des Seins], 
from which the name topology of being arose [Topologie des Seins]. Three terms 
which succeed one another and at the same time indicate three steps along the way 
of thinking: MEANING—TRUTH—PLACE (topos). If the question of being is 
supposed to become clarified, what binds together the three successive 
formulations must necessarily be disclosed, along with what distinguishes them.3 
 
In Heidegger scholarship, there is no real consensus concerning the specific role of these 
steps of his thinking, while the last one among them, namely, place [topos], is surprisingly 
the one that has received the least scrutiny. The recent Sheehan and Capobianco debate in 
Heidegger scholarship, however, has provided us with an interesting perspective in 
looking into Heidegger’s “question of being” where the significance of the question of 																																																								
3 Martin Heidegger, “Seminar in Le Thor 1968” in Four Seminars, trans. Andrew Mitchell and 
François Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 47. 
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place has become particularly explicit. The core issue of the Capobianco-Sheehan debate, 
which I highlight in different chapters of my thesis, concerns the source of our 
understanding and experience of being. Sheehan argues that the source of our 
“understanding” of being is the hermeneutic sense-making capacity of human existence. 
Capobianco claims that the source of our “experience” of being belongs to the self-
manifestation of being itself. In that context, Malpas’ topological interpretation of 
Heidegger’s thought stands out as the third approach on the issue, which particularly 
focuses on the way in which being and human being are linked via the event 
(appropriation) [Ereignis] as the happening of place. In Malpas’ interpretation of 
Heidegger, place appears as that which encompasses both the meaning and the truth of 
being and that which makes possible the understanding and the experience of being. In 
that vein of thinking, I would like to show that the question of being is accessible to our 
understanding and experience insofar as we can poetically dwell in language.  
With my topological account of Heidegger’s thought, I explicate the situated 
essence of human existence in language, engaging Malpas’ thought in advocating the 
primacy of place by expounding our situatedness in language. In that regard, I endeavour 
to explain the link between “meaning”, “truth”, and “place”, which Heidegger himself 
considers crucial for understanding his thought in a holistic way. In that context, I aim to 
respond to the Sheehan-Capobianco debate in a constructive way by placing their 









Hayden Kee has recently observed4 that the last couple of years have seen much scholarly 
focus on Heidegger’s ‘phenomenology of language’, which shows the interest in 
Heidegger scholarship in getting to the bottom of the question of language via 
phenomenology.5 I do not undervalue the significance of phenomenological approaches, 
as phenomenology itself is closely related to philosophical topology. Even as late as the 
mid-1950s, phenomenology continued to offer Heidegger new philosophical challenges.6 
That said, I do not follow a phenomenological “method” in my own interpretation because 
remaining bound by the phenomenological mode of inquiry, risks losing the sight of 
crucial issues related to what Heidegger calls “meditative thinking” [besinnliches Denken] 
and the core issue of language, as is the concern of Heidegger himself7. I also think that 
we should read Heidegger strategically, moving back and forth in different periods of his 
thinking in order to better grasp the shifts and turns in his thought. Just as we cannot 
completely debunk the question of phenomenology, we cannot simply impose his earlier 
position from the 1920s upon his position in the 1950s and 60s, though we can certainly 
find many traces of his late “thought” in his earlier “philosophy”. 
Heidegger states that the question of language shaped his path of thinking, 
commencing from his 1915 dissertation Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Theory 
																																																								
4 Hayden Kee, review of Proto-Phenomenology and the Nature of Language, Volume I: Dwelling 
in Speech, by Lawrence Hatab, Phenomenological Reviews, May 9th, 2017, 
http://reviews.ophen.org/2017/05/09/lawrence-hatab-proto-phenomenology-and-the-nature-of-
language-volume-i-dwelling-in-speech/ 
5 Charles Taylor, The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity. 
Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2016; Andrew Inkpin, Disclosing the World: On the 
Phenomenology of Language. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2016; Lawrence Hatab, Proto-
Phenomenology and the Nature of Language: Dwelling in Speech I. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield International, 2017. 
6 I discuss this issue in the third chapter in detail. 
7 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1971), 29. (From here on, On the Way to Language.) 
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of Meaning8. So, allow me to briefly summarize the three steps and periods of Heidegger’s 
thought on language in light of this focus: 
1) The Early Period: Between 1919-1934, Heidegger wrote and published his 
magnum opus Being and Time, and is paramount to stress that it is during this early period 
in time that Heidegger does not have an explicit account of language and place, though he 
explores the issue by problematizing the link between discourse [Rede] and the world. 
During this time, his writings and lecture courses are mainly guided by his early 
hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations. In Being and Time, Heidegger attempts 
to render the question of the “meaning of being” significant, a question that appears to be 
“forgotten” in the history of Occidental philosophy.9 In terms of the question of language, 
Heidegger investigates the notion of “discourse” from a phenomenological perspective in 
order to clarify the ontological nature of everyday speech and our different relations to it 
such as “idle-talk” [Gerede] and “keeping silent” [schweigen]. Nevertheless, for 
Heidegger, discussing language on its own accord was not a priority in Being and Time or 
in his other works during the late 1920s.10  
2) The Middle Period: Between 1934-1949, Heidegger gave lecture courses on 
Hölderlin, Nietzsche and pre-Socratic thought with a particular focus on art, poetry and 																																																								
8 Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness. trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum, 
2006), 365. 
9 Sallis explicates this point in a topological way. One of the major themes in his discussion is that 
Being and Time appears as a limit [peras] of Heidegger’s thought in that in his subsequent works, 
Heidegger carried out the de-construction [Abbau] of the history of metaphysics, which was the 
“actual” project that Heidegger set out to accomplish already in Being and Time. In the early and 
middle 1930s, in particular starting with the critique of the Platonist notion of “truth” as 
correctness, Heidegger took up this challenge in the rest of his thinking which was not possible to 
before and, most likely, without Being and Time. See: John Sallis, Delimitations: Phenomenology 
and the End of Metaphsics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 171. This point makes 
even more sense when read in the wake of the chapter called “End(s)” in the same work. See pages 
129-130. 
10 “I only know one thing: because reflection on language, and on Being, has determined my path 
of thinking from early on, therefore their discussion has stayed as far as possible in the background 
[…] Yet it took nearly another ten years before I was able to say what I was thinking-the fitting 
word is still lacking even today. The prospect of the thinking that labors to answer to the nature of 
language is still veiled, in all its vastness.” (On the Way to Language, 8.) 
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the critique of the essence of modern technology. The “turn” in his focus of thinking can 
be interpreted as an attempt of confrontation with his terrible political stance between 
1932-33, but even more so a change in the “method” of his thinking on the question of 
being. This transitional period of his thought includes Hölderlin’s Hymns The Germania 
and Rhine (1934-35), and Hölderlin’s Hymn The Ister (1942) lecture courses given at the 
University of Freiburg on Hölderlin’s poetry. They offer significant insights into the 
meaning of “poetic dwelling” and constitute the origins of Heidegger’s more explicit 
“topology of language”. This is also when Heidegger starts developing the notion of the 
“fourfold” [Geviert] in the Origin of Work of Art (1935–1937) as the essence of the 
meaning of dwelling. In 1936 Heidegger wrote his significant yet fragmentary text the 
Contributions to Philosophy: From the Event (1936-1938) where it becomes evident that 
the early “ontological difference” [Ontologische Differenz] is grounded in the notion the 
event [Ereignis], which remains the most important concept for the rest of his entire 
thinking. Even so, it is the 1946 letter, which is known as the “Letter on Humanism”, that 
is the keystone of the topological turn in Heidegger’s thinking, a concentration that 
becomes explicit with his understanding of language as the “house of being”.  
3) The Late Period: The final stage of Heidegger’s thought, which is where we 
find his fully developed topology of being and language, encompasses the time period 
after the late 1940s. In particular the 1950s are Heidegger’s most productive years in terms 
of developing his ideas on the relation between dwelling, language and place. His 
profoundly place-oriented thinking for more than a decade results in the 1951 essay 
Building Dwelling Thinking, and more importantly On the Way to Language,  1959, and 
Heidegger’s magnum opus on language. In the 1950s, we can also easily follow the traces 
of his dialogue with Taoism, which is one of the important sources of his post-
metaphysical writings in the 1950s and onwards. The most crucial link in this period of his 
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thought on language is the connection between the “event” and the “way-making 
movement” of language [Be-wëgung] that focuses on the three-fold movement between 
“silence”, “saying”, and “speaking”. In 1969 Heidegger writes the Art and Space, which 
can be seen as his final significant touch on the relationship between art, space [Raum], 




In Heidegger’s work there are plenty of place-related terms: Dasein (usually translated as 
being-there), place (or site) [Ort, topos], world [Welt], space [Raum], the Region [die 
Gegnet], openness [Offenheit], clearing [Lichtung], way [Weg], way-making movement 
[Be-wëgung], and dwelling [wohnen, Aufenthalten] are perhaps the most important ones. 
In Heidegger scholarship these terms are often mentioned in discussing Heidegger’s ideas, 
yet without a particular attention to their space and place-related underpinnings, which, I 
intend to carry out via my topological approach. Philosophical topology signifies the onto-
ethical and hermeneutic approach that investigates the unfolding and folding of the 
meaning of phenomena with regards to their space and place-related essence. In what 
follows, when I use the word “topological” as the method of inquiry, it indicates the kind 
of approach that thinks in terms of place. When I use “topology” independently, it simply 
refers the “philosophical” study of space and place on hermeneutic grounds. Thus, 
“topology of language” means the place-oriented, onto-ethical and hermeneutic 
investigation of our experience of being in and with language. 
																																																								
11 In Heidegger scholarship, there are two sources consisting of collected essays which contain 
sustained discussions on Heidegger’s thought on language from difference perspectives: Joseph J. 
Kockelman, ed. and trans., On Heidegger and Language. Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1972; Jeffrey Powell, ed., Heidegger and Language. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2013. 
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Otto Pöggeler was one of the first in Heidegger scholarship who used the term 
“topology” in relation to Heidegger’s thought12. Joseph Fell is another important figure 
that investigated the role the notion of place in Heidegger’s thought on being.13 In the 
most recent Heidegger scholarship the term topology has been fostered by Malpas, whose 
works on space and place offer the most encompassing explorations and interpretations of 
Heidegger’s place-oriented thought.14 Malpas suggests that topology (as a composite of 
Greek topos and logos) must be understood in hermeneutic terms as the saying and 
gathering that belongs to place, differed from the mathematical–geometrical branch of 
topology15. As he argues, “The happening of world occurs first in the calling of language, 
in the gathering of the thing, in the opening up of the time-space that is also the “taking-
place” of place”16. As Malpas understands it, it is the task of philosophical topology to 
show the hermeneutical17 underpinnings of the situated essence of human existence. 
Therefore a topological approach investigates the way in which we understand and 
interpret place in its “taking place”, while addressing our very situated–ness in places, 
both in ontic and ontological registers. A topological study may or may not have a specific 
conception of place qua place, which however does not change the fact that insofar as 
																																																								
12 Otto Pöggeler, “Heideggers Topology des Seins”, in Man and World, 2 (1969): 331-56;  
Otto Pöggeler, “Heidegger’s Topology of Being”, in On Heidegger and Language, ed. Joseph J. 
Kockelman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 107-147. 
13 Joseph Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place. New York: Columbia Press, 
1997. 
14  Jeff Malpas, Place and Experience: A philosophical Topography. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999; Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World. Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006; Jeff Malpas, Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in 
the Topology of Being. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2012. 
15 “Both “topology” and “Topologie” have a specific technical sense that refers to a branch of 
mathematical geometry that studies the nature of surfaces. Heidegger, however, drawing on the 
Greek roots that lie embedded in the term—topos and logos—takes it in the sense of a “saying of 
place” (Ort-reden)”. Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World, 33. 
16 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World, 306. 
17 Malpas announces that his approach is primarily hermeneutical. See: Jeff Malpas, “Place and 
Situation”, in The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics, ed. Jeff Malpas and Hans-Helmuth 
Gander (London: Taylor & Francis, 2014), 354–366. 
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phenomena (and our experience of them) are situated in and of place, they can be 
investigated in topological terms.18  
In hermeneutic terms, philosophical topology can investigate the very “relation” 
between the part and the whole and their dynamic interaction19, as this relation can be 
grasped as a “situated” one in a particular context. In my thesis I will not focus on the 
ontic register, e.g. particular geographical, political, cultural places, but rather my 
concentration will be on the onto-ethical nature of human beings’ “situatedness” in the 
taking place of language, as that which defines the human experience of being in the 
world.   
My dissertation, Heidegger’s Topology of Language: Language and Dwelling thus 
aims to shed light upon the place-character of the, 1) situated nature of human existence in 
the event [Ereignis] which is recognizable to human beings in the form of language, as 
well as, 2) our poetic “relation” to language as our dwelling [wohnen] in it. Although 
topology of being has been mentioned and discussed by Heidegger, Pöggeler, Malpas, and 
Fell, more recently, “topology of language” has been employed by Ziarek: 
 
Heidegger is already beginning to think about the poietic and Dichtung in terms of 
a topology of language, even if he does not yet call it by this name. Unfolding the 
“open region,” that is, the Lichtung or the clearing, the poietic dimension of art, 
puts our everyday world into question, displacing the usual ways in which we 
represent, know, do, or evaluate, as Heidegger remarks. It can decisively 
																																																								
18 Sallis’ following argument is worth considering: “[…] place is not primarily; whenever one 
comes to frame a concept of place, one does so always on the basis of place experienced in its 
intuitive singularity. Thus the concept of place, place in general, place conceived in its generality, 
as a generality, is something secondary, derivative”. Sallis calls ventures to conceptualize place as 
“transcendental aesthetic”. John Sallis, Topographies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1998), 3.  
19 In that context, in his The Wholeness of Nature, Henri Bortoft concentrates on the link between 
“belonging together” and belonging together” and offers extremely stimulating thoughts on “part-
whole” relationship, which, however, I cannot explore in detail, as doing so would require its own 
study.  
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transform not only our relation to language but also our manner of being in the 
world.20 
 
Engaging with language in a topological way can result in the “mindfulness” [Besinnung] 
of language that “shows how the event happens as the “sitedness” or the emplacing of the 
time-space of experience into its non-repeatable topology.”21 As such, the “topology of 
language” that is at issue seeks to provide a new perspective in grounding our relation to 
language, which should help us in finding a new ground and comporting ourselves toward 
things. In that framework, my approach can be easily distinguishable, not only from 
linguistic inquiries on language, but also from what has been generally called 
“philosophies of language”. “Topology of language” does not consider language only as 
an object of investigation, but as that which grounds human experience of being in the 
world, thus as an issue that we must consider in its poetic taking place. Investigating the 
meaning of dwelling in language, then, should indicate a mode of inquiry in which we try 




The structure of the dissertation emphasizes the conceptual continuity and development in 
Heidegger’s thought so that we can see how and why the issue of language and dwelling 
are inseparable from one another. The dissertation consists of four chapters that are 
composed of subsections. Each chapter primarily looks to the conceptual relationship 
between language and dwelling while engaging other topics in order to provide 
background to the discussion.  
																																																								
20 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 
135. 
21 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger, 182. 
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Heidegger’s most explicit topological discussions on language are found in the On 
the Way to Language. However, in order to fully understand Heidegger’s mature account 
of language and dwelling, the subject matter should be placed its historical context. To 
that end, firstly I focus on the middle period of Heidegger’s thought from the 1930s and 
1940s. Following that, I move on to his mature ideas in 1950s and 1960s, and then return 
to the early period in the 1920s in order to be able to offer a ground of comparison 
between the early, middle and late periods on the question of language and dwelling. It is 
possible to observe that the first two chapters illustrate how being, language and dwelling 
come to occur through topos and logos, while the last two chapters indicate how the link 
between being, language and dwelling is essentially established by ou-topos, or the place 
of no-thingness, and silence. As such, the first and last two chapters can be thought of as a 
dialogue between early and later Heidegger.  
In the first chapter, I examine the commencement of Heidegger’s explicit thought 
on language and dwelling by concentrating on his ideas between the mid-1930s and early 
1940s. I consider Heidegger’s thought from this period as the starting point of his later, 
more developed position. The main texts I analyse in this chapter are the lecture courses 
on Hölderlin’s hymns Germania and the Rhein and The Ister. The main idea that I discuss 
is that the place of poetic dwelling is the between [das Zwischen], which is the "onto-
ethical" place where any interaction and interrelation between distinct boundaries and 
regions can come to occur through their mutual "appropriation". In the course of the 
chapter, I engage with Mitchell’s idea of the inter-relational essence of the “thing” [das 
Ding] as well as discuss Malpas’ notion of the “limit” [peras] and “open boundedness”, 
which constitute the conceptual background of my examinations on the link between 
language and place. With the discussion on the meaning of dwelling, I discern the 
topological meaning of language as the between of being and human being and the 
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emergence of the mutual appropriation of the fourfold. I concentrate on “Germania and 
the Rhein” and “The Ister” lecture courses, because it is at this stage of his thought where 
Heidegger starts fleshing out the topological relationship between language and dwelling, 
and he does so by a poetic examination of Hölderlin’s hymns on the essence of rivers. For 
Heidegger, rivers represent the dynamic event of language and place in their constant 
flowing. In that regard, I draw attention to the significance of the idea of movement and 
activity by focusing on the streaming of rivers, which will be a crucial idea in Heidegger’s 
later writings in terms of the link between language and place.  
In the second chapter, I focus on Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” in order to 
closely scrutinize the statement that “language is the house of the truth of being”. This is 
where the topological link between language and dwelling becomes explicit in terms of 
the place-character of the essence of the existence of human beings. I discuss the 
ontological and ethical underpinnings of the topological approach of Heidegger, and 
discuss in which way Heidegger’s “topology of language” could be read as “ethics of 
language”. In that regard, I take issue with Joanna Hodge’s work on the matter by dealing 
with her critique of Heidegger’s supposedly lack of an “ethical” account, and explain why 
in fact Heidegger’s non-subjectivistic “ethics” differs from traditional accounts of ethics 
as moral philosophy. After having explicated why ethics must be thought departing from a 
topological interpretation of the notion of ethos in relation to the issue of “dwelling in 
language”, I discuss the significance of the notion of “truth” or “un-concealment” as 
aletheia with regards to the question of being and language. In that context, I bring to the 
fore Sheehan-Capobianco discussion with regards to the question of being, language and 
dwelling. I claim that the essence of human existence (Dasein) must be topologically 
thought in its relation to the link between language and “the there” [das Da] as the 
“clearing” [Lichtung]. In doing so, I clarify the conception of “humanism” that Heidegger 
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advances and discuss Fell’s examination of Heidegger’s topology in the Letter of 
Humanism. I specifically focus on the question of humanism by comparing subjectivistic 
underpinnings of Sartre’s existentialism with Heidegger’s idea of existence as dwelling in 
language. I propose to read Heidegger’s subsequent thinking as “topology of language”, 
which appears as a critique of philosophy as metaphysics.  
In the third chapter, I examine Heidegger’s topological thought in On the Way to 
Language. I suggest that the key notion is the “way-making movement” [Be-wëgung], 
which I consider the essence of the “event” of language. I pay particularly close attention 
to the Far Eastern sources of Heidegger’s thinking throughout the chapter. In that context, 
I show the similarities between the Taoist understanding of the “way” [Tao] and 
Heidegger’s understanding of the event of language as the “way-making movement. I 
consider the relation between “silence”, “saying” and “speaking” as the basis of the 
topological “movement” of words.  
In order to better explicate the core issues of his dialogue with the Japanese 
professor Tezuka on the nature of the unfolding of words, I investigate the “method” in 
which Heidegger arrives at a poetic interpretation of the Japanese word Koto Ba, a 
discussion which allows me to clarify Heidegger’s topological “way” of approaching the 
matter of language via Er-örterung, literally, a dialogue that situates in place. In order to 
make explicit the necessity of avoiding a conception of language as a mere container of 
meaning, and communication as the transportation and transference of meaning, I venture 
to explain “silence” as the origin of the event. In relation to that, I also consider Japanese 
philosopher Ueda’s thought on “hollow words” and the two-fold essence of the 
relationship between language, nothingness and world. In the context of Heidegger 
scholarship, I engage with Ziarek’s topological and topographical interpretation of 
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Heidegger, pointing out the sameness of the event with the unfolding of language as the 
happening of place. 
In the rest of the chapter, I consider the relationship between language and 
technology from a topological perspective. I examine and compare Heidegger’s 
topological account of language as the “way-making movement” and the obstructive 
nature of modern technology as the “Framework” [Gestell]. I link this issue with 
Heidegger’s late notion of “letting-be” (releasedness) [Gelassenheit] as a response to the 
human beings’ onto-ethical situation vis-à-vis modern technology. This discussion brings 
us to the notion of the “region” [die Gegnet], which appears as the place of “in-dwelling” 
[Inständigkeit] and “non-willing”. I show that Heidegger’s late understanding of the 
meaning of being as “letting-be” can be conceived as a tranquil way of undergoing an 
experience with language in the openness of being in the attempt of resisting the 
obstructive essence of the “framework”. 
  In the fourth chapter I return to early Heidegger in order to put his middle, late 
and early thinking in perspective, comparing and discussing the similarities and 
differences of his account on the link between language and dwelling. Although I 
principally engage with his ideas from Being and Time, I also address Heidegger’s other 
lecture courses from the 1920s. First, I focus on the meaning of dwelling in Being and 
Time with an exegesis of the relation between discourse [Rede] and “being-in-the-world” 
[In-der-Welt-sein]. In order to clarify the matter, I take issue with Dreyfus’ interpretation 
of Heidegger where I critically discuss the relationship between “place”, “praxis” and 
“existential spatiality”. In refuting the primacy of “mindless absorption” as the meaning of 
dwelling, I bring into view the Dreyfus-McDowell discussion regarding the question of 
mindfulness in human actions. This discussion allows me to problematize the issue of 
“idle-talk” [Gerede] as the articulation of the average and superficial understanding of the 
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world. In tracing the hints of a topological account of authentic dwelling in Being and 
Time, I turn to the notion of “groundlessness” [Bodenlosigkeit] of “idle-talk” and “silence” 
as the abysmal ground [Abgrund] of discourse. In that regard, I claim that Heidegger’s 
emphasis on “keeping silent”, as the abysmal ground of language is the basis of his 
understanding of dwelling in language. The “no-thing” character of “call of conscious” 
which invites us to consider the ontological nature of “silence” could be understood as one 
of the origins of Heidegger’s later topology of language and dwelling. Finally, I compare 
Heidegger’s early and late accounts of “dwelling” in engaging with Braver’s account of 
“groundless ground”. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the meaning and role that 
contextualism plays in Heidegger’s early and late thought.  In particular, I point to 
different kinds of holisms that are present in Heidegger’s thought such as “being-in-the-
world” and “fourfold”, while it is the latter that provides us with a better understanding of 














I. Poetic Dwelling in the 1930s and 1940s 
 
The significance of “poetic dwelling” in Heidegger’s later thought has already been long 
acknowledged.22 However, despite its overall recognition, there is surprisingly little 
scrutiny as to how the issue of language, place and poetic dwelling are related.23 In the 
following passage, Ziarek concisely summarizes this negligence in Heidegger scholarship: 
 
 Yet all too often only scant attention is paid to language in discussion of 
Heidegger, or else such discussion becomes too quickly limited to consideration 
of poetry and art. And in the discussions of Heidegger situated between 
Continental and Analytic perspectives, the matter of language becomes telescoped 
into the problematic of ordinary language and/or of logic, as though the aim was 
to try to domesticate Heidegger’s thought back into familiar and recognizable 
categories and terms. As a result, the latter approaches tend to evacuate precisely 
the very impetus of Heideggerian thought toward a transformation of our relation 
to language, a transformation that specifically requires changing the terms and the 
ways in which we experience language and ourselves in it.24  
 
In that context, my principal objective in this chapter is to clarify how Heidegger’s 
comprehensive understanding of the relation between language and dwelling develops in 
the period between the early 1930s and 1940s. I focus on examining the grounds of 
poeticality, which Heidegger considers to be the kind of “relation” that is required in 
investigating the nature of language. I argue that our understandings of “standing in a 
poetic relationship” means we are to probe further into the question of “poetic dwelling” 																																																								
22 For instance, Werner Marx was one of the first scholars who examined the concept poetic 
dwelling as early as in 1972. See: Werner Marx,  “The World in Another Beginning: Poetic 
Dwelling and the Role of the Poet”, in On Heidegger and Language, ed. Joseph J. Kockelman 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 235-261. 
23 In this context, one of the key figures in the contemporary literature is Jeff Malpas, whose 
topological interpretation of Heidegger with an intensive concentration on the notions of 
“situatedness” and “limit”, provides a solid conceptual footing in delving into the relation between 
being, language and place. In this section, I will engage with his thought and explore his 
understanding of his place as “open-bounded”. For Malpas’ most extensive discussion of 
Heidegger’s poetic topology, see: Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 211-305. 
24 Krzysztof Ziarek, “Giving Its Word: Event (as) Language”, in Heidegger and Language, ed. 
Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 103. 
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from an onto-ethical and topological view point. I take the “onto-ethical” to designate the 
link between one’s being and actions in the world. At issue here is the concept of place as 
topos or Ort that neither ought to be understood as a socio-political location nor fixed 
point in space, but as “finite openness” or “open boundedness”. This will be further 
explained by engaging with Malpas’ philosophy of place in the first chapter. In that 
regard, “onto-ethical” appears as the basic character of philosophical topology. This 
chapter therefore focuses on explicating the significance of standing in a poetic relation to 
place, as well as what it means to be “poetically situated” in language. 
Starting from the mid-1930s, Heidegger gave a number of lecture courses on 
Hölderlin at the University of Freiburg. Hölderlin’s Hymns Germania and The Rhine25 
(1934-35), but essentially Hölderlin’s Hymn: The Ister26 (1942) lecture courses provide 
essential philosophical material for my arguments on the nature of “poetic dwelling”, 
which signifies our “relation” to language.27 Regarding Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin, 
much emphasis is given to his earlier Introduction to Metaphysics, as it is very helpful in 
order to better conceive of the issues delineated in Being and Time. However, my primary 
aim is to provide a better way in which we can understand Heidegger’s later thought, 
because this is the period of his philosophy that still needs more scholarly attention. 
Specifically, The Ister lecture courses provide an opening to grasp the issues that become 
explicit in the “Letter on Humanism” (1947), which will help us locate the problem of 
dwelling in its broader context and further clarify the way in which being and dwelling are 																																																								
25Martin Heidegger. Hölderlin’s Hymns Germania and Rhine, trans. William McNeill and Julia 
Ireland, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. 
26 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn: The Ister, trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. (From here on: The Ister) 
27 Schmidt argues that one of the most important objectives of the lecture courses was to offer 
insights concerning the possibility of a renewal of the culture by means of poetic language, yet 
without putting the matters in nationalistic terms. Schmidt argues that the project was a big failure, 
yet I think that we cannot disregard Heidegger’s conceptual findings in these lecture courses, 
which help him in the 1940s and 1950s to develop a topological mode of thinking. Dennis Schmidt 
J., On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2001), 238. 
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related. My discussions in this chapter will provide a firm footing for the next chapter to 
examine Heidegger’s statement that “language is the house of being” in the “Letter on 
Humanism”, as well as allow me to clarify the conceptual and historical basis of the 
crucial topological notion of the fourfold [Geviert] from 1949 and onwards. 
 (1) I introduce the notion of “the between” [Das Zwischen], and argue that it is 
the place of poetic dwelling.28 In explaining the nature of “the between”, I discuss Andrew 
Mitchell’s idea of relationality and the topological implications of the idea of limit as 
peras, and how it is related to the issue of mortality.  
(2) I examine how Heidegger’s interpretation of Sophocles’ Antigone as the poetic 
between allows us to problematize the topological nature of poetic dwelling and brings out 
the reciprocal relation between mortals and immortals. In relation to this, I engage with 
Mark Wrathall’s idea of “mutual conditioning” and compare it with Malpas’ 
understanding of place.  
(3) I compare Antigone’s poetic dwelling with Hölderlin’s hymn on the river Ister 
and elaborate Heidegger’s analysis of the temporal-spatial essence of dwelling as 
becoming homely, and its relation to place.  
(4) I explain the relation and differences between poesy [Poesie] and poetry 
[Dichtung]. I make explicit the meaning of poetic dwelling and argue that one significant 
meaning of poeticality is creativity, explaining that the kind of creativity that is at issue, 
however, is not the same as “productivity”, but a sense of making space for the gathering 
of the thing.  
(5) I discuss how Heidegger’s idea of poetic dwelling in the early 1940s essentially 
constitutes the basis of the later notion of the fourfold [Geviert], and explain the 
																																																								
28 In the second chapter, I will show that the notion Heidegger uses to designate the place of 
dwelling, or dwelling place, is ethos. This is an issue that becomes explicit in the “Letter on 
Humanism”. 
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topological relation between the fourfold and language. I engage with the Capobianco-
Sheehan discussion with regards to the role of place, fourfold and its relation to being. My 
“onto-ethical” approach will allow me to problematize the tension between “ontology” 
and “ethics”, as well “being” and “action”, which will also be a central issue in the second 
chapter of my dissertation. 
 
I. 1 The Between: The Poet as the Demigod 
 
Tragedy, as one of the most ancient literary forms of drama, poetically questions mortals’ 
struggle against fate and necessity. Tragedy has always been at the centre of philosophical 
thought, seen in the dialogue of educational and political thought in Plato and Aristotle, 
through to the more recent German philosophy with its focus on the tension between 
“natural necessity and human freedom”.29 Schmidt astutely highlights30 that we must be 
aware that since Kant, German philosophy has yielded different, yet correlated 
understandings of “tragedy. Hegel, Schelling, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger all 
have their own interpretations as to how to make sense of tragedy. In what follows, the 
understanding of tragedy as this “situation” between mortals and immortals, 31 will be 
considered with reference to Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s interpretation of Greek 
tragedy32. “Situation” as a “necessary”33 issue, and one that concerns the finite human 
																																																								
29 Véronique Foti, Epochal Discordance: Hölderlin’s Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2006), 8. 
30 Dennis Schmidt J., On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2001), xii. 
31 Kalliopi Nikolopoulou, Tragically Speaking: On the Use and Abuse of Theory for Life (Lincoln 
& London: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), xli. 
32 Heidegger’s idiosyncratic appropriation of Hölderlin indeed requires its own study, which 
cannot be done within the limits of my dissertation. In this regard Gosetti-Ferencei’s examination 
of Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin is a thought-provoking one. Two of her major arguments are 
as follows: 1) Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin mostly overlooks the place of Hölderlin’s 
thought vis-à-vis Kant and German idealism. 2) When we scrutinize Hölderlin’s understanding of 
“poetic subject”, we would see that his project also shows a commitment to Enlightenment ideals. 
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nature, that thus cannot be “technologically” settled. It needs to be “poetically” 
encountered, in understanding both the “mortals” and “immortals”, and the very 
hermeneutic “inter-relation” between them. If, as Aristotle describes, tragedy is an 
“‘imitation’ not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action”34, then, 
this requires us to heed the very “site” of this “action” as “inter-action”, which gathers 
mortals and immortals in place.  
In Heidegger’s thought of the 1930s and 1940s, the place of poetic dwelling is “the 
between” [das Zwischen], and I thus discuss the topological implications of this issue. 
Since “the between” is inherently related to the question of space and place, the issue 
requires a topological inquiry.35 I consider Heidegger’s concentration on the notion as a 
direct result of his engagement with Hölderlin’s poetry36, which itself is an outcome of his 																																																																																																																																																																						
In arguing so, Gasetti-Ferencei tries to take distance from Heidegger’s political ideas from the 
early 1930s. In favoring later Heidegger’s “Gelassenheit” as a poetic way of “letting-be” over his 
early violently heroic and “resolute” Dasein, Gasetti-Ferencei deliberately shows why Heidegger’s 
later thought stands essentially closer to his pre- Being and Time hermeneutical phenomenology of 
“facticity” and is more appropriate for an authentic understanding of poetic subject and poetic 
language. Jennifer Anna Gasetti-Ferencei, Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic 
Language: Toward a New Poetics of Dasein  (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 2-5, 8. 
33 What Schmidt explains with regards to the contradiction between “techne” and “necessity” is 
significant especially considering Heidegger’s engagement with “Pre-socratic” thought. The 
Socratic thought understands “techne” as knowledge. Heidegger’s reinterpretation of techne as 
“art” (as that which makes and gathers the “world”) and how he distinguishes it from mere 
“techne” as Technik indicates that he had already engaged with the problem of the “end of 
philosophy” beginning with his thought on ancient Greek tragedy. This is because for Heidegger, 
as Schmidt also notes, the ancient Greek tragedy paves the way to the discussions of the crisis of 
history that was also being experienced in the Occident in the 20th century. On the other hand, Pre-
socratic thinkers like Parmenides, Heraclitus and Anaximander, whose thinking has indeed defined 
the course of the intellectual history of the Occident, had more appropriate ways of understanding 
“necessity”. Their “theoria”, that is, their “view” of things, was not “technical”, but “poetic”, and 
in a certain sense “tragic”. Dennis Schmidt J., On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and 
Ethical Life. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 234-235, 238. 
34 Aristotle, Poetics: 1450a 16-18. 
35 Drawing on Plato’s dialogue of Symposium, Krell finds a parallel between the notion of daimon 
and the between, both of which play a key role in Heidegger’s thought starting from the late 1920s 
and onwards. Krell’s thesis is that “the realm of the daimonic” is the between that gathers the 
world, and thus opens up to the very idea of “life”. David F Krell, The Daimon Life: Heidegger 
and Life Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), xi. 
36 Bernasconi explains why Hölderlin’s poetry was so important to Heidegger: “Hölderlin was for 
Heidegger the poet who, if the Germans decided in his favor by listening to the language of his 
poetry, could lead them to another place, a place where Western metaphysics no longer held sway. 
This is why Hölderlin was for Heidegger not one poet among others but a destiny for philosophy.” 
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long engagement with Greek tragedy.37 In discussing Hölderlin’s poem “Rousseau”, 
Heidegger claims that the dwelling place of the poet is “the between” of the people and 
the gods.38 In The Ister lecture courses, he argues: 
 
The poet of such poetizing therefore necessarily stands between human beings 
and gods. He is no longer merely a human being. Yet for the same reason he is 
not, indeed never is, a god. From the perspective of this "between" between 
humans and gods, the poet is a "demigod".39 
 
As can be observed here, Heidegger’s initial explorations do not directly consider the idea 
of between-ness with regards to the relation between being and human beings, but with 
regards to human beings and gods. However, this does not mean that for Heidegger gods 
can be taken to be the equivalent of being [Sein] as a supernatural power. Being does not 
have “agency” and is not a “subject”. Rather, for Heidegger being is not an “object” or a 
“thing” either, but very literally said, it is “no-thing”, that which makes things appear as 
things (just as the “thing” is what allows being to manifest itself as “no-thingness”). In 
talking about human beings and gods, Heidegger’s main purpose is to clarify, the 
hermeneutic nature of the poet as the demi-god, in order to develop a preliminary 
definition of “the between” and dwelling. In the 1950s, Heidegger will go on to put 
forward an understanding of poetry as the most fundamental “hermeneutic” endeavour, 
																																																																																																																																																																						
Robert Bernasconi, “Poets as Prophets and as Painters: Heidegger’s Turn to Poetic Language and 
the Hölderlinian Turn in Context.” In Heidegger and Language, ed. Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013), 146. I will make explicit why Hölderlin was crucial for 
Heidegger, specifically in hermeneutic terms. What I find particularly significant is that Heidegger 
saw Hölderlin’s poetry as a site in which philosophers and poets could remain in an open dialogue, 
a dialogue that is essentially needed for the fate of thinking itself in moving beyond the 
philosophical paradigms where language has been considered only as a object of study, but not as 
that which transforms the human being’s correspondence to being. 
37 Krell explains in great detail the background of Hölderlin’s engagement with Greek tragedy and 
poetry. See: David F. Krell, The Tragic Absolute: German Idealism and The Languishing of God 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 250-256. 
38 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymns Germania and Rhine, trans. by William McNeill and 
Julia Ireland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 30-31. 
39 (The Ister, 139) 
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appealing us to bear in mind the link between the ancient Greek god Hermes and 
hermeneutics. It may be useful to consider a passage from Heidegger’s later thought to 
have a sense in which direction Heidegger’s thinking will move: 
 
The expression "hermeneutic" derives from the Greek verb hermeneuein. That 
verb is related to the noun hermeneus, which is referable to the name of the god 
Hermes by a playful thinking that is more compelling than the rigor of science. 
Hermes is the divine messenger. He brings the message of destiny; hermeneuein is 
that exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a message. Such 
exposition becomes an interpretation of what has been said earlier by the poets 
who, according to Socrates in Plato's Ion (534e), hermenes eisin ton theon "are 
interpreters of the gods.40  
 
 In this passage we can see that for Heidegger the “between” is the “hermeneut” precisely 
as the dweller of this interval, the middle space between the people and gods.  Thias does 
not presume, the poet, a mere herald that transmits pieces of information from one ear to 
another but the poet stands in the openness of understanding and interpreting both voices 
from the sphere of the familiar and ordinary, and the unfamiliar and extraordinary. 
Heidegger makes his case regarding the idea of betweenness via examining 
Sophocles’ Antigone and Hölderlin’s hymn The Ister. As I will discuss, both Antigone and 
the river Ister appear as the between of the people and gods.41 In other words, Antigone 
and the Ister represent the same poetic and hermeneutic ethos42. According to Heidegger, 
by inhabiting the between of the people and gods, the poet makes manifest the space and 
place between mortality and immortality. Here we can ask whether the poet appears as a 
mere messenger in the sense that she or he establishes the communication between gods 
and the people by reporting and revealing their respective messages? What is the 
hermeneutic nature of that which the poet communicates? Insofar as Heidegger engages 																																																								
40 (On the Way to Language, 29) 
41 (The Ister, 142) 
42 I use the Greek word ethos here in the more common sense of character, but also with an 
emphasis on the more ancient and seldom used sense of dwelling-place.  
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with the question of the “between” by looking into the ancient Greek tragedy43 (and 
Hölderlin’s hymns), the situatedness of the poet in the “middle space” does not imply 
mere “mediocrity”. The middle space in between is not a mere gap that requires being 
externally bridged. It is not the poet’s averageness or seclusion from the extremes that 
situates her or him in the between, but on the contrary: it is thanks to the between, that is, 
the dwelling of the poet, the dwelling of the people and the god becomes a matter of 
understanding and experience in language.  
Now let me clarify the spatial and topological implications of the between. First of 
all, the between is not some empty space that stretches between two “points” in space but 
two opposites or ends which appear as regions insofar as the middle space relates them to 
one another, by bringing and letting them co-exist in the same body of space. In other 
words, it lets them constitute a context. This means, that which the between connects 
cannot be thought as presences, but rather as relations. As such, the between is not a mere 
empty passage, but rather it is a happening, an event, as it establishes the movement 
between things by providing the required space and spacing for them. In recent Heidegger 
scholarship, Andrew Mitchell discusses the notion of the between, and argues that the 
notion could be understood as “medium”. He also suggests that “medium” does not denote 
a pre-defined, empty and neutral space that is fixed between two poles.44 Mitchell claims: 
“This is what it means to be between (to “bear” it): that the supposedly antipodal, the 
parties of conflict, are born out of the between; the between does not derive from the 																																																								
43 Schmidt explains the history of the appearance and disappearance of tragedy as a philosophical 
theme in Heidegger’s thought. It is crucial to note that Schmidt argues that tragedy allowed 
Heidegger to make an issue of the poetic dimension of language, which, then would imply that 
engaging with the question of tragedy actually provided an unprecedented opening in 
Heideggers’s thought, which, before 1930s was rather limited. It can be said that, by way of 
tragedy, Heidegger took on the “heroic attitude” in terms of leaving behind the dimension of the 
“familiar” (philosophy) in moving toward the “unknown” and “uncanny” (meditative thinking). 
Dennis Schmidt J. On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life. (Bloomi on 
languagengton: Indiana University Press, 2001), 228-229, 265. 
44  Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2015), 5. 
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separation of two independent or indifferent entities”45. As such, it is the between as the 
“medium” that accomplishes the happening of the correlativity of two ends of a dimension 
that delimit one another.  
According to Heidegger, things always exist relationally, and their relationality is 
precisely what allows them to appear in the same context. Mitchell calls this the 
“hospitality” of things46. It is the middle space that “hosts”, that is, provides space for 
distinct ends of a dimension in the same body and place. Mitchell’s account of the 
between (as the medium) is one of the most important aspects of his major thesis 
concerning the inter-relationality of things, which he takes to be the central idea in 
Heidegger’s later thinking. Accordingly, things can exist as things insofar as there is the 
between because it is the between that makes them present for one another in the first 
place. If we are not to understand the between as mere mediacy, then, to stand in a relation 
to another thing also must be grasped as follows: to be encompassed in the context of 
manifold interactions and interrelations. This shifts our focus from an account of place as 
fixed presence to a dynamic one that requires movement. Now, as Heidegger attempts to 
explain “existence” itself as that very “between”, the poet as demi-god, is capable of 
hermeneutically journeying between the people and the gods (immortals), which represent 
two different modes of dwelling. In that context, let us look into the key idea of finitude 
and death as the limit of human existence. This idea is crucial in understanding the link 
between being, language, and human being, an issue that will be important in the 




45 Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger, 282. 
46 Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger, 5. 
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I. 2 Limit, Finitude, Mortality 
 
In Heidegger’s thought, the poets are the dwellers of the middle space between the people 
and gods (immortals). The key idea is that human beings can fulfil the utmost potential of 
their existence (poetical dwelling) if they can manage to die as mortals.47 Poetical 
dwelling is an onto-ethical possibility of authentic existence, and as Mitchell also 
indicates,48 not all human beings can live up to this possibility. Heidegger must agree with 
Socrates’ statement that “the unexamined life is not worth living,”49 granted that we define 
the “examined life” as a life devoted to the question concerning the meaning of being. 
This becomes possible, first and foremost, by engaging with the question of mortality as 
the most significant manifestation of human finitude. 
First, let me clarify Heidegger’s following idea that Mitchell underlines: only those 
who poetically dwell are mortals. In other words, those who genuinely experience 
mortality and human finitude dwell poetically. For Heidegger, only poets (in the sense of 
those who are capable of dwelling poetically) are capable of dying as mortals, because the 
act of dying that is at issue is not simply a biological event as the termination of one’s life 
activity. One’s capacity to die signifies one’s openness to experience one’s own finite 
nature. As such, this indicates attentiveness to the un-folding of the future into the limits 
of the present (no-thingness into the presence) and the ceaseless disclosure of one’s 
existential possibilities in that open-ended, yet bounded space. It is not an ontological 
universal for all50 because not all are capable of confronting and experiencing their 
																																																								
47  Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1993), 352. (From here on: Basic Writings) 
48 Andrew Mitchell, “Heidegger’s Later Thinking of Animality: The End of World Poverty”, 
Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 1 (2011): 80-81. 
49 (Apology, 38a 5-6.) 
50 Mitchell emphasizes the same point in arguing that we should not see mortality as a privilege, 
but an exposure. It is an existential situation into which we are thrown. Andrew Mitchell, 
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mortality in this way. One of the onto-ethical reasons behind this is in the everydayness, 
human beings (the people) marginalize the fact that they are mortals, which leads to the 
fact that their dwelling region remains as a self-enclosed field without the openness to 
experience existence in its fullness. In everyday life, the people tend to consider death as 
an “extraordinary” event that will arrive one day in the future and take away their lives, 
because they accept life as the space of the “ordinary”, as the region in which things are 
“present”. The idea of death suggests a big threat to this state of constancy. Yet, to be a 
poet means to persistently own one’s proper situatedness in “the between” of birth and 
death. This means, the poet does not consider “existence” as mere presence, but as the 
interface and the movement between appearance and disappearance, being and 
nothingness. Such an understanding of “existence” situates the poet in the actual taking 
place of nature as physis.  
In line with his interpretation of Sophocles and Hölderlin, Heidegger distinguishes 
“poetic dwelling” from “non-poetic dwelling” on the basis of the hermeneutical stance 
that the poet takes vis-à-vis finitude. The poet is not entirely absorbed in the midst of 
beings, as she or he is capable of responding to the necessity of encountering the limits of 
existence. Heidegger argues that the poet and the river are the same51, in the sense that 
both the poet and the river inhabit the “earth” in the same way, in journeying between life 
and death, absence and presence. In identifying (and experiencing) what demarcates her or 
his proper dwelling region, that is, existence as the between of life and death, the poet 
remains in the openness of understanding and interpreting a holy way of being which 
belongs to the immortals. For Heidegger, the ultimate limit that grounds finite human 
existence is mortality, mediated by one’s always approaching death, which defines the 
																																																																																																																																																																						
“Heidegger’s Later Thinking of Animality: The End of World Poverty”, Gatherings: The 
Heidegger Circle Annual 1 (2011): 81. 
51 (The Ister, 166) 
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condition of dwelling for the mortals on the earth. “There is only one thing against which 
all violence shatters. That is death. It is an end beyond all completion, a limit beyond all 
limits”52. A crucial question unfolds: what does it mean to poetically experience death and 
what is the topological relation between limit and death? 
 In Heidegger scholarship, Malpas makes explicit Heidegger’s understanding of 
“limit” as peras. Concerning the relation between the limit and death, Malpas argues: 
“Death marks a limit to our being as mortals, but not as a mere stopping point for our 
lives. Here Heidegger’s recurrent emphasis on limit as essentially “horizonal” comes into 
view once more—death is the limit that opens up the “space” within which our lives can 
be lived.”53 The topological significance of that thought is that the poetic experience of the 
limit that divides mortals and immortals is also what gathers them in the same 
neighbourhood. Their respective existential relation to death differs, yet this difference is 
precisely what unites them in two bounding regions of the same “neighbourhood”. As 
such, limit manifests and gathers the very ground of relation of two dwelling regions. 
When I look at the horizon, I can distinguish the blue of the sky from the blue of the sea, 
thanks to the horizon line [chorismos]. 54  The limit simultaneously discloses two 
dimensions by gathering two phenomena in the utmost proximity and at the same time 
“separating” them from one another. In that way, two spheres that are related by the limit 
do not appear as mere opposites, but correspondents, literally, they co-(r)respond to each 
other. This correspondence makes possible a reciprocal movement as a correlation, which 																																																								
52 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000), 168 
53 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
2006), 273. 
54 In that context, it can be useful to briefly consider Gadamer’s understanding of “horizon”. In 
Truth and Method, Gadamer argues that to have a horizon means to be able to look beyond the 
present, and unite one’s past, present and future. “A horizon is not a rigid boundary but something 
that moves with one and invites one to advance further.” Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London & New York: Continuum, 
2004), 238, 301. 
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is the extension of each constituent to its counterpart. Therefore, it is first and foremost the 
limit that allows the space and spacing within which things can come to meaningful 
presence, simply by delimiting and differentiating corresponding boundaries. 
In relation to the spatial essence of the issue, the temporal relation between limit 
and finitude is also crucial. Yet, it must be noted that the idea of death cannot be 
explicated only in temporal terms, particularly if by “temporality” we only understand the 
consequential, calculable sense of time. First, death never appears as an occurrence that 
takes place in time but always as the utmost possibility of existence, namely, as the end. 
The limit is neither inside nor outside the “space”, but it is where both the “inside” and the 
“outside” begin moving in opposite directions. In other words, death is not “in” time, but 
it determines the temporal extension of time as such. Time, as the divisible and calculable 
measure of temporal experience, is derivative of a more original experience of time as 
existence, as our standing forth into the world, as the openness of being. Although death 
primarily demarcates the “here” as the possible, it also signifies the “beyond” as the 
impossible. Yet, that which is beyond and that which withdraws from presence is 
precisely what demarcates the space of the presencing itself. Therefore it is possible to 
understand death as the abysmal ground of existence, as that which grounds our being in 
the world, precisely by virtue of not being a ground itself.55 Thus, “the here” as the space 
of the possible is disclosed in its entirety against the backdrop of the impossible. By virtue 
of being the “end”, death gives a horizon in which one’s meaningful understanding of 
existence becomes possible. In other words, it gathers and holds together one’s being in 
the world by demarcating the boundaries of existence. 
As I have explicated above, death delimits, gathers and discloses the boundaries of 
the “possible” and the “impossible”. It is in that sense that the poet’s engagement with the 
																																																								
55 I will dwell on that issue in the fourth chapter in my discussion of Being and Time. 
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limit [peras] renders her or him as the dweller of “the between”56. With that in view, the 
idea that the poet dwells in the nearness of that limit can make better sense: the poet 
acknowledges the limit as that which discloses the site of dwelling for the mortals. That is 
to say, the poetic dweller experiences the presencing of both “regions” (the site of mortals 
and immortals) and is located between these sites of dwelling. Now, let me elaborate on 
how the poetic limit both gathers mortals and immortals in the same horizon, 
differentiating and situating them in distinct boundaries. This would allow us to see how 
the issue I have raised so far with regards to the notion of “the between” is relevant in 
discussing the notion of the “fourfold” and the meaning of dwelling.  
 
I. 3 Mortals, Immortals, Finitude  
 
Here, I will primarily show the way in which Heidegger’s thinking on the relation 
between mortals and immortals in the 1930s and 1940s constitutes the topological 
foundations of the notion of the fourfold since it is one’s onto-ethical relation to death and 
finitude that demarcates one’s site of dwelling. Heidegger’s concentration in discussing 
the significance of immortals for human dwelling is a result of his engagement with 
Hölderlin.57 Like Wrathall, I find immortals (or gods) to be the most difficult component 
of Heidegger’s fourfold.58 In order to comprehend how Heidegger’s understanding of the 
																																																								
56 In that framework, Malpas also claims,“to have a life is precisely to have a sense of the bounds 
of that life, of what is part of it and what is not, of what is possible within it and what is not so 
possible. Jeff Malpas, "Death and the Unity of a Life", in Death and Philosophy, ed. Jeff Malpas 
and Robert Solomon (London & New York: Routledge,  1998), 109. 
57 “Heidegger’s later presentation of God, the gods, the last God, the dead God, the God of 
metaphysics, godhood, the flown gods, the arriving gods, the divinities, the holy, the unholy, the 
hale and the unhale, all arrive as matters for thinking after his 1934 encounter with Hölderlin. In 
Hölderlin, Heidegger found a poetic thinking of divinity’s abandonment, a thinking that he could 
hold over and against the death of God announced by Nietzsche.” Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: 
Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 163. 
58 Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 205. 
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immortals develops in the mid-1930s and 1940s and to determine what its implications 
are, it is necessary to better conceive what it means for the poet to dwell as a demigod.  
One of the most striking features of Heidegger’s application of the notion of the 
immortals (or the divinities, the godly ones [die Unsterblichen, die Göttlichen]) is that he 
preferred to use the word in the plural form. This should hint to us that Heidegger does not 
consider “gods” in a specific religious or theological framework. Rather, he topologically 
considers “immortals”, as a path that through which human beings re-member [andenken] 
the “thought” of being. In other words, thinking via immortals help us in better 
approaching the issue of being. Thinking via immortals means, “remembering” a holy way 
of being in the world. As such, an understanding of the holy [das Heilige] as the Godhead 
is what is crucial. As the immortals are the messengers of the godhood (or holiness), the 
relation between the immortals and mortals come to the fore.59  
According to Heidegger, the mortals and immortals are dwellers of distinct regions 
with regard to their different relations to mortality. The mortals are on the earth, while the 
abode of the immortals is the sky. It must be noted that, in German, the sky and the 
heaven are designated by the same word [der Himmel], as it is the case in French [le Ciel]. 
Other than the rather obvious fact that god and gods have been mythologically imagined 
to reside in the sky, the sky also indicates the space of void, emptiness, and indeterminacy. 
The sky remains in a direct and uninterrupted relationship with the earth, providing the 
entire horizon against which the earth itself can have a place and meaning.  
Giving a brief definition of the immortals as divinities, Heidegger writes, “The 
divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the 
																																																								
59 Mitchell makes precisely the same point. Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late 
Heidegger,164. 
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godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment.”60 There are 
two implications of this: first, when Heidegger talks about the “Godhead”, he does not talk 
about a particular god, but indicates something like the ontological essence of holiness, 
from which a sense of the divine emerges. Second, in talking about the concealment of 
immortals, Heidegger draws from Hölderlinian and Nietzschean representations of the 
divinities that have abandoned human beings. This is an idea that Heidegger issued mainly 
in his 1946 “Why Poets?” piece, dealing with Hölderlin’s “Bread and Wine” elegy from 
1801. Heidegger suggests: 
 
The default of God means that a God no longer gathers men and things to himself 
visibly and unmistakably and from this gathering ordains world-history and man's 
stay within it. However, in the default of God notice is given of something even 
worse. Not only have the gods and God fled, but the radiance of divinity is 
extinguished in world-history.61 
 
Heidegger explains the same point in the same essay elsewhere in a topological way: ”It is 
not only that the sacred is vanishing as the track to the godhead, but that even the tracks to 
this lost track are almost erased.”62  The topological element here is the way in which 
place is related to tracks and paths, which are also related to the notion of the “between”. 
Insofar as paths are what “relates” places to one another, they can be associated with the 
notion of the between, and they are closely tied to the core of the notion of the medium 
that Mitchell brought forward. An important matter is that a profound understanding of 
“relation” requires a hermeneutic mode of thinking. Heidegger explicitly identifies the 
disaccord between immortals and mortals as an interruption of their “relation”. What lacks 
is the “track” to the godhead: once the medium (the poet as the demigod) disappears, the 
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. (From here on: Off the Beaten Track) 
61 (Off the Beaten Track, 200) 
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bounding entity also becomes unidentifiable. What keeps things oriented and situated is 
“the between”, and not things’ fixed locatedness as present beings. As such, it is the 
dynamic nature of “the between”, the “way” that provides the possibility of being situated, 
thus, the sense of place, as well as the possibility of being “related”. 
Acknowledging the limit of finitude is what allows us to have an ontological sense 
of dwelling. Insofar as there is the limit, we can have access to the “region” in which we 
exist. As such, the limit establishes the possibility of standing in a relation to another 
phenomenon or site of being and dwelling. This is where the question of the immortals 
and its relation to modern technology come to the focus. In a technological mode of 
dwelling in the world where things only appear as “useful” objects or instruments, the 
nature of our place in the world, especially in terms of our relation to things, becomes 
problematic. In his 1949 essay The Thing, Heidegger’s discussion of the thing addresses 
the “shrinking of time and space” as a characteristic of modern technology.63 The idea of 
fourfold develops out of a thinking that first and foremost considers the link between 
mortals and things in the world on the basis of the idea of being limited and conditioned 
by that which establishes our “finitude”. 
Wrathall, whose thinking on the relation between mortals and immortals is very 
relevant in this context, identifies the ways in which we are embedded in technological 
modes of understanding the meaning of our lives, and discusses how this leads to a loss of 
a sense of orientation in the world. There are two key topological suggestions that are 
related to our “place” in the world: 1) After bringing into view Nietzsche’s announcement 
regarding the “death of God” in The Gay Science, Wrathall argues that the God has been 
the centre point according to which human beings determined their dwelling in the 
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world.64 In the absence of the God, human beings no longer have an ontological or a moral 
reference point in terms of their orientation in the world. In other words, the death of the 
God meant the disappearance of the limit. In the course of his discussion, Wrathall brings 
into view an interesting topological remark from Heidegger concerning the essence of 
Nietzsche’s thought. 65  Heidegger argues: “The thinking-through of Nietzsche’s 
metaphysics becomes a reflection on the situation and place of contemporary man, whose 
destiny is still but little experienced with respect to its truth”66. Here Heidegger’s words 
concerning the “situation” and “place” of human being are explicitly meant in a 
topological (onto-ethical) way. Neither “situation” nor “place” concerns the human 
beings, but rather it draws our attention to their dwelling in the world. For both Nietzsche 
and Heidegger, the death of God has significant consequences. With the death of God, the 
possibility of reconsidering our human situation in the world becomes possible, which 
urges us to inquire into the question of dwelling. Indeed, inasmuch as the death of God is 
ontologically a disorienting event, it is also an opening for a new interpretation of what it 
means to dwell as a human being, and our relation to the universe and the earth.  
If the “situation” and “place” of contemporary man becomes a question on its own 
terms, and if for Heidegger the major reason for the “death of God” is only a consequence 
of what has already begun with Occidental metaphysics as the “forgetfulness of being” 
[Seinsvergessenheit], this means that for Heidegger the main question to be raised is the 
“relation” between being and human beings. 2) In relation to this idea, Wrathall suggests 
that immortals can be seen as what conditions and delimits the existence of human 
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beings.67 Heidegger attempts to show the possibility of reappropriating our distance to the 
idea of the divine, thus, restoring our relation to it in the first place, instead of trying to 
produce new divinities, idols, and gods.  
As I have shown, according to Heidegger’s thought, we have lost the “way” that 
arrives at an understanding of the immortals. Wrathall also interprets this as a “loss of 
meaning” in the advent of technology. In a world where everything is perceived as 
resources, our relation to the world turns into a strict cause and effect relationship. As 
such, the world does not matter to us insofar as it does not quench our needs and 
aspirations. Wrathall concisely sums up Heidegger’s insights: “we do not have things that 
matter to us if all there is is isolated, self-contained, interchangeable entities – in other 
words, resources”68. Furthermore, this is precisely why the poets are needed, as the poets 
are capable of understanding and interpreting the wider, yet the simpler range of relations 
and interrelations within which we already stand, seeing the earth and the sky and our 
place between them beyond mere utility. This is the context in which Wrathall takes 
distance from Dreyfus and Spinosa’s reading of Heidegger69. Although Dreyfus and 
Spinosa positively try to find a way in which we could live peaceful lives in the 
technological age70, Wrathall warns against the undesired conformism that may come 
along with such an attitude towards technology. It is important to know and experience the 
novelties of the technological age. However, modern technology can also uproot people 
from living existentially meaningful lives, and impose upon them a life of instrumentality, 
where their place in the world is entirely determined in terms of their instrumental 																																																								
67 Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 219. 
68 Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History, 219. 
69 Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 203. 
70 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Charles Spinosa, “Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann 
on How to Affirm Technology”, in Heidegger Re-examined, vol. 3, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and 
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function in the society. In such a life, the earth and the sky, that between which existence 
takes place, may also lose their significance for human beings. Wrathall considers Dreyfus 
and Spinosa’s proposal as a mere “contingency plan”, which would not be desirable if we 
had the possibility to avoid it. If we could find a closer dwelling to the earth and the sky, 
this would be onto-ethically preferable, and the possibility of finding such a way of being 
must be the primary subject matter of our thinking. 
According to Wrathall’s reading of Heidegger, things with real meaning “makes a 
demand on us, and in the process, they condition us”.71 The term “real” here refers to 
existential significance, and is not used in contrast to the “ideal”. The mutual conditioning 
indicates a two-way, reciprocal situation. This means, if something appears to be 
significant for us, it cannot be only us who has power over it, but the thing must also 
impose itself on us. For instance, if we claim that forests are significant, then, we must 
find ways of preserving forests and stop building residential sites in woodlands. We must 
focus on finding ways in which we could also adapt to our environmental conditions and 
contexts. This is a way of letting the trees matter for us, that is, a way of relating ourselves 
to the trees, which means a way of understanding and interpreting the place of trees for 
our existence. Modern technology supposedly turns such a relation of reciprocity into a 
one-way relation, where the technologically equipped human beings are the sole 
conditioners of the world, as they dominate it and the other beings in it without 
recognizing the experience of being “limited” and conditioned. As a result, they are not 
related to anything beyond themselves, thus they do not have a sense of place and 
orientation. Everything turns into mere supplies that human beings can modify, transform, 
replace, and dislodge in accordance with their plans, needs and wills. Instead of 
appropriating our “relation” to them and adapting to situations (such as weather, climate, 
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geographical or geological characteristics of place), we identify them as problems to be 
resolved, and try to “fix” them in line with our needs, luxuries, and desires. As such, by 
refusing to acknowledge the conditions and circumstances of our situated essence, we flee 
the possibility of being appropriately attuned to the world, as the world itself turns into an 
object for us. In that sense, the technological understanding of the world means our 
objectification of the world by means of a technological mode of being in place. As we no 
longer conceive the place character of the earth, but only consider as an object to be used 
up and transformed, we deprive ourselves of the possibility of dwelling and the sense of 
being placed. This indicates the lack of a relation to that which is beyond human 
subjectivity, and where the “relation” lacks, our access to place, as well as the possibility 
of dwelling vanishes. Accordingly, technologically attuned human beings live a life of 
uprootedness, and Wrathall criticizes Dreyfus and Spinosa precisely in that regard, as this 
kind of an existence is precisely what stimulates Heidegger’s later thinking commencing 
from the mid-1930s and 1940s.  
In light of these remarks concerning the technological understanding of the world, 
the idea of the immortals, poetic dwelling, and the link to place becomes more apparent. 
The poet’s situatedness in the between allows to “own” the situation in which it is possible 
to be conditioned and “appropriated” by that which makes a demand on the poet. 
Accordingly, one meaning of poetic dwelling appears to be openness and receptivity to the 
“other”, which attunes the poet to the world, allowing the poetic subject to make sense of 
the world beyond the confines of egoistic subjectivism. The poet must –ideally– remain 
open to that which is beyond her or his egoistic wills or ambitions. As a consequence of 
her or his situatedness in the between, the poet must incorporate a sense of care for the site 
of dwelling in its wholeness, both near and far, that within which she or he is 
encompassed, bounded and conditioned. Therefore, the poet’s situatedness in the between 
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is also what preserves and gathers the place in its entirety. Place indicates the site in which 
one’s existential orientation in the world takes place. As such, the poet “lives” in the 
nearness of the immortals, insofar as the poet is the agent ready to be conditioned and 
delimited by the possibility of attaining a holy way of being in the world.72 
The poet is the dweller of “the between”: between the complete oblivion of 
mortality in the everyday and its complete absorption and incorporation in the dwelling of 
the immortals. On the one hand, the immortals are either deathless, or they have died in 
such a way that their death is no longer an issue. On the other hand, the people can exist 
with the oblivion of their mortality. For the poet, however, the question of mortality 
matters. In fact, it can only matter to the poet, because it is only the poet that is open to 
being conditioned and bounded. From a biological perspective, the poet is subject to the 
same conditions of impermanence as the non-poet. There are no biological differences in 
their respective “dying”. Even if the poet may strive to be immortal, she or he biologically 
fails. However, the poet agent achieves to show forth the possibility of a certain relation to 
death that does not become manifest in the death of the non-poetic agent. The poet dwells 
in her or his “own” and “appropriated” and “conditioned” topos. 
According to Heidegger, in the Occident is not the practice of religious faith that 
disappeared, but the very idea of a holy existence in the world. This is because, once the 
hermeneutic medium is lost, that is, the poetic experience of finitude, what the limit of 
finitude discloses and makes intelligible also becomes inaccessible. The profound critique 
of modernity that is at issue here underlines the necessity of standing in a poetic relation to 
the world: In our post-modern situation, however, it is possible that even the poets no 																																																								
72 Mitchell’s noteworthy idea in that regard is as follows: “The mortal comes from death insofar as 
only in relating past itself is the mortal the mortal. This is simply another way for Heidegger to say 
that the limit is where something begins (something “coming here”). It begins from its relation 
beyond itself; it begins in its origin […] Its origin is precisely the medium around it through which 
it is allowed to be what it is. Death allows for mortality.” Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading 
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longer experience what Wrathall calls “mutual conditioning”. Once the poets no longer 
remain situated in the between to make sense of the inaccessibility to the Godhead, then, 
so remain the people disoriented. As such, a world beyond human wills and calculations 
also become non-imaginable. However, the poets are to preserve the “memory” and 
“rethinking” of the immortals. It is an ontological responsibility of the poet to remain open 
to the possibility of re-emergence of the experience of holiness. This does not mean that 
the poets must only poetize about gods and write poetry with religious themes. On the 
contrary, the poet can dwell in the everyday world in such a way that she or he can bring 
into the view the essence of holiness, which remains concealed for the people in their 
ordinary lives. By remaining in the openness to the Godhead, the poet can safeguard the 
possibility of a holy understanding of being in the world, which means poetically dwelling 
on the earth and under the sky. This is why the poet’s dwelling is a “remembrance”.  
 
I. 4 Antigone: The Between of the People and the Immortals 
 
Thus far I outlined the topological underpinnings of Heidegger’s concentration on the 
notion of the between which will now help us in seeing more clearly what is at stake with 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Sophocles’ Antigone and Hölderlin’s The Ister. In order to 
elucidate the situatedness of the poetic agent in the between and the role of poeticality in 
dwelling, I will examine the abovementioned 1942 lecture courses.  
In the second division of The Ister lecture courses, Heidegger sets out to discuss 
the “onto-ethical” meaning of “home” and “homeliness” [Heimlichkeit] as concepts 
related to poetical dwelling. He undertakes this through an ontological analysis of 
Antigone’s “actions”. The question concerning the essence of Antigone’s “character” is 
one of the first instances of Heidegger’s discussion of ethos in relation to the link between 
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being and dwelling, ontology and ethics, which becomes an even more important point of 
focus in the “Letter on Humanism”.73  
According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Antigone74 is the “uncanniest of the 
uncanny”,75 which is also a characterization of the essence of the poetic agent. The 
discourse on the uncanny essence of Antigone’s actions proves to be key with regards to 
the problem of poetic dwelling. 76 Antigone is the uncanniest of all mortals due to the 
specific relationship in which she stands to her own death and mortality.77 Heidegger 
argues that the word deinon indicates three fundamental “situations” that co-constitute the 
ground of Antigone’s actions. Accordingly, Antigone’s actions are: (1) Fearful 
[Furchtbar] (2), Powerful [Gewaltig] and, (3) Inhabitual, in the sense of “wontless” or 
unfamiliar [Ungewöhnlich]. 78  Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greek deinon as 
“Unheimliche”, literally meaning “not homely, or home-like”79  gathers together the 
manifold essence of Antigone’s character and actions into a single word.80 Heidegger’s 
understanding of “translation” is as follows:  
																																																								
73 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 271.  
74 Let us briefly remember the plot of Sophocles’ Antigone. The new king Creon of the Kingdom 
of Thebes takes over the throne from the old King Oedipus, as a consequence of a throne fight 
between two brothers, Eteocles and Polynices. The two brothers kill each other in the struggle 
hoping to become the new king. Creon commands that the dead body of Polynices should be left 
to rot in the open, outside of the city, without being buried. Antigone rises against this order and 
decides to bury her brother Polynices nevertheless, at the expense of breaking the law. Although 
she tries to convince her sister Ismene to join her in standing against the order of Creon, Ismene 
cannot defy the law and acts in accordance with the common sense showing loyalty to the law of 
the kingdom. As Antigone’s burial of her brother becomes known, the tragic story of Antigone on 
her way to death begins. Although Ismene renounces her decision and apologetically wishes to be 
imprisoned with her sister, Antigone refuses. In the end, Antigone commits suicide.  
75 (The Ister, 51, 61-63) 
76 (The Ister, 64) 
77 (The Ister, 104) 
78 (The Ister, 63) 
79 Here, the English translation of Heidegger’s interpretation of the word “uncanny” must be 
literally thought in relation to the original German word, which essentially means “un-homely”.   
80 Das Ungeheure, “monstrous”, is Hölderlin’s own translation of Greek “deinon”. Friedrich, 
Hölderlin, “Sophokles” in Sämtliche Werke, „Frankfurter Ausgabe, 16. Band, Edited by Michael 
Franz, Michael Knaupp und D.E. Sattler (Frankfurt am Main: Roter Stern, 1988), line: 349-352. 
		 42	
 
Translating" [über-setzen] is not so much a "trans-lating" and passing over into a 
foreign language with the help of one's own. Rather translation is more an 
awakening, clarification and unfolding of one's own language with the help of an 
encounter with the foreign language.” 81 
 
This means that every translation is a confrontation with one’s own language, an 
adventure during the course of which one comes to “learn” the pathways of one’s 
language by way of learning to hearken to the poetic word. Antigone’s poetic 
“uncanniness” is related to her relation to mortality as the original dwelling place of 
human existence, which is revealed to us by the word deinon. 82 Yet, other than merely 
underlining the etymological meaning of the word, what does Heidegger understand by 
deinon? In Introduction to Metaphysics he specifies it: “Dike is the overwhelming 
fittingness. Techne is the violence-doing of knowing. The reciprocal relation between 
																																																																																																																																																																						
 Schmidt explains that in his translations Hölderlin’s primary objective was to not appeal to 
“intelligibility”, but to make German language imitate ancient Greek even at the expense of 
alienating German language in order to attend the so-called oriental and eccentric attitude of 
Greece and the Greek language. The fact that Hölderlin attempted to go beyond a mere linguistic 
listening in his translations may be one of the reasons why and how Heidegger has come to see the 
issue of language beyond merely linguistic terms and concerns. Dennis Schmidt J., On Germans 
and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 143-
144. Also concerning the issue of the translation and interpretation of “deinon” see the pages 145 
and 246 in Schmidt’s work. 
81 (The Ister, 65-66) Indeed, this also means that translation can be a violent and dangerous 
gesture, for not only it displaces the original language that from which one translates, but even 
more, so it risks going beyond one’s already established own language which, in this way, is 
displaced from its habitual and ordinary place. Hölderlin and Heidegger, in that sense, have similar 
understandings and practices of “translation”. 
82 In Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger explains the sense in which deinon should be 
understood as “Unheimliche”, namely, uncanny. Although the sense of “terrifying” is significant, 
he rather wants to draw attention to the topological sense of the word, indicating why and how it is 
related to the issue of dwelling when he claims: “But human beings are the uncanniest, not only 
because they spend their lives essentially in the midst of the un-canny understood in this sense, but 
also because they step out, move out of the limits that at first and for the most part accustomed and 
homely, because as those who do violence, they overstep the limits of the homely, precisely in the 
direction of the uncanny in the sense of the overwhelming.” Martin Heidegger, Introduction to 
Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Frien and Richard Polt. (New Haven& London: Yale University 
Press, 2000), 161. 
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them is the happening of uncanniness.”83 Like Hölderlin, Heidegger attempts to bring the 
issue into view in terms of one’s relation to one’s being as a mortal, which, situates the 
major concern of his discussions within the dimension of mortality, in specific in terms of 
the dialogue between mortals and immortals. The “justice” is the “fittingness” of one’s 
situation in the taking place of being, which is mediated by one’s relation to finitude, and 
“techne” is one’s poetic “knowledge” of one’s place within the boundaries of that 
bounded openness.  
First of all, as Antigone goes to bury her brother, her kinship with the dead ones 
comes to fore as a striking feature of her character. Antigone says: 
And if I have to die for this pure crime/ I am content, for I shall rest beside him/ 
His love will answer mine/ I have to please The dead far longer than/ I need to 
please The living /with them, I have to dwell forever.84 
 
Antigone’s words above draw our attention to consider the link between “being” and 
“action”. If an action is a certain manner of relating oneself to the overall situation in 
which one finds oneself and responding to it, this means that “being” and “action” do not 
stand in a dualistic relation. Antigone perceives the situation in which she finds herself as 
an opening to become who she already is. In other words, the situation offers her a way of 
enacting her true “character”. This is the sense in which Antigone’s dwelling through her 
decisions has an “onto-ethical” nature, where she comes to define her “being” through the 
way in which she “acts”. Antigone’s being and actions are “onto-ethical” in the sense that 
they bespeak Antigone’s “character”. 
There is a tendency in Heidegger scholarship to concentrate on the moral and 																																																								
83Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Frien and Richard Polt. (New 
Haven& London: Yale University Press, 2000), 176. It must be noticed that Heidegger translates 
dike (traditionally translated as “justice”) as “fittingness” [Fug] and techne (traditionally translated 
as “art”) as “knowing” [Wissen]. In effect, Heidegger’s translation of dike as Fug is suggestive of 
the way in which he attempts to do away with what he calls a juridical and moralist understanding 
of justice. He argues later on: “Being, physis, is, as sway, originary gatheredness. Being is 
fittingness that enjoins: dike.  
84 (Antigone, line: 71–75.) 
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political aspects of Antigone’s decision. This is because her actions are considered as a 
way of fulfilling her civic identity, moral personality and such, but, surprisingly, not so 
much with regards to her very ontological being and the place of her dwelling. One 
example is Kathleen Wright’s interpretation of Heidegger, which she conceptualizes under 
the title of “forgetfulness of the ethical difference”.85 In comparing Hegel’s Antigone with 
Heidegger’s interpretation, her main argument is based on the following idea: Heidegger’s 
oblivion of the sexual difference, as well as the prioritization of deinon over dike, leads 
Heidegger to produce a conflicting reading with Hegel’s reading. This results in the 
contrast between “ethical difference between family law and state law” and “ontological 
difference between poetic dwelling on the earth and the technical mastery of the world”.86 
According to Wright, Hegel gets it right by proposing that the conflict between the 
obligations to family and state are the most foundational sources of ethical conflicts: 
Heidegger’s thought is oblivious of the sexual difference that cannot be separated from the 
character of Antigone. As such, Wright contends, Heidegger cannot address the question 
of the ethics. One question that appears in response to Wright's interpretation is the 
following one: how can we distinguish between an ethical and ontological decision? In 
other words, at which point can one’s action be characterized as ontological (that which 
concerns one’s being) or ethical (that which concerns one’s moral character)?  
First of all, there are different understandings of the “ethical” that are at issue here, 
which is the major difference in Wright and Heidegger’s respective readings. Véronique 
Foti deliberately recognizes this point as she defends the Hölderlinian paradigm, which, as 
she argues, is followed by Nietzsche and Heidegger against the Hegelian understanding of 																																																								
85 I contend that putting the matters in terms of the forgetfulness of the ethical difference appears 
to be a narrow reading of Heidegger’s thought in its unity. See: Kathleen Wright, “Heidegger on 
Hegel’s Antigone”, in Endings: Questions of memory in Hegel and Heidegger, ed. Rebecca 
Comay and John McCumber (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999), 170. 
86 Kathleen Wright, “Heidegger on Hegel’s Antigone”, in Endings: Questions of memory in Hegel 
and Heidegger, ed. Rebecca Comay and John McCumber, 173. 
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tragedy in terms of “ethicality” as Sitthlichkeit and “self-realization of Spirit.87 Whereas 
Hegel’s understanding of “ethicality” involves the subject-related tension between law and 
history especially on the grounds of kinship and the shift from matriarchal society to 
patriarchal society, in the Hölderlinian paradigm it becomes a matter of the onto-ethical 
“situation” and “correspondence” between mortals and immortals. As I will discuss, 
Heidegger wants to show that the “ethical” cannot be detached from the issue of 
“dwelling” –yet beyond nationalistic, subjectivistic and historiographical frames – as well 
as being itself cannot be separated from “deed”.88 In other words, when we look into the 
issue topologically by thinking via the notion of dwelling, our thinking incorporates both 
“ontology” and “ethics” in a hermeneutic way that invites us to examine the link between 
being, language and place. In that context, I argue that Heidegger’s reading of Antigone 
embarks on closing the gap between the so-called ontological and the ethical difference in 
putting forward a new interpretation that seeks to go beyond the limits of “being-action” 
dichotomy. 89 
Antigone’s becoming homely in the counter movement against the laws of the 
polis is a movement in which she is directed to find her dwelling place, as well as her true 
ethos, in performing the unfamiliar action. Antigone’s action is a great source of awe for 
the common sense that is represented by the chorus.90 According to Heidegger, the chorus 
																																																								
87 Véronique Foti, Epochal Discordance: Hölderlin’s Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2006), 14. 
88 Capobianco’s discussion of Heidegger’s Antigone is worthwhile in pointing out the similarities 
and nuances comparing the 1942 Ister lectures with the 1935 Introduction to Metaphysics. His 
reading also encompasses the notion of “being at home”, while dealing with Heidegger’s texts 
spanning from mid–1920s until 1960s. See: Richard Capobianco, Engaging Heidegger (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010), 55–65. 
89Nikolopoulou offers a thought-provoking reading that favours an ontological interpretation of 
Antigone, which thematizes the problem of poetic dwelling. Nikolopoulou suggests that 
Antigone’s decision is one that was already taken –almost even before the play commences. 
Kalliopi Nikolopoulou, Tragically Speaking: On the Use and Abuse of Theory for Life (Lincoln & 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), xxxix. 
90 This is also related to the fact that, as I will explicate further, Antigone has the poetic ethos in 
that she has the capacity to “dare” [tolma] in her violent uncanniness. She is the creative, that is, 
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represents the common sense of the everydayness by embodying the moral norms of the 
city. Antigone’s action has an overwhelming weight, which manifests the absorption of 
Ismene’s being in the everydayness, where her actions are altogether defined by the 
dwelling of the people. Ismene’s being belongs to the people of the polis, while 
Antigone’s being belongs to the limit between mortals and immortals. Antigone takes the 
risk of her being un-settled by leaving the boundaries of the “homely”, and yet only in 
doing so, she achieves to be at home in her own being. Antigone’s deed separates her from 
the realm of common sense, and thus, everydayness.91 Accordingly, in ethical terms, such 
deed would be called “transgression of the conventional limits”. This means that being 
able to go beyond the limits of the ordinary indicates one’s resoluteness for a dwelling that 
has a horizon. In the following lines, Antigone voices her inner state of being in the face 
of death: 
 
Unfortunate that I am— Neither living among those who are alive, nor Dwelling as 
a corpse. Among corpses, having no home with either the living or the dead.92  
 
Antigone knows that she can neither dwell with the alive nor with the dead. This places 
her in the between. The fact that Antigone is deprived of any possibility of being–at–home 
is one of the aspects that Heidegger pays attention to in Sophocles’ tragedy. The core 
matter of Heidegger’s argument is that Antigone is completely at home in not being-at-
home, which is not the case for Ismene. Antigone’s unsettledness in polis also unsettles 
Ismene’s ordinary being-there. Where Antigone’s tragedy comes to end, Ismene’s 																																																																																																																																																																						
the poetic one, who sets out into the “un-said”, “who breaks out into the un-thought”. Martin 
Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Frien and Richard Polt. (New Haven& 
London: Yale University Press, 2000), 172. 
91 Related to this issue, Capobianco indicates the similarities between Lacan and Heidegger’s view 
of Antigone and he uses the word transgression [Überstreitung] in describing the onto-ethical 
movement of the poetic agent from the habitual to the inhabitual, from the settledness towards the 
unsettling. 
92 (Antigone, Line: 909-913) 
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commences, for now Antigone’s uncanniness gets transferred to Ismene, yet Ismene does 
not even have the possibility to die her own death. She is condemned to eternally die 
Antigone’s death; yet, this opportunity is also taken away from her, again, eternally. As 
such, what Antigone achieves at once, to die her own death, is precisely what Ismene fails 
to seize. 
From the very outset, Antigone acts in accordance with what she “ought” to do on 
the basis of her very “being”, and she is not capable of acting differently by any means.93 
Antigone’s decision is not more terrifying (unsettling) or overwhelming than it actually 
and already is because she is a woman. The issue that she deals with, namely, the question 
of human mortality (that of Polynices' and consequently her own), is that which de-limits 
her “existence”, that is, her being exposed to death. The “decision” is to dwell with the 
dead, which is an acknowledgment of and a confrontation with her mortality. As a result, 
Antigone’s confrontation with the living (in siding with the dead against time) is what 
constitutes the “onto-ethical” significance of her decision, and not her going against the 
law of the city. Antigone’s action indeed has social and political consequences, but her 
character is profoundly pre-political94. This is why in her interpretation, Wright seems to 
underestimate the fact that Heidegger’s primary concern is first and foremost human 
being’s liminal situation vis-à-vis death, from which all both ontological and ethical 
questions emerge, much before the conflict with the state and the family may arise as 
subjectivistic concerns. Her ethos, in the sense of her way of dwelling, drives Antigone’s 																																																								
93 Bernard M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy (Los Angeles & 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 62. 
94 This is also the sense in which Nikolopoulou raises her concerns regarding a narrowly framed 
feminist reading of Antigone: 
“Given that Butler’s interest in the play stems from her interest in an antistatist kind of feminism 
as opposed to a recent wave of feminism that seeks “the backing and authority of the state to 
implement feminist policy aims” (1), I find that Antigone’s prepolitical (or antipolitical) character 
may be more relevant to her argument than the politics of social construction.” Kalliopi 
Nikolopoulou, Tragically Speaking: On the Use and Abuse of Theory for Life (Lincoln & London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 178. 
		 48	
actions. This point is related to the fact that in Heidegger’s thought there is no conflict 
between “being” and “praxis”, but on the contrary, insofar as one’s response to the 
situation in which one finds oneself is the outcome of an onto-ethical “responsibility”, 
being and acting, “is” and “ought”, stand in a close and reciprocal relationship.  
Thanks to her ethos, Antigone accomplishes what Ismene is even afraid to 
imagine. Antigone’s burial of Polynices breaks the law of the city, and locates Antigone’s 
ethos far beyond of what is acknowledged as customary and habitual. In the act of burying 
Polynices, she is in a complete state of seclusion, even abandoned by Ismene. In 
performing such an action that no one else in the kingdom of Thebes dares, she prefers 
homelessness to rootlessness, her own death to a life whose consequences she would not 
be able bear.95 In choosing to act in this way, Antigone not only chooses authenticity over 
inauthenticity, but also turns towards immortality, showing the limits of mortality that she 
encounters. As such, we find Antigone, as the demigod, placed between the people and the 
immortals.  
Following a similar line of thinking to Heidegger, Lacan suggests: “This then is 
how the enigma of Antigone is presented to us: she is inhuman”. 96 Insofar as being poetic 
means to situate oneself in “the between”, her dwelling is a poetic one, for only through 
her ethos the being of the immortals and the people become manifest within the same 
horizon of understanding. In experiencing the limit of mortality and immortality, her 
dwelling discloses both regions as two conflicting modes of relating to existence. As 
Antigone decides not to remain within the boundaries of an everyday understanding of the 
law, she encounters her envisioned “dwelling-place” in the city, but she ventures beyond 																																																								
95 Here we should pay attention to the German word “inhabitual” that Heidegger here uses. 
“Ungewöhnlich”, derives from the verb of wohnen, which means to dwell, live. English language 
has the same word “wont”, also in the adverb form of “wontedly”, which means “in accordance 
with the conventions and tradition. 
96 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: Norton, 1992), 263. 
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these limits at the expense of losing her mortality, which, in turn, allows her to attract the 
appraisal of the gods.97 ” According to Knox, there are certain religious underpinnings of 
Antigone’s actions. For instance, she has a very strong and pious relation to the gods of 
the underworld and her reverence for the gods go beyond the polis.98 As can be seen, here 
Antigone’s “place”, or what we might also call her situatedness, is not her physical 
location in a geo-political location or dimension, but the way in which she positions her 
being: the way in which she dwells in situating herself in the between.   
In siding with the commonplace moral values of the polis, Ismene chooses to dwell 
with the divine law, yet her over proximity to the polis annihilates, and further distances 
her from divinity, whereas Antigone attracts the divine praise. Ismene’s dwelling is too 
habitual (homely) to become inhabitual (unhomely), that is, to encounter the liminal space 
between mortality and immortality, whereas Antigone is extremely inhabitual to the extent 
that her dwelling is a direct encountering of that very limit. Antigone's existential 
transgression of the limits of mortality indicates a way of moving beyond the region of 
everydayness (dwelling region of people) towards the inhabitual region (dwelling region 
of gods). It is an essential confrontation with time (the temporal region of mortality), just 
as a confrontation with the earth (the spatial region of mortality). Antigone performs what 
we can call proto-hermeneutics by the very way in which she comports herself as the 
interpreter of the most unsettling aspect of life, namely death. This does not mean that 
Antigone’s dwelling exemplifies some sort of ‘poetic hermeneutics’, but rather the way in 
which her dwelling enacts hermeneutics is a poetic engagement. In turn, the hermeneutic 																																																								
97 Nikolopoulou argues: “It is they, in fact, who glorify her fate as being equal to the gods’, and 
their earlier praise of Antigone’s destiny has even implied that Antigone’s predicament surpasses 
Niobe’s in that the former consciously chose the moral high road whereas the latter committed 
hubris unthinkingly: "Yes, you go to the place where the dead are hidden, / but you go with 
distinction and praise" (lines 878–79)”. Kalliopi Nikolopoulou, Tragically Speaking: On the Use 
and Abuse of Theory for Life (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 15. 
98 Bernard M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy (Los Angeles & 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 98. 
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nature of “the between” that is at issue is topological, insofar as it is related to the 
situatedness of the dwelling place of Antigone. The source of her “onto-ethical” 
transgression is her heroic temper, which according to Knox has two characteristics: 1) 
autonomos: “a law unto itself”, 2) autognotos orga: “passion self-conceived”. He 
describes this as a result of her physis as her being and character: “it is not to be explained 
by outside circumstances”.99 She directs those two characteristics of her being to her 
comportment towards death, which allows her to transgress the political boundaries of the 
polis.  
After having explicating the ontological aspect of Antigone’s action, Bernard 
Knox also considers the political (and also the religious) register of Antigone’s action. 
Indeed, Antigone stands in a fierce opposition to Creon, and if he is the head of the polis, 
then, Antigone’s defiance of the law appears as a political action. Now, Knox considers 
the polis in the customary sense of the word as the city-state, or simply the state as the 
subject of the power. While Ismene submits to that power, which according to Creon 
represents the authority of the law and the civilization, Antigone goes against it by her 
extreme loyalty to the blood relationship, a loyalty that is normally expected to be shown 
for polis.100 On the other hand, Heidegger’s interpretation of Antigone attempts to shift the 
focus from a subjectivistic understanding of community to an “onto-ethical” 
understanding of being there and dwelling-place in reading Sophocles via Hölderlin. In 
order to comprehend the essence of polis, we need to concentrate on place, insofar as 
Heidegger understands it as the place that gathers one’s relation to things. This should also 
help us in clarifying further the way in which place and poetry are linked.  
  																																																								
99 Bernard M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy (Los Angeles & 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 67. 
100 Bernard M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy (Los Angeles & 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 76. 
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I. 5 The Ister: The Journeying of the Place and the Place of Journeying  
 
The topological examination of Heidegger’s interpretation of Antigone’s dwelling 
showed us the poetic sense of the between, especially regarding the relation between 
mortals and immortals, but also between the earth and the sky. It turned out that one of the 
significant designations of the dwelling-place is polis; however, Heidegger understands 
the term in its pre-political sense. Now let us focus on the possibility of a pre-political and 
poetic understanding of place as such.  
Polis is a key concept in The Ister lectures in many respects. Considering the fact 
that the lecture courses were given at a time when Greece was under Nazi occupation, it is 
unrealistic to think that Heidegger did not consider the historical relation between 
Antigone and Hölderlin, ancient Greece and Germany. Yet, for later Heidegger, nations 
are the geo-political and subjectivistic representations of the actual homeland, heimat, as 
one’s belonging place. The onto-ethical heimat of human existence is death.101 This is 
why Heidegger attempts to show forth the pre-political implications of polis. He argues: 
“If "the political'' is that which belongs to the polis and therefore is essentially dependent 
upon the polis, then the essence of the polis can never be determined in terms of the 
political, just as the ground can never be explained or derived from the consequence.”102 
So, what does the polis amount to? According to Heidegger, the polis is founded upon the 
“truth of being” (aletheia) and refers to the site [Ort] in which all beings and all relational 
comportment toward beings is gathered.103 The polis is where the people build political 
establishments because it is the onto-ethical site of dwelling that gathers their relations to 																																																								
101 The historical relationship between Greece and Germany must also be seen in this context: 
Ancient Greece is the “beginning” of philosophy, while Germany is the “end”. The so-called 
historical relationship between them is thus not a “historiographical”, “cultural”, “geopolitical” or 
“inter-national” affinity. It is solely on the grounds of the “onto-historical” happening and destiny 
of thinking itself. 
102 (The Ister, 85) 
103 (The Ister, 86) 
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the world. So to say, the polis is where they are born, where they have their families, 
occupations, interests, desires and projections. But it is not as if these “human ventures 
and procedures” [poros] determines the polis. Rather, it is the place as Ort, and 
specifically the happening of place that brings and gathers people together. In other words, 
polis is where human “situation” takes place. This is the meaning of polis as being “in the 
midst of beings in such a way that they comport themselves toward beings as such.”104 
Political and moral registers of thought remain only derivative of this relation to the 
"open", and this is why the holy remains closed off to them.105 As such, in order to 
properly understand polis appears, we must first consider our relation to physis. It is in 
that sense, the river Ister and the onto-ethical meaning of its flowing activity becomes an 
issue, which interrelates the poetic dwelling of Antigone with the Hölderlin’s Ister: Both 
Antigone and Ister are of physis, and both are representative of modes of dwelling that 
invite us to think the happening of being itself as the very emergence of the nature. Only 
doing this would allow us to have a holy sense of being and dwelling in the world by 
letting ourselves be conditioned and bound by that which is beyond human.  
As Mitchell also points out, Heidegger understands the holy as that which is 
liberated from utility as Uneigennützige.106 A topological mode of thinking can help us to 
elucidate what is at issue here. If the holy liberates one from the confines of everydayness, 
it is because it allows us to see things not as mere objects to be used, but as things to be 
encountered, as things with which one can dwell. As such, it brings the human being into 
the openness of an understanding of being. It does so by not letting the human being be 
encircled in the hustle and bustle of everydayness, and the openness of being is found 																																																								
104 (The Ister, 89) 
105 In Heidegger scholarship, Young also understands the meaning of polis as pre-political. See: 
Julian Young, “Poets and Rivers: Heidegger on Hölderlin’s ‘Der Ister’”, in Heidegger Re-
examined, vol. 3, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (New York: Routledge, 2002), 79, 
84. 
106  Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2015), 191. 
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precisely at that topos where the human existence is not constrained inside, but rather 
liberated into the open. “The open” is where the experience of the holy comes to take 
place. In other words, it is the holy essence of the medium that mediates the mortals and 
immortals, the earth and the sky, and essentially, being and human beings via “the 
between”.  
As such, for Heidegger, a holy relation to polis is only possible on the grounds of 
poiesis that speaks of physis, because it is poetry as the essence of any activity of 
“making” which reveals the world to us so that we can “build” on the earth [Erde], which 
also means under the heavens (sky) [Himmel]. Essentially, polis is the place of the 
“fourfold”, because it is where human beings see the possibility of dwelling and building. 
This is why the matter is taken up through Hölderlin’s hymn107, where the question at 
issue is the “poetic dwelling”, and not “political dwelling”. The dwelling that is at stake 
can only originate from the “open”, as the place of being in which it opens itself up to 
human beings. Heidegger claims, “Only because human beings can say ''it is" can they 
also say " I am," and not vice versa. And it is because human beings can say, "is." As they 
"have" a relation to being, they are able to "say" and they can "have" the word, thus, they 
are zoon logon echon.”108 In turn, when the mortals stand in a relation to being, they also 
make this relation explicit poetically. Mitchell argues: 
 
The poet speaks in a way that allows the words their widest reach. Poetic language 
is understood here to reverberate with ambiguities and variant meanings, to form 
connections with other words, other thoughts, and other things through the 
relations it unfolds and the relations it allows. The poetic word is born from a 
sacrifice of linguistic utility along with the relations that utility privileges and 
prescribes (clarity, univocity).109  
 																																																								
107 (The Ister, 1) 
108 (The Ister, 90) 
109  Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2015), 196. 
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What this means is that via the holy, one finds a deeper relation to the world via language, 
just as it means that via language, one finds a new relation to the holy, which, in turn, is 
the medium between the mortals and the immortals.  
Heidegger finds the poetic “between” he captured in Antigone’s dwelling also in 
the flowing activity of the river in the hymn “The Ister”110, which directs our attention to 
the topological underpinnings of the relation between dwelling and place. In the first 
division of the lecture courses, Heidegger focuses on the interpretation of Hölderlin’s 
hymn. The Ister, which is a derivation of the Greek name Istros, is the Latin word for the 
river Danube.111 Heidegger closely investigates the poetic meaning of the rivers Rhine and 
Danube [Ister] that spring from the German homeland and flow in different directions. 
From this geographic-historical context, Heidegger derives different modes of dwelling 
which can be associated with the respective dwelling of Ismene and Antigone.112  
 Heidegger’s most important conceptual discussions in The Ister lectures are often 
omitted in the contemporary scholarship, which also results in the negligence regarding 
the profoundly topological framework of the lecture courses. Heidegger’s major idea of 
dwelling in The Ister lecture courses is based on his criticism of calculative and 
technological understanding of temporality and spatiality. This issue is important, as it is 
something that impacts our relation to things, which later becomes a discussion on its own 
																																																								
110 The river Ister springs from the town Donauschingen in the Black Forest region in Germany 
and runs its course toward the Black Sea, into which it discharges by passing through historical 
ancient Greek sites in today’s Romania. 
111 The ancient and modern history of the river Danube departing from Heidegger’s Der Ister 
lecture course has been very well documented in the 2004 experimental philosophical 
documentary of Daniel Ross and David Barison.  
112 The historical and geographical significance of those rivers at issue should be acknowledged. 
Hölderlin wrote: “Und warum hängt er / An den Bergen gerad? / Der andre Der Rhein ist seitwärts 
Hinwegegangen.” Martin Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymne: Der Ister (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1984), 4 (GA 53). 
Here Hölderlin hints that Rhein abandoned the task of going to the “source”, whereas the river 
Danube accomplishes it: it springs from the Black Forest region in Germany, and by passing 
through number of countries, including the historical Ancient Greek regions, discharges into the 
Black Sea.  
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terms in the 1949 The Thing essay. Heidegger’s critique is not against natural sciences and 
their mathematical methods of understanding time and space, but rather against the 
reductive view that only a representational mode of thinking can provide us with a 
profound understanding of space, time and place. 
In order to emphasize the flowing activity of the river, Heidegger proposes a new 
pair of terms, which invites us to reconsider the relation between space, place and time. 
“Locality (or abode) and journeying”, [Ortschaft und Wanderschaft]113, which represent 
the poetic dimension of the relation between space, place and time, shifts our focus to the 
necessity of thinking the journeying experience of being in place, as well as being placed 
in the happening of time. Heidegger argues, “the abode is a whiling. It needs a while. In 
such a whiling human beings find rest.”114 The temporal occurrence of the river is 
essentially a whiling in place. This is because whiling requires a dwelling place, and 
without place, no dwelling or whiling can come to occur. Therefore the primary 
experience of space and time are grounded in being situated in the action of dwelling. In 
order to understand how dwelling grounds the taking place of space and time, we must 
first consider the dynamic essence of journeying as unfolding and happening, a point that 
is particularly related to the notion of event [Ereignis] as we will see.  
The rivers have obvious geographical or anthropological significances. For 
instance, most human settling historically took place in regions that are close to rivers. In 
the course of its journeying, the rivers shape and nurture the land. Once they originate 
from their sources, they are in the course of flowing into far away lands, leaving behind 
the place from which they originate. When thought from a human perspective, it is only 
by abandoning the home as the origin that the rivers become homely. In other words, this 
is how rivers disclose what belongs to themselves as their own.  																																																								
113 (The Ister, 39) 
114 (The Ister, 20) 
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The continuous tension between the origin and the end, the source and the 
opening, the near and the far, belongs to the very event of the rivers. Yet, these different 
“ends” do not appear as opposing binaries, but as that which constitute a unity and a 
singularity, provided by the “movement” of the flowing activity. The river shows forth the 
“between” and the “medium”. Because of that, Mitchell argues that thinking the river also 
means to think the meaning of interrelationality115. With a poetic reflection on the ethos of 
rivers, it is possible to show that the meaning of “journeying” (as the poetic essence of 
temporality) does not have to be attributed to the origin, but it becomes meaningful in the 
journeying from the origin to the opening, from past to the future. In a certain ontological 
sense, this is how anything becomes what it is insofar in its unfolding. This is also the case 
for mortal human existence: we are thrown into certain situations and environments, yet 
these historical conditions and circumstance project us into the future. The past has never 
really passed, just as the future is not something that will arrive at sometime beyond this 
moment. The past as that which delimits my present now is constantly flowing into the 
future as that which remains open and that towards which I move. This is the meaning of 
“presencing” in the sense of things’ unfolding and coming to appear from place, from a 
particular openness. 116  With this view, Heidegger wishes to establish the sense of 
“journeying” as the true source of the meaning of “temporality”. With this characterization 
of the concept, another crucial element with regards to the dwelling of the river comes to 
the fore. The water’s ongoing flowing activity from the origin to the mouth of the river 
makes manifest the relation between existence and death.   
 According to Heidegger, in order to be able to confront the unsettling character of 
the nearest, one has to depart from the “home” (origin) and learn to inhabit the “foreign”, 																																																								
115  Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2015), 96. 
116 This is also the meaning of aletheia as the truth or disclosure of being with regards to human 
Dasein.  
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and in order to be able to make sense of the “home”. In other words, we have to think 
“death”, in order to be able to appropriately think “existence” and ask concerning the 
meaning of being (in the world). Before The Ister lectures, for instance, in the 
Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, Heidegger closely engaged with the interpretation of 
Hölderlin’s poem “Homecoming/ To the Kindred Ones” [Heimkunft/ An die 
Verwandten]117. It is possible to observe that Heidegger finds considerable philosophical 
material for his own thinking when he considers the notion of “homecoming”, which is 
one of the most common subjects for the ancient Greek poetry and tragedy as well.118 This 
is also the main theme of Hölderlin’s novel The Hyperion119, an idea that Hölderlin 
himself poetically narrates at length. That being said, it is important to note that Heidegger 
elucidates the notion of homecoming from an “onto-ethical” perspective, dealing with the 
homecoming of human existence in relation to the question of journeying and dwelling. In 
other words, Heidegger does not concern himself with the “homecoming” of an individual 
in geo-spatial terms, but his thinking proceeds in a much broader context. His thinking 
shows a way in which we could reorient our understanding of the relationship between 
death and our mortality. The poet learns from the river precisely this: namely, how to 																																																								
117  Martin Heidegger, Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, trans. Keith Hoeller (New York: 
Humanity Books, 2000), 26. 
118 The Nostoi and Homer’s Odyssey are two of the most significant examples of this common 
theme for Greeks. 
119 “Bellarmin is the name of the companion with whom Hyperion once engaged in a long 
conversation in the course of many letters, which tell stories of days of love and deeds. Hyperion is 
the name of the poet. He himself is the companion about whose whereabouts the question inquires. 
But where he himself is the poet must certainly know, especially now, because, as the greeting 
one, he lets himself be known as the one who stays behind in his homeland. But the poet first asks 
about Bellarmin with his companion. Are we to suppose his companion is still with him? Or are 
we to assume that the two are separated? Where are the friends? This question does not want to 
locate the friends' whereabouts geographically. It thinks the essence of the place to whose location 
each of the friends has now been destined. For in the meantime, since the poetic period of 
Hölderlin's novel Hyperion, the poet has experienced other things. In the drama Empedocles the 
friend is no longer Bellarmin’s companion. He has journeyed to another essential place. But even 
this place has been left behind in the interval. The Empedocles still belongs to the journey. 
Homecoming begins only where The Wanderer has crossed over to the poetic saying about the 
homeland's rivers ("The Rhine" and "The Ister")”. Martin Heidegger, Elucidations of Hölderlin’s 
Poetry, trans. Keith Hoeller (New York: Humanity Books, 2000), 150. 
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think the relationship between birth, existence, and death; the presence and absence; 
journeying in time and place, while attempting to understand how to dwell poetically. 
Approaching the streaming of the river situates us within the boundaries of a poetic mode 
of thinking. 
 Heidegger’s claims concerning the relationship between the “near” and the 
“distant” are central to his main argument. With this, Heidegger also makes use of the 
phenomenological law of proximity. Accordingly, the things that are near remain distant 
from our immediate attention. Just as when we stand too close to an object, we cannot 
have a perspective that will capture the object in full detail. Our over-proximity requires 
us to take a step back, or change focus, in order to see the object from a better perspective. 
This is the same when it comes to our relation to death. Death as our no-longer-being-
there-in-the-world stands too near as an event, therefore thinking the meaning of death 
requires a change of focus regarding our situation in existence. Oddly enough, one has to 
exist to learn death while existing, and yet, one also has to “die”, in order to question the 
meaning of “being” in its entirety, while this is precisely where existence (our situatedness 
in asking the question of being) disappears. In this context, one of the outstanding lines in 
Hölderlin’s hymn reads:  
 
Not without wings may/Someone grasp at what is nearest Directly/ And reach the 
other side.120 
 
Accordingly, the river has wings. Under a certain light, this indicates the immediate 
relationship between the sky and the earth: with wings one flies. In this case, it is the river 
that may reach the other side. The other side is also the nearest. The double meaning here 
that is at issue concerns the way in which one has to incorporate one’s existence as a 
																																																								
120 (The Ister, 4) 
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mortal, through experiencing the constant journeying of one’s death from the future 
toward the presence. The presence is the nearest and therefore it always disappears in sight 
and is only understandable as something to be remembered of the past, or, as something to 
be accomplished, projected into the future. In that sense, there are two simultaneous 
motions taking place “between” the past and the future (the origin and the end) that co-
constitute a two-way counter-movement: I exist, moving from my past toward my future, 
yet my future, whose limits are delimited by my death, is simultaneously running toward 
me. The middle space between my past and my future is where the spatiotemporal essence 
of my existence as “presencing” takes place, where I find myself as an existing being. 
Indeed, the counter movement that is at stake highlights this manifold process of folding 
and unfolding. While the past is folding into the future, the future is simultaneously 
unfolding into the past. The between, which discloses the presence as presencing is the 
event [Ereignis] in place as journeying.  
In the following passage, Heidegger gives a very concise summary of his Ister 
lecture courses on the relationship between the home and abroad, one’s own and the 
foreign, which needs to be carefully considered in an onto-ethical register: 
 
Yet that which is their own often remains foreign to human beings for a long time, 
because they abandon it without having appropriated it. And human beings 
abandon what is their own because it is what most threatens to overwhelm them. 
One’s own is least of all something that produces itself of its own accord […] In 
that case, however, to dwell in what is one’s own is what comes last and is seldom 
successful and always remains what is most difficult. Yet if the river determines 
the locality of the homely, then it is of essential assistance in becoming homely 
[Heimischwerden] in what is one’s own121. 
 
In light of this passage, we can say that Heidegger’s Ister lecture courses are founded 
upon the following thought: In order to be able to dwell, one needs to reinhabit one’s own, 
																																																								
121 (The Ister, 21) 
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which always remains the nearest and the most difficult to appropriate, precisely because 
of this utmost proximity. This is what distinguishes the poet from the non-poet: while the 
poet journeys the limits of presencing, the non-poet gets lost in the proximity of the limit, 
in fleeing it. The poet ontologically appropriates her or his dwelling place, in the sense 
that she or he constantly journeys through the limit, which allows her or him to inhabit 
two respective dimensions that are opened up by and at the limit. The non-poet remains in 
the midst of things, always exposed to this nearness, never being able to making his 
dwelling place her or his own, thus remaining distant to it, stuck in sheer presence. Spatial 
proximity does not mean existential nearness. The nearness must be seen as the place 
where journeying takes place so that our relation to it can continue to unfold. 
 As I have stated, according to Heidegger the poet learns the capacity to 
appropriate and be appropriated by what is near from the flowing activity of the river. 
Nikolopoulou astutely describes what is at stake regarding the relationship between the 
flowing of rivers and the streaming of human existence in the direction of death: 
 
Hölderlin produces yet another paratactic identification, at least as fraught as he 
thinks the previous one: describing the human desire for death, which becomes 
intensified in moments of extreme danger, the poet compares it to a natural 
phenomenon — namely, to the rivers that impulsively seek rest in the ocean. This 
comparison does not stop at the level of metaphorical resemblance but runs deeper 
in order to reveal nature as the unreflexive, blind structure of some human acts. 
Through a catachrestic use of personification, Hölderlin not only likens but 
actually equates the way in which rivers — against their wish (wider Willen) — 
rush seaward following the sacred call and the way in which human beings 
unthinkingly — with no sense of self-reflection (selbstvergessen) — follow blindly 
a shortcut (die kürzeste Bahn) to their destruction, overtaken by holy fire in the 
form of a death wish (Todeslust). The human becomes one with nature, as both act 
with no reference to reason.122 
 
For Heidegger, Ister’s discharge into the Black Sea in its counter-flow from the 
																																																								
122 Kalliopi Nikolopoulou, Tragically Speaking: On the Use and Abuse of Theory for Life (Lincoln 
& London: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 210. 
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“homeland” and Antigone’s “movement” against the polis signify the two-fold onto-
ethical nature of homecoming. In that regard, Mitchell also underscores the relationship 
between the river and the sea. Drawing on Heidegger’s 1934 lecture courses, Mitchell 
suggests, “the source and the mouth are nothing other than the river itself […] the sea 
itself is the source at its most distant remove”.123 The focus here is on the streaming 
activity of the river, yet the sea itself gets embodied in the topos of this flowing activity, 
as the source meets the sea. The rivers show forth the same poetic ethos of the between 
insofar as they stream.  
Seeing the issue against this background can bring into view the way in which 
Antigone decided to run against the law of the city. The river Ister can be associated with 
Antigone, while the Rhein can be linked with Ismene. Antigone is the between (of the 
mortals and immortals, earth and sky), which forces her to move outside of the limits of 
the polis. In contrast, Ismene remains inside the “presence”, submitting to the law of the 
polis. In other words, Antigone and Ismene’s dwelling look to completely different 
directions. Antigone’s dwelling, which is a being on the way towards death, becomes the 
source of her longing for immortality instead of living without honour. This is the core of 
Antigone’s tragedy, which annihilates her: the obstinate will to be near to gods, a 
complete denial of the polis, mortality, finitude, and the time, while being a devotee of the 
underground gods.  
Heidegger’s purpose in bringing Hölderlin’s hymn “The Ister” and Sophocles’ 
Antigone into a historical dialogue is that he sees a profound relationship between the 
ways in which both the river and Antigone move against, towards and within their 
destinies. The Ister runs its course moving away from the source and the homeland, and it 
looks to explore the possibility of becoming–at–home [Heimischwerden] by moving away 																																																								
123  Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2015), 93. 
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from the customary, daring to journey into the foreign. Yet, Antigone experiences the 
poetic essence of human finitude, and as such she grasps the limits of human dwelling, 
that is, being in the world as journeying towards death, by leaving behind the law of the 
city. If so, the key topological claim is the following one: the limit, as the between, 
“discloses” the possibility of the interplay between the bounding regions, which unfolds 
the finite nature of dwelling as existence in its entirety. 
The river leaves behind its origins and springs into the unknown, by projecting 
itself into the future [Zu-kunft], that which is “to come”, but also, that which has always 
“been coming”124. As I have explicated before, future, as that is yet to come and, at the 
same time, as that has always been coming, appears as the source of constant self-
origination. This is precisely what the river accomplishes in flowing. At the same time, it 
appears as a limit through which one has to experience the “now” in its streaming from the 
past towards the future. Therefore, the flowing of the river must manifest the sense of 
immortality that is at stake for the poet, within the finite limits of the act of flowing. It 
flows within the boundaries of the riverbanks, the source and the sea. In that regard, 
Hölderlin associates the being of the flowing activity of river with the onto-ethical 
journeying of language. The hymn reads:  
 
Not in vain do Rivers run in the dry/ yet how? / Namely, they are to be to 
language. A sign is needed, nothing else, plain and simple125 
 
This can be read in two ways: 1) Hölderlin says that there is a need of a sign that will 
capture the sense of the flowing activity of the river. This can mean that the poetic 
dwelling of the river must be poetically brought to word that will speak the dwelling of the 																																																								
124 The words and their meanings show a similar pattern of movement, springing from manifold 
sources, and historically moving beyond the presence by carrying along new significances through 
the contexts they traverse. 
125 (The Ister, 5) 
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river. In this way, the dwelling of the river will be intelligible for human beings, which 
remains forgotten. We are prone to conceive the river as a mere water source, or at best a 
natural entity. However, the river needs to be understood according to its own nature, 
therefore we need the poet to interpret and translate the activity of the river. 2) The river 
runs its course risking to dry up. Accordingly, the journeying of the river and the 
journeying of the language share the same fate. Hölderlin ends his hymn by saying:  
 
Yet, what that one does, that river/ No one knows” [Was aber jener thuet der 
Strom, Weis niemand]. 126 
 
According to Heidegger, it is only the poet that can actually know what the river does. It 
seems that Heidegger assumes that there is a certain mode of knowledge, which we can 
call poetic knowledge that only the poet possesses. When space and time are merely 
applied as frames to calculate and manipulate the unfolding of the nature, the limits of the 
dwelling of human beings, as well as the limits of nature itself disappear. This leads to the 
loss of the sense of the between that is the topological condition of poeticality. In the 
following passage, Heidegger highlights how our technological relation to the river covers 
over the non-utilitarian characteristics of the river: 
 
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It sets the Rhine to 
supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines turning. This turning 
sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for 
which the long-distance power station and its network of cables are set up to 
dispatch electricity. In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the 
orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something 
at our command. The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was 
the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years. Rather the 
river is dammed up into the power plant. What the river is now, namely, a water 
power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station.127 
 																																																								
126 (The Ister, 4) 
127 (Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 16) 
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The example that Heidegger gives here is particularly important because it clarifies why 
we need a richer and more encompassing understanding of the streaming activity of the 
river. Indeed, this can be seen related to Heidegger’s implicit criticism of sentiocentrism 
and biocentrism, and places Heidegger much closer to an “ecocentric” position. Even if 
the river is not a sentient being and has no phenomenal consciousness, it has its own ethos, 
namely, own way of dwelling and character. The true ethos of the river can make sense to 
us, if we poetically problematize its journeying.  
According to Heidegger, we cannot grasp the being of the river in its entirety if we 
only conceive it as a mere resource or object: it rather must be understood in terms of 
what it “does” (according to the last line of Hölderlin’s hymn, river “does” something that 
we do not know), and we must acknowledge the proper identity of the river as a river. 
Although the river does not have “actions” that can be located in a cause-effect scheme, it 
nevertheless fulfils its own being. Nevertheless, the fact that Heidegger’s thinking can 
stimulate an ecological interpretation of our relation to nature does not mean that the core 
of his thinking can be captured by philosophy of ecology. First of all, the “eco” of 
“ecology” must be considered. In “eco-logy”, what is at issue is first and foremost the 
“logos” of the “oikos”, which can be understood as the knowledge and the saying of the 
"house" and dwelling that takes place in that "house". Second, it is not clear how an 
understanding of “ecology” can be developed without first thinking nature itself as the 
place of being and dwelling. This shows the adequacy of an onto-ethical and hermeneutic 
approach, because what is at issue here is not to consider nature as an entity or object of 
research that can be thought independently from human nature. What this means is that we 
need to look into the way in which nature as physis and ethos must be thought in relation, 
in terms of the question of dwelling. Therefore, even an ecologist reading of Heidegger’s 
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thinking must first engage with the “onto-ethical” dimension of the question and consider 
the dwelling that unfolds in place.  
In this context, it is interesting to briefly consider the consequences of the recent 
law that has passed in New Zealand, which has given the legal rights of “personhood” to 
the Wanganui River. Gerrard Albert, who is one of the negotiator of the local tribe, says: 
“[…] treating the river as a living entity is the correct way to approach it, as in indivisible 
whole, instead of the traditional model for the last 100 years of treating it from a 
perspective of ownership and management.” 128 This recent juridical progress in New 
Zealand is a sign that it is possible to revise our ways of understanding of the place of 
non-human entities in the world. Furthermore, it is suggestive of the fact that a 
technological or economic understanding of the nature is not the only way, as a poetic 
interpretation of the “world” and the “nature” can bring about practical changes in politics. 
On the other hand, this case invites us to inquire, what does it mean to allocate 
“personhood” in order to protect its “rights”? What does this say about our conception of 
the river, which needs to be entitled with the rights of a “person” in order for us to not 
destroy or manipulate it? Furthermore, what does it say about our “ethos”? This is why it 
is useful to delve into the “onto-ethical” foundations of the being of rivers, and call into 







128 Eleanore Ainge Roy, “New Zealand river granted same legal rights as human being”, The 
Guardian, March 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-
granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being 
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I. 6 Poesy, Poetry and Poetic Dwelling 
 
Thus far I have examined the “onto-ethical” underpinnings of poetic dwelling in 
Heidegger’s thought. I have shown that dwelling cannot be associated with mere staying 
in a fixed location. According to Heidegger, both the dwelling of Antigone and the river 
Ister indicate a poetic mode of journeying in the between as a mortal. The dynamic 
character of their dwelling means to stay with the whiling of the place. This makes it 
possible for one to belong to the interplay between the near and the distant, “here” and 
“beyond”, mortals and immortals, the earth and the sky, which constitute the wholeness of 
the world within which one exists. It is this constant and dynamic mode of re-situating 
oneself in the world that appears as the topological characteristic of poetic dwelling. On 
the other hand, explaining that the place of poetic dwelling is the between does not 
necessarily answer why the between is poetic. One significant question that I seek to 
answer in this section is the following: what is the relation between poetry as a genre of 
literature and poetic dwelling as a way comporting oneself in existence? 
In Heidegger scholarship, the difference between the poetic nature of dwelling and 
poetic works of literature is an issue that has not drawn significant attention. Explicating 
what “poetic dwelling” amounts to and how it differs from the mere writing of poetic 
works of literature is necessary, as this would illuminate what Heidegger means by 
“standing in a poetic relation to language”, which is the core matter of his subsequent 
investigations on language. In that regard, I suggest that in Heidegger’s thought, the poetic 
between should be understood as the source of creativity with respect to one’s existence. 
In a nutshell, one’s existence makes sense if it is examined, and the way to do so is to be 
poetic, which means to examine [historein] one’s existence and situatedness in the world 
creatively and learn to become oneself. I claim that if we recognize the meaning of 
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poeticality as “creativity”, only then we can fully recognize the significance of poetic 
dwelling for Heidegger’s thought in the context of one’s existence.  
I find the traces of my interpretation in Heidegger’s reading of ancient Greek 
philosophy. Although it is not explicated in the framework of the notion of “creativity”, it 
is also clear that the meaning of the ancient Greek word poiesis is as an essential aspect of 
Heidegger’s understanding of poeticality, and, indeed, of poetic dwelling. When we 
consider the etymology of poiesis, we see that the meaning of the word indicates a certain 
manner of “making”129, a point that Heidegger himself mentions130. Explaining this point 
will also help us to see the relation between “building” and dwelling, a critical link in 
Heidegger’s later thought in relation to the idea of poetry and poeticality.  
Let me first make several conceptual distinctions. According to Heidegger, 
“poesy” [Poesie], as the poetic use of language, occurs from poiesis, yet, is not the same 
as poetry [Dichtung]. Although “poesy” is an outmoded word in English, it helps us 
identify the difference between “works of poetry” and a poetic mode of existence (poetic 
dwelling). For instance, one can write works of poetry, but that does not entail that she or 
he dwells poetically. On the other hand, someone who does not write works of poetry can 
still exist poetically. Heidegger clarifies what he does not mean by dwelling: accordingly, 
dwelling [wohnen] “does not describe today's dwelling conditions. Above all, it does not 
assert that to dwell means to occupy a house, a dwelling place. Nor does it say that the 
poetic exhausts itself in an unreal play of poetic imagination”.131 As such, it is not about 
“occupying a lodging”. Likewise, when Hölderlin talks about dwelling, he means the 
existential situation of human beings in terms of how they poetically orient themselves in 
the world. It is not as if there were “dwelling” on the one hand, and the adjective 																																																								
129  Ernest Klein, Klein’s Comprehensive Etymology Dictionary of the English Language 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 572. 
130 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 212) 
131 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 212) 
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“poetical” on the other, attached to it as a positive attribute. Essentially, “poetical” makes 
the “dwelling”. This is where the relation between building and dwelling comes to the fore 
via the essence of poiesis as making. Heidegger claims, “But through what do we attain to 
a dwelling place? Through building. Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of 
building.”132 This is a making that is attained by language. On the other hand, this is not 
the mere mastery of language. It is first and foremost “measuring” against that which 
conditions the human being. This “measure” [metron] is the measuring of the dimension, 
the place, so that the humans can orient themselves in the world as the mortals, against the 
immortals, where the sky measures against the earth.133 The “poetic”, first and foremost, 
means making an issue of the “place” of human existence.  
In light of these considerations, Heidegger’s use of the adjective poetic/poetical 
[dichterisch] cannot refer to mere “poesy”, as we have also seen with the dwelling of 
Antigone. She dwells poetically. The reason why the essence of poeticality matters so 
much is because it is closely related to humans’ relation to language as the site within the 
boundaries of which things come to unfold. Heidegger claims that the specific kind of 
relation that one can hold to language, which “brings out” the essence of poetizing, is 
poetry [Dichtung], and to dwell poetically [dichterisch wohnen].134 Yet, what is at issue in 
this act of “bringing out”? Furthermore, what is the trifold link between language, poetry 
and poetic dwelling? Answering these inquiries require a simultaneous reconsideration of 
the topological meaning of language and creativity, because the one significant element of 
“poetic dwelling” is poetic building, which is a form of “making”. “Bringing out” as one 
of the characteristics of poeticality is closely tied to the “making” that is at issue, as by 
way of “making” something, we can “bring out” [poiei] that which is related to the 																																																								
132  (Poetry, Language, Thought, 213) 
133  (Poetry, Language, Thought, 219) 
134 In same train of thought, in 1946, Heidegger will write, “thinking is Ur-poetry which precedes 
poesy” (Off the Beaten Track, 247) 
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essence of the thing. That being said, “making” is not a synonym for “bringing out”, but a 
more encompassing action that situates the act of “disclosure” and “unconcealment”. In 
Heidegger’s later writings in the early 1950s, the claim that dwelling is inherently related 
to building [bauen] is a key point. It is not a coincidence that one of Heidegger’s most 
important essays on the question of dwelling is entitled Building Dwelling Thinking 
(1951), where Heidegger explicates the relation between building and dwelling:  
 
[i]ch bin, I am, du bist, you are, the imperative form bis, be. What then does ich 
bin mean? The old word bauen, to which the bin belongs, answers: ich bin, du bist 
mean: I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which 
we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be 
on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell.135 
 
Being, dwelling, and building are all closely related to one another. The act of building 
that is at issue here is not the mere erection of buildings. The key claim, which I will 
develop below, is that the essence of building cannot be found in the idea of production 
and fabrication, but in dwelling.136  
We can see that building is related to a set of actions such as forming, creating, 
producing, and making. On the other hand, building, when thought in link with dwelling, 
is not only a certain “manner” or “art” of making, neither a mere act of form-giving, but 
making as the “measuring” of the place in the sense of “finding the limit and room”, also 
related to Latin meditari in the sense of “think”.137 Finding the limit from which the 
boundary can commence its spacing is the ground of building, that is, poiesis, which itself 
derives from the Greek poiein (making). It is in this context that Heidegger’s account of 
building and dwelling can be seen as topological, as Heidegger considers the essence of 																																																								
135 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 145) 
136 “We do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, 
because we are dwellers.” (Basic Writings, 350) 
137  Ernest Klein, Klein’s Comprehensive Etymology Dictionary of the English Language 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 461. 
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dwelling to be “sparing” and “freeing” [schonen and freien]. Accordingly, he considers 
poetic dwelling as an action that provides space, and brings human beings and things into 
a free interrelation.138 This is the sense in which we should comprehend Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Hölderlin’s understanding of poiesis as “measuring” that allows for 
“making”. This means, the act of building that is at issue first needs to make space for 
something to grow and emerge in and from that place. Therefore, in order to better 
conceive how building and dwelling are related, we must first understand the relationship 
between space and place as well as “making” and “freeing”.  
The immediate etymological relationship between “freedom” [Freiheit] and 
“peace” [Friede] stimulates Heidegger’s understanding of the bond between building and 
dwelling. According to Heidegger, building as dwelling fundamentally signifies to free 
and open up the space, which also means to bring peacefulness into space. Making-space 
within which things can emerge is one significant meaning of preserving the place. This is 
also the implication of dwelling [wohnen] as remaining in place [sich aufenthalten] by 
letting the place preserve a free and peaceful dimension from which new things can 
emerge and grow. In that context, the notion of creativity remains in a close relation to 
physis that indicates the unfolding of things in their abundant spontaneity from their 
hiddenness. The river Ister makes space by letting things around to emerge, grow and be 
built such as human dwellings. This means that first the nature must be saved poetically, if 
we expect a political tranquillity to flourish.  
It is in this sense that building cannot be understood as mere production and the 
erection of buildings, but rather as creating a whole site of dwelling, making-way for a 
world of existence to emerge and grow in place. Furthermore, the existence that comes to 
occur in this site needs to bring tranquillity and ontological balance back to the place. 
																																																								
138 (Basic Writings, 351) 
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Dwelling means to preserve the place that provides free space that within which things can 
freely and tranquilly emerge, grow, and remain and as such, be. As we can also observe 
from the etymology of the verb “to create”, the more primordial meaning of Latin crescere 
is “to cause”, or “to let grow”, also interestingly related to the name of the Roman goddess 
Ceres, namely ancient Greek Demeter.139 As such, the notion of creativity that is at issue 
is primarily related to letting something emerge and grow from place, principally from the 
earth. Making is not necessarily pro-duction in the sense of leading-forth and 
commanding, but rather creating in the sense of providing the space and preparing the 
conditions for growth. This is the sense in which Heidegger can say that the river dwells. 
The river makes and creates the space for building and dwelling. The poet does the same 
thing for human beings’ existence. 
 It is in this framework that Heidegger’s way of issuing the question of poetic 
dwelling invites us to reconsider the meaning of both poeticality as creativity in terms of 
one’s existence and dwelling. Creativity can be thought in a rich hermeneutic-topological 
context, especially in terms of one’s kinetic inter-action with one’s existential “situation”. 
This is because poetic creativity first and foremost means the disclosure of new “ways” of 
relating oneself to the world and things. It means the unfolding of new ways and 
possibilities of engaging with one’s situation, creativity also indicates movement in the 
sense of “transgression”, a going beyond the ordinary and envisioned limits, as was the 
case in Antigone’s dwelling. Creativity does not indicate a mere avant-garde, or an 
ongoing experimentalism. The meaning of creativity should be rather sought in the 
correspondence between this motion that invokes transgression and regression, departure 
and arrival, which the flowing activity of the river Ister also brought forward. This is the 
sense in which creativity, as the nature of the topos of one’s existential actions, does not 																																																								
139  Ernest Klein, Klein’s Comprehensive Etymology Dictionary of the English Language 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 175. 
		 72	
only “disclose”, but also makes way for the “gathering”. Accordingly, the “between” 
opens up the boundary and the dimension within which “building” as “making” becomes 
possible. The dweller of the between achieves creativity by standing in relation to the 
limit, thus confronting the beyond, and arriving at the possibility of bringing out 
something that has not been readily available and applicable in “presence”, which needs 
“disclosing” and “gathering”. This means that the between as that from which the 
possibility of poetic dwelling emerges creates the inhabitable space where creative 
building may take place. The poetic between is the “source” of creativity in providing the 
“measure” for the limit. 
Władysław Tatarkiewicz’s historical and conceptual analysis of “creativity” also 
shows evidence that the essence of poetry indicates essential making and creating. His 
explorations into the issue can be considered in order to render Heidegger’s ideas more 
intelligible. According to Tatarkiewicz, for ancient Greeks, there was a decisive difference 
between poetry and art. While the former made use of and thrived on creativity, the latter 
was thought to be the imitation of the nature.140 The artist was not expected to demonstrate 
an aesthetic sense of freedom, but, on the very contrary, his art was seen as an imitation 
and reproduction of the laws of nature. The poet, however, was the discloser and the 
creator of a new world of understanding within which things can come to unfold in an 
original way. Tatarkiewicz argues: “the poet is not bound by laws as artists are; he is free 
in what he does. There was no term corresponding to 'creativity' and 'creator', but in reality 
the poet was understood to be one who creates. And only he was so understood.”141 In the 
Roman world, the Greek conception of creativity has evolved in a way that it was entitled 
																																																								
140 Władysław Tatarkiewicz, A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics (Warsaw: Polish 
Scientific Publishers, 1980), 245. 
141 Władysław Tatarkiewicz, A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics, 245. 
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to painters as well.142 There were two words in use for “creating” in Latin, facere and 
creare, which both meant the ancient Greek poiein. However, in the Christian world, 
creare was associated with God’s creation [creation] from nothing [ex nihilo], while 
facere indicated human beings’ ordinary makings. As a result, even the poetry was 
thought to be subject to certain rules in the middle ages, as it was the case in the ancient 
Greek techne. As such, it was considered to be a matter of skilfulness, not necessarily 
creativity. In the wake of this separation, making (or doing) and creating indicated distinct 
modes of expression, the former referring to mere production or transformation of an 
object, while the latter meaning bringing out something from nothing.143  
In his thinking of poetry and poetic dwelling, Heidegger extends the meaning of 
poetic creativity into one’s existence and, thus, one’s relation with being. This idea could 
make sense especially with regards to Antigone’s dwelling. Antigone is neither a poet nor 
an artist, yet she dwells poetically. Nevertheless, for Heidegger she is the measure of 
poetic dwelling. What is also challenging to grasp is the poetic dwelling of the river Ister. 
Our first reaction might be that Heidegger’s association of poetical dwelling with the river 
is intended only in a metaphorical way. Heidegger refutes a reading of the comparison 
between Antigone and the Ister,144 which he takes to be an influence from Hegelian 
aesthetics that necessitates us to consider the river merely as a “symbolic image”. 
Accordingly, we would not have to think the river itself in its streaming activity, but as a 
metaphor of some other entity. In this way, the river appears merely as an image [Bild] or 
a representation [Vorstellung] that distracts us thinking the flowing activity of the river 
itself. The issue is closely related to the essence of poesy and its difference from poetic 
dwelling, which needs to be clarified.  
																																																								
142 Władysław Tatarkiewicz, A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics, 246. 
143 Władysław Tatarkiewicz, A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics, 248. 
144 (The Ister, 17-18) 
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In the 1930s, Heidegger initially juxtaposes poetic language with everyday 
language. According to Heidegger, the latter signifies the corrupted” form of language: 
“Poetic saying, however, falls into decline and becomes genuine, and then bad ‘prose’, 
which eventually becomes idle-talk”.145 Here Heidegger’s critique of “everyday language” 
must be questioned. Separating poetic language from everyday language as such yields to 
a dualistic mode of thinking on the issue. However, the corruptness of everyday discourse 
that Heidegger mentions here is an outcome of our “relation” to language. In the 1934 
lecture course Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, Heidegger 
makes the following remark concerning the relationship between the poet and the works 
of poetry: 
 
However, the poet is not he who writes verses about the respective present. Poetry 
is no soothing for enthused little girls, no charm for the aesthetes, who believe that 
art is for savoring and licking. True poetry is the language of that being [Sein] that 
was forespoken to us a long time ago already and that we have never before caught 
up with. 146 
 
Heidegger’s interpretation of poetry and art here alerts us to the fact that the matter at 
hand is not the mere production of poesy. Accordingly, Heidegger does not see poetry 
merely as an aesthetic and high use of language147, but on the contrary, he sees poetic 
dwelling as the originary source of poesy. The significance of poetry does not lie in its 
literary value, but in the fact that it allows us to get near to the experience of dwelling in 																																																								
145 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymns Germania and Rhine, trans. William McNeill and Julia 
Ireland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 59. 
146 Martin Heidegger, Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, trans. Wanda 
Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), 141-142. 
147 That being said, it must be noted that in the 1930s and 1940s, Heidegger’s ideas about the 
meaning of language are not well defined. We see Heidegger operating, at times, in the earlier 
register of the essence of language as discourse [Rede] as he designated in Being and Time. On the 
other hand, it is also clear from some of his rather fragmentary writings, such as the Contributions 
to Philosophy and The Event, that his thinking on the meaning of language already took course in 
a different direction compared to Being and Time period. This is the transition period in 
Heidegger’s thought on language, and thus, his investigations on Hölderlin’s poetry constitute the 
primary attempts to construct a more comprehensive view of language. 
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place.148 Only if one can dwell poetically, then poesy can possess an authentically poetic 
element. This poetic element, as I have explicated, is creativity with regards to one’s 
existence, which means one’s capacity to “measure” the dimension within which one’s 
existence takes place. This act of measuring is related to one’s nearness to the limits of 
existence, which is demarcated by one’s death. As such, the poetic “measure” of creativity 
is one’s active participation of the happening (mutual conditioning) of the fourfold, where 
building as making and creating can occur. The river teaches human beings this creative 
“measure” of engaging with place and thus it cannot be a metaphorical “representation” or 
“image”. 
For Heidegger, the most essential poesy would be the one that shows the poetical 
essence of poetry, and this is precisely the reason why he engages with Sophocles’ 
Antigone and Hölderlin’s “The Ister” in the same context.149 If poetry requires one to 
remain in a poetic relation to place, which is more fundamental than the act of producing 
poetic-literary works of art, then, poetic discourse means the kind of discourse that can 
show forth language in its unfolding as the “dwelling place” of human existence. In other 
words, with essential works of poetry, we can experience the poetic essence of language 
as the site (place) [Ort, topos] of poetical dwelling. This is why not all poetic discourse is 
essentially poetic, because not all works of poetry allow us to acknowledge the essence of 
poetical dwelling in its “taking place”. The poetical and topological essence of language is 
that it provides the space in which one can build and dwell. For as the original meaning of 
the word poiesis indicates, “poetizing” essentially means “making”, particularly making 
by “measuring”. This means that if we miss the poetic understanding of language as the 																																																								
148 “This poietic force is to be thought idiomatically as Dichtung, which does not refer specifically 
to verse, poetry, or literature, but instead indicates the inventive momentum of artworks […] 
Dichtung refers to the poietic register of language, which comes to be disclosed in a special, 
transformed relation to language.” Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013), 130. 
149 “Language is not poetry because it is the primal poesy; rather, poesy takes place in language 
because language preserves the original nature of poetry”. (Poetry, Language, Thought, 72) 
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dwelling place of human existence, we also risk missing the core of the issue of language 
and dwelling. In that regard, the adjective poetic [dichterisch] principally describes the 
“creative” way in which one relates oneself to language as the dwelling place where any 
building can come to occur.  
 
I. 7 From The Fourfold to Place and Language 
 
Thus far I have shown the way in which “the between” appears as the site of poetic 
dwelling and how to link poetry with the idea of poetic dwelling in Heidegger’s thought, 
mainly departing from a topological examination of Antigone and the Ister, focusing on 
the meaning of “creativity” with regards to the essence of poetic making and existence. 
The poet, as the dweller of “the between” shows forth the meaning of language as the 
onto-ethical dwelling place of human existence. In that vein of thinking, the central 
arguments of the section are as follows: 1) Heidegger’s mature account of the fourfold in 
the late-1940s develops on the basis of his earlier lecture courses on Hölderlin. 2) 
Heidegger arrives at the notion of the fourfold by engaging with the idea of mortality in a 
topological manner, mainly bringing up the question of the dimensions and regions of 
dwelling. 3) Heidegger lays the foundations of his mature account of language from the 
1940s and 1950s on the basis of the notion of the fourfold as the taking place of dwelling. 
Therefore, this section will be about how showing the basis of the fourfold allows us to 
understand Heidegger’s later account of language.  
We find the final version of Heidegger’s fourfold in The Thing essay, which is 
originally a lecture course from 1949-50 given in Bremen. As I have shown, Heidegger 
commenced to develop the notion in the 1930s, by focusing on the relation between the 
mortals and immortals, and by issuing human beings’ dwelling place in the world. In the 
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Origin of the Work of Art essay, the strife between the earth [Erde] and the world [Welt] 
was a significant element of the mutual conditioning that takes place between the 
constituents of the fourfold.150 The difference between these two notions comes to the fore 
in Heidegger’s discussion of Van Gogh’s 1885 painting “A pair of Shoes”.151 As ordinary 
“things”, the pair of shoes belongs to the world of the peasant. The world of the peasant 
means the web of significances that determine and shape the context of her life. The pair 
of shoes that are used in the field shows forth the world of the peasant, and in doing so; it 
immediately summons us to understanding the peasant’s relation to the earth, because the 
peasant earns his life from the earth. As a “thing”, the pair of shoes appears as “the 
between” (that which discloses and gathers) of our understanding of them and their 
material presence. The realm of significance within which peasant’s life makes sense is 
distinct from the earth, where the peasant’s material life continues. The earth gives 
concrete space for the world of the peasant, while the world of the peasant allows the earth 
to have a meaning and appear as the earth to our understanding. The strife between the 
two is a back and forth movement. Without the earth, the world does not exist; yet without 
the world, the earth does not appear as the earth, and remains as an unintelligible physical 
matter out there.  
In his later work, Heidegger replaced the notion of the “world” with the “sky”. As 
such, the earth and the sky constituted the two ends of the axis of “spatiality”. The main 
reason for this should be that Heidegger aimed to avoid presenting the two-way interplay 
between the earth and the world as a dualism that is suggestive of the philosophical 
dispute between “idealism” (the world) and “realism” (the earth). It is possible to interpret 
the case as follows: Later Heidegger acknowledged that earth appears as the earth insofar 
as human beings have a world, just as much any world can exist if and only if there is the 																																																								
150 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 61) 
151 (Basic Writings, 159) 
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earth. This has two significances: 1) the earth does not stand in a mere opposition to the 
world, just as the earth cannot even make sense beyond the hermeneutic capacities of 
human beings as mortals. Only insofar as there is a human world, there is the earth 
available to the intelligence of human existence. 2) The earth appears as the earth only for 
the mortals. It never signifies mere soil or ground. In order to recognize the earth as the 
earth, human beings need to have a direct relation to the changing of the seasons, the 
growth of plants, the lives of the animals. They must work with and on the earth in order 
to understand it. Only insofar as the earth appears as that which conditions their existence, 
the earth appears as the ground of their journeying from birth to death. In that sense, the 
earth can appear as the place of “the between” for the mortals.  
Replacing the world with the sky (and/or heaven) and placing the immortals as 
those who can condition the existence of human beings, Heidegger designates two sites of 
dwelling that represent two modes of being. The four components of the fourfold, sky, 
earth, immortals and mortals, constitute the “world” as the place of the thing. The thing is 
that by which the unity of the four takes place. In other words, the thing, such as the 
jug152, is the medium by which the mortals find their orientation on the earth, in remaining 
open to the appearance of a sense of holiness. Insofar as it is the thing that gathers the 
four, the thing appears as the place of the happening of the fourfold.153 The two 
dimensions of dwelling are mortality and immortality, which establish the “temporal” 154 
																																																								
152 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 171) 
153 Yet, the “thing” appears as the “thing” insofar as there is language. 
154 When the “spatial” is placed against “temporal” as such, we must be careful to distinguish the 
topological unity that is at issue, so that “time” and “space” are not to be merely conceived as 
binary notions. Time and space co-emerge from the topos of dwelling. As such, it is important to 
note that regarding the issue of temporality, Sheehan acknowledges Heidegger’s topological 
understanding of the notion: “In 1969 he [Heidegger] redefined “temporality” (Zeitlichkeit) as 
man’s original dis-closedness or openedness, ἀλήϑεια-1. We would do well, therefore, to retire the 
word “temporality” from Heidegger scholarship, or at least to put it under heavy erasure, when 
speaking of the thrown-open (“ex-static”) dis-closedness of ex-sistence.” Thomas Sheehan, 
Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 168-
169. 
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axis of the fourfold, while the “spatial” axis consists of the sky and the earth. Heidegger 
writes at the beginning of The Thing essay: “All distances in time and space are 
shrinking.”155 This is the same idea that appeared in The Ister lectures that led Heidegger 
to modify the concept of temporality with “journeying” [Wanderschaft] and spatiality with  
“site” [Ortschaft] in order to draw attention to the significance of rethinking our relation to 
time and space. This is the way in which Heidegger ventures to examine the possibility of 
undergoing a new experience with the place of dwelling, which is also the commencement 
of his thinking on the possibility of undergoing a new experience with language as the 
event, that is, two-fold unfolding of topos. 
The fourfold is the most crucial concept in Heidegger’s late account of dwelling. 
With that concept Heidegger aims to develop his implicit understanding of place as the 
open bounded. In that sense, the fourfold appears as an advanced formulation of the early 
“being-in-the-world” [In-der-Welt-sein] from Being and Time156. Now, the meaning of 
dwelling exceeds the limits of human world.157 That being said, the fourfold cannot be 
made sense of as an immediately present state of correlations that can be readily found in 
the nature as such. In that sense, my approach concerning the fourfold is similar to 
Mitchell’s reading. Mitchell attempts to “take Heidegger at his word” in explaining the 
notion of the fourfold in relation to the idea of the thing [Ding]158, which I interpret in 
relation to the topological grounds upon which the conception of the fourfold is 
constructed. As Mitchell suggests, “Once again, if we think we have got hold of the 
between by finding it between two presences, we have lost it […] the between is thus the 
																																																								
155 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 163) 
156  This is an important issue that I also discuss in the last chapter, in comparing the “fourfold” 
and “being-in-the-world”. 
157 (On The Way to Language, 106) 
158  Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2015), 4. 
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site of relations, not of presences”159. In discussing the “medium” and the “relation”, 
Mitchell argues:  
 
The medium is not simply “between” the things, rather, in some abstract 
geometrical sense, it surrounds them. The things are immersed in it.  It is the field 
of their interaction, that through which streams the relations that they maintain.160 
 
What Mitchell here peculiarly calls “some abstract geometrical sense”, is precisely the 
topological element that I have been discussing. The following passage from Malpas 
explains further the necessity of a topological engagement, especially with regards to the 
relation between the place of human being in the world, and how the fourfold draws 
attention to the question of place: “What threatens dwelling is, indeed, the loss of such 
questionability, the loss of concealment, the loss of finitude and boundedness—the loss, 
one might say, of the nearness to the holy, of a proper “ethos,” of a proper place.161 
Mitchell argues that, in Heidegger scholarship the fourfold is taken out of the 
Heideggerian context that to which it needs to be brought back.162 The main issue 
regarding the fourfold is to explain what “relationality” is about. A mere description and 
elaboration of the constituents of the fourfold, mortals, immortals, sky and earth, does not 
suffice in terms of explaining why and how they are related to one another. Furthermore, 
saying that things are all the way down relational does not add much of new information. 
What we need to learn is the essence of the dynamic movement, the nature of the “event“ 
itself that gathers the four constituents that condition one another. 
Heidegger’s notion of the fourfold is an attempt to explicate human beings’ “onto-
ethical” situation with regards to the reciprocal movement as journeying between the near 																																																								
159  Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2015), 121. 
160 Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger, 5. 
161 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
2006), 277. 
162 Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger, 4. 
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and the distant. This is why he claims that the question of nearness and distance cannot be 
asked via the notions of calculable time and space, just as the question of dwelling needs 
to be primarily posed onto-ethically (topologically) and not spatially, geographically, 
historically, politically, sociologically and such. The fact that I can take the next plane to 
fly wherever I wish to go does bring no nearness or connectedness, but on the contrary, by 
concealing the time and place in-between, it destroys the possibility of nearness. Malpas 
suggests how the thing and place should be considered in connection, especially with 
regards to the issue that Heidegger’s fourfold brings out: 
 
The way in which the question of nearness, and of the thing, are here tied together 
is indicative of the way in which what is at issue in both the question of nearness 
and the question of the thing is the question of the “there/here,” of “place,” for it is 
only in relation to “there/here,” only in relation to place, that anything can be near 
or far.163  
 
As Heidegger writes, “the persisting nature of nearness is not the interstice, but the 
movement paving the way for the face-to-face of the regions of the world's fourfold. This 
movement is nearness in the nature of nighness.”164 Although the fourness of the fourfold 
may give rise to the impression that it is a square-like structure that consists of four fixed 
points, the very movement that connects the four components must be a circular one: 
 
The fouring, the unity of the four, presences as the appropriating mirror-play of the 
betrothed, each to the other in simple oneness. The fouring presences as the 
worlding of world. The mirror-play of world is the round dance of appropriating. 
Therefore, the round dance does not encompass the four like a hoop. The round 
dance is the ring that joins while it plays as mirroring. Appropriating, it lightens 
the four into the radiance of their simple oneness.165 
 
																																																								
163 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
2006), 227. 
164 (On the Way to Language, 104) 
165 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 178) 
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The circular round–dance [Gering] points out the fact that dwelling does not get initiated 
by any of the regions, but all components of the fourfold simultaneously partake in the 
happening of this constant and circular movement.166  If the “fouring” movement of the 
fourfold is activated by the event [Ereignis], which also means the mutual “appropriation” 
of the dimensions of the fourfold, and if this is meant to represent the very emergence of 
the “there” [Da] as the world of human existence, then, this implies that this very 
movement shows the very interaction between the human beings and the unfolding of 
being that occurs as an inter-play. It is their gathered disclosure in place that situates them 
in the same interaction and interplay. Fourfold is precisely this “play-field” [Spielraum], 
the mirroring mutual conditioning.  
  
I. 8 The Fourfold: Capobianco, Sheehan, Malpas on Truth, Meaning and 
Place 
 
In terms of the question of the fourfold and dwelling, Heidegger’s is mainly concerned 
with the possibility of providing a poetic paradigm within which humans can come to 
reconsider their relation to the world. Only after refining the way in which they comport 
themselves to things, human beings can pose the question of being under a new light, 
which would allow for a new interpretation of the meaning of being to emerge. In recent 
Heidegger scholarship, human beings’ relation to being, as well as the question as to the 
meaning and truth of being, has become a point of focus. Two central Heidegger scholars, 
namely Sheehan and Capobianco, disagree as to whether it is self manifestation of “being 
itself” that renders human beings as the kind of beings that they “are”, or instead, whether 
																																																								
166 Starting from the 1950s, Heidegger defines the nature of letting-dwell “regioning” [Gegnen], 
which derives from the German word “gegen” that means “against”, but also “toward”. So the 
notion has both the “nearing” and “distancing” associations, signalling a two-way motion. 
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it is the hermeneutic structure of human existence that projects and makes sense of being. 
Discussing these two conflicting standpoints will help me to emphasize the necessity of 
looking into the issue from a topological perspective by engaging with the question of 
language and dwelling. 
According to Capobianco, being [Sein] remains the single issue for Heidegger’s 
thinking, and being amounts to the truth [aletheia] of being, or as later Heidegger called it, 
the “appropriation”, or “event”. [Ereignis]. Capobianco contends the idea that it is human 
logos, which he considers our self-conscious intelligence that permits us to comprehend 
being as such. The idea is that the manifestation of being itself overflows our 
transcendental sense-making capacities. It is rather that we understand ourselves as human 
beings thanks to the emergence of being itself. For Capobianco, later Heidegger 
consistently tried to set himself free from the transcendental-phenomenological 
philosophy of consciousness that interprets being as that which exists in the human 
consciousness. He associates this line of thinking with Sheehan’s recent reading of 
Heidegger. In Capobianco's interpretation, it is being as aletheia and physis that 
determines human beings’ way of being. In short, if there is no manifestation of being, 
then, there is no understanding–meaning of being either. Capobianco claims:  
 
[I]nsofar as there is manifestation, emergence, is there meaning at all. Thus, Being 
qua manifestation is structurally prior to, and the ontological condition of, 
meaning. Being structurally precedes and exceeds meaning. Being is irreducible to 
meaning.167  
 
In other words, for us to be able to make sense of anything, being itself must become 
manifest. The fact that we are, ontologically precedes the fact that we are the kind of 
species that comport themselves to understand the meaning of being. Human beings are 																																																								
167 Richard Capobianco, Heidegger’s Way of Being (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 
4. 
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the “there” [Da] (to-which) of the manifestation of being. In that, they are simply 
receptive. If human beings can respond to the manifestation of being as the “there”, it is so 
by virtue of the fact that they remain secondary and passive in this occurrence of the act of 
self-manifesting. As Capobianco argues, “Yet die Sache: not principally Dasein, but Sein 
qua manifestation – what Heidegger came to call “the truth of Being” – in relation to 
Dasein.”168 If there is no “being”, then there can be no “there” and “being-there” [Dasein] 
either. The “there” that refers Dasein’s worldliness is primarily opened up by the self-
manifestation of being. Human beings are mere passive receivers of the ways in which 
physis spatiotemporally springs out. 
Sheehan argues for the opposite position. He states that being [Sein] has never 
been the actual matter of Heidegger’s inquiries.169 If this were the case, he claims, 
Heidegger would not have been any different from other philosophers in the history of 
philosophy. It is characteristic of a metaphysical approach, delineating the substance of 
being with countless different conceptualizations, such as idea, ousia, God, absolute mind, 
will, will to power, etc., which Heidegger seeks to eliminate. The very core of Heidegger’s 
thought is that he tried to understand the fundamental existential structure that gives rise to 
an “understanding” of being170, namely, whatever it is that allows us to issue the meaning 
of being in the first place. In other words, it is about the source that allows us to consider 
things as things. Sheehan asserts that it would be impossible to imagine something like 
being, let alone grasp or be open to the manifestation of being, if first and foremost we do 
not possess the hermeneutic sense-making capacities that we possess. In order to be able 																																																								
168 Richard Capobianco, Heidegger’s Way of Being (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 
4. 
169 “I try to make sense of Heidegger by showing that his work, both early and late, was not about 
“being” as Western philosophy has understood that term for over twenty-five hundred years, but 
rather about sense itself: meaningfulness and its source” in Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of 
Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), xi. 
170 One thing that I should mention here is, as a matter of fact, Capobianco is not interested in the 
“conception” of being, but rather, he concerns himself with “experiencing” the happening of 
being, which is a point that Sheehan might be missing. 
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to perceive and cognize phenomenal objects, I need to have eyes and a nervous system 
that transmits signals to the brain. This does not mean that things out there do not exist if I 
am blind, just as it does not mean that it is my “seeing” that makes things to exist in the 
external world. But insofar as the act of “seeing” is what is at stake, I would not be able to 
see things as things without my eyes. Likewise, if I do not have the hermeneutic structure 
that constitutes my existence as the openness of being, I cannot be able to make sense of 
things in terms of their being. We are all essentially hermeneutic and thrown into the 
world as understanding beings.171 Things are not mere stuff for us, but they make sense to 
us as things with meaning. The core of Sheehan’s account is that we always find ourselves 
already attuned to the world, making sense of thing. Even someone who claims that 
phenomena in the world do not make any sense, her/his criterion for making this judgment 
would be measured against our capacity of understanding. According to Sheehan:  
We are a hermeneutical field of force, like a magnet that draws things together into 
unities of sense insofar as these things are connected with a possibility of ourselves 
as the final point of reference. Anything outside the scope of our embodied 
hermeneutical ken does not make sense.172  
 
Said differently, we could physically exist just like other material entities, but this would 
not even become an issue for us. Otherwise, like some animals who have no visual 
capacities to see certain colours, we would be being-blind, if we did not wear these 
hermeneutical lenses.  
One of the reasons why Sheehan and Capobianco disagree is because they do not 
focus on the situated character of the interaction between being and human beings. On the 
one hand, there is some sort of physical existence out there, and certainly it is possible to 
assume that the presence of the cosmos is independent from our conscious making sense 
																																																								
171 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2015), 104. 
172 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, 104. 
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of it. Yet, being needs the presence of some kind of entity that comports itself to the 
meaningful appearance of things and makes sense of them as things. It is in this way being 
can be understood as meaningfully recognizable reality. However, it is also possible to 
look to the issue from a topological perspective: being and human beings need to be 
gathered in the same event that puts them in contact, a site in which being can appear to 
human being, as well as human being can remain receptive and approach to the self-
manifesting of being. The very act of remaining in this neighbourhood is the primary 
meaning of dwelling. This is the site of the event, as the dwelling place of human 
existence, which “situates” both an understanding and experience of being and the self-
manifestation of being, in the same interplay. In other words, the event situates both being 
and human being in the same site of dwelling and correspondence, which is “the 
between”. 
In Heidegger scholarship, Malpas advocates the view that “to be” means “to be 
situated” in place. Following Heidegger, Malpas refutes the view that the situated nature 
of our being in place is meant in a metaphorical way. We stand in a relation to the world 
insofar as we perceive the situated nature of the thing. The thing opens up itself to the 
world, which is a dimension within which the interaction and relationality of things takes 
place in the mode of a correspondence.173 It is in this “open-boundedness” that I can 
approach and perceive the thing in its being, and in this way the thing can appear in my 
field of understanding as a thing to be meaningfully understood. The essence of that 
relation is two-fold, as both my understanding of the thing and the thing’s self-disclosure 
towards me is a reciprocal event. This is the opening up of the world via the thing. The 
happening of the place is this middle region as a between, the medium that gathers my 
being and the being of things in the same open-boundedness.  																																																								
173 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
2006), 248.  
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Malpas’ account of place has Aristotelian and Heideggerian sources: 1) the liminal 
understanding of place as topos as the bounding vessel, and 2) the understanding of place 
as Ort and Ortschaft as the happening of meaningful presencing from the “there” [Da], 
which is the event [Ereignis]. With Malpas’ spatial and topological investigations of the 
notion of the fourfold, the understanding of place as open bounded comes to the fore: 
place is that which delimits the opening up of space, as well as the opening that discloses 
the boundaries of the space.174 Place is neither an enclosed container nor mere infinite 
openness, but on the contrary, it is that which both provides the journeying while 
demarcating the limits of its boundary.  
Malpas elaborates the spatial characteristics of place by thinking in terms of 
Aristotle’s notion of topos from his Physics. In the history of philosophy, Aristotle’s 
account of place is one of the first explicit discussions of place qua place.175 His 
explications with regards to the notion of movement176 and corporeality of being are also 
essential for better understanding Heidegger’s discussion of place and boundary. The first 
premise that Aristotle considers is the view that “whatever exists exists somewhere”177. 
This holds true for all phenomena except for the “unmoveable mover”, which is located 
outside of “place”. If everything must be somewhere, then, that which is encompassed and 
contained in that “space” also must be somewhere; however, this process of containment 
cannot go on ad infinitum. This is where we observe the immediate relationship between 
“body” and “place”, a connection that is fundamental for Aristotle’s account. 
																																																								
174 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World, 221. 
175 What Malpas is hesitant in explaining in detail, but what I find crucial is that in Aristotle’s 
examination of the concept of place as topos appears as the precondition of movement [kinesis] in 
Physics. Aristotle, Physics, I-IV, vol. 1-2, trans. Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 277–327. 
176 The translator of Physics warns us that the notion of movement [kinesis] has many different 
meanings, such as the transition between places, passaging, as well as growth from a sapling into a 
tree. Aristotle, Physics, I-IV, vol. 1-2, trans. Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford, 274. 
177 Aristotle, Physics, IV, 1, 208 a 80–81. 
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In his discussion of topos, Aristotle examines the links between space, spatiality 
and the location of beings.178 We must note that, in Physics Aristotle is not interested in a 
hermeneutical discussion of place with regards to the issue of human dwelling. These are 
issues that belong to the domain “ethics”, where ethos is thematized in terms of the habits 
(custom) of human character. In Physics, he concerns himself with the location of beings, 
thus he addresses place as that which holds the phenomenon in a specific location. 
Accordingly, place itself is not a body in which beings are located. Namely, if place were 
to be a body, then the body that it contains would have no place in which it could exist. In 
this way, two bodies would collapse into one another, which is not possible.179  
Aristotle denies the view that place can be conceived of as a content (hyle) or a 
form (eidos), which is a direct criticism of Plato’s notion of place as “chora” that he 
developed in Timaeus as the infinite womb, or spectacle that which includes everything in 
the universe.180 In that regard, Aristotle also refutes that an object cannot be encompassed 
in itself, again, in light of the idea that an object’s place must be something other than the 
object itself, because both matter and form are already contained in the nature of the 
object. 
Aristotle’s own account of place comes in the chapter IV of the Physics. For 
Aristotle, the place of a thing is the inner surface of the envelope in which it is 
encompassed. That which embraces the phenomenon in its entirety, yet at the same time, 
that through which the phenomenon is wholly distinguished from its spatial location, is the 
proper place of that entity. In other words, that which embodies the object also constitutes 
its place. The place of the object remains attached to the surface of it. The object’s proper 																																																								
178 Malpas argues that Heidegger’s early discussion of “insideness” [Inwendigkeit] is where we see 
an Aristotelian notion of spatial containment. See: Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, 
Place, World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 69-70. 
179 Aristotle, Physics, IV, 1, 209 a 5–8. 
180  Sallis discusses Plato’s “chora” in his significant study on the topic. See: John Sallis, 
Chorology: On Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. 
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place touches the outside surface of itself. As such, the place of the object completely 
envelops the body of the object. Therefore, place is not the dimensional extension that 
stretches between the object and that in which it is contained, but place is that which 
embodies the body of the object by corporeally surrounding it. If this is so, then, wherever 
I move, I am already embodied in my own place that contains me and distinguishes me 
from my outside as my boundary [peras]. My extension in space can only begin to the 
extent that my body is bounded in place. Place is inseparably enclosed to the body that it 
encompasses, and therefore place is intrinsically related to the particular object that it 
embodies. Otherwise the thing would be incorporeal, that is, it would be placeless. 
Although Aristotle’s discussion of place is in spatial terms, it does not consider place as a 
mere mathematical-geometrical space, but rather as a vessel that embodies the 
phenomenon in a particular way. 
It is significant to note in that context that Aristotle also makes explicit the 
relationship between movement and place. Aristotle argues: “We must recognize that no 
speculations as to place would ever have arisen had there been no such thing as 
movement, or change of place.”181 As Brogan points out: 
 
A natural being for Aristotle is never reducible to its material extension. It is 
always a concrete being, a tode ti, a “this”. Only that which is a being can take its 
place and leave it. Place is not an indifferent container that defines the being. 
Rather, the being arrives in its place and thereby its place first comes to be.182 
 
Aristotle explains this relationship between place and movement with the example of the 
location of a boat floating on the river. When the boat changes its location, if the place of 
the body is also in motion, this means that the boat nevertheless remains embodied and 
																																																								
181 Aristotle, Physics, IV, 1, 211 a 15–18. 
182 Walter A. Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2005), 36. 
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situated. Although the physical location of the boat may change from one location to 
another, the boat, in each and every case, has its own embodied space. Aristotle explains 
this by stating that “place [is] an ‘immovable vessel’, and vessel [is] a ‘moveable 
place’”183 The proper place of the boat is not the flowing water, the river bed, the banks of 
the river, or the empty space which is filled with the extension of the river. The place of 
the boat is the unity of that which environs and embodies river, and as such, river 
constantly appears as the site of the boat.184 In its flowing movement, although the 
location of the boat on the river changes, its place remains the same because the boat has 
its proper place that can move with itself independent of where it moves in space. 
Aristotle issues the link between kinesis and topos in terms of physical space and 
containment. In that context, I also consider the necessity of the relationship between 
movement and place in “onto-ethical” and hermeneutic terms. Although Aristotle’s 
account of place as topos does not tell us what a dwelling place is, nevertheless, a 
significant aspect of topos becomes explicit on the basis of an understanding of the 
movement of things. In that sense, dwelling in place does not indicate a mere remaining in 
a particular location, but rather it indicates the interaction and interplay between place and 
movement. In light of this idea, we can see the reason why Heidegger calls the later phase 
of his thought “topology of being” and not “chorology of being”. The notion of “chora” 
constitutes the basis of Plato’s account of place. Plato prioritizes the spatial locatedness of 
all phenomena in space. As such, chora emerges as the womb of things, whereas 
Aristotelian topos indicates the bodily interface between beings: being means being-in-
																																																								
183 Aristotle, Physics, IV, 1, 212 a 15–16. 
184 Aristotle, Physics, IV, 1, 212 a 20 
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movement.185 The place of a thing does not only signify the “where”, that is, but rather it 
also indicates the movement and interface between whence and whither. 
These clarifications of Aristotle’s account of place brings us back to the question 
of the event [Ereignis] and the fourfold, and its relation to the two characteristics of place, 
boundedness and openness. In The Thing essay, the simple diagram that Heidegger 
illustrated shows a capital E signifying the “event” [Ereignis] with a note next to it that 
reads “there” [Da]. This could be interpreted as meaning the taking place of the event is 
also the taking place of the “there” [Da].186 What does that mean? 1) In an ontological 
register, the event denotes the spatiotemporal emergence of all entities in nature, 
becoming what they are as entities. 2) In an “onto-ethical” register, the event is the 
gathering of being and human beings in the same site of being, where the meaning of 
things could be understood and experienced by human beings via dwelling in place. The 
event is not a particular political or historical event, but rather it is the primary happening 
that makes things to appear and make sense as the kind of beings that they are.  
It must be noted that in Heidegger’s diagram, the event as the cleared-open region 
appears at the very centre of the fourfold. “There” [Da] that is at issue is the “t/here” of 
the being-there [Da-sein] as the essence of the existence of human beings, where the 
unconcealment of being occurs. As such, the place is the “t/here” in the sense that it is 
both the openness of being and the centre of gravity of the fourfold. By issuing the there 
[Da], event [Ereignis] and the fourfold [Geviert] in the same context, Heidegger wishes to 
develop the meaning of the Da as the site of nearness within the boundaries of which the 																																																								
185 As Brogan suggests: “It is this way of being that directs and makes possible the kinds of motion 
that beings undergo. This way of being is physis. Physis is the arche of beings that move 
according to their nature. Physis is not motion but the arche of the motion in beings such that it 
lets them be the beings they are.” Walter A. Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of 
Being (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), 79. 
186 In their respective readings, Malpas and Mitchell agree on this point that the capital E refers the 
Ereignis. Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 2006), 226; Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2015), 118. 
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self-opening, manifestation of being as the event, takes place.187 This means the open-
bounded allows for the near and the distant to come into an interplay.  
Now, in addition to Malpas’ account of place as the “open bounded”, according to 
Heidegger this “middle” ground, the open bounded and the place of nearness where 
human beings find the possibility of dwelling, is the topological meaning of “language” as 
place. Language, as “the between”, as Heidegger calls is, the “relation of all relations”188. 
The relationality that takes place with and within the fourfold is not some arbitrary, 
neutral correlativity. It does not signify a mere context of neutral connections. It is the 
emergence of the possibility of any interrelation to appear in the same context. It follows 
that one of the definitions of language for Heidegger is as follows: language is the most 
basic contextual ground that in, through and by which things are gathered and disclosed to 
one another as relevant and meaningful structures and entities. In other words, before 
language comes to signify “discourse”, it refers to the place of the meaningful emergence 
of the world that hosts the meaningful co-responsiveness of things.  
With Heidegger’s explorations into the nature of event and fourfold, we discover 
an implicit sense of language as the between of being and human being, as the central 
movement and kinetic space. As such, I claim that Heidegger understands language not 
simply as discourse, but as that larger context of correspondence of being and human 
being via the event, which makes space for any intelligibility, discourse and 
communication. Language can never come to mean mere communication at first, but 
initially it appears as the ground upon which any communication as interaction can take 
place. We can ask why do we have to call such a phenomenon language? We could not we 
call this topological register of language “intelligibility” or “understanding” because 
language does not only signify the mere understanding or processing a set of facts, but 																																																								
187 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 60) 
188 (On the Way to Language, 107) 
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also the act of making space for responding to what we perceive. The happening of 
language has a place-character because of the reciprocal interplay in which it places 
human beings vis-à-vis being.  
Let me remind us how we arrived at this topological significance of language. At 
the commencement of this chapter I delved into the debate between Capobianco and 
Sheehan in attempting to resolve the disagreement concerning the place and role of human 
being in terms of its relation to being. I proposed a topological way of seeing the issue by 
focusing on the “place” of being, where the “truth” of the “meaning” of being can come to 
unfold. After having clarified Aristotle’s account of place and the relation between topos 
and kinesis, I have mentioned Malpas’ thought of place, which emphasizes the situated 
nature of human existence in place. According to Malpas’ understanding of place as the 
open bounded, human existence is bounded by its finitude, yet always facing the openness 
of the self-manifestation of being in making sense of things in the world. Here I have two 
arguments: 1) If human existence is situated in place, and if the place of poetic dwelling is 
“the between”, I interpret this onto-ethical “between” and “medium” to be language which 
both encompasses human being, while both placing human being in the openness of an 
understanding of being 2) If the fourfold is Heidegger’s later designation of the meaning 
of dwelling in the world, and if Heidegger considers the event as the happening of the 
“there” [Da], then, the happening of “place” also indicates the happening of “language” as 
the medium, which situates immortals, mortals, sky and earth in the same “circular” 
movement in the neighbourhood of one another. In other words, language can be 
understood as a site of correspondence, as well as the happening of the “medium”. 
Dwelling in language as the site of the event, human existence is both active and passive, 
both venturing towards the meaning of being, as well as receiving the manifestation of 
being.  
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In light of these views, it appears that the topological dimension within which 
poetic dwelling takes place constitutes the basis of the broader sense of language that 
Heidegger aimed to bring to the fore in his subsequent thought. Therefore we should not 
look for a simplistic concept of language in Heidegger’s thought as a means of 
communication, but we should look for a richer understanding of language by considering 
the “interaction” and “relation” between human beings and being, as well as by looking 
into the nature of being situated in place. In this chapter I have shown that what Heidegger 
comes to mean by “language” can only be discovered after having examined what “poetic 
dwelling” means. In the next chapter, I will investigate Heidegger’s statement that 
“language is the house of being” in a similar way. 
In this chapter, I have argued that in order to have a better comprehension of 
Heidegger’s later idea of language, we need to understand what it means to have a poetic 
relation to language. Without maintaining this poetic relation to language, its essence does 
not become apparent in its entirety. This required me to examine the place-character of 
dwelling in Heidegger’s thought in the 1930s and 1940s as “the between”, which brought 
us to the meaning of poetic dwelling. Looking to the place-character of our relation to 
language demanded an “onto-ethical” investigation, which I considered to be the main 
feature of hermeneutic topology. With hermeneutic topology, we can have an account of 
the situated essence of human existence as the openness (clearing, or the there [Da]) of 
being in language. In this way, we can develop the argument that Heidegger understands 
dwelling as an action (indeed, an action that does not cause an immediate effect or change, 
but an active way of orienting oneself upon which any praxis is built). This requires us to 




II. The Topological Turn: The “Letter on Humanism” 
 
The main text that I will discuss in this chapter is Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” 
(1947). In the letter, Heidegger advances a strong “onto-ethical” position in looking into 
the essence of language and its significance for human existence by stating that language 
is the “house of being”. Heidegger discusses language as the ethos of human essence, as 
the site of being in which human being first emerges as human being, and dwells. In that 
regard, I will show that Heidegger’s interpretation of ethos determines his understands of 
“ethics” of dwelling in language. As such, Heidegger considers “ethics” and “action” 
beyond the limits of human subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. In that way, the link 
between being, human being, place, and language itself comes to the fore via an 
interpretation of “ethics” linked to the question of dwelling. 
My line of thinking in this chapter will be as follows: 1) I provide an exposition of 
the “Letter on Humanism” in order to show what is at stake with Heidegger’s slogan 
“language is the house of being”. I argue that the slogan needs to be topologically by 
underscoring the “onto-ethical” essence of the relation between human beings and 
language. 2) I show why and how Heidegger problematizes the place of ethics via the 
question of language and dwelling, instead of giving an ethical theory of action, which 
distinguishes his line of thinking from other thinkers. In that regard, I take issue with 
Johanna Hodge’s analysis of Heidegger’s “ethics”. 3) After explaining why Heidegger’s 
“ethics of language” should be read as his “topology of language”, I discuss the 
connection between being, place, and language. I develop the topological argument 
concerning the relationship between Da, as the open and relational site of being, and 
language. In doing so, I return to the Sheehan and Capobianco debate on the issue, in 
order to clarify the meaning of aletheia and its link to place and language. 4) After 
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discussing the meaning of human “existence”, I bring into view Joseph Fell’s comparison 
of Sartre and Heidegger on the question of existence, subjectivity, and humanism, 
showing why Heidegger’s understanding of existence cannot be treated only within the 
boundaries of subjectivity, and that it must be thought in relation to the happening of the 
site of being itself. 5) I conclude the chapter with a detailed discussion on Heidegger’s 
critique of philosophy as metaphysics. I suggest that Heidegger’s topology of language 
constitutes the basis of his post-metaphysical thinking moving to his mature thought on 
language in On the Way to Language.  
 
II. 1 Language, Being, Human Being 
 
At the very outset of the “Letter on Humanism”, Heidegger responds to the following 
question raised by his colleague and friend Jean Beaufret: “How can we restore the 
meaning of humanism in the 20th century?” 189 This question allows Heidegger to open up 
a discussion concerning the relation between being and human being. Initially, I would 
like to emphasize the point that for Heidegger, human being means the kind of being that 
has an explicit relation to its own “being” [Sein] “there” [Da] in the world. The “onto-
ethical” essence of human existence comes before its biological, psychological, 
anthropological characteristics. The entire letter is a reconsideration of that specific 
relation (being–human being), by looking at how language determines the place of 
existence. 
With the question concerning the meaning of humanism, the essence of human 
existence becomes the central issue in the letter. Heidegger mentions Christianity, the 
Renaissance, and Marxism as three distinct examples of “humanism” in the history of the 																																																								
189 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 239-277. (From here on: “Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks) 
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Occident, which he considers inadequate in thinking the “essence” of the human.190 All 
three movements think of the essence of human being with regard to something other than 
its existence. Even Sartre’s “existentialism”, whose subject matter is to re-think the 
meaning of human existence, is an arbitrary one, insofar as he treats “existence” in a 
metaphysical way by putting in a dualistic relation with “essence” (essentia)191. In effect, 
for Heidegger, existence is the way of being of human beings, and in that sense, it is also 
both the essence and existence. Yet, what does the essence of human existence precisely 
amount to? Keeping this question in view, we can read Heidegger’s critique of humanism, 
re-examining the conception of “human” in “humanisms” in Occidental thought. With this 
in view, the focus of the inquiry turns to the question of language in its relation to being as 
that which constitutes and accomplishes the “humanness” of human being. It is within this 
context that I will issue Heidegger’s statement that “language is the house of (the truth of) 
being”. 
Firstly, I claim that Heidegger’s statement concerning the “house of being”, which 
is the most significant idea in the letter with regards to the essence of human existence, 
should not be read as a mere definition of language as discourse [Rede]. It must be thought 
in relation to the “onto-ethical” relationship between being, human being and language. It 
is “ontological” because it is about the link between being and the essence of human 
existence. As I will discuss the relation between ethos, ethics and dwelling, it is “ethical”, 
as it concerns the way in which human being inhabits the world. Yet, it is “ontological” 
and “ethical” in a way that exceeds the limits of both enterprises. Dwelling (wohnen, or as 
often used in the letter, aufenthalten) is an inter-play in which human beings participate, 
																																																								
190 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 244) However, Heidegger also marks that Marxism, in its 
reading of the homelessness and estrangement of human being, is a more adequate designation of 
the human being than other historical interpretations. (p. 258-59.) 
191 I will come back to this topic in two occasions: first, in my discussion of Hodge’s critique of 
Heidegger, and second, in Fell’s comparison of Heidegger and Sartre’s thought. 
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as I have shown in the previous chapter with regard to the idea of the fourfold [Geviert]. 
Dwelling means the taking place of the event [Ereignis] in the sense of the mutual 
appropriation and conditioning of the earth, sky, mortals and immortals. The inter-play 
that dwelling implies the emergence of place as disclosing and gathering, and as I will 
argue, this is also what Heidegger brings into view with the statement that “language is the 
house of being”.  
Wrathall astutely draws attention to the ongoing silence in Heidegger literature 
regarding Heidegger’s “slogan”. He writes:  
 
In secondary literature on Heidegger, the slogan is often invoked but rarely 
deemed to warrant any kind of extended discussion. Almost everybody acts as if it 
is immediately apparent what Heidegger is trying to say: they take it as a 
declaration of the view that the being of entities somehow depends on the 
linguistic expressions we use in thinking or talking about those entities.192  
 
In that framework, Heidegger points out the necessity of a new way of thinking the 
relationship between language and dwelling: 
 
The talk about the house of being is not the transfer of the image "house" onto 
being. But one day we will, by thinking the essence of being in a way appropriate 
to its matter, more readily be able to think what "house" and "dwelling" are.193   
 
Heidegger’s argument in that passage shows that the issue requires a more appropriate 
approach that does not read the statement as a metaphor. This is why I suggest that a 
topological interpretation of the statement is essential, as it precisely helps us avoid 
transferring the image of “house” onto being. On the contrary, we must examine what it 
means for language to be the “house of being” with an analysis that delves into the very 
																																																								
192 Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 120. 
193 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 272) 
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place-character of house and dwelling, and how the matter is tied to the question of 
language. 
In the history of philosophy, especially since Aristotle, one of the defining 
characteristics of human beings has been language as discourse, meaning the capacity to 
speak [logos, Rede]. This has also been interpreted to mean that human beings possess a 
faculty of reason [ratio] that separates them from other living beings. The ancient Greek 
word logos has a broad range of implications such as language, word, reason, law, and 
account. As such, Aristotle’s designation of human being as “zoon echon logon” does not 
only mean “living being that possesses discourse (or discursive intelligence)”. Heidegger 
initially acknowledges Aristotle’s premise that human beings have “logos”, yet he objects 
to the way in which we think the relation between the human being and logos: “This 
essential definition of the human being is not false. But it is conditioned by 
metaphysics”.194 This means that Heidegger does not refute the designation of human 
being as the “rational animal”, but what we mean and understand by it. What does 
“rationality” mean, especially if it is tied to human being’s capacity of speech? In that 
context, Heidegger argues that if language determines human existence, then, it must 
rather be language that possesses the human being. 
According to Heidegger’s account, in the Roman designation of the statement, the 
Greek word logos is reductively translated as ratio meaning “reason”. Human beings are 
“rational animals” [animal rationale]195, namely animals bestowed with logos, for they 
have bodies just like beasts, but in addition they possess “ratio” along with spirit or 
mind.196 However, Heidegger’s argument is that human beings are not “rational” because 
they possess faculty of reason, but on the contrary, because they dwell in the openness of 
																																																								
194 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 246) 
195 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 245) 
196 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 245-246) 
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being as language, they have access to “rationality”. Likewise, human beings are not mere 
animals with additional intellectual qualities such as mind, spirit, soul or likewise. This 
would mean to misunderstand both the essence of animality, as well as the being of human 
beings.  
I have mentioned that one of the peculiar characteristics of Roman philosophy is to 
identify the essence of human existence as animal rationale, i.e., rational animal. For 
Heidegger, Roman philosophy is where we find the origin of the concept of “humanity”, 
interpreted on the basis of Roman ideals of what it means to be a “human”. The 
understanding of human being as rational animal, in turn, is based on a peculiar 
interpretation of logos as ratio as reason. Yet, if the validity of the understanding of logos 
as ratio becomes questionable, then, the understanding of the human being as the rational 
animal, as well as the actual meaning of concept of “human” concealed “humanity” also 
turns out to be problematic. The motive that lies at the bottom of Heidegger’s critique of 
the interpretation of zoon echon logon is to refute the designation of the human being 
solely based on its biological-animalistic nature. This is tied to his disagreement with the 
view that considers language only as a mean of communication or self-expression. This 
should not mean that Heidegger ignores the so-called “animalistic” aspects of human 
existence and the communicative use of language in general; however, in order to find out 
human beings’ particular relation to language, we cannot only focus on the linguistic 
process of signification and communication. Heidegger objects to the envisioned dualism 
between the animal as the bodily beast and the human being as the being endowed with 
spirit, mind, consciousness, and such. Human being is not something more than animal by 
virtue of its intellectual or spiritual capacities, for this comparison lacks a firm ground as it 
leaves the “animal” undefined, and imposes a ground of comparison based on only what 
human beings possess and what animals lack, e.g. language as that within which things 
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appear in terms of their being. Looking into the problem of metaphysics neither allows us 
to understand the human being, nor the animalitas of the “animal”.197 Therefore, we must 
consider the question of language beyond the linguistic and communicative features of 
language. 
It is within this framework that Heidegger problematizes the relationship between 
language, dwelling, and place with the statement that “language is the house of being”. 
Heidegger claims: “Language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of 
being.”198  Here, it is evident that Heidegger does not talk about language as speech or 
discourse, which for him designates the unity of phoneme, written character, melody, 
rhythm and meaning.199 This is the animalistic-metaphysical understanding of language 
that considers language solely as a means of communication that carries out the 
transmission and exchange of ideas, emotions, needs, and desires. Indeed, Heidegger does 
not deny that this register of language is vital for our biological and communal needs; 
however, it is not the foundational aspect of our relation to language either. The original 
step in Heidegger’s thought is to consider the origin, ground and unfolding of language. 
This is why Heidegger endeavours to look into the relationship between language and the 
truth of being.  
Though I will discuss the term in detail later in the chapter, here I can clarify that 
the term “truth of being” indicates the ontological event through which the disclosure of 
the meaning of things takes place. The argument is that language is the primary site within 
and of which this very emergence takes place. It is also possible to express this idea as 
follows: the site within which the meaning of things comes to appearance is language. In 																																																								
197 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 246) 
198  (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 243) Here, it is also noteworthy that Heidegger 
emphasizes the notion of “truth of being”. This is an often overlooked point that needs closer 
attention, because discussing it will illuminate the ontological relation between the “truth of 
being” and “place being”, which is crucial to understand the conceptual development of 
Heidegger’s later thinking.  
199 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 254) 
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this second formulation, it becomes even more obvious that language cannot primarily 
signify speech or communication, but things must issue from the happening of language. 
Language is the site of interrelatedness and correspondence, and thus provides the 
possibility to interact with phenomena on a meaningful level. Anything meaningful 
already exists within the boundaries of language, not necessarily as the space of self-
expression and communication, but as the field of the very possibility of coming into 
appearance. Wherever our intelligence finds meaningful, that is, of meaning, we are 
already moving in the region of language, which itself remains in relation to silence.  
In light of these considerations, let me focus on the meaning of “house of being”. 
In Heidegger scholarship, Wrathall draws attention to earlier appearances of the term 
“house of being” in the history of philosophy. He shows that Heidegger’s statement is 
related to Nietzsche’s designation of “house of being”. Heidegger must have been familiar 
with Nietzsche’s views on being and language thanks to his Nietzsche lectures in the mid-
1930s. Nietzsche writes: “Everything breaks, everything is joined [gefügt] anew; the same 
house of being builds itself eternally. Everything parts, everything greets itself again; the 
ring of being remains loyal to itself eternally.”200 The word that Nietzsche uses at this 
instance for ‘enjoining’ has its origins in the etymologically related German words Fug 
and Fuge, which, for Heidegger appears to have broader meanings.201 According to 
Heidegger, Fuge as “jointure” is what keeps the “house of being” together and renders it 
as a place of gathering. This means, the characteristic of “relating and keeping together” is 
one of the most elemental features of Heidegger’s statement that has been previously 
brought up by Nietzsche.  																																																								
200 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Adrian Del Naro, trans. Robert B. Pippin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 175. 
201 In his 1946 essay Anaximander’s Saying, Heidegger translates the ancient Greek word dike 
with the German Fug, as ‘order’, which conventionally means justice or rightfulness. “The 
jointure belongs to what stays awhile which, in turn, belongs in the jointure. The jointure [Fuge] is 
order [Fug]”. (Off the Beaten Track, 269) 
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Karl Jaspers was one of the first critics of Heidegger’s designation of language as 
the “house of being”.202 Wrathall reports203 that in one of his letters to Heidegger, Jaspers 
maintains the view that language should rather be conceived of as a bridge.204 This is 
because, for him, language is the medium of human communication. Here, we must ask 
whether the notion of “medium” indicates a conception of language as a mere device of 
communication. Although I have argued that language is the “middle” space, “the between 
of human being and being, a “means of communication” is not the sense in which the 
issue can be understood in Heidegger’s thought. Only if we understand the “bridge” in the 
topological sense of the happening of the “between”, this would then give us a proper 
definition of the "medium". In this case, language would mean that which makes the 
interrelation and interaction between being and human being possible, instead of being the 
mere tool of communication between individual human beings, as a mere external 
connector. Therefore the betweenness of language that is at issue is not between human 
beings, but between being and human being. As such, we need to think the issue in a non-
subjectivistic vein. The “house of being” is where the essence of human being (existence) 
and the event of being come together, gathered in the site opened up in “the between”.205 
The “medium” is not that a bridge that human beings make or create, but that which 
discloses, gathers and makes any experience [Erfahrung] possible as a “journeying” in the 
first place. 
The primary implications of the description of the topological essence of language 
as the “house of being” are the following: as a manifestation of place the “house of 																																																								
202 Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 135. 
203 Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History, 121 
204 “Karl Jaspers to Heidegger, Letter of August 6, 1949”, in Martin Heidegger and Karl Jasper, 
Martin Heidegger - Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1920–1963, ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner 
(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann/München: Piper, 1990), 179. 
205 The between and the middle ground in terms of human understanding and communication is a 
critical hermeneutic idea for Gadamer, which I discuss in the next chapter. 
		 104	
being”, 1) opens up and provides space, 2) safeguards and protects, and 3) gathers and 
holds together meanings that unfold in it. In other words, language provides things with 
the possibility of appearing in terms of meaning, and preserves meaning in the space that 
it opens up for communication. The key point here is that Heidegger considers language 
as the house of the “truth of being” (aletheia).206 Language is not only a container of 
meanings where they are preserved and encapsulated as ready-made tag words. Language 
does not safeguard the meaning of things, but it safeguards the region in which 
phenomena can come to unfold. In other words, instead of constituting a metaphysical 
“space of meaning”, it lets the “presencing” of the meaning of things. That does not mean 
that language is a subject on its own that can be thought independently of human being. 
The happening of language must be thought in relation to the event [Ereignis]. In effect, 
language, as the house of truth of being, as well as the happening of place, is precisely the 
two-fold movement between being and human being. This is precisely where we need to 
abandon the subjectivistic mode of thinking in associating language with “meaning-
making”. 
Referring to Being and Time, Heidegger writes: “That is why we also say (p. 230) 
that how being, is to be understood chiefly from its "meaning" [Sinn], that is, from the 
truth of being.”207 In this regard Heidegger also claims: 
 
This abode [truth of being] first yields the experience of something we can hold on 
to. The truth of being offers a hold for all conduct. "Hold" in our language means 
protective heed. Being is the protective heed that holds the human being in his ek-
sistent essence to the truth of such protective heed - in such a way that it houses 
ek-sistence in language. Thus language is at once the house of being and the home 
of the human essence. 208 
 
																																																								
206 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 243)  
207 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 257)  
208 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 274) 
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Here, the crucial point that Heidegger suggests is that language, as the house of truth of 
being and as the abode of human dwelling, is the ground of “all conduct”. It is evident that 
Heidegger considers language as the house of being, where the belonging together of 
human being and being “takes place”. Another key point in the passage is that Heidegger 
looks into discussing ethics as ethos in relation to the question of language and dwelling. 
The capacity to understand phenomena as meaningful things via language is the ground of 
all human “conduct”. The simple question ti esti “what is” occurs from this place where 
human beings can comport themselves toward the event through which the unfolding of 
the meaning of things. Put differently, their nearness to the event in the “there” is what 
makes human beings the kind of beings that they are. Human beings “act” on the basis of 
the essential character of its existence. As such, Heidegger brings up the notion of 
“action” within the context of the completion of the humanness of human being which 
appears in the house of being, and not in terms of the “making” of the individuals.  
The concept of “action” that Heidegger discusses at the outset of his letter is 
significant, and understanding it would prepare us for better conceiving the discussion on 
ethos and ethics. According to Heidegger, the meaning of “action” should be understood 
as “fulfilling” and “bringing to completion” [vollbringen] rather than “causing a mere 
effect”.209 It is not the action is that produces the effect, but the action simply allows for 
an effect to come about by being the medium, providing the space of embodiment. The 
action is what enables [vermögt] in the topological sense of “giving space” where things 
can emerge and flourish. In that sense, for Heidegger, the meaning of thinking is to 
“create” with and within language, which is a fundamental action.210 Put in this way, we 
may eliminate the envisaged dichotomy between “acting” and “thinking”. Those who 
create with language, such as the poets and thinkers are the guardians of the “house of 																																																								
209 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 239) 
210 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 239) 
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being”, which means that they protect the middle space in and through which any thinking 
can emerge by inhabiting it. In doing so, they fulfil the essence of being a human being 
simply by “thinking”, because thinking is the most fundamental human action in the sense 
that it is the enabling force of human existence211, which allows for the possibility of all 
human “production” to emerge. This means, where there is no thinking, which is undergo 
an experience with language and journey within its boundaries, there can be no human 
production either.  
The most concrete meaning of this is that the poets preserve the possibility of a 
new understanding of things to become manifest by virtue of remaining in relation to the 
event by dwelling in language. For Heidegger, what first and foremost matters is the 
relation that in which human beings stand to language, and the transformation that our 
understanding of language must undergo. As such, 1) Insofar as our relation to language is 
what is at stake, Heidegger’s account can be interpreted as “ethics of language”, 2) 
However, the kind of “ethics” that Heidegger’s position entails is different from the 
traditional normative, descriptive or applied ethics that think within the framework of the 
“human” or “inter-human”.  Now, we can inquire into the place-nature of Heidegger’s 
“ethics” of language as a questioning on the meaning of being as dwelling in place, by 
considering language as the primary ethos of human existence.  
 
II. 2 “Ethics of Language”: Topology of Language 
 
One way of approaching the “Letter on Humanism” is by focusing on Heidegger’s 
discussion of ethics, in specific with a concentration on the significance of ethos as 																																																								
211 “Thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is 
applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action is presumably the simplest and at the same 
time the highest because it concerns the relation of being to humans.” (“Letter on Humanism”, 
Pathmarks, 239) 
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dwelling place. An investigation concerning the meaning of ethos is key to understand 
what the essence of language amounts to in Heidegger’s “onto-ethical” approach. 
Heidegger argues:  
 
If then, in accordance with the basic meaning of the word ethos, the name ‘ethics’ 
says that it considers the true habitation of human beings [Aufenthalt des 
Menschen], then that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primary 
element of human beings, as something which exists, is already an originary 
ethics. 212  
 
This is the key point in Heidegger’s thought concerning the meaning of ethics as ethos. It 
allows us to see the basis of his topological turn in examining language that becomes 
explicit with the statement that language is the “house of the truth of being”. This is 
because the statement is about the dwelling (habitation) of human existence within the 
boundaries of language. One of the least discussed aspects of Heidegger’s ideas in the 
“Letter on Humanism” is the way in which he distinguishes “ethos” from “ethics”. The 
very basis of his thought on ethics is that he considers human conduct not on the basis of 
moral principles and “oughts”. 
 Another philosopher that comes to mind in terms of the critique of the “ought” is 
Hegel. He challenged the prioritization of “ought” in Kant’s deontology that thematizes 
the moral duties of any rational being on the basis of formal, universal principles of action 
attained by the faculty of practical reason. However, Heidegger’s understanding of ethics 
still vastly differs from that of Hegel’s, even if both seem to go against a deontological 
mode of thinking. For Hegel, any discussion of ethics must start by analysing customary 
forms of life that exist one’s society. The key term for Hegel is Sittlichkeit, which is 
distinct from Moralität. In a certain sense, the distinction between the two is similar to the 
difference between “ethics” and “morality”. Bernard Williams argues that while the 																																																								
212 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 271) 
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former is more about the individual disposition and habit, the latter is about the 
application and the results of one’s actions for and within the society.213 We cannot 
suggest that some actions or dispositions are “moral”, yet any action or disposition with 
moral qualities is always already ethical.  
In that context, we can ask the following question: what is the overall foundation 
of ethical theories, if there are any? What are their basic characteristics? The answer that 
Williams gives allows us to distinguish Heidegger’s position from traditional ethical 
frameworks. I consider the criteria that Williams mentions are sufficiently valid for 
identifying the fundamental framework of paradigmatic ethical theories, and thus it can 
guide us in determining whether Heidegger’s position could be called “ethical” in the 
conventional sense of the term, and if not, why so. Accordingly, an ethical theory usually 
attempts to answer to the originally Socratic question “What should I do”, in thematizing 
and signifying, 1) obligation or duty, 2) actions and dispositions that issue from virtues, as 
well as the moral development of these virtues.214 In Heidegger’s thought of ethos, 
however, there is neither a sense of Sittlichkeit nor Moralität in the traditional sense of the 
terms. For Heidegger, both the “virtue” and “duty” of human existence must be conceived 
in non-subjectivistic frames, only in relation to one’s bond to the event [Ereignis], which 
itself is not an entity or agent, but a happening that is beyond human control and making, 
one in which human being partakes insofar it “has” (dwells in) language.  The most 
fundamental action on the part of human beings is the occurrence of “self-relating” to the 
event [Ereignis] via thinking, which takes place in and through language as the “house of 
the truth of being”. It is this originary action, which situates the human being in its 
belonging dwelling place. 																																																								
213 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London & New York: Routledge, 
2006), 6. 
214 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London & New York: Routledge, 
2006), 8-9. 
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A new understanding of “ethics” requires a reconsideration of our relation to 
language, which itself requires an understanding of the place-character of ethos. This is 
because only in doing so we can problematize the question of ethics as the question of 
dwelling. In this way, the issue of “action” can be brought up in a more fundamental way. 
But can we call this “ethics” in the way it has been traditionally understood among 
philosophers? Based on Williams’ definition of an ethical theory, Heidegger’s thought 
appears outside of the confines traditional ethical theories. Another question in that regard 
is the following: in trying to lay out the possibility of a new understanding of “ethics”, 
does Heidegger’s thought hold a meta-ethical position? The answer to that question 
depends on what we mean by “meta-ethics”. If the term “meta-ethics” signifies the sub-
discipline of ethics that attempts to ground the nature and validity of ethical judgements, 
we must admit that Heidegger’s thought does not have much to do with “meta-ethics”. 
Meta-ethics is generally defined as the kind of enterprise that asks, “what is the meaning 
of a good action”, instead of asking, “what should I do” (normative ethics). On the other 
hand, if meta-ethics could be defined as the attempt to reposition the discipline of ethics as 
such, it would be possible to say that Heidegger does some sort of “meta-metaethics”. 
However, again, this would be a very idiosyncratic definition of “meta-ethics”.215 
First and foremost, we should bear in mind that Heidegger wants to provide a new 
ground of ethics (as well “ontology” and “logic”, and for thinking in general), not a new 
theory within the already existing frameworks of ethics. In the “Letter on Humanism”, 
Heidegger offers a topological perspective to achieve that. Here, I use the word 																																																								
215 I find it relevant when Sheehan argues: “Heidegger’s question, on the other hand, is meta-
metaphysical: it takes a further step.  beyond realness/ousia itself.  µετὰ  τὴν  ϕύσιν  εἰς  τὸ  “X.” 
Metaphysics asks: “How come beings”?  whereas Heidegger asks, “How come being_—that is 
meaningful presence at all?” in Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 68. 
Likewise, Heidegger’s meta-metaethical position is that he questions the ground from which any 
possibility of ethics emerges. He does not ask the meaning (or validity) of certain actions, but 
problematizes the presencing of any meaningful action. 
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“topological” with an eye to underscore the place-related underpinnings of the Greek 
notion of ethos as dwelling-place. Heidegger suggests: “Ethics means dwelling place, 
abode. The word names the open region in which human being dwells.”216 In this 
alternative understanding of “ethics”, the term “open region” indicates the ethos of human 
existence, which means human being’s situatedness in language. A topological 
understanding of ethics means engaging with the place-character of human existence, 
meaning its open and finite nature as the “there” [Da] which grounds the happening of 
being [Sein]. In that regard, the principle idea is that language is the dwelling-place of the 
essence of human beings (existence).217 In Heidegger scholarship, Malpas draws our 
attention to how a topological manner of thinking would help us to understand the core 
matter of Heidegger’s ethics. He argues: 
 
The “ethics” at issue is not one that consists in the establishment of certain rules 
for conduct or in the uncovering of certain basic ethical “principles.” It is instead 
the “ethics” that speaks of the need to respond to the proper “ethos” of human 
being—an ethics that is given essentially in the form of dwelling.218 
 
 
In that line of thinking, let me first focus on the meaning and implications of ethos before 
I deal with the link between ethos, language and human existence. In the history of 
philosophy, the connection between place and ethos is well documented. Philosophers 
have marked the understanding of ethics of ethos as inhabitation and dwelling-place since 
antiquity. Although it is indeed possible to engage with the issue by revisiting Aristotle, 																																																								
216 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 269) 
217 He suggests: “The tragedies of Sophocles - provided such a comparison is at all permissible - 
preserve the ethos in their sayings more primordially than Aristotle's lectures on "ethics." A saying 
of Heraclitus that consists of only three words says something so simply that from it the essence of 
ethos immediately comes to light.” (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 269) This passage attests 
to the accuracy of having discussed Sophocles’ Antigone and Hölderlin’s “The Ister” in terms of 
dwelling, habituation, and ethos as I have displayed in the previous chapter.  
218 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
2006), 277. 
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Heidegger shows that the understanding of ethos as dwelling-place has played an even 
more crucial role for the “pre-Socratic”219 thinker Heraclitus. 
To discuss the meaning of ethos and how it differs from our traditional 
understanding of ethics, Heidegger mentions one of Heraclitus’ well-known fragments, 
where he captures a similar understanding of ethos as dwelling-place. “The saying of 
Heraclitus (Fragment 119) reads: ethos antropo daimon. This is usually translated "A 
man's character is his daimon."” According to Heidegger, this translation does not show us 
the most significant aspect of the fragment,220 because it is a subjectivist interpretation of 
the statement, which focuses on the human, but not on the topological meaning of 
ethos221. That said, Krell’s way of taking up the notion of daimon via Platon’s Symposium 
as the dweller of the between, namely, between the mortals and the mortals, can also point 
out the topological aspects of the issue. 
The English version of Heidegger’s translation in German underscores the 
topological underpinnings of the saying: "The (familiar) abode for humans is the open 
region for the presenting of god (the unfamiliar one).222 Accordingly, ethos, in the 																																																								
219 Although it is fairly common to refer to Heraclitus and Parmenides as “pre-Socratic” thinkers, 
such designation and classification of the history of philosophy is biased in its prioritizing of the 
thought of Socrates and Platon.  
220 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 269) 
221 Krell provides a detailed analysis of the issue in relation to Heraclitus’ story that Heidegger 
borrows from Aristotle, where a very similar understanding of ethos comes to the fore, yet at the 
same time, it also bring into view the ways in which the question of “life” is pushed to the 
background. According to Krell, this is the weak point of Heidegger’s thought itself, especially 
when thought within the context of his politics. David F Krell, The Daimon Life: Heidegger and 
Life Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 1-4. 
222 At this point, one might wonder whether Heidegger completely left behind the subject of 
“divinities” that played such a major role in his elaborations on the essence of poetry in early 
1930s and 1940s. In his 1946 essay “Why Poets?”, he remarks: “Being, as itself, spans its own 
province, which is marked off (temnein, tempus) by Being's being present in the word. Language 
is the precinct (templum), that is, the house of Being.” Here Heidegger’s slogan is formulated in a 
different way, but again, in topological terms. It is noticeable from the way that Heidegger deploys 
the German word Bezirk, or Ancient Greek and Latin templum, he does not mean the language of 
everydayness. A precinct is in each and every case a very precise region, since it is demarcated 
and cut off from a more encompassing space. Heidegger here wants to point out the necessity of a 
poetic relation to the house of being. The problems that he engages with in the “Letter on 
Humanism” do not allow him to problematize the nature of divinities, yet this does not mean that 
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broadest sense of the word, indicates the way in which one’s habits emerge through one’s 
way of dwelling-habituation. What is the relation between habit and place that makes 
Heidegger’s account topological? Inhabiting a place allows one to develop a character that 
results from that very way of orienting oneself in “there”. In other words, habits are 
consequences of our relation to the happening of the contexts in which we exist. In a 
certain sense, a habit appears insofar as it is a result of the correspondence and interplay 
between one’s being-there (one’s situated essence) and the “there” [Da] itself, (the place 
where one is situated). Just as habits are not merely repeated random actions, they are not 
character traits that we can change at will either. The relationship between ethos as 
“character” and ethos as “dwelling place” is something Jean-Luc Nancy also considers: 
 
Presence and disposition: sojourn and comportment, these are the senses of the two 
Greek words ēthos and ethos, which contaminate each other in the motif of a stand, 
a "self-standing" that is at the root of all ethics. In a different manner yet oddly 
analogous, the Latin terms habitare and habitus come from the same habere, 
which means first "standing" and "self-standing," to occupy a place, and from this 
to possess and to have (habitudo had meant a "manner of relating to ... "). It is a 
having with a sense of being: it is a manner of being there and of standing in it. A 
world is an ethos, a habitus and an inhabiting: it is what holds to itself and in itself, 
following to its proper mode.223 
 
Baracchi’s interpretation of the concept of “ethos” in Aristotle supports Heidegger and 
Nancy’s position: 
 
The word ethos signifies precisely disposition, character in the sense of 
psychological configuration, and hence comportment, the way in which one bears 
oneself. However, the semantic range of the term exceeds this determination and 
signals that it must be situated in the broader context of custom, of shared usage, 
and even understood in the archaic but abiding sense of the accustomed place 
																																																																																																																																																																						
this dimension of his thought disappears. On the contrary, at the end of 1940s and the beginning of 
1950s, the questions of divinities come to the fore again, in an even more consolidated manner. 
223 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and 
David Pettigrew (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 42. 
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where the living (animals, plants, or otherwise) find their haunt or abode.224 
 
Baracchi continues her argument by saying: “Finally, ethos names the exquisitely human 
abode – most basically, but not only, in the sense of the land in which a people settles, the 
geo-political space in which a community is as such constituted and lives”.225 What 
precisely needs to be emphasized at this point is that Heidegger understands ethos not in 
the usual geo-political sense of the word. The emphasis is not on particular, so to say, 
ontic locations, but on the happening of place as dwelling-place as such. According to 
Baracchi’s interpretation of the Aristotelian understanding of ethos, customary ways of 
being-with as dis-positions226 already establish an “ethics” insofar as they create a context 
and certain relations of reciprocity. This, however, does not mean that just by being the 
kind of beings that we are, we, individually or collectively, possess some sort of a pre-
established morality, nor should it mean that the kind of “dwelling” we possess could be 
morally justified. Yet, an originary “ethics”, in considering the meaning of human 
customs and character via the question of existence already bring into view the definition 
of a human being.227 Now, from an Aristotelian perspective, the most significant and 
essential character of human being is its political being. Indeed, Aristotle names the 
human a political animal in the book one of his Politics, but on the grounds that human 
																																																								
224 Claudia Baracchi, Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 53. 
225 Claudia Baracchi, Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy, 54. 
226 There is a curious etymological connection between the Greek ethos, and Latin habitus, 
disposition, as disposition literally means “act of placing here and there”, deriving from Latin 
disponere. Ernest Klein, Klein’s Comprehensive Etymology Dictionary of the English Language. 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 219. 
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human beings. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics, 
with an Addendum”, in The Bloomsbury Companion to Aristotle, ed. Claudia Baracchi, (London 
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beings have logos.228 If the most fundamental characteristic of human existence is its 
communal dwelling, and if this depends on its access to language, then, does not a sound 
“ethical” theory, which seeks to understand the basics of human dwelling, first and 
foremost needs to attempt to ponder what it means for human beings to have language? It 
is in this vein of thinking that Heidegger can go on to say that “this is not ethics in the first 
instance because it is ontology”.229 This is a form of “onto-logy” that inquires into the 
question of language, and its relation to being and dwelling as the source of the presencing 
of beings. Furthermore, the question of language does not only come up within the context 
of communication and self-expression, but as that which opens up any field of 
understanding, which translates into meaningful action and articulation.  
 
II. 3 Heidegger and Ethics 
 
I will now move on to Hodge’s discussion of Heidegger’s ethics. Like many other critics 
of Heidegger, Hodge focuses on Heidegger’s negligence of moral problems. Heidegger’s 
infamous affiliation with the Nazi party in 1933 has been a major source of suspicion 
towards the possibility of a Heideggerian “ethics”. Heidegger’s short-lived turn to the idea 
of “people” [Volk] reinforced the conviction that his thought carries traces of National 
Socialist ideology. Furthermore, in light of the recently published Black Notebooks, it is 
evident that Heidegger was, somehow, not able to see beyond certain stereotypes about 
Jews (though we must also ask whether what is at issue was always an underdeveloped 
and never fully established critique of the “mono-theism” that is at issue in Judaism, 
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Christianity, and even Islam). Although these charges must be taken very seriously230 and 
even if Heidegger the person may have failed in some of his personal relationships and 
political engagements, Heidegger the thinker’s understanding of ethos still can provide us 
with significant insights into the essence of ethics. 
Despite Heidegger’s bad reputation on the issue, there are several important works 
that examine Heidegger’s ethics. Hodge’s Heidegger and Ethics (1996)231 stands out as 
one of the very first critical works engaging with the matter at length. Frederick Olafson, 
William McNeill and Michael Lewis also review the question of ethics and the role it 
plays in Heidegger’s overall thinking. 232 As can be observed in Olafson and Lewis’ 
works, there is a tendency to take the notion of “being-with” [Mitsein] as the starting point 
of Heidegger’s ethics. It is true that the notion of “being-with” from Being and Time is the 
closest conceptualization of Heidegger of a theory of inter-subjectivity, namely, the 
ground for the inter-action of human beings with one another. Yet, as Lewis also points 
out233, the issue is also connected to the “being-with” of human being and beings. 
Departing from the notion of “being-with” risks covering over the significance of 
Heidegger’s thinking on the meaning of ethics, because it sets out to think within 
conventional frameworks.  
Lewis’ account acutely overcomes these difficulties as a result of his explicit focus 
on the notion of the event [Ereignis]. His recognition of the limitations of Heidegger’s 
early thought regarding the “ontological difference” of Being and Time allows him to 
move beyond the mere subjectivistic understanding of “being-with”. In mentioning the 																																																								
230 For detailed discussions of Heidegger’s ethics and politics, see: Bernhard Radloff, Heidegger 
and the Question of National Socialism: Disclosure and Gestalt, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2002; Frank Schalow, Language and Deed: Rediscovering Politics through Heidegger’s 
Encounter with German Idealism, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998. 
231 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, London & New York: Routledge, 1996. 
232 Frederick A. Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998; William McNeill, The Time of Life: Heidegger and Ēthos. Albany: SUNY Press, 
2006; Michael Lewis, Heidegger and the Place of Ethics. London & New York: Continuum, 2006.  
233 Michael Lewis, Heidegger and the Place of Ethics, 3. 
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relation between the event [Ereignis] and the fourfold, Lewis is able to thematize a sense 
of “being-with” that exceeds the human and inter-human. He explicitly acknowledges the 
fact that in Heidegger, ethos amounts to dwelling, yet dwelling is dwelling with the 
“other”.234 The “other”, however does not necessarily indicate other human beings, but 
rather things, as well as immortals, sky and earth. Likewise, his response to the Levinasian 
critique of Heidegger in not prioritizing ethics over ontology does justice to the fact that 
Heidegger wishes to de-structure the relation between ontology and ethics, and not to 
prioritize one over the other. 
 One problematic aspect of Lewis’ approach in general is that he takes the “place” 
of ethics as a rethinking of “being-with”, without giving an account of what “place” 
means. Although Lewis states that it is not possible to think or understand Heidegger’s 
thought on ethics (and politics) without considering “being-with”235, this argument needs 
to be developed. First of all, “being-with” in the sense of the gatheredness of being, 
human being and things (or the components of the fourfold) via the event, already 
presupposes an understanding of place. Place is indeed that at which the “with” [mit] of 
“Being-with” [Mitsein] can have a ground so that it can stand upon and where things can 
be interrelated and gathered together. This is language in the sense that it is the between of 
human being and being, namely the house of being, that without which being and human 
being cannot come to correspond. This is why Heidegger’s thinking on ethics needs to be 
seen in its relation the question of language, even if we start from the notion of “being-
with”. 
In order to clarify Heidegger’s thought on ethics, I will now first discuss the 
plausibility of the standard criticism directed at him. This is the reason why I prefer to 
take issue with Hodge’s position in her Heidegger and Ethics. Hodge’s account is two-																																																								
234 Michael Lewis, Heidegger and the Place of Ethics, 6. 
235 Michael Lewis, Heidegger and the Place of Ethics, 161. 
		 117	
fold. Firstly, she claims that the strict ontological underpinnings of Heidegger’s thought 
lead him to underestimate the significance of ethical questions. (Olafson, for instance, 
defended the ontological basis of Heidegger’s ethics).  In that regard, Hodge’s main 
argument is the following: Heidegger falls short of the full potential of his own anti-
metaphysical agenda by proposing to step back into the ground of metaphysics, while 
failing to raise the following question: what is ethics?236 I contest this idea by arguing that 
Heidegger effectively problematizes the ground of ethics by interrogating the essence of 
language and dwelling. Secondly, Hodge has a positive view of Heidegger’s ethics. She 
suggests that Heidegger’s statement that language is the house of being can actually be 
thought from an ethical point of view.237 As a matter of fact, she explains in six steps why 
Heidegger’s ethical thinking has not been well recognized in Heidegger scholarship. I 
think the second and third points are the most important: 
 
First, there is the failure to distinguish between producing universal principles, 
which for the purposes of this discussion has been called moral reflection, and the 
broader concern with human relations, both self-to-self and self-to-others […] 
since Heidegger is evidently not producing universalisable moral principles, it is 
falsely assumed he cannot be concerned with ethics. Second, Heidegger claims his 
enquiries are not concerned with ethics, because his notion of ethics is restricted to 
inter-human relations and does not include the relation between human beings and 
the contexts in which they find themselves.238 
 
These are two of Hodge’s arguments in claiming that Heidegger actually offers a model of 
ethical theory in Being and Time. According to Hodge, Heidegger’s way of thinking of 
ethics opens up the possibility of thematizing the “broader concern with human relations 
self-to-self and self-to-others”, yet Heidegger’s subsequent thought fails to achieve this. 
The reason why this is the case is that Heidegger’s thought always remained influenced by 
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his earlier project of “fundamental ontology”, which resulted in his “repression” of ethics. 
This is an argument that Heidegger refutes in the letter239 by pointing out what Lewis 
suggests: “Fundamental ontology” was a provisional way of entering the discussion of the 
relation between being, human being and things. Insofar as it took for granted the 
“ontological difference” between being [Sein] and beings [Seiende], it remained 
groundless. What provides this ground is the notion of the event [Ereignis] (which is the 
basis of the idea of the fourfold), because it precisely explains how being and beings are 
appropriated to one another in the clearing [Lichtung] and truth of being (aletheia), which, 
in turn, takes place in and as language, in the sense of the place of the meaningful 
presencing of things. Furthermore, even if Heidegger seems to never give up on the 
ontological priority of his questioning, this could be the case if and only if he insisted on 
seeing “being” strictly as part of an ontological discourse. For Heidegger, doing ethics 
does not necessitate distinguishing action from being. The thinking of being, which 
Heidegger describes as the “quiet power” of the favouring-enabling, that is, of the 
“possible”, is already thinking the ground upon which human beings act.240 This view 
rejects the dualism between actus and potentia. We cannot understand potentiality 
separate from acting and actuality, if that which allows for an action to take place is being 
as the enabling force.  
Positioning herself against Heidegger, Hodge claims that Heidegger’s later thought 
is a kind of “ontology”, one that still ventures to repress “ethics” as such.241. In Hodge’s 
explanations, one distinction is important. She distinguishes moral reflection that she 
attributes to Kant from ethical reflection that she attributes to Aristotle. In the former, we 
concern ourselves with the universal principles and criteria of judgment, while in the latter 
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we focus on the formation of one’s character [ethos].242 Accordingly, the fact that 
Heidegger is not interested in moral reflection does not entail that his thinking is not 
ethical. Heidegger wrote the “Letter on Humanism” only a year after the end of the 
Second World War. This is the commencement of the heyday of political activism in 
Europe, in particular, with an eye to causing an immediate effect in the aftermath of the 
destruction that the war caused. Heidegger’s letter can also be regarded as an implicit 
response to that movement in thinking. Heidegger writes: 
 
Soon after Being and Time appeared a young friend asked me, ‘‘when are you 
going to write an ethics?’’ Where the essence of the human being is thought so 
essentially, i.e., solely from the question concerning the truth of being, and yet 
without elevating the human being to the centre of beings, a longing necessarily 
awakens for a peremptory directive and for rules that say how the human being, 
experienced from ek-sistence toward being, ought to live in a fitting manner. The 
desire for an ethics presses ever more ardently for fulfilment as the obvious no less 
than the hidden perplexity of human beings soars to immeasurable heights.243 
 
As we can see in that passage, the kind of criticism that Hodge directs to 
Heidegger is not unanticipated for Heidegger. In that regard, Nancy also draws attention to 
what Heidegger’s thought states: “if the essence of human beings is grounded in language, 
then the question of being would have to precede ethics, physics and logic. The question 
of being can be only adequately posed on the basis of an amended relationship through 
language244”, which already requires a different engagement with the entire “human 
situation”. Contending Heidegger in the Hodge way does for not looking further into the 
question of ethics in terms of the “inter-human” is not different from blaming Heidegger 
for not being a speech therapist. One may argue that this will not do away with the charge 
that Heidegger neglects moral questions, and since Heidegger has no interest in normative 																																																								
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ethics, this is bad for Heidegger’s philosophical legacy. Or else, it is also possible to say 
that an implicit form of normative ethics follows from Heidegger’s view. For instance, the 
destruction of our habitat is wrong precisely because it destroys our humanity. 
Nevertheless, the case that Heidegger is trying to make is exactly the following: what is 
destroying our humanity cannot be identified with a normative approach.  
It seems that the core issue of Hodge’s criticism of Heidegger also concerns how 
Heidegger wants to interpret his own work. In that sense, Hodge proposes to refute 
Heidegger’s stipulations about his own work and suggests, “I defend Heidegger’s earlier 
view of philosophy against the later one by disputing his identification of philosophy with 
metaphysics”245. In contrast, while upholding the possibility that in Being and Time 
Heidegger was already going beyond his metaphysical inclinations, I essentially defend 
Heidegger’s later view of “philosophy” against his earlier “practice” of it on the basis of 
the “ethical” human situation of our time: our homelessness in the age of technological 
advent, which first needs to be properly experienced in and through the question of 
language and dwelling.  
In more recent literature, Braver draws attention to the fact that Heidegger’s 
originary ethics must be seen as an innovative account of ethics, one that problematizes 
the dwelling place of human beings.246 Braver argues that Heidegger’s originary ethics 
can also be called “perfectionist ethics”, one that Heidegger borrows from Aristotle. 
Braver writes: “The idea is that once we find our essence or what makes us distinctive 
(our ergon), the best way of living consists in performing this activity with excellence 
(arete)”.247 It could be argued that Heidegger develops the Aristotelian underpinnings of 
ethics with a topological focus. However, for Aristotle, ethics is about individuals’ moral 
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character and human happiness [eudaimonia]. In other words, it is a subject-oriented 
ethics, as it examines the most reasonable actions and habits to be mastered of the 
individual in actualizing the best version of one’s self as human being. Now, on the other 
hand, the “ethics” that Heidegger advocates, is a being-oriented “ethics”. This does not 
mean that the good life or happiness of the agent drops out of the picture, but the “good 
life” becomes conceivable insofar as human beings maintain their relation to being.248 A 
proper understanding and experience of being is what situates the human existence in its 
belonging place: language. Humans’ relation to language is what they must perfect, for 
this is the home in which they can bring out the most significant possibilities of being a 
human being. In effect, for Heidegger, thinking means maintaining this relation to being. 
Yet, thinking does not simply mean disengaged reflection or theoretical contemplation. A 
human being that “thinks” does not imply a disengaged agent that sits at his table all day 
long and ponders about the meaning of being. Insofar as one partakes in a meaningful 
correspondence with things by means of one’s actions, one already stands in a relationship 
with being and language. Heidegger’s point is that we reach such an understanding of 
language only after having experienced it not by means of “philosophy of language”, 
which results in the objectification of language as an entity, but by means of poetic 
thinking. This is why, in the letter, he insists upon Hölderlin’s line: “Full of merit, yet 
poetically, man dwells upon this earth.”249 Therefore, the fact that language is the house of 
truth of being is related to the fact that “ethics of language” can be mainly accessed by a 
poetic mode of thinking. Thinking language in these terms can help us to understand what 
it means to dwell in the “house of being”. 
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From the perspective of traditional moral philosophy, the main issue with 
Heidegger’s proposed “ethics” is that we cannot address more practical and concrete 
issues that belong to our everyday lives. I think Hodge is certainly right in asserting that. 
That said, Heidegger’s thought attempts to show forth a new paradigm of thought in 
which we can re-examine our place in the world, which indicates a new way of being, 
other than proposing a philosophical framework in which we could theoretically address 
ethical issues in a cause-effect scheme. This is why Heidegger would not accept Hodge’s 
criticism, not because Hodge is wrong in saying that Heidegger cannot address “practical” 
and “ethical” issues of inter-subjectivity, but because Hodge does not want to 
acknowledge that Heidegger is not interested in supplying this demand. He writes: 
 
The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato and Aristotle. They take 
thinking itself to be a techne, a process of deliberation in service to doing and 
making. But here deliberation is already seen from the perspective of praxis and 
poiesis. For this reason thinking, when taken for itself, is not "practical." The 
characterization of thinking as theoria and the determination of knowing as 
"theoretical" comportment occur already within the "technical" interpretation of 
thinking.250 
 
In view of this, Hodge states that Heidegger’s language as the “house of being” can be 
conceived of as an ethics, because language itself is a “form of life”.251 This is a 
significant premise that Hodge does not discuss at length. Furthermore, when Hodge 
mentions language, she considers the linguistic register of language as discourse. 
However, the subject requires a discussion of the topological essence of language and its 
place-character that defines the dwelling place of human beings. For Heidegger, the 
essential “interaction” and relationship is the one that takes place between human beings 
and being, not between human beings. When he ventures to discuss the “existence” of 
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human beings, the focus of his discussions is not the individual as ego: “[e]xistence here is 
not the actuality of the ego cogito. Neither is it the actuality of subjects who act with and 
for each other and so become who they are.”252 Human beings interact with one another 
on the basis of their implicit understanding and experience of being because this is simply 
how things appear meaningful to them. To that end, Heidegger problematizes the essence 
of action and proposes a more encompassing definition that is inclusive of the link 
between language and action.253  
We are accustomed to conceive of actions in terms of the cause-effect relationship. 
Accordingly, the subject performs an action in order to do this or that, which results in 
certain effects. When the subject achieves to cause the anticipated effect, this appears to 
be an individual accomplishment. However, as I have explained, Heidegger aims to 
review the very meaning of “accomplishment” [vollbringen], which is where we should 
try to find out a different understanding of action. Heidegger argues, “[…] yet thinking 
never creates the house of being. Thinking conducts historical eksistence, that is, the 
humanitas of homo humanitas, into the realm of the upsurgence of healing [des Heilen].254 
The kind of “activity” that is at stake does not create an effect or an immediate change in 
the course of things, yet it is that on the grounds of which any action becomes possible. If 
we change our “relation” toward things, then the interaction in which we partake will also 
be different. We must reorient ourselves in the “house of being”, where a different relation 
to language may appear, as the happening of the between of being and human being, 
which will result in a different relation to reality as well.  
Within that framework, Heidegger’s thought on being cannot be seen as a mere 
ontology in the traditional sense of the notion. Insofar as it thinks the relationship between 
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being and human beings, it is a thinking that goes beyond the confines of ontology and 
ethics. This is a considerable idea that Jean-Luc Nancy also defended: 
 
By claiming the title "original ethics," and by identifying it with a "fundamental 
ontology" prior to all of the ontological and ethical partitions of philosophy, 
Heidegger cannot but have kept deliberately quiet about the only major work of 
philosophy, Ethics, which is an “ontology” as well as a “logic” and an “ethics”. 255 
 
It is an originary ethics, in the sense that it ponders the origin of the relationship between 
being and human being with regards to place, namely, the house of truth of being. This 
relationship that is at issue is nothing but dwelling. Now, having clarified the issue at hand 
concerning Heidegger’s standpoint vis-à-vis “ethics’, let me elaborate on the idea of the 
truth of being and its topological relation to language as the site of the disclosure of being.  
 
II. 4 Existence, the There and Language 
 
Although I have mentioned the relation between the place of human existence – as the 
“there” [Da] – and language, the issue requires a closer scrutiny. Doing so will help 
discuss the topological underpinnings of Heidegger’s “ethics of language” and how it 
links up with the notion of aletheia. According to Heidegger, in order to understand the 
meaning of dwelling place (ethos), we should look into the relationship between being, 
human being and language. He writes, “and so it is proper to think the essence of language 
from its correspondence to being and indeed as this correspondence, that is, as the home 
of the human being.” 256. Heidegger calls it a correspondence, since the relation between 
human being and being is what constitutes the site of nearness in which dwelling takes 
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place. I have argued that the middle space, or the interval, is the between [das Zwischen] 
where the correspondence of being and human being comes to occur as the event 
[Ereignis]. In the support of this reading, Heidegger argues in the letter: “Rather, before 
all this, the human being in his essence is ek-sistent into the openness of being, into the 
open region that first clears the ‘between’ within which a ‘relation’ of subject to object can 
‘be’”.257As such, the openness of being that is at issue first and foremost means the 
“there” [Da] of the existence of human beings.  
What is existence? Krell describes the rich etymological background of the notion 
in relation to the “ecstatic” nature of temporality:  
Whence the terms Ekstase, ekstatikon, derived from the verb existanai, existemi “to 
displace,” in Heidegger’s analysis of temporality? His own etymology, the 
reference to Existenz and ex(s)istere, “to stand out,” is hardly the place to terminate 
the discussion. True, the words “existence” and “ecstacy” share the same root: sto, 
“stare” derives from the Greek sta- histemi (“to set,” “to place”), the Sanskrit sthâ, 
sthalam meaning “locus” or “place”. The Latin ex(s)isto or ex(s)to has an extensive 
history: in Livy, Cicero, and Augustine it means “to step out” “to come forth,” 
“emerge,” “appear”: in Lucretius, Caesar, and Cicero “to spring,” “proceed,” 
“arise”, “become”.258 
 
It is within this context that the topological meaning of existence comes to the fore, which 
is a crucial point in the letter: Ek-sistence is standing in the clearing [Lichtung] of being, 
which is the way of being of the human being.259 Language is the dwelling-place that 
gathers being and human being in the site of being as the there [Da], where the movement 
(the presencing of the sense of beings) from being to human being and vice versa can take 
place as the event. Heidegger states: “[h]uman being is the being whose being as ek-
sistence consists in his dwelling in the nearness of being. The human being is the 
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neighbour of being.”260 Therefore, the topological inquiry concerning being implicates a 
questioning as to how human beings inhabit that nearness within the “there” [das Da], as 
language.  
Language, as the “house of being” and the dwelling-place of human beings, 
implicates the idea of “there” in relation to the essence of “human existence” as Da-sein. 
We could also simply say “existence”, instead of “human existence”, because for 
Heidegger “existence” specifically indicates the way of being of human beings, which in 
that topological sense also means, their “situated being” in facing the manifestation of 
being. For Heidegger, “existence” does not mean the presence of any entity in the world, 
as it has a very specific meaning in terms of the link between the “world” and 
“presencing”. In everyday life when we say that “the tree exists”, we do so without giving 
much thought to the different ways of being present in the world. The sentence “the tree 
exists” means that the tree is present, simply that the tree is there. However, here the 
physis (as the way of being and occurring) of being-there does not become an issue. We 
consider the tree only as a real object that appears before us. The literal way of designating 
the essence of the presence of the tree would be: The tree trees, that is, the tree appears 
and exists in the way a tree does to which we have limited access within the boundaries of 
our human way of being present. Heidegger argues: “The human being occurs essentially 
in such a way that he is the ‘there’ [das ‘Da’], that is, the clearing of being. The ‘being’ of 
the Da, and only it, has the fundamental character of ek-sistence, that is, of an ecstatic 
inherence in the truth of being.”261 Human beings have a very specific relation to the 
“world”, in that, the world as the “there” [Da] appears not only as some container in 
which beings are present. Accordingly, Heidegger suggests, “For us ‘world’ does not at all 
signify beings or any realm of being but the openness of being. The human being is, and is 																																																								
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human, insofar as he is the ek-sisting one. He stands out into the openness of being.”262 
This is the “being” of human being, which means, “existing”, and as such, human being 
understands other beings as “existing” beings as well. 
One of the most important discussions with respect to the topological relation 
between the “truth of being”, language, place, and existence can be found in Sheehan’s 
interpretation of Heidegger. Although Sheehan does not acknowledge the topological 
orientation (or at least the topological consequences) of his own thinking, I will show how 
he thinks in space and place related terms and notions, though without providing an 
analysis of these place related terms and notions. In that context, let us remember 
Sheehan’s major argument. 
There are numerous explicit topological (place-related) concepts in Sheehan’s 
analysis of Heidegger. Only a few examples: “field”, “place” [topos], “openness”, 
“clearing”, “the thrown open clearing”, “the open region of understanding”, “the realm of 
disclosedness”. A very clear example can be found in the following formulation, where 
Sheehan compares early and late Heidegger: “His earlier work stressed ex-sistence insofar 
as its thrownness has always already opened up the clearing and holds it open (Da-sein), 
whereas his later work stressed the clearing as held open by thrown-open ex-sistence (Da-
sein).”263 In the second part of the sentence, Sheehan emphasizes the word Da [there], 
which he understands as the “openness” or the “clearing” within which the sense of things 
appears for human intelligence. He explicitly claims that the “sought-for” of Heidegger’s 
thinking is not only the “whence” of beings, but “whence and how is there the open”.264 In 
other words, Heidegger asks concerning the site of being (meaning, sense), by bringing to 
the fore the astonishing fact that things are accessible to us as meaningful things. Our 
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access to the meaning of things is a result of our appropriated [Er-eignet] situatedness-
existence as the openness of being. This is the meaning of “Da” as the there, which 
defines the essence/existence of human beings [Da-sein]. 
 Sheehan offers that what makes any understanding of being (meaningful presence 
[Anwesen]) possible is the “thrown-open” existential structure of human being’s being in 
the world. “Thrown-open” signifies the there [Da] that within the boundaries of which 
human beings find themselves projected into their futures, making sense of things. There 
can be no intelligence of phenomena if human beings do not possess the kind of 
hermeneutic directedness towards things. This hermeneutic capacity is the essential part of 
what makes human beings the kind of beings they are. This implies that for Heidegger, the 
actual matter of thinking was a thinking of that source from which any understanding of 
being becomes possible, and not being itself as an agent of entity. This means that being 
as presence was not what Heidegger was after. Furthermore, being is a word that 
Heidegger should have dropped from his philosophical terminology long ago. Being 
means “sense” [Sinn], or “disclosedness-to-understanding”, and the key point in 
Heidegger’s thought is that he problematized that from which the “presencing” of 
meaningfulness arises. In that regard, Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s thought as proto-
phenomenology instead of naïve realism is important. Accordingly, what Aristotle was 
interested in was finding out the appearance of phenomena, as Sheehan puts it, “within the 
field of human comportment and interpretation.”265  
Sheehan’s implicit topological interpretation of Heidegger has two sources: his 
reading of the event [Ereignis], which he prefers to call “appropriation”, and its relation to 
the ancient Greek aletheia. First, let me bring to the fore Sheehan’s exposition of the three 
implications of aletheia in Heidegger’s thought. Sheehan finds three distinct yet correlated 																																																								
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senses of the notion of “aletheia”, which he refuses to call “truth of being”, because 
according to him employing the notion in this way confounds our understanding of 
complex background of the notion. Aletheia-3 indicates correctness of a statement, the 
correspondence of intellect and thing. Aletheia-2 is the pre-propositional meaningfulness 
of things. Aletheia-1 signifies the place of the truth of being. In Sheehan’s words, 
Aletheia-1, as the most fundamental significance of “truth of being”, is the “open space” 
in which we can take things “as” something in their meaningful presence.266 Sheehan 
claims that it is the Aletheia-1 as the occurrence of the open region of meaningfulness that 
makes possible the (2) pre-propositional availability of the unfolding of things as things to 
understanding, and (3) the apophantic correctness of things. Without the openness in 
which things can be gathered and disclosed, the correctness of our representations could 
not even become an issue. First and foremost, we need an access to that occurrence, as 
well as a site of dwelling in which this occurrence can take place and embody us in its 
happening.  
The next crucial step is to find out what illuminates the question of being, which 
Sheehan takes as the question of humans’ openness to “meaning-making”, as the event or 
appropriation [Ereignis]. So far, we have seen three meaning of aletheia, which constitute 
the happening of the site of being, within which the unconcealment of the meaning of 
beings can take place. Now, in this three-fold structure, there is a unifying singularity that 
gathers together distinct yet correlated steps of the process of the unfolding of the sense of 
being. Sheehan claims, “it remained for Heidegger to see that Ereignis, the thrown-
openness of ex-sistence, can never come into the open (a fact that Heidegger called Ent-
eignis) precisely because it is the necessarily presupposed reason why there is an open at 
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all.”267 Here, Sheehan explains the topological relation between the event and the open in 
arguing that the event (appropriation) [Ereignis] is not a thing, but it is that on the grounds 
of which things come to be what they are. Accordingly, for Sheehan, the event is the “Ur-
phenomenon” of Heidegger’s entire thought. Why does Sheehan insist on using the term 
“thrown-open”? Sheehan understands the situatedness of human existence in the world as 
thrown-ness [Geworfenheit], in light of early Heidegger’s philosophy. Accordingly, 
Dasein finds itself thrown (pro-jected) into its future possibilities of existence, always 
ahead of itself, in the world. The open signifies the “always-already opened up space”268 
that is the disclosedness of the meaning of things and its accessibility for the human 
intelligence. Without this openness, there can be no understanding of being, since the 
place, as the necessary condition of any understanding, would be missing. In turn, without 
the thrown nature of human beings’ situatedness in the world (because in each and every 
case human being “finds” itself in the there), which also signifies the finite essence of 
human existence, there would be no relation to that site. What Sheehan calls the “thrown-
open”, then, indicates the site of being as the taking place of the unconcealment of what 
Heidegger explicates as the “truth of being” in the “Letter on Humanism”. This could be 
interpreted as follows: the event [Ereignis] is the necessary condition of the following 
three-fold process: 1) the possibility of any meaning at all as situatedness in the openness 
(clearing) [Lichtung], 2) the happening of the unconcealment of the meaning of being, 3) 
the availability of meaningfulness to the human being. It follows that this three-fold 
occurrence takes place in the place and site [Ort/Ortschaft] of being. The event represents 
both the place and the taking place of the disclosure of the thingness of things. This is the 
main relationship between the three meanings of aletheia and the event. Therefore, 
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although he does not make an issue of the question of dwelling explicitly, Sheehan’s 
position is through and through topological insofar as he argues that the central point in 
Heidegger’s thought is Ereignis as the place [Ort] of aletheia, which delivers us to an 
understanding of things. 
I have shown how Sheehan discusses the notion of the event as what constitutes 
the place-character of dwelling, if by dwelling we can understand the relationship between 
the situated human existence and its nearness to the manifestation of being itself.  Sheehan 
explains the taking place of the event in six steps, without, however, bringing up the 
matter in terms of the question of language and dwelling.269 The first and third points are 
significant: 
 
1. To think or act dis-cursively entails “running back and forth” (dis-currere) 
between the thing and its meaning, or the tool and the task, as we check out 
whether this thing actually does have that meaning or whether in fact this tool is 
suitable for that task. […] 
 
3. But we can think and act discursively only by metaphorically “traversing the 
open space” between the tool and the task, or the thing and its possible meaning.270 
 
Two notions are important: a- discurere in the sense of “running back and forth between” 
and b- “traversing the open space”, and its so-called “metaphorical” essence. Now, as I 
explained in the first chapter, the idea of “the between” is crucial in thinking the 
hermeneutic essence of our poetic relation to being with and as language. Without 
language, which as an idea that oddly lacks in Sheehan’s discussions, there is not even an 
understanding of the fact that there can be any understanding. Things are meaningful 
because they appear as things of language. In that sense, things are always linguistic (they 
pertain to language). Earlier, I indicated that language as the place of “the between” and 																																																								
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the place of dependence brings out the dwelling place of the human being. This was the 
main topological point. Now, it should be pointed out that Sheehan associates thinking 
with  “discursive action”, which, in relation to the movement between the thing and its 
meaning, is a going back and forth, in the sense of inhabiting “the between”. The reason 
why this is so is because the “sense” of the thing manifests itself via this back and forth 
movement, the “thrown-open” human existence being emplaced and interwoven in the 
con-text: (a) is the meaning of (b) as traversing the open space.  
The issue here is that Sheehan calls thinking the “metaphorical” traversing 
between the thing and its being/meaning. What Sheehan means here by considering this 
discursive movement a “metaphor” is not clear. It is possible to see the movement of 
“running back and fro” not as a physical action that takes place in the brain or out there in 
space. He takes the dynamic relation between the thing and meaning to be an “abstract” 
movement. This would be the most plausible yet misleading reading of the use of the word 
“metaphorical”, which is nevertheless misleading, in the sense of “abstract” or 
“theoretical”. The word “metaphor” derives from the ancient Greek (meta-pherein) in the 
sense of “carrying something beyond, transferring”.271 However, if this is a transfer of an 
image of “place” or “space” onto the manifestation of being, then, the question lingers as 
to the “actual” essence of the relation between the thing and its meaning. Does that mean 
that this is how (in phenomenological terms) we could grasp the matter, yet, it actually 
occurs otherwise? Would not that imply that Heidegger’s “hermeneutic 
phenomenological” position is just another appearance of metaphysics, which Sheehan 
refutes as a claim? I suggest that we should understand Heidegger’s topological language 
in issuing the question of aletheia and the event beyond the literal-metaphorical dualism, 
because doing so conceals the essence of the issue. 																																																								
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My argument is as follows: the act of discursive traversing the open space of the 
interval between the thing and its appearance to human existence, insofar as it appears to 
us as such, signifies the dwelling and dwelling place of human beings. It simply points to 
the happening of the place of the event (and the event of place) as language. Now, this 
connects well with the fourth, fifth and sixth points in Sheehan’s interpretation of 
Heidegger. The main issue in Heidegger’s thought is not as Sheehan sometimes calls it, 
the “meaning” or the “sense of being”, but as he himself comes to clearly express it at 
times, the place of being as the event [Ereignis], which situates us in the interplay, the 
inter-relation. 
 
6. Therefore the always-operative thrown open clearing is the thing itself of all 
Heidegger’s work.  
 
Here Sheehan mentions the same point in saying that the “being itself” [das Sein selbst] 
amounts to the “thrown open clearing” or “appropriated clearing”. 272  Accordingly, 
thinking is a deed that takes place in the clearing of being, which signifies the region in 
which human beings’ relation to the world constitutes a meaningful context of 
“existence”, an existence that can become meaningful only within the boundaries of 
language.  
Now, let me clarify how this is related to the statement concerning the “house of 
being”, which Sheehan does not address in his interpretation. Sheehan considers thinking 
as a discursive act that “runs back and forth” in the process of making sense of things. 
However, thinking cannot be grounded without language. Heidegger writes, “thinking 
attends to the clearing of being in that it puts its saying of being into language as the home 
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of eksistence.”273 What this means is that language is the place as the source of thinking, 
which, in turn, implicates that where there is no language, there can be no relation to the 
event [Ereignis]. Thinking stands in a relation to the manifestation of being only insofar as 
it can have access to the un-concealment [aletheia], which takes place in the occurrence of 
the “sense” of things in language. As we can primarily make sense of the meaning of 
things by regarding the difference from what they are not, language allows us to 
understand the meaning of things in their kinetic happening, namely, their movements. 
This would be an accurate description of thinking as a deed and discursive act. This is 
why Heidegger claims, “to bring to language ever and again this advent of being that 
remains, and in its remaining waits for human beings, is the sole matter of thinking”274.  
In Heidegger scholarship, Capobianco’s reading  of Heidegger on the question of 
aletheia diverges from Sheehan mainly in two points: 1) Capobianco retains the 
expression “truth of being” and uses it for the happening of the unconcealment of being as 
aletheia, and does not only associate it with the correctness of propositions, 2) For 
Capobianco, the unconcealment of being is not the emergence of the meaning of things, 
but it is the emergence of being itself. For Sheehan, aletheia and physis refer to the 
manifestation and availability of things in their appearance, while for Capobianco, 
aletheia and physis, along with Lichtung, logos, hen, Ereignis and such, are different 
names of the happening of being that all express the same. One way of understanding 
Capobianco’s suggestion is that those notions and terms all signify the unified and 
singular essence of the event in different ways. If being has abundance of names as 
Aristotle suggests, then this is precisely where we observe it happening. This does not 
imply that different historical epochs understand the ground of being (being as beingness, 
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as the substance of all things) in different ways and thus name it differently, such as, 
physis, poiesis, God, cogito ego, technology. Capobianco presses the point that insofar as 
we understand the taking place of being (the appearance of being itself as the clearing), 
this is being itself [Sein selbst], which remains the “Ur-phenomenon” of Heidegger’s 
thinking. When understood in this way, being itself already comprises the togetherness of 
being and human being, and there is no need to specify that the understanding of being is 
dependent on human existence. Otherwise, this makes the statement sound like a 
transcendental argument, which brings us back to an epistemology-based thinking of 
being, where the understanding of being remains a product of human “consciousness”. 
This is where Capobianco refuses the move from Sein to Sinn.275  
Now, I want to point out the possibility of a middle way between Sheehan and 
Capobianco. Insofar as both Sheehan and Capobianco admit that for Heidegger, the key 
question is the relation of the appropriation/event [Ereignis]276 and how it takes place via 
the manifestation of being (aletheia), their interpretations differ mainly in terminology and 
in their respective concerns regarding Heidegger’s thought. In that regard, I would like to 
reiterate the substantial difference in their accounts, which I have discussed in the first 
chapter. Capobianco thinks that in Sheehan’s reading, being turns out to be a production 
of human sense-making capacities. However, Sheehan also acknowledges the fact that 
even though it is human sense-making capacities that stand in the openness of the clearing 
of being, this disclosedness and availability to human intelligence is not something that 
human beings can make or produce. As I have discussed, it would be unfair to say that 
Sheehan only reads Heidegger only from a Kantian-Husserlian transcendentalist 
perspective, precisely due to his –restrained– topological concentration on the issue. He 
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also acknowledges that Heidegger abandons the transcendentally oriented project after the 
turn.277 Likewise, Capobianco does not state that the issue of understanding of being and 
the meaning of being are completely irrelevant topics at all. He only argues that meaning, 
at its deepest level, is related to the manifestation of being: 
 
The core matter for Heidegger – and for those inclined to his thinking – is that 
physis is the measure, not Dasein. Nevertheless, this by no means diminishes the 
human being, not at all. It is simply to recognize the limit of our marvellous logos, 
our comprehensibility (Verstehbarkeit), our taking-as, our meaning-making.278 
 
What Capobianco argues here not mean that Dasein is not an integral element of the 
relation between the emergence of being and human being. His position does not assign 
agency to being either; on the contrary, he criticizes the view that takes being as 
“beingness” –as ground and cause of substance of things.  
The question that needs to be addressed is whether it could be possible without the 
place of being, that is, language, for human being and being to ever appear in the same 
context of understanding and experience. In other words, how does physis appear for 
human being anyway? Likewise, how does human understanding respond to the 
presencing of things? What constitutes the nature of human existence in order to make it 
receptive and active (simply said, responsive) to the self-manifestation of the meaning of 
things? It is language, as the house of the truth of being that provides the human being 
with the capacity to partake in the correspondence with being. This is the meaning of 
“dwelling” in “the between”. Human being does not simply express the meaning of being 
via language. On the contrary, according to Heidegger’s position in the letter, language is 
what places the human being in the nearness of this understanding. Only then human 																																																								277	Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (New York: Rowman & 
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being can say and bring it to words. That said, language is not something that human 
makes or produce either. It is of the same essence as physis itself. It is in that context that 
thinking is a discursive action, in the sense of running back and forth, inhabiting “the 
between”. This means that for Heidegger, the significance of human existence in 
responding to the unconcealment of being does not only indicate self-expression, but first 
and foremost attending, listening, and thus being receptive. This is why, according to 
Capobianco, human beings cannot exhaust the manifestation of being279, because in each 
and every case it is human beings that partake in the happening of place as language. This 
does not mean that language is a mystical phenomenon independent of human existence, 
but it simply implies that language as the “relation of all relations” emplaces the human 
being in its dwelling place, namely, the site of the unconcealment of being. Language 
must be considered in this topological way where it exceeds the limitations of mere signs 
or instrument of communication280. 
 
II. 5 Heidegger, Sartre and Topology 
 
Having examined the relation between the there [Da], human existence, aletheia, and 
language, I will now discuss Heidegger’s critique of humanism, which will bring us back 
to the question of ethics. In this section, I will also engage with Joseph Fell’s 
interpretation of Heidegger’s topology, which has not received sufficient scholarly 
attention in Heidegger literature. His interpretation focuses explicitly on the link between 
being, place, and language. Looking into Joseph Fell’s topological reading of Heidegger 
and Sartre can clarify the non-subjectivistic underpinnings of Heidegger’s criticism of 
Sartre’s existentialism.  																																																								
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 Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” can be read as a response to Sartre’s 1945 
public lecture L’existentialisme est un humanisme [Existentialism is a humanism], whose 
main purpose is to endorse existentialism as a legitimate philosophical movement. 
Existentialism has often been associated with pessimism and quietism, which are the 
charges that Sartre attempts to cast away in the lecture, as he tries to provide an ethical 
defence of his existentialism as a form of humanism.  
For Heidegger, contemplating the relation in which human being stands to 
language means to investigate its ethos, which in itself is an “ethical” engagement, ethical 
taken in the sense related to the dwelling of human being. In that sense, “topology of 
language” itself is an “ethical” endeavour, insofar as it questions the being of human being 
via its relation to language. This is clear when Heidegger asks in the letter “can we obtain 
from such knowledge directives that can be readily applied to our active lives”, and then 
goes on to argue that “such thinking comes to pass the distinction between ‘practical’ and 
‘theoretical’”. It has no direct result and effect. On the contrary, “It satisfies in essence in 
that it is. But it is by saying its matter.”281  
Heidegger was dismissive of Sartre’s way of linking the idea of “existence” and 
humanism because Sartre’s conception of humanism was based on a metaphysical and 
subjectivistic understanding of being and human being. Fell summarizes in three points 
the points that Heidegger refutes in Sartre’s reading: Sartre thought that, 1) Heidegger was 
an atheist existentialist, 2) advanced a thinking of human subjectivity, and 3) argued for 
the view that existence precedes essence.282 According to Heidegger, his thinking is 
neither atheist nor existentialist in the way Sartre understands these terms. First, he objects 
to Sartre’s association of his ideas with atheism and theism. This is because Heidegger 
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makes no judgments concerning the existence or the non-existence of God in the way 
Christian tradition understands the concept.283 His considerations regarding the existence 
of God are rather in line with Hölderlin and Nietzsche’s idea that human beings’ relation 
to God has been transformed in a way that the Christian God no longer appears as the 
gathering power for human beings. Heidegger’s hermeneutics of the immortals 
problematizes the question of god(s) as immortals in poetic terms with respect to the 
question of finitude and dwelling of human beings.  
Second, Heidegger explains in the letter that his thinking does not focus on human 
subjectivity284 , but on the contrary. In his later thought, Heidegger tries to avoid 
subjectivism by discussing “existence” as humanity’s exposure to the clearing of being 
where its essence gets determined by that site of being. In other words, his conception of 
the human being is defined on the basis of the happening of the onto-ethical context in 
which human beings partake as the members of manifold interrelations that exceed the 
limits of subjectivity. Heidegger’s later thinking problematizes the essence of human 
subjectivity, but does not depart from it. We can rather say that it attempts to arrive at a 
new understanding of human “subjectivity”, which, however, need not be labelled as 
“subjectivity” because it does not think in terms of “subjects” and “objects”. In specific, it 
considers the human being in its essence, that is, as Existenz, which comes to mean the 
“whither” of the self-manifestation of being where the unfolding of the meaning of being 
happens. In that sense, human existence is first and foremost the receiver of that which 
being gives in the there [Es gibt]. Sartre’s interpretation of Heidegger is based on a 
human-centred reading of the Dasein analysis in Being and Time. However Heidegger 
explains that even Dasein cannot be merely thought as the “human being”, but it should be 
thought as the “openness” of being, in Dasein’s belonging to being [Sein].  																																																								
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Finally, Heidegger does not think that existence precedes essence, but as he 
mentions in Being and Time, the essence of Dasein is grounded in its existence285. In other 
words, existence and essence should not be thought of in a dualistic way. The idea is 
rather that the humanness of human being is to be found in its existence. Based on these 
crucial differences, Heidegger’s understanding of “humanism” differs fundamentally from 
that of Sartre’s, because Heidegger has a completely different vision of the human being 
and of the relation between being and human being. Heidegger argues: “[S]artre 
expresses: we are precisely in a situation where there are only human being] […] Thought 
from Being and Time, this should say instead: we are precisely in a situation where 
principally there is being”.286 
This “situation” that is at issue here is exactly what refers to the topological sense 
of interrelatedness between being and human being which gathers them in the same site. 
Without this mutual correspondence between the “there” [Da] and being [Sein] via the 
event of the self-manifestation, there can be no “situation”, for the ground and the place 
for it would be lacking. This is where Fell’s interpretation of “topology” or “sense of 
place” comes to the fore. According to Fell, the entire modern European philosophy, 
following the thought of Galileo and Copernicus, represents the displacement of the 
human-centred, geocentric worldview.287 What the phenomenological ontology inherited 
as a philosophical problem was to deal with the disorientation of the agent’s ordinary 
phenomenal experience of the world. The phenomenological tradition, starting with 
Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, attempted to inquire into our relation to 
phenomena in their appearing to human understanding, which necessitated to pose the 
																																																								
285Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1985), 152. 
286 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 254) 
287 Joseph Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place (New York: Columbia Press, 
1997), 3. 
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question of our being “placed” in the world. Heidegger’s entire project, starting from 
Being and Time where he named the essence of being of human beings Da-sein [being-
there], is an attempt to develop a thinking of the way in which human being exists, 
departing from its situated and contextualized character in place. 
 Now, according to Fell, the primary meaning of place in Heidegger’s thought is 
the event [Ereignis]288, which signifies the “taking place” of the disclosedness of the 
intelligibility of beings, leaping from their originary, singular and simple ground, which is 
also the happening of the nature as physis. Unlike Sheehan, Fell explicitly acknowledges 
this as a topological project. All beings appear to understanding emerging from their 
hiddenness. This emergence is always a movement in and from place because of two 
reasons: 1) the event is literally the “appropriation” of the world and the earth to one 
another as the “worlded earth”. Later Heidegger can advocate neither “idealism” nor 
“realism”. On the contrary, with his focus on the situated character of the event, he wishes 
to overcome this dualism. 2) The event takes place in and as the clearing [Lichtung] of the 
site within which the world opens up to the earth and vice versa. The clearing, which 
designates the there of being (Da of Sein), is where the “world” and the “earth” 
correspond to each other as the event of place. In this context, Fell appropriately argues 
that this place is language: “The environment makes sense because it is always linguistic, 
for it is always already a juncture [Fuge] of the imperceptible and the perceptible, and in 
naming language accomplishes this juncture.”289 Furthermore, “to be human being is to be 
a linguistic being in a world of linguistic beings–that is to inhabit a world lighted by 
intelligibility”.290 
 Here Fell uses the word “linguistic” in the simple sense of “pertaining to 																																																								
288 Joseph Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place, 218. 
289 Joseph Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place (New York: Columbia Press, 
1997), 225. 
290 Joseph Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place, 226. 
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language,” where language comes to mean the dwelling-place of human being, in line with 
Heidegger’s statement concerning the “house of being”. It turns out that the “house of 
being” as the place of the event is precisely what amounts to language. We can ask, how is 
this related to the issue of the being of human being? In effect, as Fell suggests, human 
beings’ “releasedness”, to the clearing of being as language is the source of all human 
“activities”, because this is what enables any understanding, as well as any meaningful act 
of responding to that which one understands. This is why the issue is not mere 
“understanding” or “meaning”, but a correspondence; thus, the topos of understanding that 
also yields to communication must be language. When he writes, “what makes possible 
the entirety of human being-in-the-world is the event of the open place in language”, he 
means the following: to be a human being is to exist in the clearing of being, which is 
meaningful and accessible to human beings as language. There is a difference between 
saying “in” language and “as” language, as in the former we might think that we are 
merely encompassed in language as if it is a space of meaning, whereas in the latter it 
becomes explicit that the event as the place and language already signifies the site where 
“saying” can become possible. With Fell’s examinations of Heidegger’s topology of 
language, it becomes clear that language for Heidegger means our exposedness and being 
given to understanding. This is why Heidegger calls the “releasedness to understand and 
respond” language, and this is also why understanding is always dependent on this 
directed and inter-dimensional situatedness of human existence. This is also the reason 
that language, as the house of being, is not “linguistic” in the sense of being constituted by 
the correspondence between phoneme and meaning. Human existence can be called 
“linguistic” insofar as it can be what it is by way of being related to and determined by its 
relation, distance, and nearness to language. In other words, the ground upon and from 
which any verbal and written discourse can unfold depends on the very presence of a site, 
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a clearing within which understanding and responding to that understanding is gathered 
together in the same inter-action. Only then, insofar as communicating appears within the 
radar of meaningful actions, language in the sense of discourse [Rede] can exist. This 
means that when we say that language is constitutive of human existence, the nearness to 
language is precisely the fundamental element, and not language as a means of 
communication. To say that language is not a mere means of communication does not 
mean we are advocating a “post-modern” Heidegger, but it simply points out the 
topological character of language from which any discourse emerges. Therefore, language, 
as the site of the event and the house of being is where understanding and communication 
appear always already linked.  
Problematizing the meaning and place of language for human existence is the first 
necessary step to provide a definition of “humanism”, because it first and foremost 
concerns the very fundamental ethos of human being. This approach is at odds with 
Sartre’s view of existentialist humanism, which suggests that in order to accomplish a 
meaningful being in the world, one has to realize oneself through praxis. In advocating his 
existentialist humanism, Sartre states: “The doctrine that I am presenting to you is 
precisely the opposite of quietism, since it declares that reality exists only in action.”291 As 
I have discussed earlier in the chapter, this understanding of action depends on the 
presupposition that action means causing an immediate effect. Yet, this is precisely the 
approach that Heidegger challenges.  
Heidegger’s approach can be explained with the following example: before 
building a house, one has to focus on clearing up the field. First, we need to clear the 
ground before we set out to construct a building. The construction of a building does not 
commence by building the walls, putting bricks together, but by digging the ground for 																																																								
291  Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 2007), 36-37. 
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arranging the place for the instalment and erection of piles. Likewise, thinking is the act of 
clearing of the field by reconsidering of our relation to place, which is the true sense of 
restoring the meaning of humanness of humanity. Heidegger’s answer to the question 
posed by Jean Beaufret regarding the meaning of humanism indicates an engagement with 
our place in the world via language. As such, in Fell’s exploration of the issue, it appears 
that the disagreement between Heidegger and Sartre on the meaning of humanism could 
not be easily resolved as they follow completely different paths in their subsequent 
thoughts.292 Sartre tries to think of being departing from the perspective of human 
subjectivity and consciousness, and Heidegger seeks to establish the reorientation of the 
relation between being and human being. Sartre declares the basis of his philosophy when 
he says  “As our point of departure there can be no other than this: I think therefore I 
am”.293 Sartre thinks that in Being and Time Heidegger implicates a similar view, or he 
simply misreads Heidegger’s Dasein as a substituting term for human subjectivity. Now 
let us review the consequences of these different visions of “human” and humanity, which 
brings us to different understandings of doing “philosophy”. 
 
II. 6 The Consequences of the “Letter on Humanism” 
 
Although Heidegger’s critique of philosophy plays a significant role in the letter, there is 
almost no engagement with this issue in Heidegger scholarship, focusing on his arguments 
in “Letter on Humanism”. On the other hand, this is not surprising, as the commonplace 
academic attitude towards Heidegger’s writings is to focus on his conceptual advances in 
hermeneutics, phenomenology or existentialism in order to produce new philosophical 
																																																								
292 Joseph Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place, (New York: Columbia Press, 
1997), 364. 
293Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, p. 40. 
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theories or frameworks. This attitude overlooks the actual intellectual problems that 
stimulate Heidegger’s concerns about the present state of thinking, as well as philosophy as 
an academic discipline in the Humanities. Any account of Heidegger’s ethics (and 
topology of being and language) that does not pay attention to the relation between 
thinking and philosophy would be incomplete. At the end of the “Letter on Humanism”, 
Heidegger announces the following provocative idea: 
 
It is time to break the habit of overestimating philosophy and of thereby asking too 
much of it. What is needed in the present world crisis is less philosophy, but more 
attentiveness in thinking; less literature, but more cultivation of the letter.  
The thinking that is to come is no longer philosophy, because it thinks more 
originally than metaphysics –a name identical to philosophy.294 
 
The reason of the “crisis” in which we find ourselves is not only the oblivion of being, but 
also our oblivion of this oblivion –that the essence of being is Ereignis. The “crisis” is the 
“onto-ethical” homelessness of human beings that continues to propel. As we can see, 
there are two footholds of the issue: the first one is about place, for the oblivion of the 
event [Ereignis] amounts to an oblivion of the place of human being in the world, and the 
second one is about language, because, as the “relation of all relations”, the abandonment 
of our dwelling in language results in the loss of a genuine relation to the world. This idea 
corresponds very well with one of Heidegger’s earlier statements in the letter, that the 
thinking on language can no longer be a philosophy of language.295 It appears that there is 
a parallel between Heidegger’s increasingly topologically oriented thinking and his desire 
to “step-back” from the boundaries of academic philosophy.  
In that vein of thinking, in this section I argue that 1) Heidegger’s thinking of ethos 
as dwelling does not lead to an “ethical theory”, but it leads to his topology of language, 
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295 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 243) 
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2) Heidegger’s topology of language, whose explicit foundations are laid in the “Letter on 
Humanism”, must be read as a critique of our contemporary relation to philosophy as a 
mere academic discipline. The very problem is that there are experts in philosophy, 
however no more any thinkers. Before getting to this, let me briefly remind in four steps 
what we have reviewed so far in the “Letter on Humanism”:  
1) Heidegger’s discussion of language concerns the relation between the “onto-
ethical” nature of human existence (its directedness to the linguistic disclosure of things) 
and language (that which releases the human existence to the manifestation of being) as 
the dwelling place of human existence. 
2) Language as the “house of being” is the place (the open-bounded) of the 
manifestation of being as aletheia-1 or the “truth of being”. The “house of being” situates 
the essence of human existence in the clearing and as the openness of being that can 
respond to the manifestation of the meaning of things.  
3) Inquiring into the dwelling of human being in “onto-ethical” terms also 
problematizes the ethos of human being in a fundamental way. This points to a topological 
mode of thinking that redefines the site of human existence with and in relation to 
language. In asking the question of language and dwelling in terms of the nature of human 
existence, we overcome the dualism between “ontology” and “ethics”.  
4) In such a mode of thinking, “thought” does not imply the “theoretical”, just as 
“acting” does not imply the “practical”. Therefore, producing new moral “theories” to be 
applied to so-called “practical” problems becomes pointless as the sole way of doing 
ethics.  
Let me particularly focus on the fourth point, because specifying how Heidegger’s 
thinking of ethos leads to his topology of language is essential, as Heidegger’s critique of 
philosophy perfectly links up with this point. When Heidegger makes the connection 
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between ethos and ethics, he aims to problematize the actual dwelling place of the being 
of human beings. However, it is necessary to re-examine the legitimacy of academic 
divisions in philosophy such as “ontology”, “ethics” and “logic”. These divisions may be 
useful considering the pedagogic conveniences that they offer, in helping us identify and 
analyse thoughts and concepts via philosophical formulations. Therefore, Heidegger 
problematizes the very ethos of philosophy itself namely. He writes: 
 
Even such names as "logic," "ethics," and "physics” begin to flourish only when 
originary thinking comes to an end. During the time of their greatness the Greeks 
thought without such headings. They did not even call thinking “philosophy." 
Thinking comes to an end when it slips out of its element.296 
 
It is well known Heidegger was thoroughly influenced by Aristotle and this is certainly the 
case regarding the question of ethics. Nevertheless, the reason why Heidegger goes to 
Heraclitus, and not to Aristotle in the “Letter on Humanism”, is thought provoking. At his 
time, Heraclitus did not know the word “philosophy”, and he did not consider the question 
of ethos under the rubric of “ethics”. However, this does did prevent Heraclitus from 
thinking and engaging with the question of the meaning of ethos. On the contrary, 
Heidegger claims that this is precisely why Heraclitus could think the question of “ethics” 
a more fundamental way than Plato and Aristotle. Wee need to identify the difference 
between thinking and philosophizing, as a mode of theorizing and conceptualizing: 
Heidegger writes: 
 
When thinking comes to an end by slipping out of its element it replaces this loss 
by procuring validity for itself as techne as an instrument of education and 
therefore as a classroom matter and later a cultural concern. By and by philosophy 
becomes a technique for explaining from highest causes. One no longer thinks; one 
occupies oneself with "philosophy." In competition with one another, such 
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occupations publicly offer themselves as "-isms" and my to outdo one another.297 
 
Here it becomes apparent that Heidegger is primarily interested in de-structuring 
[Destruktion], that is, loosening the boundaries of our conventional understanding of these 
“academic” divisions in philosophy. Their classification is “academic”, because it belongs 
to an epistemic-scientific and objectifying mode of reflection with mostly pedagogic 
concerns, in the wake of Plato’s Academy.298 Pre-Socratic thinkers such as Anaximander, 
Heraclitus, and Parmenides asked concerning the meaning of physis, ethos and logos 
without having classified their thinking under the rubric of “ontology”, “ethics”, and 
“logic”. Yet, they explored the nature and arche of existence, human being’s place in the 
world, and the correspondence between the self-manifestation of nature (physis) and 
human beings in a holistic matter. In that context, the core issue of Heidegger’s critique is 
regarding the envisioned gap between thought and action that is further reinforced in 
academic philosophy due to its calculative underpinnings. He thinks that when philosophy 
is taken up a mere research activity, even ethical theories turn into mere “professional” 
engagements. In the wake of scientific and technological organization of university, 
thinking turns into a mere battlefield of expertise, where different standpoints struggle to 
outclass and overcome one another.  
 Heidegger explicates the primary issue with our way of relating ourselves to the 
philosophical mode of thinking in the following passage, which I consider to be very 
significant: 
Since then "philosophy" has been in the constant predicament of having to justify 
in existence before the "sciences." It believes it can do that most effectively by 
elevating itself to the rank of a science. But such an effort is the abandonment of 																																																								
297 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 242) 
298 “Along with ‘logic’ and ‘physics’, ‘ethics’ appeared for the first time in the school of Plato. 
These disciplines arose at a time when thinking was becoming "philosophy," philosophy episteme 
(science), and science itself a matter for schools and academic pursuits”. (“Letter on Humanism”, 
Pathmarks, 269) 
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the essence of thinking. Philosophy is hounded by the fear that it loses prestige and 
validity if it is not a science. Not to be a science is taken as a failing that is 
equivalent to being unscientific. Being," as the element of thinking, is abandoned 
by the technical interpretation of thinking. "Logic," beginning with the Sophists 
and Plato, sanctions this explanation. Thinking is judged by a standard that does 
not measure up to it. Such judgment may be compared to the procedure of trying to 
evaluate the essence and power of a fish by seeing how long it can live on dry 
land. For a long time now, all too long, thinking has been stranded on dry land.299 
 
 According to Heidegger, the technical understanding of logic underpins our ways of 
philosophizing. First of all, we must reinterpret the meaning of logos. 300 Logic, as the art 
and technique of reasoning, as well as reason as ratio, can make proper sense after we first 
look into the originary ground of logic as logos. We need to rethink the meaning of 
language as logos and its relation to being and human existence if we wish to get a grasp 
of our ethos.  
  In the summer semester of 1944, only a couple of years before he penned “Letter 
on Humanism”, Heidegger gave a lecture course entitled Logos where he discussed 
Heraclitus’ fragment B 50. The translation reads: “When you have listened not to me but 
to Logos, it is wise within the same Logos to say: One is All”.301 Initially, Heidegger 
provides further information about the etymological implications of logos, which allows 
for a topological interpretation.302 In Greek, the verb legein, from which the word logos 
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300 “This thinking alone reaches the primordial essence of logos, which was already obfuscated and 
lost in Plato and in Aristotle, the founder of ‘logic’. To think against logic does not mean to break 
a lance for the illogical but simply to trace in thought the logos and its essence”. (“Letter on 
Humanism”, Pathmarks, 265) 
301 Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, trans. David Farrell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New 
York: Harper San Francisco, 1984), 59. (From here on: Early Greek Thinking) 
302 “Who would want to deny that in the language of the Greeks from early on legein means to 
talk, say, or tell? However, just as early and even more originally—and therefore already in the 
previously cited meaning—it means what our similarly sounding legen means: to lay down and lay 
before. In legen a "bringing together" prevails, the Latin legere understood as lesen, in the sense of 
collecting and bringing together. Legein properly means the laying-down and laying-before, which 
gathers itself and others. The middle voice, legesthai, means to lay oneself down in the gathering 
of rest; lechos is the resting place; is a place of ambush [or a place for lying in wait] where 
something is laid away and deposited.” (Early Greek Thinking, 60) 
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derives, means to say, to speak.303 Another meaning of the word is to lay and gather, in the 
sense of “letting-lie-before-us”. As such, Heidegger observes a link between “saying” and 
“laying” when he argues, “Saying and talking occur essentially as the letting-lie together- 
before of everything which, laid in unconcealment, comes to presence.”304 Heidegger 
thinks that considering this very relation would show us an essential characteristic of the 
essence of language.305 What language essentially accomplishes in its taking place is 
“luminous self-showing.” 306  Logos and aletheia as the disclosure and self-
showing/manifesting are the one and the same307. Heidegger concludes by stating: The 
logos, thought as the Laying that gathers, would be the essence of saying [die Sage] as 
thought by the Greeks. Language would be saying.308  
This characteristic of language did not become explicit for ancient Greeks309, 
because they were already living in that understanding of the word. In other words, they 
took it for granted, without having undergone an experience with it. With this idea in 
view, it is evident that we need a new sensitivity in thinking not only the linguistic 
qualities of language, but also our interaction and understanding of what we accomplish 
with language in our ordinary lives in reading, thinking, writing, and listening. A mere 
theoretical understanding of language will not be sufficient, and we must find ways to 
undergo a new experience with language, which, as an attempt, is the very practice of 
“ethics” (topology of language) itself.310 As such, the question of language cannot be 
																																																								
303 “What logos is we gather from legein. What does legein mean? Everyone familiar with the 
language knows that legein means talking and saying; logos means legein as a saying aloud, and 
legomenon as that which is said.” (Early Greek Thinking, 60) 
304 (Early Greek Thinking, 64) 
305 (Early Greek Thinking, 63-64) 
306 (Early Greek Thinking, 64) 
307 (Early Greek Thinking, 70) 
308 (Early Greek Thinking, 77) 
309 (Early Greek Thinking, 77) 
310  This is precisely the point that Jussi Backman makes in his article when he writes: 
“Accordingly, Heidegger’s lecture is not primarily a discourse on (über) the essence of language, 
but rather allows an indirect encounter with this essence by drawing our attention to the way 
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restricted to a certain philosophical model of questioning and theorizing, simply because 
language is not only an object of investigation. Our relation to language (dwelling) is 
what allows any investigation of language to emerge in the first place, as language is both 
the ground and horizon of any questioning.  
Now, in light of these clarifications, what does Heidegger’s topology of language 
entail? First of all, we should acknowledge that topology of language requires us to leave 
behind the representational mode of thinking deeply implemented in the act of 
“philosophizing”. Philosophy is only a certain manifestation of thinking that flourished 
and started to lose its influence in the Occident in the wake of the emergence of particular 
sciences. The matter of thinking is no longer adequate to be thought under those rubrics 
due to the holistic nature of the issue, that is, the question of being. Heidegger argues: 
 
Because there is something simple to be thought in this thinking it seems quite 
difficult to the representational thought that has been transmitted as philosophy. 
But the difficulty is not a matter of indulging in a special sort of profundity and of 
building complicated concept rather, it is concealed in the step back that lets 
thinking enter into a questioning that experiences and lets the habitual opining of 
philosophy fall away.311 
  
The representational thought, which Heidegger sees as the source of the inaptitude of 
philosophical discourses for rethinking the meaning of humanity and “humanism”, cannot 
be “theoretically” or “practically” overcome by merely constructing various systems of 
thought. The representational thought is not adept at thinking without concepts, because it 
always has to have an image of what it attempts to think. The representational mode of 
reflection transforms its subject matters into “objects”, for the being and unfolding of 
																																																																																																																																																																						
discoursing takes place from and on the basis of (von) language. This is what Heidegger means by 
‘experience,’ Erfahrung, in the emphatic sense: a journey (Fahrt) along the path of language as an 
event.” Jussi Backman, “The Transitional Breakdown of the Word: Heidegger and Stefan 
George’s Encounter with Language”, in Gatherings, vol 1 (2011): 64. 
311 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 261) 
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being itself are not representable “objects”.312 Wittgenstein, who views the issue from a 
similar perspective, would support Heidegger concerning the necessity of stepping back 
from philosophy with a reconsideration of our relation to language, as he writes in the 
Philosophical Investigations: “philosophical problems arise when language goes on 
holiday.”313Once we stop paying attention to the core matter of language, we are drawn 
into engaging with philosophical problems that are not even actual problems for 
“existence”. Elsewhere, Wittgenstein also writes: “The real discovery is the one that 
enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to. The one that gives philosophy 
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question”314. 
Heidegger’s version of this idea is as follows: 
 
[L]anguage surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of 
domination over beings. Beings themselves appear as actualities in the interaction 
of cause and effect. We encounter beings as actualities in a calculative businesslike 
way, but also scientifically and by way of philosophy, with explanations and 
proofs.315 
 
In this passage, Heidegger is not passing a judgment on the inherent value of logical 
explanations and proofs. He is essentially inviting us to reconsider the overall scheme in 
which academic philosophers are expected to “calculate”. If the only objective of 
philosophical discourse is conceptual clarity and theoretical soundness, then it becomes 
questionable whether our attempt to move beyond the Cartesian framework is running in a 
vicious circle. This does not mean that conceptual clarity is bad for thinking, but it simply 
suggests that expecting a similar degree of conceptual-scientific precision for every 																																																								
312 Accordingly, if a topic at matter is not representable, then, it must belong to the domain of 
“metaphysics”. This is precisely why Heidegger argues, as early as in 1929 in What is Metaphysics 
that Occidental thought is still not capable of thinking the “nothing”.  
313 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M . S. 
Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 23e. (From here on: The 
Philosophical Investigations) 
314 (The Philosophical Investigations, 57e) 
315 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 243) 
		 153	
philosophical matter disrupts the nature of thinking itself. This is especially the case if the 
issue at hand is to refine our relationship to language. In other words, if the objective is to 
undergo a new experience with language, the technical use of language that might work 
well for other areas of philosophy may not be suitable for topology of language.316 What 
poetic saying is capable of achieving has its own kind of rigor and soundness.317 In light 
of these considerations, it becomes evident Heidegger’s attitude toward philosophy (or 
metaphysics) can be characterized as a “stepping-back”, which however should not be 
interpreted as a call to abandon philosophy. On the contrary, critically engaging with the 
tradition allows us to find our ways in thinking beyond it.  
Heidegger states that the poetic mode of thinking that is to overcome metaphysics 
need to remain nameless without being conceptualized as a philosophical movement or 
method.318 Instead of endlessly classifying philosophers and attributing pre-defined -isms 
to their ideas, we should let thoughts remain as thoughts. Heidegger writes, “Thinking is 
on the descent to the poverty of its provisional essence. Thinking gathers language into 
simple saying.” 319  In this regard, topology of language must be understood as a 
confrontation with the ways and site of thinking which allows us to see that philosophy is 
only one of the possible ways of recounting the destiny of thinking.  
In this chapter, I have discussed that Heidegger understands language as the 
dwelling place of human existence. In that regard, the idea of “relation” has been key in 																																																								
316 As Malpas argues: “The idea of topology suggests that it is a mistake to look for simple, 
reductive accounts—whether we are exploring a concept, or problem, or the meaning of a term, 
the point is always to look to a larger field of relations in which the matter at issue can be placed. 
This means, however, that it will seldom be possible to arrive at simple, univocal definitions.” 
Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
2006), 35. 
317 The rigor of thinking: in contrast to that of the sciences, does not consist merely in an artificial, 
that is, technical-theoretical exactness of concepts. It lies in the fact that saying remains purely in 
the element of the truth of being and lets the simplicity of its manifold dimensions rule (“Letter on 
Humanism”, Pathmarks, 241). 
318 “But if the human being is to find his way once again into the nearness of being he must first 
learn to exist in the nameless.” (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 243) 
319 (“Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, 276) 
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my argument. In the first chapter as the “between” and in the second chapter as the “house 
of being”, I consider language as the dynamic happening between “being” (“ontological”) 
and “dwelling” (“ethical”) as that which interrelates being and human in dwelling. The 
“Letter on Humanism” indicates the commencement of the explicit topological orientation 
of Heidegger’s thought of language, where the statement that “language is the house of 
being” appears for the first time. My approach has been “onto-ethical” in delineating the 
way in which human beings dwell in the openness of being [Sein], which appeared to be 
the “there” [Da]. The “there” is also the site of the event [Ereignis], which is intelligible to 
human beings as language. As the house of being, language gathers being and human 
being in the place of the event. Human being needs to learn to dwell in that “place” in 
order to fulfil its humanness, as this is how a non-metaphysical understanding of 
“humanism” can be developed. As such, the topology of language in the letter paved the 
way for a post-metaphysical engagement with the core matter of language as a 
“mindfulness of language”. Now we can look into the happening of language itself as the 
“relation” and the “way” between being and human being. Examining his magnum opus 
on language, On the Way to Language, which I will undertake in the next chapter, should 










III. Language and Dwelling in the 1950s and 1960s 
  
Thus far I have shown that we must read Heidegger’s “topology of language” as non-
metaphysical approach that seeks to move beyond the existing paradigm of philosophies 
of language. Heidegger’s idea in the late 1940s is that we must first find a proper 
“relation” to language in which we can discourse “about” it, which must unfold from our 
dwelling in the “house of being”. What has not become obvious so far is the “way” in 
which we can undergo an experience with language, which is an issue that appears in 
Heidegger’s thought in the 1950s and onwards. To that end, in this chapter I will examine 
Heidegger’s On the Way to Language (1959) and I will conclude the chapter with a 
discussion of the Conversation on the Country Path (1966). While the former can be seen 
as Heidegger’s magnum opus on the question of language, the latter work is also 
extremely significant in exemplifying the relationship between “letting-be” or 
“releasement” [Gelassenheit], thinking and language. Appropriately understanding the 
nature of language and its relation to the issue of dwelling (as our onto-ethical experience 
of being placed) requires me to explain and discuss the topological foundations of the link 
between “way”, “way-making” and the event, which is the key point in Heidegger’s 
thought of language in the 1950s. 
In that context, the structure of the chapter will be as follows: 1) I problematize the 
way and the ‘method’ in which we can discuss and situate [er-örtern] ourselves in the 
“event of language”. As such, the primary focus will be on the notion of “situating-
discussing” [Erörterung] and its relation to place [Ort]. 2) I explain the difference 
between “method” and “methodology”, and discuss the trifold relationship between 
“hermeneutics”, “phenomenology” and “hermeneutic phenomenology”. I evaluate the 
significance and the role of Heidegger’s topology of language with regards to the issue of 
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the ground and horizon of the question of language. 3) Departing from the “method” of 
the “discussion”, I bring to the fore the topological significance of the “way” of language 
and its “way-making” movement, explicating the relation between “way”, “way-making”, 
“movement” and place in relation to the event of language. In that regard, I highlight the 
trifold relation between “silence”, “speaking”, and “saying” which appear as distinct 
moments of the happening of language. 4) I discuss the meaning of the Japanese word 
Koto ba as a poetic designation of the essence of language as “saying” that shows forth the 
“way-making” movement. I show the way in which “discussion” discloses the event of 
language and its relation to the emergence of nature. In doing so, I also discuss the 
influence of Asian thought in Heidegger’s later thought. 5) I bring to the fore and 
elaborate on the idea of sameness of the “event of language” and the “language of the 
event”. In that context, I explain why and how Heidegger criticizes Humboldt’s 
subjectivistic philosophy of language. Subsequently, I discuss Ziarek’s account of 
Heidegger’s discussion of language as the site of the event, and explain the relation 
between “topology of language” and “topographics of language” in pointing out the 
significance of moving away from the “meaning of being” to “truth of being” and “place”, 
and the spacing between them. 6) I explicate the link between Heidegger’s understanding 
of the “framework” as the essence of modern technology and how the “framework” 
signifies the logical-logistic manipulation of the “way-making” of logos. 7) By showing 
how the critique of the “framework” brings us to the late notion of “letting-be” or 
“releasedness”, I discuss the topological underpinnings of notion of the “region” as the 





III. 1 Erörterung: The Way of Discussing-Situating Language 
 
In this section, I introduce the notion of Erörterung, which means “situating-
discussing”320 and appears as the “method” (way) of the discourse on language. I will 
clarify how we should understand “situating-discussing” as an original “method”, as well 
as how to better make sense of the very term “method”.  
We encounter the notion of Erörterung mainly in two essays in On the Way to 
Language: first, in “A Dialogue on Language” (1953/54), second, in “Language in the 
Poem: A Discussion [Erörterung] on Georg Trakl’s Poetic Word” (1953). It is in the latter 
piece that Heidegger highlights the etymological implications of the word and points out 
the relation between “discussing” and place: 
 
We use the word "discuss" here to mean, hint, to point out the proper place or site 
of something, to situate it, and second, to heed that place or site. The placing and 
the heeding are both preliminaries of discussion.321 
 
Heidegger’s thought emphasizes the point that in German, discussing [erörtern] a subject 
matter means situating it in its belonging context or place.322 “Situating” [er-örtern] 
derives from “place” [Ort]. Accordingly, the aim of a discussion [Er-örterung] is to 
situate its subject matter in context, so that it can gather the issue at hand in such a way 
that the “topic” can become a matter of conversation and discussion.323 This means that 
																																																								
320 I will use both “situating” and “discussion” when referring to the word Erörterung in quotation 
marks, and I will refrain from translating it as “situating-discussing” as much as possible, because 
in colloquial German, it simply means “discussion” and its topological background is rather 
implicit. The translation “situating-discussing” is useful only in places where mere “situating” or 
“discussion” does not sufficiently clarify the topological meaning of the context. 
321 (On the Way to Language, 159) 
322 In Turkish, the reciprocal verb “speaking” konuşmak and the noun “neighbour” komşu derive 
from the common root verb kon- “to situate one self”. (See: Introduction, 1) 
323 Malpas also dwells on the topological underpinnings of the word Erörterung as discussion or 
inquiry: “The employment of ‘Ort’ as a term that relates to topos is itself indicated by the way in 
which both terms figure in ways that can be used to designate a discussion or focus of inquiry. 
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we must first let the “topic” become apparent in and from its proper place [topos]. 
Heidegger’s use of the notion is inherently related to the fact that he attempts to reorient 
our way of thinking the nature of language so that we learn to think with and of language. 
According to Heidegger, in the course of a conversation324, the aim should not simply be 
to construct a “view” (theory), but rather to first allow for the open space from which any 
“viewing” can become possible. In other words, first, one must access the horizon that 
from and within which things can be seen and grasped. “Discussion” aims to provide the 
“access” in opening the way from the ground to the horizon. The dialogue “on” language 
is grounded “in” and “of” language itself by which one attempts to comport oneself to the 
inner movements of language instead of “setting” [thesis, tithenai] it theoretically from a 
distance. 
Such a way of “situating” ourselves in language, which is the way in which we 
relate ourselves to the “event of language”, can be called Heidegger’s “method” of 
discussion of the nature of language. The very first application of this “method” can be 
found in the first essay of the English translation of On the Way to Language, where 
Heidegger converses with the Japanese professor Tezuka about language. The original 
title of the essay is more suggestive than the English translation (“Dialogue on 
Language”), as it literally says “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache”: “From a dialogue 
																																																																																																																																																																						
This is true of the English word ‘topic’ and so the idea of ‘topology’ in Heidegger’s thinking can 
sometimes be viewed as relating as much to the idea of a literary or textual ‘site’ as to a place as 
such. The German term ‘Erörterung,’ which contains ‘Ort’ within it, also means a debate or 
discussion, but Heidegger employs it in a way that plays on the sense of ‘situating,’ ‘locating,’ or 
‘placing’ that it also connotes. This is significant, not because it somehow shows that Heidegger’s 
talk of ‘topos’ or ‘Ort’ is really a reference to something linguistic, but rather because of the way it 
is indicative of the intimate connection between language and place.” Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's 
Topology: Being, Place, World, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 30. 
324The English word “conversation” also has the meaning of abiding, living with, turn round, and 
remain. Ernest Klein, Klein’s Comprehensive Etymology Dictionary of the English Language 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 164. 
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(conversation-discussion) of the language”.325 The first essay of the original volume 
Unterwegs Zur Sprache “Die Sprache” (1950), which is not included in the English 
translation, problematizes our “situation” vis-à-vis language and the event at the very 
outset. “Die Sprache erörtern heißt, nicht so sehr sie, sondern uns an den Ort ihres Wesens 
bringen: Versammlung in das Ereignis.”326 This essay (“The Language”) could be found 
in Poetry, Language, Thought, which is an edition that consists of Heidegger’s various 
essays. Albert Hofstadter translates the sentence as follows: “To discuss language, to place 
it, means to bring to its place of being not so much language as ourselves: our own 
gathering into the appropriation.”327 An alternative translation could emphasize the key 
issue more explicitly: “Discussing language does not so much mean situating it 
(language), but rather bringing ourselves into the place of its essence: gathering in the 
event.” With this translation it appears clearly that it is language that situates us in place, 
not human subjectivity that situates language. The task is to let language situate us 
through our discussing it, which is the true meaning of “situating-discussion”. Therefore, 
before we come to produce a “thesis” about language, we should first attempt to find the 
way in which language “attunes” our very being so that a genuine correspondence can 
take place. 
 As I will explicate below in detail, in the course of their conversation, neither 
Heidegger nor Tezuka force one another to come up with, or depart from a pre-defined 
theory of language: 
 
I: Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably into an object. 
J: And then its reality vanishes.328 																																																								
325 Martin Heidegger, GA: 12 Unterwegs Zur Sprache, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1985. 
326 Martin Heidegger, GA: 12 Unterwegs Zur Sprache (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1985), 10. 
327 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 188) 
328 (On the Way to Language, 50) 
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The phrase “its reality vanishes” can be properly understood as follows: When we 
objectify language by only speaking about it, its “taking place” (i.e., its reality) is 
concealed (vanishes). As such, the discourse on language is a dialogue, and therefore it is 
a mutual act of situating, which does not draw upon a pre-fixed “standpoint”. This is 
related to the kinetic nature of place, which requires us to consider the role of “way” and 
“the between”, as we orient ourselves with regards to and in places by moving in and 
between them. The notion of place that is at stake here can be understood in relation to the 
nature of language as an active happening, which gathers us around a subject matter, a 
topic, insofar as we let it take over our objectifying comportment. The hermeneutic 
circularity at issue is that whenever we talk about language, we already find ourselves 
moving within the boundaries of language. Yet, it is precisely this circularity –understood 
in the sense of a dynamic and circular movement that results in creating its own topos– 
that allows us to approach the question of language again and again, and consider 
language not as something that we can exhaust as a mere object of investigation, but rather 
as the very place of the discussion which situates us. The “discussion” of language has 
neither a predefined “viewpoint”, nor it aims to arrive at a conclusive, univocal “concept” 
of language: it simply journeys the “saying” of language in listening to [zuhören] and 
belonging [gehören] to it. Let me clarify the “situating” nature of discussion. 
I have claimed that “situating” is the “method” of the discussion. At this point, it is 
useful to distinguish “method”329 from “methodology”. Heidegger marks this difference 
by looking into the meaning of the notion of “way”, which is what the word “method” 
																																																								
329 Method, methodos in ancient Greek, derives from the combination of two words namely 
meta+hodos. Meta stands for “after”, as hodos means “way”. Literally, it means “a way to be 
followed after”. 
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means in ancient Greek.330. Now, for Heidegger, “methodology” indicates the logical 
formalization of the way in which language moves in the course of a dis-course.331 Every 
questioning has a “method”, in the sense that every questioning “follows after” 
[nachgehen] a certain “way” in order to be able to “dwell” on the topic of that which it 
makes an issue.332 If the essential meaning of “method” is searching and following after 
the matter itself, then, the topological “method” that is at issue here is the “discussion” of 
language in the sense of situating ourselves in accordance with the “way(s)” and 
movements of language.333 
Heidegger puts forward the idea that modern science and technology no longer 
understands “method” as the “way” of thinking, but only as “methodology”, as the logical 
arrangement and organization of the “techniques” in and through which one reflects by 
calculating and accounting. As such, one arrives at accounts and theories about this or that 
idea. Yet, it is evident that Heidegger does not appeal to some sort of “method–less”, 
wishful thinking. The point is that the “method” (way) should be determined in 
accordance with the proper context of the topic (the place of the subject matter) and 
therefore, a methodology that does not belong to the context of the matter should not be 
externally applied to it. The subject matter and our way of discussing it must disclose its 
proper “methodology”. Not doing so renders the “method” a “methodology”, a predefined 																																																								
330 Brogan claims that Aristotle does not use the term merely as a “technique”, as it is the case in 
its modern scientific or artistic use “Method is not a technique for Aristotle. It is, as his manner of 
inquiry, a remaining faithful to the matter that presents itself, by questioning the matter in regard 
to its being Walter A. Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2005), 80. 
331 (On the Way to Language, 74) 
332 “Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, 
and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics. The way is a way of thinking”. 
(Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 3) 
333 Otto Pöggeler also aptly makes this claim as he suggests: “Heidegger compares his ground–
word Ereignis with words such as tao and logos, and he often remarks that in our word ‘method’ 
the Greek word for ‘way’ still resonates, but that the insistence on and absolutization of method 
distort every following of a way and thereby the collecting of oneself for the event of 
appropriation.” Otto Pöggeler, “West–East Dialogue: Heidegger and Lao–Tzu”, in Heidegger and 
Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 62.  
		 162	
“technique” and a “procedure” by way of which one pre-determines the “scope” of the 
topic, before having followed the way of the– matter itself. When applied as such, 
methodology denotes the objectified systematization-formalization of the way(s) and their 
movement. Heidegger claims:  
 
The sciences know the way to knowledge by the term “method.” Method, 
especially in today's modem scientific thought, is not a mere instrument serving 
the sciences; rather, it has pressed the sciences into its own service.334 
 
 
Here, Heidegger wishes to draw attention to the fact that there are at least two ways of 
understanding how methods function. On the one hand, the method can serve as the 
instrument to knowledge, and on the other hand, the method can be applied in a way that it 
turns into a tool that instrumentalizes knowledge. Nevertheless, what Heidegger aims to 
point out in relation to the question of language is not simply the understanding of method 
as an instrument that we can apply in order to obtain more knowledge about language. If 
the primary purpose is to revise our relation to the proper nature of language, then, there 
can be no pre-scribed, pre-defined “methods” as instruments that bring us to knowledge. 
The aim is not to use the “method A” in order to get to the point Y from X. Therefore, it is 
clear that we need a third way of understanding methods, one that does not determine the 
method as a mere instrument to get more knowledge “about” language. This is the 
significance of “situating-discussing” where the “method” is not applied in a logical-
logistic way, but the matter of the topic itself is “followed-after”, which first clears the 
“way”. It is in that context that Heidegger endorses a topological understanding of the 
“method” as way and refrains from making sense of it as “methodology”. In On the Way 
to Language he writes:  
 
																																																								
334 (On the Way to Language, 74) 
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In thinking there is no method or theme, but rather the region, so called because it 
gives its realm and free reign to what thinking is given to think. Thinking abides in 
that country, walking the ways of that country. Here the way is part of the country 
and belongs to it.335  
 
The topologically oriented wording at this passage is not arbitrary, and it should awaken 
us to thinking the place-nature of the issue at hand. We can unpack the statement as 
follows: thinking means dwelling, as walking the ways of the country in which it is 
rooted, that is, language. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, for Heidegger, there 
is a major difference between “thinking” and “philosophizing”, and they do not only 
signify different names for the same action. The latter can be designated as the kind of 
reflection that walks the paths of thinking that have been already opened. In order to argue 
for this or that, one needs to get from here to somewhere else by following such and such 
route. However, as I will discuss, meditative thinking, whose nature is poetical, differs 
from a philosophical mode of thinking (propositional and representational) that is 
grounded in episteme from which modern sciences have emerged. The poetic (or 
meditative) thinking first finds and opens the paths to be walked, “walking” in the sense of 
moving within the boundaries of language on the way to (and from) the clearing. In 
“thinking” meditatively we can also disclose that which has been concealed in 
“philosophizing” about “philosophy”. As such, thinking first and foremost brings us to 
where we have always and already been. It does not produce a different “technique” of 
thinking, but summons us to approach “philosophy” anew, without “philosophizing”. 
Therefore its “following-after” is not the same as following a technique (or a mode of 
argumentation) that has been already established. The task at hand (undergoing an 
experience with language) requires thinking: it means first finding one’s way in the 
language and orienting oneself in and among different paths of thought. This is why we 
																																																								
335 (On the Way to Language, 74) 
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need to constantly orient ourselves in language, which first requires finding the “way(s)” 
and “movement” of language so that we can arrive at its openness. Insofar as we only 
theorize about language, we get away from its actual core matter. Heidegger’s “way” of 
inquiring into the question of language indicates the necessity of orienting oneself in the 
site of the question within which a genuine conversation and discourse can take place.  
The aim of the “discussion” of language, which is distinct from mere theorizing 
about language, is also what Heidegger calls “letting language speak”. It means letting the 
language to become a matter of topic on its own terms, and not on the basis of pre-defined 
theories. We should let language transform our relation to things instead of imposing 
theories designating the “what-ness” of language. As such, it signifies indeed an attempt 
to go beyond a mere discourse about language that departs from human subjectivity, 
especially in thinking about the question of being as the event, which is accessible via and 
as the question of language and dwelling.336 The main objective is to let language come to 
its own by situating us in its happening because being is what is “proper” to human 
beings. This is related to the idea that for Heidegger, it is not that human being “has” the 
language, but language “has” the human being, because it is language that determines the 
essence of the human existence as the openness of being, as the “there”. I will explain this 
idea in detail later in the chapter. 
In this context, Heidegger’s dialogue with professor Tezuka aims to perform a 
thinking dialogue on essence of the nature of language.337 Reinhard May reminds us that 
																																																								
336 This attitude towards language within the limits of conversation could be named therapeutic. 
Wittgenstein had a very similar vision of philosophical discussions “125. Philosophy just puts 
everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to 
view, there is nothing to explain.” (The Philosophical Investigations, 55e). “If someone were to 
advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would 
agree to them.” (The Philosophical Investigations, 56e)” 
337 We must note that the text is still written by Heidegger himself, and the dialogue is loosely 
based on one of his conversations with Tezuka in 1953/54. In a sense, the dialogue should be 
considered similar to Socratic dialogues. That is, the exact authenticity of dialogue is disputable, 
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the dialogue is a pseudo-dialogue, because it is not entirely based on the actual 
conversation that took place between Heidegger and Tezuka, and it contains Heidegger’s 
self-interpretations of Tezuka’s words.338 However, what should rather concern us is the 
context of the text itself, and not so much the biographical accuracy of the “actual” 
dialogue, because first and foremost the dialogue attempts to indicate a way in which we 
should undergo an experience with language rather than giving an account of language. 
Heidegger and Tezuka, which are respectively named as “Inquirer” and “Japanese” in the 
original text and not as Heidegger and Tezuka, try to establish a genuine context (a ground 
and a horizon) of discussion within the boundaries of which they may come to “say” 
something of the nature of language (in the sense of letting language “show” something of 
itself). The possibility that this may not even occur so is a point upon which they agree, 
and in effect, this is precisely the comportment towards language that releases their “con-
versation” into the openness of thinking. This changes the focus from a “philosophy of 
language” where we try to explain what language amounts to by series of propositional 
arguments to an open-ended dialogue with language itself. It acknowledges silence as the 
essential characteristic of the speaking of language that may hint something about the 
nature of language. Now, having clarified what it means to be situated by language let me 
explain the “horizon” and the “ground” of the “way”. 
 
III. 2 The Ground and the Horizon of the Way 
 
In the course of the conversation between Heidegger and Tezuka, the “discussion” of the 
Japanese notion Iki serves as a significant gateway to situate the question concerning the 																																																																																																																																																																						
and yet, what matters for us is the ideas discussed in the text, as we will address the problem of 
authenticity in the next section with regards to the problem of hermeneutics and Erörterung.  
338  Reinhard May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work, trans. 
Graham Parkes (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 47 
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nature of language. The difficulty of talking about the meaning of Iki results from the lack 
of a common horizon of understanding. This is why Heidegger and Tezuka acknowledge 
the necessity to address the nature of a dialogue before they venture to explicate the 
meaning of the notion. This is where the ground and the horizon of their discussion 
immediately becomes the focus. In this way, they come to discern that the “situating-
discussion” is to primarily provide a way for them to arrive at the shared horizon of the 
topic. In other words, discussion should situate us in the topos of the topic. In that sense, 
discussion should not be merely understood as a mere exchange of viewpoints and 
opinions, or as a conceptual analysis written in the form of a dialogue. This is why the 
meaning of Iki, which is related to the discussion of the Japanese word for the event of 
language Koto ba, remains enigmatic until the late stages of the dialogue.  
Concerning his earlier conversations with Count Kuki, who is a former colleague 
and student of his, Heidegger claims: “The danger of our dialogues was hidden in 
language itself, not in what we discussed, nor in the way in which we tried to do so.”339 
The danger is that “the languages of the dialogue shifted everything into European.”340 
Accordingly, the danger that worries Heidegger is the following one: if Iki is a Japanese 
expression, and, if the language of the dialogue is German, then, how is it possible to 
understand Iki within the boundaries of German language while not transforming the 
original context and background of Iki into something foreign to its own nature? In other 
words, is there a way to discuss the subject matter without appealing to subjectivism and 
objectivism? What must be the ground and the horizon of the discussion that gathers its 
interlocutors in the same “between”? 
Here, let me briefly bring into view Gadamer’s conception “the fusion of 
horizons” [Horizontverschmelzung] becaue it is in many ways comparable to Heidegger’s 																																																								
339 (On the Way to Language, 4) (My emphasis) 
340 (On the Way to Language, 4) 
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discussion, and it can help us to understand the nature of the dialogue between Heidegger 
and Tezuka. The “fusion of horizons” is one of the key notions in Gadamer’s Truth and 
Method341, which denotes the intertwining of distinct horizons of understanding that takes 
place342 in the act of interpreting works of art, philosophical texts, but also the respective 
standpoints and opinions of the participators of a dialogue. Indeed, dialogue does not only 
imply two persons’ simultaneous speech, but it indicates the mutual interaction of two 
sources of discourse that co-determine one another. In that sense, it could be understood as 
a readiness to encounter the “other”, as much as a willingness to encounter one’s own 
anew thanks to and through the “other”. Gadamer initially relates the notion of horizon 
with the idea of limit: 
 
Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of "situation" by 
saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence 
essential to the concept of situation is the concept of “horizon”.343 
 
Within that context, Gadamer emphasizes the very temporal-historical significance of the 
concept of horizon. The “situation” in which we find ourselves is through and through 
historical. The historical horizon of understanding in which we are taken up determines 
the way in which we experience our life-worlds, the very factual state of affairs in 
everyday life. However, inasmuch as the temporal-historical situation determines and de-
limits our understanding, it can be also liberating in providing the boundaries for it, which 
are the “limits” of that life-world. Only in encountering the “limits” which bounds the 
neighbouring space, the site can become apparent as a whole. This is why Gadamer writes, 
“On the other hand, ‘to have a horizon,’ means not being limited to what is nearby but 
																																																								
341 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. 
London & New York: Continuum, 2004. (From here on: Truth and Method) 
342 (Truth and Method, 305) 
343 (Truth and Method, 301) 
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being able to see beyond it”.344 According to Gadamer, in order to have a “horizon” of 
understanding, one must maintain a sense of openness that allows one to move beyond the 
limits of his or her own understanding of the world. As such, if my understanding were to 
have a horizon, this means that it ought to provide more than a mere acceptance of or 
submission to the societal and cultural norms and values that construct my life-world. It 
must disclose the life-world of one’s and the other, while also gathering them in the same 
nearness.  
As we can see here, any “horizon” is already a fusion of previously fused horizons. 
The “fusion of horizons” means that two or more horizons of understanding co-determine 
and constructively transform one another. This is why there is never a self-contained and 
isolate horizon. While Gadamer talks about “horizons” more specifically in the context of 
one’s historical confrontation with one’s tradition, we can also observe more specifically 
the spatial and topological significance of the fusion of horizons in the course of the 
dialogue between the two interlocutors. This is where we can make a comparison between 
Heidegger and Gadamer, as well as consider the nature of the dialogue between Heidegger 
and Tezuka.  
An ideal dialogue necessitates several basic characteristics that interlocutors must 
perform: 1) an active cooperation in attending the subject matter, 2) refraining from pre-
defining the course of the dialogue and avoiding pre-determined conclusions, (3) a 
readiness and an openness to the possibility that one may have to change one’s previous 
standpoint. The very nature of the conversation between Heidegger and Tezuka shows 
forth such a mindfulness in the attempt of opening up a way of bringing the relation 
between language and being into perspective. Now, while it is possible to conceive of 
Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” similar to the Hegelian sense of the dialectical occurrence 
																																																								
344 (Truth and Method, 301) 
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of sublation [Aufhebung], both Gadamer and Heidegger’s concerns differ significantly 
from Hegel’s way of thinking. First, Heidegger endorses the holistic singularity of the way 
in which distinct horizons of understanding appear in the event of language as the 
happening of the open site of being. This singularity, however, is not a pre-arranged 
agreement in which both interlocutors happen to share the same worldview. It is rather a 
correspondence [Ent-sprechung] that opens up the dialogue [Ge-spräch] through the 
speaking [sprechen] of the speakers, which requires a two-way movement, where the 
shared site of being comes to emerge. The “fusion” that is at stake here is not the 
dialectical struggle of two “presences” that come to be overcome by a higher and more 
complete “view”. This is because the “fusion of horizons” does not have a telos, a 
logically explicable and pre-defined end, which distinguishes the notion from Hegel’s 
dialectics. On the very contrary, the “fusion” that is at stake brings each “boundary” to the 
openness of the other, and this is the meaning of a horizon, where the limit both discloses 
and gathers two distinct boundaries in the same “between”. The matter at stake is not the 
accumulation of episteme in order to attain a more absolute “truth”, but being emplaced in 
the very happening of a horizon of understanding in which the unconcealment of any 
“truth” becomes possible in the first place. 
In the beginning of the section, I argued that the discussion concerning the 
meaning of Iki was the main departure point of the conversation between the interlocutors. 
It was initially held back due to the necessity of first coming to terms with the horizon and 
ground (context) of the dialogue in situating oneself in the site of the conversation. At this 
point, the question concerning the phenomenological and hermeneutic underpinnings of 
the nature of their dialogue comes to the fore. Tezuka insistently invites Heidegger to 
clarify his position with regards to both phenomenology and hermeneutics in a number of 
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different instances in the course of the dialogue.345 Both Tezuka and Heidegger identify 
that thinking under the rubric of such terms such as “hermeneutics”, “phenomenology” or 
“hermeneutic phenomenology” do not assist us in undergoing a new relation with the 
language, unless we first come to appropriate our relation to these philosophical 
movements and methods. Tezuka and Heidegger discuss the relationship between 
hermeneutics and phenomenology as follows: 
 
I: As I do so, I would like to start from the etymology of the word; it will show you 
that my use of the word is not arbitrary, and that it also is apt to clarify the 
intention of my experiment with phenomenology. 
 
J: I am all the more puzzled that you have meanwhile dropped both words. 
 
I: That was done, not-as is often thought-in order to deny the significance of 
phenomenology, but in order to abandon my own path of thinking to namelessness. 
 
J: An effort with which you will hardly be successful.  
 
I: … since one cannot get by in public without rubrics.346 
 
 
The passage above can be interpreted as follows: Heidegger acknowledges that when seen 
from a purely philosophical point of view, his later thinking can be said to have 
“phenomenological” underpinnings, but to call it under that rubric does not help us in 
undergoing an experience with language, which for him appears as the actual task of 
thinking. The thought and its method should initially rather remain nameless. The 
“namelessness” that is at issue here denotes the kind of thinking that refrains from pre-
determining the “course” of its “discourse”. This attitude is similar to what Heidegger 
called the “de-structuring” in Being and Time, in terms of the history of ontology.347 De-
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structuring does not imply destruction; on the contrary, it indicates the act of loosening the 
boundaries [Abbau] so that the site of the topic itself can come into full view. The passage 
above can also be read in connection with Heidegger’s position in the “Letter on 
Humanism” where he explicates that a philosophical mode of reflection is no longer apt in 
thinking through the core issue of language, because it immediately transforms language 
into an organisable, orderable, calculable object. Therefore, the debate on the question of 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, and hermeneutic phenomenology should primarily guide 
us in understanding the way in which Heidegger oriented his later thinking. In that regard, 
Tezuka asks Heidegger about his encounter with Count Kuki, when Heidegger had 
mentioned to him a “new direction” in phenomenology under the rubric of “hermeneutic 
phenomenology”. Heidegger responds to this inquiry by saying: 
 
I: It may indeed have looked that way. In fact, however, I was concerned neither 
with a direction in phenomenology nor, indeed, with anything new. Quite the 
reverse, I was trying to think the nature of phenomenology in a more originary 
manner, so as to fit it in this way back into the place that is properly its own within 
Western philosophy.348 
 
Heidegger here emphasizes that he was primarily interested in showing the very source of 
“phenomenology” as to what makes our understanding of the meaningful “presencing” of 
things possible in the first place, which is a project that he advances via the question of 
being. The way in which Heidegger understands “phenomenology” as a philosophical 
movement is entirely different from how, for instance, his teacher Husserl conceived it. 
Heidegger sought to change the focus of phenomenological discourse from consciousness 
to being, although thinking the former was essential to Husserl’s project.349 As for 
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349 “Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology frees its from 
its one-sided orientation toward perception and theoretical knowledge, and leads to an ontological 
reinterpretation of the phenomenon. The phenomenon belongs no longer to consciousness. For 
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Heidegger, it becomes clear in his later thought that any discourse of consciousness is 
derivative of the gathered-situated nature of human existence, not in particular ontic “life-
worlds”, but first and foremost in the very state of being situated in the “there” as the 
openness and clearing of being where any “life-world” can come to be situated and make 
sense for us in the first place. In other words, Heidegger’s thought seeks after the 
gathering place of being and human being in their mutual correspondence, especially the 
opening that allows human beings to respond to the disclosure of being, which is, as 
being-in-the-world (or the later fourfold), what allows human beings to have 
“consciousness” in the first place. That said, as consciousness is always the consciousness 
of something that is, the more essential question is the ways in which we encounter the 
source and very emergence of being itself. Therefore, the source of phenomenology for 
Heidegger must be the study of the way in which we are situated in the happening of the 
event, which becomes accessible to human beings via language. As such, phenomenology 
can no longer be the sole “method” of thinking. Phenomenology, which looks to the 
meaningful appearance of phenomena, must first look to the “grounding” of the ground 
from which any appearing becomes possible. This means it should consider the dynamic 
relation between the “ground” and whatever sources from that ground. Thinking, then, 
must look into the mutual correspondence between the emergence of the ground and the 
horizon in the site of being. 
In the previous chapters I have argued that my position is “onto-ethical”, which I 
considered to be one of the main characteristics of “hermeneutic topology”, especially in 
looking to the relationship between the place of being and the dwelling place of human 
beings. So far, the meaning of hermeneutics has come to the focus only in terms of its 
relation to poetry. Now, a more thorough explication can be provided. Heidegger puts 																																																																																																																																																																						
Heidegger, it is a manifestation of being.” Frank Schalow and Alfred Denker, A Historical 
Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2010), 221 
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forward the view that hermeneutics should not only be understood as the science of 
interpretation, but as the very act of interpreting interpretation itself.350 Interpreting 
something means to find the horizon of the subject matter by placing it and being placed 
by it, where we can first come to have a “horizon” before we have a fixed “standpoint”. 
The “discussion” that situates is precisely such a way of orienting ourselves in the context 
of the appearance of the thing, which suggests that with hermeneutics, the very ground of 
phenomenology itself becomes an issue for thinking. The hermeneutic underpinnings of 
phenomenology are what follows: in the attempt of understanding the thing, the 
“discussion” is precisely the act of situating the topic, as well as letting the topic itself 
situate us, so that we may have a better perspective from which we can view the matter. In 
other words, hermeneutics is a way of contextualizing the subject matter, while also 
letting ourselves to become a part of that context by interacting with it. Instead of merely 
endorsing a certain interpretation of the matter, it signifies the way in which we learn to 
see the issue from different angles and standpoints. This act of encircling the topic creates 
the topos of the act of understanding and interpreting where we can actually “grasp” the 
thing in its wholeness. Now let me explain further how this is linked to the issue of 
language and topology. 
Heidegger’s discussion of phenomenology in Being and Time shows that he 
understood phenomenology in terms of the appearance of phenomena through and as the 
very manifestation of logos itself.351 The Greek word phenomenon derives from the verb 
phaintesthai meaning “showing itself”. In that regard, Heidegger argued that, “Thus we 
must keep in mind that the expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in 
itself, the manifest”.352 We can work with this early definition of the notion which is also 
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relevant for late Heidegger.353 If phenomenology is the philosophical approach that 
engages with the very motion of self-manifestation, and if hermeneutics is the attempt that 
seeks to comprehend the ground upon which one understands and interprets the self 
manifestation of phenomena, then, in engaging with the question of language what 
Heidegger pursues is the following: undergoing an experience with the ground and 
horizon of the site in which our understanding/interpretation of the motion of self-
manifestation becomes possible. Heidegger writes: 
 
I: What mattered then, and still does, is to bring out the Being of beings-though no 
longer in the manner of metaphysics, but such that Being itself will shine out, 
Being itself-that is to say: the presence of present beings, the two-fold of the two in 
virtue of their simple oneness […] 
 
I: Accordingly, what prevails in and bears up the relation of human nature to the 
two-fold is language. Language defines the hermeneutic relation.354 
 
As can be observed here, the primary aim is to understand the source of the presencing 
that grounds the very two-fold, namely the self-manifesting relation between being and 
beings, which Heidegger calls the event. I claim that the nature of this self-manifesting 
relation is hermeneutic if and only if we understand the happening of language of the 
event as the source of the relation. This is so because it is through language that human 
beings have access to the appearance of things in a meaningful way, precisely because the 
relation that gathers being and human being in the same place appears as language: the 
way and the relation between human being and being that by and within which things 
appear as things is language. Therefore, topology of language is also a discussion of the 
ground and horizon of language. 
Heidegger and Tezuka discuss the meaning and the nature of “hermeneutic 
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relation”, and in this context the nature of “relation” becomes an issue on its own terms. 
Heidegger does not understand the word “relation” merely in the sense of “relationship” 
or “correlation” as that which connects two different entities or realms.355 This is an idea 
that I have also explicated in the first chapter with regards to the idea of “the between”. 
Heidegger conceives of the “relation” as an active occurrence, namely, as the constant un-
folding of “the between” which gathers being and human being in place [topos] as the 
open bounded. The idea is that human beings cannot have an external (objective or 
subjective) “relationship” to the appearance of the two-fold which is grounded by 
language.356 When we raise the question of the nature of language, the ground, the horizon 
and the phenomenon turn out to be the same, which is why talking about language is not 
sufficient, particularly if the matter at hand is to find a new relation to language. This is 
because it is language that: 1) situates the appearing of the manifestation of being in place 
and, 2) provides the horizon against the backdrop of which understanding and 
interpretation (taking things as things) become possible. The movement that is at issue 
must engage with the ground and horizon of the happening of the site that gathers and 
situates them in the same context. If to undergo an experience with language is similar to 
dancing, remaining a mere observer of a dancer means to theorize about language. Only 
by dancing with language we can understand what it is like to follow the rhythm that 
attunes language as the event. Likewise, in terms of our relation to language, we must 
learn to comport ourselves toward “the bearing of message”357 in order to adapt to 
language’s own vibrations and attunement. Being attentive to language, as the source of 
the “hermeneutic relation”, places human beings in its belonging “nearness” where any 
interpretation as such becomes possible. In listening to language itself, our relationship to 
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being can no longer be simply theoretical, for “listening” involves no “looking” from afar, 
but rather being-with in the sense of a moving-with in paying attention and following that 
which concerns us. Showing heedfulness to the source of the hermeneutic relationship 
refers to the kind of orientation that situates the human being in the proper nearness to 
things, neither too close nor too distant, but always journeying “the between” as the 
“relation”.  
In the course of the dialogue, Tezuka inquires about the 1921 lecture course titled 
Expression and Appearance358 and the conversation returns to the discussion of the 
Japanese term Iki, the nature of aesthetics, and following that, the very notion of 
“relation”, yet this time by way of clarifying the link between “object” and “subject”. 
Tezuka asks for further clarification concerning the subject-object relationship: 
 
J: "Expression" is the utterance of something internal and refers to the subjective. 
"Appearance," on the contrary, names the objective, if I may here recall Kant's 
usage according to which appearances are the objects, the objects of experience. 
By giving your lecture that title, you did commit yourself to the subject-object 
relation.359 
 
Heidegger admits that his thinking in 1921 was determined by the traditional aesthetic-
philosophical paradigm, yet it is in light of this paradigm that his thinking advanced, 
allowing him to take issue with the origin of subject-object relation, 360 especially with 
regards to certain themes related to art. Tezuka’s question requires Heidegger to explicate 
what it means to have a subjective or objective relation to a phenomenon in general. 
According to Heidegger, the aesthetic “experience” of the artwork turns it into an “object 
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for our feelings and ideas.”361 Here the notion of experience is obviously used in a 
different way than when it denotes the kind of experience that one must undergo with 
language. On this note, we can say that Heidegger has two notions of “experience”: 1) 
experience in the sense of “undergoing an experience with …”, indicates a being and 
moving-with the subject matter, and letting it transform our nature to the extent that we 
incorporate it in our being. This is experience as Erfahrung. 2) In the case of “the aesthetic 
experience,” we turn the thing into an “object” for our subjective will and desire without 
actually going journeying with the matter. This is experience as Erlebnis.362 Here is an 
example: some people travel with the only purpose of having been in a place. One might 
walk for hours on the 5th avenue in the New York City as a tourist, yet this does not mean 
that one actually “experienced” what it means to “dwell” there as a business man, or a 
coffee shop owner whose life continues in the site. The tourist has only a superficial 
impression of the place without real substance. Once the “tour” is over, one returns to her 
or his old life as if nothing happened. Yet, there is also a mode of traveling in which one 
may prefer to live in a place for a longer period of time, speaking or learning the native 
language, and try to understand the culture of place in a genuine way. Such an 
“experience” transforms one’s existence. Only the latter kind of experience is the one that 
involves “dwelling”, which requires the onto-ethical participation of one’s being in the 
place. 
Now, the sort of “relation” that Heidegger criticizes is the one in which we 
objectify the artwork, situating ourselves as egoistic subjects over and against things as 
objects. As early as 1933, we know that for Heidegger the artwork, such as the Greek 
temple, indicates the emergence of the world within which phenomena appear to human 																																																								
361 (On the Way to Language, 43) 
362 This is a difference that Bernasconi also acknowledges in putting Heidegger in a dialogue with 
Hegel on the issue of experience. See: Robert Bernasconi, The Question of Language in 
Heidegger’s History of Being (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1985), 82. 
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beings in their wholeness.363 A true artwork has the capacity to redefine and transform the 
existing paradigms of our understanding, because it provides a new ground upon which 
things start making sense in a different way. It shows things anew to us by providing a 
new ground and horizon of understanding. The aesthetic “experience” of the artwork, 
however, remains a subjectivistic endeavour, since it understands the artwork solely as an 
aesthetic object of pleasure, or some kind cultural achievement, as something that evokes 
sentiments for the individual’s aesthetic esteem. The same point is at issue with regards to 
language, as one’s “relation” to it must not be objective or subjective. What that means is 
that we cannot get to the core matter of language insofar as our study of language remains 
attached to the investigation of language as “self-expression” and “communication” 
(subjectivism) or the scientific description of linguistic components of language such as 
phonetics and syntax etc. (objectivism). How can we let language orient our dis-course so 
that it may replace our “theoretical” position vis-à-vis language? Heidegger and Tezuka 
implicate that this would require a topological engagement when they say: 
 
I: Then, man, as the message-bearer of the message of the twofold's 
unconcealment, would also be he who walks the boundary of the boundless. 
 
J: And on this path he seeks the boundary's mystery.364 
 
The topologically relevant idea here is the act of walking the boundary of the boundless. 
The openness in which we are situated that de-limits our relation to being itself is the site 
of the event, which becomes accesible insofar as human beings dwell in language. In turn, 
we maintain our relation to language if and only if we remain open to bearing the 
message, listening to language’s own speaking. This is what situates us in the happening 
of language, just as this is when we let our discourse on language to be determined by our 																																																								
363 (Basic Writings, 168) 
364 (On the Way to Language, 47) 
		 179	
poetic relation to language. With this idea in view, we can say that inquiring into the 
place-character of language would be the originary source of “hermeneutic 
phenomenology”, because inquiring into the meaningful presencing of phenomena 
(phenomenology) is rooted in the gatheredness of being and human being in the 
happening of the world. Yet, this means that the kind of “hermeneutics” that is at stake 
here is the one between being and human being in their situatedness in language where 
any interpretation (taking things as things) is possible, because it depends on the very 
capacity to say “it is”, which also means, “there is”. The saying of place (logos of topos) is 
what grounds the “hermeneutic relation” as the place of saying (topos of logos): it is 
topology. 
Here we can take a step back and review the issue within the limits of Capobianco-
Sheehan debate. Capobianco emphasizes that the kind of hermeneutics that is at work in 
Heidegger’s later thought does not focus on the “discourse” or “dialogue” that takes place 
between human beings.365 Capobianco’s main concern is to avoid the reading that limits 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics to the scope of “human inter-subjectivity”. Although 
Heidegger’s early thought can be investigated in terms of inter-subjectivity, later 
Heidegger’s primary focus is not the understanding and interpretation of phenomena. 
Rather it is an inquiry into the correspondence between human beings and being itself. 
The “way” of this topological inquiry is the “discussion” that situates in place, and in 
effect, “situating-discussion” is the key to understanding the hermeneutic vein in 
Heidegger’s later thought. This is an idea that also appears in the dialogue, one that 
Heidegger confirms himself.366 The vey nature of the situating-discussion allows us to 
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problematize the nature of “hermeneutics” itself and this is the reason why Heidegger 
refrains from associating the position of his later thought with hermeneutics as such. This 
is evident in the following passage: 
 
I: It can hardly have escaped you that in my later writings I no longer employ the 
term "hermeneutics." 
 
J: You are said to have changed your standpoint. 
 
I: I have left an earlier standpoint, not in order to exchange it for another one, but 
because even the former standpoint was merely a way-station along a way.367 
 
It is in that context helpful to review Sheehan’s perpsective regarding the issue. Sheehan 
argues that Heidegger was all the way down a phenomenologist368 and his phenomenology 
has hermeneutic underpinnings and implications369. Accordingly, Heidegger primarily 
understands human being as the kind of being that can have a relation to the world thanks 
to its hermeneutic sense-making capacity, as the result of the kind of existence that it 
possesses. However, according to Sheehan, Heidegger was at the same time after the 
“source of meaningful presence, whatever that source might be”.370 Sheehan states, 
“Everything is intelligible except why there is intelligibility at all.”371 In view of this, if 
Heidegger was after the “source” that from which the possibility of understanding/sense-
making/intelligibility emerges, then, this would be language as the between [das 
Zwischen] of being and human beings, wherein it both determines and gathers the human 
being and being by allowing them to correspond to each other. This is because “the 
source” emerges through and as language insofar as we can conceive of it as the condition 
of possibility of the meaningful manifestation of being. If this is so, phenomenology as an 																																																								
367 (On the Way to Language, 12) 
368 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (New York: Rowman & 
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369 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, xii. 
370 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, 129. 
371 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, 115. 
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endeavour looking into the appearance of phenomena itself is possible only via the 
topology of language, which inquires into the topos of the very occurrence where the 
appearing of phenomena becomes manifest. Therefore the place [Ort] that Sheehan 
mentions372, without naming it as such, is language. It is the source, not in the sense of a 
mere point of origin, but as the happening of the source as sourcing. If this were to be a 
source somewhere “beyond” our meaning making capacities, it would never become an 
issue for us in the first place. Therefore, it makes more sense to consider the source as the 
event of language (which makes intelligibility possible) itself rather than mystifying the 
source of intelligibility as some sort of a meta-metaphysical origin beyond where we find 
ourselves situated in the world. The source is always and already “here”, in the “there” 
[Da] where we exist. The question “why there is intelligibility at all” needs to be answered 
simply as follows: there is intelligibility because this question makes sense for us insofar 
as we find ourselves placed in language. This is our initial access to the “sourcing of the 
source”, as language is the site of the between, where the event between being-human 
being itself “takes place”.  
Within this context, it would be accurate to say that from the very beginning of his 
thought, Heidegger was interested in preparing the readiness to situate the question of 
being as the question of language as place and vice versa, which first becomes possible as 
soon as we discern the hermeneutic relation between being, language and place373. Once 
Heidegger identified the sameness of the happening of the event as the gathering and 
disclosing essence of language, he no longer needed to appeal to phenomenology or 
hermeneutics as the method or the definition of his thought because he has already 
discovered a more encompassing explanation that grounds both hermeneutics and 
phenomenology. As Heidegger argues, the relation between being and human being 																																																								
372 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, xviii. 
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“cannot be hidden in anything other than the voice that determines and tunes his 
nature”374.  Accordingly, (1) Heidegger was after the source of the question of being via 
language as the happening of place because, (2) the question of being emerges from our 
situatedness in language as “the between”, and (3) the topology of language is late 
Heidegger’s way of issuing the origin of the aletheia of the meaning of being. Finally, (4) 
“situating-discussion” of language is the way and movement of thinking, which is the kind 
of approach that refrains us from viewing language objectively or subjectively, but by 
constantly reorienting ourselves in the very site of the event itself. Therefore we can infer 
that the later period of Heidegger’s thought cannot be merely defined as hermeneutics, 
phenomenology, nor hermeneutic phenomenology. It is rather an attempt of grounding the 
“hermeneutic relation” between being and human beings, which signifies the topological 
nature of language as well as our dwelling in it. In that regard, when Sheehan suggests that 
Heidegger’s “focal point was not Sein” and that he was primarily after the “mean-
ingfulness and its source”375, this requires a careful scrutiny. Initially, we can say that 
Sheehan makes a point because Heidegger’s thought was not concerned with some sort of 
supernatural being as a god-like subject whose radiance illuminates all other phenomena. 
It is about Ereignis, which is not an entity, but the taking place of the openness of the 
coressepondence between being and human being, as that which grounds any presencing 
of the presence as such. Yet Sheehan’s statement is also misleading because the 
gatheredness of the manifestation of being and human existence’s openness to its 
manifestation in language is precisely what is at the root of the question of being [Sein], 
and this is beyond the question of being as meaning. The very correspondence in the site 
of being grounds the emergence of meaningfulness, so being does not amount to meaning, 																																																								
374 (On the Way to Language, 47) 
375 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2015), 10-11. 
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but to the interrelation between that which becomes manifest (phenomena), to that which 
can make sense of this manifestation (human being), and the very site in which the event 
takes place (language).  Being itself, or physis, which Capobianco considers the core 
matter of Heidegger’s thought, is the very unity of these distinct elements. An experience 
of being itself may be enacted if human beings manage to be able to respond to the event, 
which is the meaning of dwelling in language. 
In light of these arguments, it is now evident that there is no possibility of 
encircling language as a mere object of investigation, because, as we have examined, it is 
the ground of the appearance of phenomena (phenomenology), and the horizon of the 
understanding and interpretation of that appearance (hermeneutics). Engaging with the 
ground and the horizon of that two-fold appearing is the task of the topological study of 
language. Now, having clarified that “situating-discussion” [Erörterung] is the “way” in 
which Heidegger raises the question of language, we can move on to discussing the nature 
of the “way” and “movement”. This should bring to the fore the “way-making movement” 
of language as the happening of language as the topos of being. 
 
III. 3 The “Way-Making” of Language 
 
Thus far I have shown the way in which Heidegger problematizes the “way” of his 
discourse on language in On the Way to Language. This prepared us for understanding the 
appropriate mode of thinking that is needed for considering the nature of language. 
However, I have not explained the nature of the “way” itself, and how it might be 
connected to the place-related nature of language (the way-making movement) and the 
event, which will be the primary issue at hand in this section. 
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The “method” of discussing language as “situating” requires the correspondence of 
the “way” and the actual subject matter. This correspondence can be understood as the 
harmony between the issue and the method that Heidegger considers necessary for the 
poetic discussion of language. Namely, the subject matter should determine the way and 
vice versa. This is connected to the way in which Heidegger makes sense of the nature of 
the “way”, when he writes, “Ways are not mere stretches that connect two places”376. The 
way (as the dynamic relation that constitutes the between) is what allows the boundary of 
place to appear as such. As I have suggested, the matter at hand is to review the relation in 
which we stand to language. If and only if we find the proper relation to language being 
itself can be appropriately experienced, because language is not just any relation, but the 
relation of all relations. This is exactly the same idea that I have explicated with regards to 
the notion of “the between” in the first chapter. Now the same idea is at work with regards 
to the relationship between “movement” and “way”, yet even in a more explicit way.  
First it must be noted that in German, “way” [Weg] and “movement” [Bewegung] 
are etymologically connected. In the essay “The Way to Language”, Heidegger refers to 
Be-wëgung from the Swabian-Allemanic dialect of German, a word that implies the way 
that clears up a field and the movement that opens up space. 377  In other words, 
“movement” is the happening of “way” which shows forth the openness. If we look to the 
root of the word “way”, we observe the meaning of “weighing” as “bearing”, “carrying” 
and “moving”378. Therefore, there is a trifold link between “way”, way-making”, and 
“movement”, that requires a closer look. Let me explain how this is also related to the 
question of the nature of language. 
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In their dialogue, Heidegger and Tezuka attempt to find a fitting word that can help 
them in pondering the essence of the event of language:  
 
I: For long now, I have been loth to use the word "language" when thinking on its 
nature. 
 
J: But can you find a more fitting word? 
 
I: I believe I have found it; but I would guard it against being used as a current tag, 
and corrupted to signify a concept. 
 
J: Which word do you have? 
 
I: The word "Saying." [Sage] It means: saying and what is said in it and what is to 
be said. 
 
J: What does “say” [sagen] mean? 
 
I: Probably the same as "show" [zeigen] in the sense of: let appear and let shine, 
but in the manner of hinting.379 
 
In this instance, it becomes clear that one of Heidegger’s aims in On the Way to Language 
is to distinguish “saying” from “speaking”, and explicate how saying and speaking are 
linked. Topologically understood, “saying” designates the way-making movement of 
language. In phenomenological terms, “saying” is the disclosive gesture of language that 
Heidegger uses in the sense of making manifest, yet not in the sense of “laying bare 
open”. To show something rather means letting something to come into appearance, which 
requires us to provide it with the needed space in which it can move. As Heidegger 
formulates it: “This way-making puts language as language into language.”380 What that 
means, as I will discuss in detail, can be reformulated as follows: The relation between the 
emergence of meanings from silence and their manifestation into the sounded word is the 
																																																								
379 (On the Way to Language, 47) 
380 (On the Way to Language, 131) 
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“way-making” movement of language. In other words: the event becomes manifest not 
only via language, but also as the “way-making” of language. Heidegger suggests: 
 
The moving force in Showing of Saying [is] what brings all present and absent 
beings each into their own, (from where they show themselves in what they are, 
and where they abide according to their kind. This owning which brings them 
there, and which moves Saying as Showing in its showing we call Appropriation 
(the Event) [Ereignis].381 
 
Let me explicate the topological underpinnings of this point further by looking into the 
nature of the “movement” that is at issue. 
Heidegger considers “saying” [Sage], which he understands as the primary 
function of language, as that which opens up space, in the sense of creating a “clearing” 
[Lichtung].382 “Saying” is the “way-making” motion of language as that which allows for 
the two-way “movement” [Bewegung]. The making that is at issue here should be 
primarily understood in the sense of creating (as in “making room” [einräumen] for 
something), but not in the sense of “production”.383 Heidegger emphasizes that the “way” 
of language can be considered the most hidden yet the most powerful “stream”, which 
also reminds us of the way in which he discussed the essence of rivers in the mid-1930s 
and the early 1940s via Hölderlin’s poetry. As I have shown in the first chapter, Heidegger 
already recognized the source of the river, its streaming activity, and its discharge into the 
sea as the unity of the event. The source, the stream and the mouth of the river constitutes 
a singularity, a place that is gathered and concentrated in its own occurrence. Now, 
																																																								
381 (On the Way to Language, 127) 
382 Perhaps one could even say that if “saying” is that which opens up the clearing of being as Da-
sein, then “saying” would be the highest and the most virtuous action on the part of human beings. 
In that sense, “saying” would require a constant openness to listening to the emergence of being 
itself, as well as a capacity to bring that listening into the boundaries of speech by “saying”.  
383 It could also be conceived of in terms of “poetizing”, in the sense that I used in the first chapter 
as “making space” for dwelling. 
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Heidegger comes to claim that, “All is way”384, which requires a close scrutiny with 
regards to the inner “movement” of language.  Heidegger argues: 
 
Saying keeps the way open along which speaking, as listening catches from Saying 
what is to be said, and raise what it thus has caught and received into the sounding 
word. The way-making of Saying into spoken language is the delivering bond that 
binds by appropriating.385  
 
What that means is that in order to understand the “event of language”, which is its “way-
making movement”, we need to focus on “saying”. In the quoted passage, Heidegger’s 
emphasis is on the gathering nature of the “way-making”, the same sense of unity that is 
also at issue in the statement “all is way”. The expression of the “delivering bond” is the 
key expression here, particulariy indicative of the way in which the intrinsic motion of the 
“way-making” establishes unity. Accordingly, what does “saying” designate? It is first 
and foremost “deliverance”. It can be thought in line with the original meaning of “way” 
as “weighing” and “carrying”. Yet, what does the “saying” deliver? It does not simply 
deliver the “meaning” of a word or expression, but rather the event of language itself. It 
brings the world of understanding, interpretation and expression into the word that bears 
the meaning of that which we want to say. The very motion of bringing into the uttered 
word is what “saying” accomplishes and this is where we see that the action and the 
occurrence that brings the world of meaning into the sign is distinct from the sign itself.  
Now, although “saying” is not mere expression, and it is certainly distinct from 
mere discourse, this does not mean either that it is completely detached from them. Every 
“speech” emerges from saying in that without the possibility of “saying”, we would not 
have “speech” either. We “speak” because we want to “say” something in order to indicate 
that “this is so” or “this is not so”. I show how the state of affairs is via language. In turn, 																																																								
384 (On the Way to Language, 92) 
385 (On the Way to Language, 131) 
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“speech” makes this “audible”. Yet, it is not certain at all that what we “speak” will 
actually achieve to “say” what have in mind. As a matter of fact, each meaning of the 
word may conceal another one.  
Within this context, it is interesting to consider the 20th century Japanese 
philosopher Ueda’s topological ideas on language. Ueda is a third generation thinker from 
the Kyoto school whose thinking develops his teacher Nishida Kitaro’s topologically 
oriented explorations of the pure human experience in attempting to overcome the 
“object” and “subject” dichotomy via looking into the “logic of place” [basho no ronri].  
Ueda’s thinking aims to show how object-subject division is preceded by a more primary 
experience of being in the world, which comes to the fore in our limit experiences of 
language. What he calls “hollow words”, as we see in the sayings of Zen tradition or 
poetry, can disclose the openness of language, as well as our finite situatedness in 
language.386 A scrutiny of Ueda’s understanding of the role of hollow words may show 
forth the relationship between language and nothingness, which must be thought in terms 
of the interplay between showing and hiding, appearing and disappearing. Ueda claims: 
 
The words of language (kotoba) show things, events, or states-of-affairs (koto). 
Words express or manifest things; at times they can be said to manifest while 
expressing them. Therein lies the power of language. Moreover, as things are 
revealed, they disappear as words. This is the wonder of language. In the process 
of showing something, a word disappears as word and in its place something 
appears as something.387 
 
This has two significances: first, the words do not simply indicate the meaning of things, 
but they make manifest the world in which they are meaningful. Second, when the 
ordinary meaning of the words becomes the primary focus, we risk losing our poetic 																																																								
386  James Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo, ed., Japanese Philosophy: A 
Sourcebook (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 765-766. 
387 Ueda Shizuteru, “Language in a Twofold World”, in: Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. 
James Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo, 766 . 
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relation to the words. This latter point comes at the expense of overlooking the core matter 
of language and the necessity to undergo a poetic experience with the appearance of the 
words, but it is also what enables human beings to communicate in the factual world, 
which constitutes the two-fold essence of the issue. If the primary objective is to first 
undergo an experience with language, then the logistics of meanings via communication 
(the transportation of meanings via sign-words) can be pushed into the background. Yet, 
with this in view, Ueda comes to grasp a very significant point: language, as the primary 
condition of our meaningful being in the world, is “space-making”, inasmuch as it is a 
“limitation”. In allowing us to say what we want to say, the nature of language disappears. 
This is a topic that requires careful attention to grasp the relationship between phenomena 
and the words. 
 Ueda’s topological thought of language brings into view the two-way movement 
of language, which is related to the question of the “ineffable”. Is the nature of language 
inside or outside of language? Can we express the being of language by speaking about it 
via words? There are two extreme views in this regard: 1) everything is in language, 
because even the question of the nature of language appears within the boundaries of 
language. For instance, even the expression “outside of language” does not exist outside 
of language. 2) We can move “outside of language”, since language is used as an 
instrument which obstructs our immediate access to pure experience. The real nature of 
language cannot be expressed in and of language. Now, Ueda offers a third way: the 
dynamic movement of “exiting language and then exiting into language”,388 which is a 
movement that the poetic words reveal. It signifies a movement from and into silence 
where the core matter of words becomes explicit, yet, neither “within” nor “outside” of 
																																																								
388 Ueda Shizuteru, “Language in a Twofold World”, in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. 
James Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2011), 768. 
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language, but at the very “limit” of language. This is an experience that strikes us in the 
case of being at a loss for words. Precisely when we experience the gap between the 
“word” and the “thing”, this is when being itself overflows us. The overflowing of being 
comes to appear at that limit which, if thought of in a Heraclitean way, neither conceals 
nor discloses language, but hints it. This is where Ueda comes to link “nothingness” with 
language in the movement that takes place into and out of it. What has been traditionally 
called “being” in Occidental thinking as the very nature (physis) of any manifestation in 
the world, is “nothing” within the context of Oriental thinking, which is where Heidegger 
and Ueda’s thinking can be reviewed in the same framework.  
 According to Ueda, the world in which we meaningfully exist cannot exhaust the 
significance of the happening of being; as such it is located in the limitless openness, 
which he defines as the “hollow” space of “no-meaning”.389 This creates the two-fold 
nature of the structure of human existence in the world in terms of its exiting into and out 
of it.390 Now let us focus on different stages of that movement. In order to show the 
significance of “hollow words” and our situatedness in the infinite openness, Ueda 
interprets the poem of a child who lived near the lake Nojiri in Nagano prefecture, with 
the title “Evening Glow”. The poem reads as follows: 
 
The sun sets between Mt Kurohime and Mt Myōkō; 																																																								
389 Ueda Shizuteru, “Language in a Twofold World”, in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. 
James Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo, 769. 
390 At this point, Ueda remarks that this very movement into and out of language brings to the fore 
what we call the phenomenon of “religion”. His comparison of various religions and language, as 
a particular concentration of his thought on Eckhart’s mysticism, is noteworthy, yet a subject that I 
cannot explicate in detail here. It is perhaps useful to mention that, according to Ueda, the motion 
of exiting from and into language is what Eckhart’s mysticism closely observes as its subject 
matter. For the religions of faith with a systematic theology, on the other hand, language becomes 
an issue as the word of God mediated from His realm to our everyday worlds. His words constitute 
“sacred texts”. It can be interpreted that the mystic’s relation to language where it aims to 
experience the movement of language is topologically closer to Heidegger and Ueda’s 
understanding of the nature of language as a “way-making” that commences its movement from 
the limit. 
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Just then an orange cloud 
Smoothly passes before my eyes. 
Carrying the day’s events, the cloud drifts along. 
I was studying at school— 
Is it watching that, I wonder?391 
 
The point that Ueda wants to show by examining the poem is the fact that, when we speak 
with words, the own nature of language gets concealed. In speech, we take words as 
signifiers of phenomena and states of affairs in the world. However, he argues that the 
fourth line of the poem indicates a significant contrast with the preceding three lines. The 
fourth line, “Carrying the day’s events, the cloud drifts along”, does not simply designate 
what things are, but also brings our attention back to the words themselves, and to the fact 
that what is said in the fourth line can only be said in language: The clouds carry day’s 
events, drifting along. This is not an “event” that is present in the world as such, but 
nevertheless, it can become available to our understanding in and with language, which 
has the capacity to re-orient us in our understanding of the world. It is in this sense that 
language can display the very happening of the world even in cases the world itself 
remains mute. In this case, language silently expresses the “hollow” thing, and as such 
provides the thingness of the thing.392 Yet, the thing-nature of the thing appears from an 
“originary nothingness” which, as the basic event of language, is implicated in the last 
line: “Is it watching that, I wonder”. The agent is no longer the mere subject of the action 
of seeing, but he also becomes that which is to be seen by the cloud. My seeing of the 
orange cloud is no longer the question, but the issue is abandonment of one’s ego, and 
one’s situating oneself in the presence of one’s own being not as a self, or as we can also 
say, as a “selfless self”. Ueda astutely describes this as follows: “While actually existing 																																																								
391 Ueda Shizuteru, “Language in a Twofold World”, in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. 
James Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2011), 772. 
392 Ueda Shizuteru, “Language in a Twofold World”, in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. 
James Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2011), 774. 
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in the world, at the same time we hollowly exist in the limitless openness in which the 
world is located. By means of language we, who are located in this twofold manner, come 
to awaken to our actual hollow existence.”393 This limit experience that we attain by 
dwelling in the self-happening of language as the open-boundedness of the world, as well 
as the experience of hollowness that emerges from this nothingness, is where we come to 
see necessity to understand language not only as a possession of human beings that they 
can control and manipulate at will. In opening up the world of meaning as well as letting 
us enter into the hollow space that encircles existence, its two-fold movement situates us 
in place as topos, which means open-bounded. In letting ourselves to be de-limited by the 
very happening of language, we stop merely talking “about” language. We let our own 
existence to become a matter of “discussion” as well, since the world, which becomes 
manifest via language beyond ourselves, shows us something about our place in the world.  
Ueda’s way of pointing out the significance of “original nothingness” and its 
relation to the two-fold experience of the language and the world, show another significant 
dimension of the topic. Ueda’s ideas on the issue, especially with regards to the necessity 
of seeing the core matter of language moving beyond the subjectivistic understanding of 
language as a mere presence of meaning, is also one of the footholds of Heidegger’s 
thought. Heidegger criticizes the three main characteristics of our traditional 
understanding of language, whose foundations were laid out by Aristotle and further 
solidified by Humboldt’s philosophy of language: 1) language is expression, 2) language 
is an activity of human beings, and 3) human expression is a representation of the real and 
the unreal.394. In order to critique this understanding of language, Heidegger looks into the 
question of language not only as human speech, but rather as language’s own speaking 
																																																								
393 Ueda Shizuteru, “Language in a Twofold World”, in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. 
James Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo, 776. 
394 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 190) 
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through human speech. In that sense, we can say that, like Ueda, Heidegger sets out to 
point out the ways in which language need to be considered beyond the philosophy of 
meaning and signification, and he emphasizes the very role of silence and listening to the 
stillness of language. Silence is the mode in which language itself speaks, just as the very 
emergence of being itself happens via its no-thingly essence. 
The poets are capable of “saying”, because they are able to heed the emergence of 
the world of meaningfulness via silence. In Heidegger’s dialogue with Tezuka, the idea of 
“bearing the message” appears as the way of relating ourselves to the silent emergence of 
the words. Now, Heidegger claims: 
 
In the naming, the things named are called into their thinging. Thinging, they 
unfold world, in which things abide and so are the abiding ones. By thinging, 
things carry out world. Our old language calls such carrying Bern, bären—Old 
High German beran—to bear; hence the words gebaren, to carry, gestate, give 
birth, and Gebärde bearing, gesture. Thinging, things are things. Thinging, they 
gesture—gestate—world. 
 
The crucial idea that comes to the fore again here is that insofar as “bearing” must be 
understood as a “gesture”, one by which we come to “hint” the thing through the un-
folding of the world. Therefore, “saying” as the essential occurrence (way-making) of 
language is not about the deliverance of “meanings” from one point to another. What 
saying delivers is not the meaning of the words as if they are immediately available 
“standing-reserve”. Therefore, the “words” do not carry “meanings”, but first and 
foremost they “bear” (and give birth to) the emergence of meanings. The poetic word 
achieves this by way of “naming” and “hinting”, which “situates” the subject matter (or 
the thing) in its belonging world. Heidegger claims, “Things bear world. World grants 
things”395. In this granting, language grants its ways that in and through which humans 
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need to walk. This is the meaning of walking the boundary of the boundless that has 
become a topic in Ueda’s thought, which also situates the human at the limit of the two 
worlds, where, for Heidegger, the relation of all relations becomes possible as “the 
between”. In other words, the “way-making” of language situates the human being in the 
proper distance to the self-manifestation of being as “no-thingness”, where the question of 
being, and not the question of “beings” [Seiende] can appear in the first place. The “way-
making”, then, does not primarily indicate a linguistic movement, but first and foremost, it 
maintains the relatedness of human being and being by gathering them in the between, at 
the limit. The taking place of the relation is the happening of the way.  
After having examined Heidegger’s thought in the same context with Tezuka and 
Ueda, now, providing some historical and philosophical background about the notion of 
the “way” can help us to better comprehend Heidegger’s arguments concerning the nature 
of language as the “way-making movement”. In the 1950s, the Far Eastern thought 
appears as an essential source for Heidegger’s thinking. The reason is that Heidegger 
thought that with the help of Far Eastern thought, it could be possible to understand what 
Occidental thought could not say of being and language. Likewise, many Japanese and 
Chinese scholars found Heidegger’s thought extremely useful in identifying and 
elucidating certain characteristics of Oriental philosophy. In that framework, starting from 
the late-1940s and 1950s, Heidegger attempts to bring Occidental and Far Eastern 
traditions of thought into dialogue.396 Heidegger sought the traces of a poetic mode of 
thinking, which he found in the Far Eastern tradition. He thought that Far-Eastern thought 
does not tend to ponder through “sign-words” (the mere representation and images of 
words), but with the “hints” that invite us to heed words as words, listening to what they 																																																								
396 Paul Shih-yi Hsiao reports about their common attempt with Heidegger to translate Lao-Tze’s 
Tao Te Ching into German, which was never completed: Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, “Heidegger and our 
Translation of the Tao te Ching”, in Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 93–103. 
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make manifest. 
Heidegger draws our attention to the thought of Lao-Tze, who was an ancient 
Chinese thinker and writer who lived around 6-4th century BC, and the reputed author of 
the Tao Te Ching (or Daodejing). It is clear that in On the Way to Language, when 
Heidegger mentions the relation between “way” and “word”, he has Lao-Tze’s use of Tao 
(or Dao) in mind, which primarily means “way” among its other meanings and 
connotations.397 Heidegger urges us to think on the relation between the Taoist notion of 
“Tao” and the Alemannic–Swabian words wëgen and be-wëgen, which can be understood 
as the “way–making, clearing movement”.398 Now, this way-making movement is key in 
understanding how Heidegger explains the topological relation between speaking, saying, 
and silence, as well as the relation between “words” [Worte] and “signs” [Wörter]:  
 
To clear a way, for instance across a snow-covered field, is in the Alemannic-
Swabian dialect still called wëgen even today. This verb, used transitively, means: 
to form a way and, forming it, to keep it ready. Way-making understood in this 
sense no longer means to move something up or down a path that is already there. 
It means to bring the way ... forth first of all, and thus to be the way.399  
 
Having pointed out the role that Eastern thinking played in Heidegger’s later thought, let 
me elaborate the idea of stillness and silence, which is related to the nature of the “way” as 
a “hinting” gesture and indicative of the hollow nature of language. In that regard, let us 
return to the dialogue between Heidegger and Tezuka. 
																																																								
397 May finds similarities between Heidegger’s “weg” and the Daoist notion of “Dao”. May 
suggests that the parallel drawn between “way” [weg] and “dao” also revert to the Heraclitusian 
“logos” in Ancient Greek. As such, May argues that for Heidegger, the event of being and 
language are closely related, the traces of which Heidegger also seeks to track down in Far Eastern 
thinking. See: Reinhard May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work, 
trans. Graham Parkes (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 40. 
 398 Otto Pöggeler has delivered one of the most significant studies on the issue in juxtaposing 
Heidegger’s thought with Lao–Tzu. As such, he also addressed the topological relationship 
between Tao and Logos. See: Otto Pöggeler, “West–East Dialogue: Heidegger and Lao–Tzu”, in 
Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes, 51. 
399 (On the Way to Language, 130) 
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After having clarified the way in which they must “situate” the question of 
language, Heidegger and Tezuka slowly make their way into discussing the nature of 
language and saying through their dialogue. They call the way in which the words grant 
themselves in the course of a dialogue a delicate gesture, namely, a beckoning, or hinting 
[winken]. Hinting is the way of “showing”. In other words, “saying as showing” 
(sagen/zeigen) follows the way of “hinting”. Heidegger and Tezuka come to define the 
significance of “hinting” through their discussion of the Japanese notion of Iki. In relation 
to the way they set out to discuss the “way-making” of language, they come to designate 
the meaning of Iki as the “pure delight of the calling stillness”.400 The term is particularly 
important for the role that it plays in Japanese arts, which appears as a way of making 
things manifest through stillness and tranquillity. Iki is the way of showing, yet a showing 
that issues from and as stillness. It is not a mere demonstration, but hinting of the 
appearing motion of the appearance itself. This means that it is not we as subjects who 
“show” the phenomenon. We only assist (let) its self-manifesting motion in its moving 
toward us by preparing (clearing, opening and protecting) it’s way. As such, one must first 
prepare oneself for the self-manifestation of being itself (as no-thingness) by comporting 
oneself appropriately, bearing its birth, that is, paying heedfulness for the stillness that is 
the source and the way of the kind of “showing” that is at issue.  
This point is connected to the way (“method”) of the “discussion” as situating. 
What is significant is not so much arriving at the meaning of the notion of Iki, but heeding 
the “way” through which it arrives at our understanding, as we undergo an experience 
with language. As such, the “discussion” first attempts to arrive at the “stillness”, which 
Ueda called the “hollow” nature of language, infinitely open to nothingness. Now, it must 
be noted that the “stillness” that is at stake here does not indicate mere muteness as the 
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absence of speech or sound. Speaking, saying and silence are not three distinct present 
beings “correlated” by some linguistic process of signification and correlation called the 
“way-making”. Likewise, nothingness does not mean the mere absence of things. 
“Stillness” is the way of “silence”, as that through which silence appears, just as 
nothingness as the way of being, at that through which no-thingly nature of being comes 
into view. 
Silence, as the “way” of “saying” embodies the hinting gesture of saying, which 
becomes manifest in speaking. Manifesting something through speaking, saying itself 
becomes manifest via silence, which is the “way” of stillness. That means, that which 
comes into the sounded word, the sign, is that which has become shown (signified), yet its 
proper gesture of “hinting” belongs to the “saying”. “Saying” shows, issues from and in 
the mode of silence. We first hear that which is spoken but not that which is said, and how 
it is brought into the saying from stillness. In other words, silence “hints” (“signals”) the 
“word” via saying, which is delivered to the “sign”. A work of art, namely a painting, is 
essentially “word-less”, yet it silently delivers the message in the mode of “saying”. The 
painting can transfer a particular world of meaningfulness to us, without having to utter 
words, yet, we still understand the painting, as it shows forth the happening of a world. 
The problematic aspect of philosophies of language is that they do not take into 
consideration that silence is an essential aspect of language. The incapacity of the word to 
represent the thing in its entirety is taken as a failure and thus silence is immediately 
associated with muteness.401 Heidegger’s thinking specifically underlines the fact that a 																																																								
401 The threefold relationship between speaking, saying and silence can perhaps make more sense 
if thought with regards to the early Wittgensteinian problem of quietism, especially in terms of 
whether Heidegger would support the proposition “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be 
silent” or not. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, proposition 7, trans. G.F. 
Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 99.) Here, differing from 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein makes a categorical distinction between “speaking” and “silence”, and 
locates them in different regions. Here, “remaining silent” means something like staying mute, and 
thus it is used in opposition to ”speaking”. On the other hand, for Heidegger every “saying” has a 
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word or conception of language that is capable of disclosing the nature of language does 
not exist because language is not a static object.402 Likewise, in the course of the 
conversation, it becomes evident that Heidegger’s earlier notion of “house of being” 
should not be conceived of as a conception of language either, a point that Heidegger and 
Tezuka underscore.403 The “house of being” is only a hint that appeals us to approach the 
question of language from a new perspective with a new orientation in thinking. This new 
kind of thinking requires us to acknowledge the limits of language, namely, the fact that 
discourse is surrounded and bounded by silence. In that regard, the significance of silence 
about the nature of language comes to the fore: 
 
J: We Japanese do not think it strange if a dialogue leaves undefined what is really 
intended, or even restores it back to the keeping of the undefinable. 
 
I: That is part, I believe, of every dialogue that has turned out well between 
thinking beings. As if of its own accord, it can take care that that undefinable 
something not only does not slip away, but displays its gathering force evermore 
luminously in the course of the dialogue.404 
 
Speech communicates the “way” of language to others by speaking it.405 In that sense, 
“speaking” shelters the “deliverance” of the subject matter by following the “way” of 
saying. Now, though the sign preserves and encompasses the saying, its function is not to 
deliver the meaning. That said, insofar as the movement that the “way” discloses is always 																																																																																																																																																																						
silent source and not any “muteness” signifies “silence”. Therefore, Wittgenstein’s approach is 
metaphysical in that it thinks the relation between speaking, saying and silence only in terms of the 
presence and absence of signs within the traditional paradigms of linguistic theory. Heidegger’s 
thinking does not advocate “quietism”, for the quietness that is at issue in that metaphysical 
heading is thought in terms of muteness or lack of speech.  
402 (On the Way to Language, 127) 
403 “No, those conceptualizations are not what I have in mind. Even the phrase "house of Being'' 
does not provide a concept of the nature of language.” (On the Way to Language, 22; see also p. 
25, 26.) 
404 (On the Way to Language, 13) 
405 “I: What are you thinking of now? 
J: Of the Same as you have in mind, of the nature of language. 
I: That is what is defining our dialogue. But even so we must not touch it.” (On the way to 
Language, 22) 
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two-fold, there is also the possibility of tracing the “word” moving from the “sign”. The 
appropriateness of the signs with which we speak plays a major role in allowing us to 
attend that which the saying hints. It is through the sign(s) that we journey back and forth 
within the boundaries of communication. As Heidegger argues elsewhere, “If we go to the 
fountain, if we go through the woods, we are already going through the word ‘fountain,’ 
through the word ‘wood,’ even if we are not saying these words aloud or have any 
thoughts about language.”406 As such, the “sign” of the “word” allows or disallows the 
word to be represented in such a way that it may or may not bring us to the “way” itself. 
The “sign” is not the same as the “word”, but only the image and form of it. Because the 
“saying” (showing as hinting) belongs to the “word”, and “sign” can only “speak” that 
which we want to “say”.407 This is the sense in which the idiosyncratic formulation 
“bringing language into language as language”408 should be understood. 
In recent Heidegger scholarship, Ziarek draws attention to Heidegger’s topology of 
language in relation to the way-making character of language. 409 His explorations of 
Heidegger carries out a significant task in expounding the silent nature of the “way-
making” of language, where our letting language speak via the poetic saying remains the 
key point of focus instead of our speaking with and about language. Ziarek has two 
arguments: First, “What Heidegger terms the “way-making” (Be-wëgung) movement of 
language provides the context, or topologically speaking, the region, from which all signs 
and signification unfold.”410 The second argument is that Heidegger’s aim is not to 
construct a “meta-discourse about language in language”.411 As such, “language must be 
																																																								
406 (Off the Beaten Track, 232-233) 
407 (On the Way to Language, 61, 123) 
408 (On the Way to Language, 59) 
409 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 
78. 
410 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger, 80. 
411 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger, 16. 
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conceived in its essential occurrence.”412 Accordingly, there are two opposing ideas that 
need to be reconciled. On one hand, we avoid objectifying language and on the other, we 
nevertheless attempt to say something about the nature of language. The solution is that 
even if we cannot entirely escape talking about language, our discourse on language must 
develop out our non-objectifying experience in language. As our examination of Ueda has 
also showed, the issue of language is two-fold, yet not in a dualistic manner. On the 
contrary, any attempt to stand in a poetic relation to the essence of language must initially 
acknowledge the two-fold nature of our situation in language so that at the limit of 
language our relation to it becomes a topic on its own accord.  
I have discussed that Heidegger and Tezuka both understand “hinting”, and not 
merely “signifying, as the basic characteristic of the words.413 Saying is possible with the 
words, because saying does not mean the transportation of meanings from one mind to 
another. One does not “say” with the “signs” in the sense of transferring a “meaning”, 
since what is “transferred” in any case is the world that the words make manifest. Said 
differently, the “signs” do not bring us to where we need to go, but they only show us the 
way and they bring us to the way of thinking. It is our own responsibility to trace the path 
that the “signs” signal to us. According to Heidegger, in the history of philosophy it has 
become our commonplace attitude toward language that we consider “signs” (as chiffres) 
as the images of various concepts. Our incapacity to make sense of what these conceptions 
historically have been “saying” in different epochs of being is the very source of the 
metaphysical relation in which stand to philosophy. This is why these “signs” need to be 
constantly de-structured so that their metaphysical connotations become explicit and come 
apart in order to awaken a mindfulness of thinking. Restoring our relation to language can 
stimulate this awakening, and also reorient us in the site of thinking:  																																																								
393 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger, 80. 
413 (On the Way to Language, 24) 
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J: Hints and gestures, according to what you indicated, differ from signs and 
chiffres, all of which have their habitat in metaphysics. 
 
I: Hints and gestures belong to an entirely different realm of reality, if you will 
allow this term which seems treacherous even to myself.414 
 
Here, it is clear that Heidegger and Tezuka distinguish “hints and gestures” from “signs 
and chiffres”. Nevertheless, this does not mean that “words” that hint and “signs” that 
signify belong to completely different dimensions. This is obvious in the dialogue when 
Heidegger states that we could not think without “concepts”, not because we need them, 
but because the conceptual way of thinking, “insinuates itself all too easily into every kind 
of human experience”.415 There is no thinking that has access to “pure” signs, just as there 
is no “pure” language where words always mean what they are designed to mean. It is in 
the nature of words to turn into signs, because words are not meant to “signify” as they 
fail to objectify the substance of things. What is in their capacity is to beckon towards the 
movement that takes place in the occurrence of things, opening up horizons in which we 
may attempt to think.  
If one does not experience the way-making movement of language, thinking turns 
into a mere application of readymade chiffres as symbols, using words merely as objects. 
In such an application of the “sign”, we fix the meaning of the “word” by attaching it to a 
certain representation of the thing, where the “word” turns into a tag-word. As such, the 
“sign” only fills the space that is left empty by another “sign”, in which case the 
possibility of an experience of the “word” withdraws. We can call this process the 
instrumentalization of language. What Heidegger critiques is then the total technicization 
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of language such that we come to consider language as a tool of information that only 
consists of “signs and chiffres”.  
Now, if the matter at stake is transforming the relation in which we stand to 
language and undergoing a new experience with it, then, we must dwell in the region 
between the “signs” and the “words” by journeying there. This is the basic condition of 
finding a poetic relation to language where we may first clear up the ground upon which 
we can build and dwell. This is what Tezuka means when he says, “A manner in which 
the builders must at times return to construction sites they left behind, or go back even 
further.”416 In finding a poetic relation to the “there” [Da], human beings travel the 
interval back and forth between the word and the sign. The “signs” that we use in ordinary 
language are not technical-instrumental images of the words. On the contrary, if 
considered carefully, the “signs” leave traces that signal back to the poetic experience of 
the “words”. The poet is the agent who is capable of appropriately travelling the way 
between the “word” and the “sign”. By naming the “word” in a way that the “sign” that is 
assigned to the “word” attunes our being, the poet can hint the way-making movement of 
language. Likewise, the thinker should be topologically experienced in order to be able to 
show us the “way” departing from the “sign” toward the “word”. The experience [Er-
fahrung] of the thinker and the poet must be this constant two-way journeying [fahren] in 
the nearness of thinking and poetizing. This is the neighbourhood of thinking and 
poetizing as the site of the two-way journeying from the “word” to “sign” and vice versa 





416 (On the Way to Language, 21) 
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III. 4 Koto Ba: The Blossoming of Words 
 
Thus far I have explicated the “way” of “discussing” language and the way-making 
movement of language as the essential occurrence between silence, saying and speaking as 
the moments of the interval between “words” and “signs”. Here, I will discuss the 
definition of language that Heidegger and Tezuka come to identify at the end of the 
dialogue, which will be helpful in fleshing out the topological essence of the way-making 
nature of language.  
 In the course of the dialogue, Heidegger demands from Tezuka to explain the word 
“language” (or any word that comes to mean “language”) in Japanese.417 The word that 
Heidegger asks about turns out to be koto ba418, which Tezuka comes to utter only at the 
end of the dialogue after long hesitation and contemplation, just as was the case with the 
other Japanese notion Iki. Tezuka starts explaining the “source” of the “meaning” of koto 
ba only when he is convinced that they have opened up the required space for saying the 
word. In this way, they both know that the Japanese word for language shall not be taken 
as a conception of language, but only as a hint. While Tezuka repeatedly warns Heidegger 
concerning their “way toward the reality of language”, Heidegger responds by saying that 
it may be even sufficient to build a “bypath” at this point, namely, a pathway that shall 
																																																								
417 “I-What does the Japanese world understand by language? Asked still more cautiously: Do you 
have in your language a word for what we call language? If not, how do you experience what with 
us it called language?” (On the Way to Language, 23) 
418 May’s translation of Tezuka’s text in which Tezuka reveals the actual details of their encounter 
is highly significant for several reasons. First of all, it shows that both Heidegger and Tezuka 
sincerely engaged in a dialogue, although Heidegger at times tries to objectify the Japanese koto 
ba in line with his own conceptions. Secondly, it appears that the etymological background of the 
word koto ba is not an inventive word play on Heidegger’s part. The original text of Tezuka 
appeared in: Tezuka Tomio, “Haidegg to no ichi jikan” (“An Hour with Heidegger”), in “Kotoba 
ni tsuite no taiwa” (“From a Conversation on Language”), Haidegg zensh (Complete works of 
Heidegger) 21 (Tokyo, 1968; 3rd edition: 1975), 159–66. Reinhard May, Heidegger’s Hidden 
Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work, trans. Graham Parkes (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 61. 
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take us to the way of language.419 This “bypath” is their attempt to arrive at the 
designation of language as koto ba, yet only with the reservation that even the Japanese 
expression that speaks the essence of language should not be taken as a tag-word. It 
should be thought as a hint [Winke] that will appeal us to reconsider our relationship with 
language.420 
 
J: [t]he word is a hint, and not a sign in the sense of mere signification. 
 
I: Hints need the widest sphere in which to swing…421 
 
The hinting character of saying makes the space in which one can freely move between the 
“word” and the “sign”. The motion of “swinging” here is indicative of the nature of the 
two-way movement that takes place between the “word” and the “sign”. In swinging, the 
motion is tranquil and it is in accord with the nature of the showing as hinting. The 
topological character of the event of language becomes apparent in that very “relation” 
between the “word” and “sign”, which may remind us of the relation of the emergence of 
being into beings and the two-fold relation that the event embodies. The motion has a 
swinging character; as such it does not denote a one-way, linear, or pre-defined movement 
precisely because the way is not a mere “route”, but the boundedness of open space where 
a freeing movement can take place. The way is distinct from the “route” in that the former 
opens and clears the space, while the latter only lets one to get from the point A to the 
point B. Koto ba comes to the fore via the “way” of language, in the swinging movement 
from the word to the sign and vice versa. Now, let us focus on the meaning of koto ba 
having clarified its ground and horizon. 
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421 (On the Way to Language, 28) 
		 205	
In the dialogue, we observe that koto ba, literally meaning “words”, implicates the 
blossoming of flower petals, namely “appearance of a bloom”. The occurrence of the 
words is described in the text as the gracious gesture from stillness, in relation to the 
Japanese term Iki.422 The second part of the word “ba (ha)” has the sense of “density” and 
“abundance”. In this particular case, it may be interpreted as leaves and blossom petals. 
Koto means, “the matter, affair, state of affairs”, as well as “taking place of an event” and 
“happening of a thing”.423 The Japanese expression that bespeaks the nature of language in 
the sense that Heidegger understands “saying” is koto ba, which implicates the happening 
of abundance of words, and in particular, the emergence and arising of words from 
stillness. The reason why Tezuka does not choose the more ordinary Japanese word gengo 
(language as Sprache) is because he aims to find a designation of language that hints at the 
dynamic activity of the way-making of language. In this way, he refrains from defining 
language merely as discourse or communication. Koto ba signifies the poetic way of 
conceiving the nature of the words because it discloses the way in which the “words” 
appear in their hollowness. 
 Graham Parkes explains the etymological background of koto ba further by 
drawing on the Chinese characters that we see in the Japanese word. Accordingly, the first 
part, koto, signifies the sense of end and origin, –edge or border– beginning and end.424 It 
is interesting to observe the semantic parallel between the German Ort and Japanese Koto, 
as the German expression for place also has a meaning of edge and limit.425 Another 																																																								
422 (On the Way to Language, 45) 
423  Reinhard May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work, trans. 
Graham Parkes (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 62. 
424 Graham Parkes, “Afterwards–Language”, in Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 214. 
425 “This conception of place connects, in English, with the way in which the term ‘place’ is itself 
derived from Greek and Latin roots meaning ‘broad’, or ‘open way,’ as well as with the sense of 
‘place’ associated with the way in which the intersection of roads in a town or village may open 
out into a square that may itself function as somewhere in which events and people may gather and 
perhaps even as the center for the town or village as such. The idea of place as tied to a notion of 
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similarity arises is that Japanese allows for a rich interpretation of the image of petals that 
can be thought as the mouth of a flower. This resembles many Occidental words 
representing language such as lingua, which mean tongue as the organ of speech.426 Here, 
the phenomenon of language is associated with the organ as that through which we 
express ourselves. Drawing our attention to the possibility of larger understanding of 
language, Heidegger aims to emphasize the difference between discourse and language, as 
in German “speech” [Sprache] stems from “speaking” [sprechen]. The word koto ba does 
not simply signify the sign that designates a “flower”, but rather it implicates the 
“emergence of the flower petals” in their occurrence from silence to speech. The word is 
the silent “tuning of being” which makes its way to the sign, as the sounded word. The 
journeying of the “words” spring from silence passing through “signs” only to descend 
back to silence, because the “sign” can never say the “word”. The word’s return to silence 
is its homecoming, which is the same as the petals’ descend back to the earth. The circular 
movement of nature and language in topos is the same in that they make manifest the 
same event that takes within the boundaries of being bounded by no-thingness. In that 
sense, koto ba indicates the unfolding of “no-thingly” essence of being and language from 
the place of no-thingness.  
The dialogue on koto ba can also be read as a poetic discussion of the essence of a 
tree. In doing so, the way in which Heidegger sees the relationship between the physis of 
saying and the saying of physis also comes to the fore. The way-making movement of koto 
ba is the same as the activity of the tree. The movement that “saying” enacts in language 
“is” the gathering of the roots and the blossoming petals in a singular site. The roots, the 
																																																																																																																																																																						
gathering or ‘focus’ is also suggested by the etymology of the German term for place, Ort, 
according to which the term originally indicated the point or edge of a weapon the point of a spear, 
for instance —at which all of the energy of the weapon is brought to bear.” Jeff Malpas, 
Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 29. 
426  (On the Way to Language, 47) 
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trunk, the branches and the petals of the flower become unified in the singular emergence, 
constituting a singular topos. Here, the place of the tree is no longer another property 
externally attached to the tree, but rather, the body and the spacing of the tree constitute 
the place in its wholeness. The tree faces the sky rooted on the earth, both open and 
bounded. In fact, the higher it grows in reaching the sky, the more encompassing its roots 
become in grasping the earth. The upward movement from the roots to the petals 
embodies at the same time the downward movement from the petals to the roots. The 
flower petals that silently blossom from the earth allow the word to offer itself as the sign. 
The emergence of the word is the happening of the way as the body of the tree as the 
movement is the emergence from the earth, nurturing the tree through the roots, body, 
branches which arrive at the flowers that turn into fruits. As such, according to Heidegger, 
the happening of language is to be sought precisely at that interval (as the dynamic 
between) that gathers the word and the sign in the same active movement.  
We should be aware of the fact that the sameness of the emergence of the tree from 
place and the emergence of the word from does not imply a metaphorical transfer of 
meaning from one domain to another. It is not as if there is the physical activity of trees 
from which we derive a sense of “occurrence” and project upon the essence of language. 
As I have addressed in the first chapter, this is similar to the sameness of the way of 
dwelling of the river and the poet. The becoming of the tree from which the petals grow 
and the words from which the signs emerge are the same. Their sameness precisely 
indicates that they are not identical. Sameness can be possible insofar as we have at least 
two non-identical, distinct elements. Their sameness appears in that they bring out the 
event in the same manner in a way that they mirror each other. 
Here we can explain further the spacing between the word and the sign, which the 
taking place of koto ba shows forth. The space that stretches between and gathers distinct 
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ends of language becomes manifest in the saying. In view of this, the “word” and the 
“sign” do not appear as two fixed points.  
As I have explicated earlier, the boundary as limit [peras] has two defining 
characters that give the place its essence: openness and boundedness. Likewise, “way-
making” both provides the “boundary” in the sense that it makes room [einräumt] within 
which the movement between the “word” and the “sign” can take place. It de-limits and 
gathers them in “the between”, yet the boundary is also essentially “open”, as it is de-
limited and encompassed by silence from both ends, so that the place can remain as the 
clearing of being. It is the open-bounded nature of the “way” that permits the event to 
occur in and through the space. If the words and the signs appear as the ends of language, 
and if the limit (peras) is where the presencing of phenomena commences, then, the 
“word” and the “sign” also define boundaries after which the “in-definite” commences. 
The opening that extends into the “in-definite” is de-limited by the boundary that gathers 
the “word” and the “sign”, which is place (topos). As koto ba designates the blossoming 
of the plum and cherry petals, we can conceive of the Japanese experience of the 
happening of language same as the happening of place. This means, “words” and “signs” 
constitute the boundaries of language, which is the place of journeying for human 
existence. In other words, the movement between the “word” and the “sign” is what 
discloses the “there” [Da]. These boundaries disclose the “place of saying” and “saying of 
place” via the “way-making”.  
The discussion of koto ba brings out the idea that we should stop making sense of 
language in terms of the self-expression of the “living-being”. For it has been traditionally 
considered within the boundaries of this framework, language has been primarily 
associated with the organ of speech as “tongue”, “lingua”, “glossa” (i.e., in Turkish dil 
means both language and tongue as well). Indeed, in the course of verbal communication 
		 209	
we speak words with the help of the organs such as the lips, teeth, tongue, as well as the 
muscles that move these organs. In this regard, Heidegger makes an interesting claim: 
“But the mouth is not merely a kind of organ of the body understood as an organism –
body and mouth are part of the earth's flow and growth in which we mortals flourish, and 
from which we receive the soundness of our roots”427. Let us elaborate this claim. 
Heidegger understands “body” in terms of space and place, in particular as the 
“relation” and as “the between”. The body embodies and provides the spacing by that 
which things are gathered in the same spatial nearness. In terms of the structure of human 
experience, the body is also the limit that from which “I” can move from my “inside” to 
“outside”. The body is the limit of my first-person experience of the world in that it 
spatially seperates me from that which is beyond me, and it is precisely this seperateness 
that can distinguish my place, and determine my nearness or distance to other phenomena 
in space. Therefore, inasmuch as my body is what places me in my “being-myself”, it also 
allows me to have a relation to my “non-being”, that is, the space outside of me. The 
immediate space of my “self” appears in its wholeness thanks to the mutual placing and 
displacing characteristic of the body. As such, the body is not only that which 
encompasses one’s “spirit”, not a mere “instrument” that serves to preserve one’s 
“consciousness” of the world, but by first creating and mediating the space between the 
“self” and the “external world”, it is that which allows one to be as such in the first place. 
In that sense, language can be also understood as the body of human existence. It 
embodies things in “the between”, gathering and disclosing the nearness in which the 
things enter into and exit from the world of meaningfulness.428 
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428 For more on the issue, Vallega-Neu’s ideas are stimulating and need consideration, given the 
fact that “body” is a matter that Heidegger’s thinking has not been sufficiently addressed. Daniela 
Vallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension in Thinking, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2005.  
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Now, the body of the tree, which holds together the constant occurrence that 
correlates the earth, the roots, the trunk, the branches, the flowers and the fruits, is “the 
between”. It is the “relation” of the corporeal being-there of the tree which separates it 
from what it is not, yet still ties to place. The slow yet the constant movement of the sap 
that nourishes the tree relates the underground with the sky. The “saying” which moves 
everything by its occurrence interrelates the appearance of the word with its 
disappearance. In that regard, the flower is the “same” as the river, which performs the 
same relation making movement with the two ends of the place, situated in being, yet 
encompassed by no-thingness and emptiness [mu/wu]. This is the context in which 
Heidegger mentions Hölderlin’s hymn “Germania” twenty years later after his first lecture 
courses and states, “language is the flower of the mouth”.429 Hölderlin’s poetic saying, 
“language is the flower of the mouth”, resonates with the meaning of koto ba as the 
emergence of the words as flower petals. This is the sense in which the “saying” of 
language must be thought as the “event” of being in its inexhaustible self-manifesting 
emergence as physis, which now brings us to the following formulation: The event of 
language (is) the language of the event.  
 
III. 5 The Event of Language: The Language of Event 
 
Understanding the relationship between the “way-making movement” of language and the 
event of (as) language is essential to grasp the core matter of Heidegger’s topology of 
language. The event of language becomes an issue for Heidegger as early as the mid-
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1930s in the Contributions and remains the key idea onwards.430 In that context, it is 
useful to bring into view Ziarek’s examination of Heidegger, in problematizing the link 
between “topology” and “topography” of language, which will help us to explicate the 
nature of the relationship between the event and language. 
In On the Way to Language, Heidegger sets out to explicate the essence of 
language in the essays titled “The Way to Language” and “The Nature [Wesen] of 
Language”. These two essays complete one another. Heidegger problematizes the title 
“On the Way to Language.” He emphasizes significance of appropriately understanding 
what it means to be on the “way to language”431, as there is a double sense here that needs 
close attention. First, if we are on the way to language, it means that we are not there. 
However, if human existence always already finds itself in language, there is no way to 
get there. This seemingly paradoxical situation puts forward the “hermeneutic circle”, or 
as we can also call it, the hermeneutic topos in and through which we must approach the 
question of language. The possibility to undergo a new experience with language only 
appears within the boundaries of our existing relation to language. Our situatedness in the 
“hermeneutic circle” is what allows us to interpret language different than a mere tool of 
communication, while it is also that which allows us to approach the question of language 
via language itself.  
It is within that context Heidegger reformulates the title of his essay as follows: 
“The Nature? Of Language?”432 It should be noted that Heidegger places the word nature 
in quotation marks. It indicates that inasmuch as the nature of language is at stake, our 
thinking is also moving in a direction where the nature (or essence) [Wesen] itself 
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becomes an issue, which shifts the focus of the discussion to the relation between 
language and being. In talking about the sameness of being and language, Heidegger 
essentially considers the ancient Greek notion of logos. Heidegger argues:  
 
The oldest word (or the rule of the word thus thought, for Saying, is logos: Saying 
which, in showing, lets beings appear in their “it is”. The same word, however, the 
word for Saying, is also the word for being, that is, for the presencing of beings. 
Saying and Being, word and thing, belong to each other in a veiled way, a way 
which has hardly been thought and is not to be thought out to the end.433 
 
As I have explicated in the chapter on the “Letter on Humanism”, Heidegger 
acknowledges Aristotle’s designation of the human being as “logon echon zoon”, agreeing 
with the fact that human being’s existence is distinct due to its relation to logos.434  That 
said, Heidegger does not conceive of logos as the faculty of reason of the subject, but 
simply as language, which instantaneously shows forth the happening of being itself as the 
event. Logos means “gathering” and “laying” considering the fact that it derives from the 
verb of legein. In that sense, the way in which he perceives logos essentially implies the 
correspondence between human being and being. In order to draw on the non-
subejctivistic nature of the happening of language and the manifestation of being itself, 
Heidegger reverses the phrase by underscoring that it is language that “has” the human 
being. Because the happening (disclosing-situating-gathering) of being as the event is not 
“humanly” [menschlich], in the sense that it is not a human production. Within this 
context, the “discussion” of the sameness of the “way-making” of language and the event 
comes to the fore in his review of the last stanza of Stefan George’s 1919 poem titled 
“The Word”. It reads as follows: 
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So lernt ich traurig den verzicht: Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht. 
 
So I renounced and sadly see: Where word breaks off no thing may be.435 
 
In reading the poem, we must let language itself attune us rather than attempting to come 
up with a philosophical interpretation of it. Initially, the poet appears to be “pointing out” 
that we cannot make sense of things if our words for the things are lacking. What this 
means is that words name objects, and in the absence of signs with which we represent 
objects, there can be no understanding of things as things. This would be a “correct”, but 
also a simplistic reading. We know that even at times when speech comes to a stop in the 
moments of astonishment, forgetfulness, shock, anger and such, we can still relate to 
objects. For instance, if I want my friend to pass me the spoon and if for some reason I 
cannot remember the word “spoon” which signifies the object, then, I can express myself 
in another way and say, for instance, “will you pass me that thing” simply by pointing to 
the spoon, and my friend will immediately get what I mean by that. This is because we 
already know the context in which the sign-word “spoon” can be employed. Insofar as the 
context can immediately “signify” the object, the “sign” itself can be dropped. The “sign” 
operates like a “password” or a “chiffre” that we enter in order to access a bank account or 
e-mail address. Even at times when the “password” is lost, there are ways to re-access it, 
for instance, by means of security questions or a backup e-mail address where we can 
create a new “password”. I can use body movements, facial gestures, or expect my friend 
to understand the meaning simply by guessing from the context.  
Now, there is still another and more significant register of George’s poem that 
concerns the relation between the words and the things. What the poet does is “naming” 
the event of the language as the language of the event. The essence of naming is “calling”, 
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especially in the sense of calling into “nearness”.436 The nearness that is at issue does not 
indicate mere spatial proximity: “Two isolated farmsteads -if any such are left- separated 
by an hour's walk across the fields can be the best of neighbours, while two townhouses, 
facing each other across the street or even sharing a common wall, know no 
neighbourhood.”437  In naming things, the poet does not aim to provide an image of things, 
but invites us to think the taking place of the world through the word and vice versa. It is 
in that sense that naming as calling is different from giving a name or a title for an entity 
that stands over and against us. In attending the call of the poet, we are invited to think the 
world via the word, which the poem makes manifest in its wholeness. George names the 
word, although this is not because a representation of the “words” lacks. Naming situates 
the human existence (Da-sein) precisely between the interplay of Da and Sein. The event 
is the “way-making movement” between the “there” and “being”.  
Before venturing too far in reading into the poem, Heidegger’s thought invites us 
to consider the following question: is it appropriate to make a propositional claim about 
the poem? What do we perform when we infer philosophical claims such as, “something 
is only where the appropriate and therefore competent word names a thing as being and so 
establishes the given being as a being.”438? According to Heidegger, such an explanation 
may be useful for philosophical and literary studies, but when it comes to experiencing the 
words, it is not sufficient. What is primarily needed is not only a literary or philosophical 
clarification of the poem, as if the poet’s words are mere representations of sentiments that 
lack “argumentative clarity”. In this way, “We would have reduced poetry to the servant's 
role as documentary proof for our thinking, and […] in fact we would already have 
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forgotten the whole point: to undergo an experience with language.”439 Therefore, for 
Heidegger, the matter is not the mere interpretation of the poem, but actually to make 
sense of the way in which the poet comes to undergo an experience with the words. The 
event is concealed in the silent way-making movement of language and this is why it 
needs to be “thought”, and not only be technically “explained”. This is because thinking 
does not mean the mere conceptual analysis of the sign-words, but more so engaging with 
the infinite openness of language, within the boundaries of “saying”. 
So far, my discussions focused on the disclosive character of the way-making 
movement of language. However, in that regard, we must address the disappearance of 
meanings since the truth of being (aletheia) is a two-fold occurrence. Ziarek draws 
attention to the fact that the interval that exists between the “word” and the ”sign” actually 
emerges from our incapacity to say the word.440 He argues that for Heidegger, the event is 
essentially something that becomes manifest in the failing nature of language,441 though 
the failing characteristic of language is not a matter of signification. For instance, the 
wrong or inaccurate definition of a phenomenon is not the failure that is at issue. On the 
contrary, the more dangerous concealment of language occurs when we think that we have 
exhausted the meaning of a word. We think that we have fulfilled the function of language 
in the course of an intelligible communication. However, a more profound experience of 
language allows us to attend the interval between the word and the sign. Indeed, this is an 
idea that we observe in the Contributions to Philosophy, one that remains to be significant 
in On the Way to Language as well.442 The word that will speak the nature of language 
resists coming into the boundaries of speech, and this “concealment” is the very core 																																																								
439 (On the Way to Language, 63) 
440 “When the word fails, when it does not reach dictionary words, that is, signs, the word, as it 
were, escapes and frees itself from signs. This escape marks the opening of the interval between 
signs and words, and as such it constitutes the hint if being” Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after 
Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 81. 
441 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger, 81. 
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matter of the relation between words, being and nothingness. On this note, Heidegger 
argues: 
 
Concealment can be a refusal or merely a dissembling. We are never fully certain 
whether it is the one or the other. Concealment conceals and dissembles itself. This 
means that the open place in the midst of beings, the clearing, is never a rigid stage 
with a permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings runs its course. 
Rather, the clearing happens only as this double concealment. The unconcealment 
of beings—this is never a merely existent state, but a happening.”443 
 
The so-called “negative” character of the happening of language –which makes it both 
possible and yet difficult to undergo an experience with it– is related to the fact that the 
word is not a linguistic image of the object, but it constitutes our linguistic relation to 
things. The word is primarily the happening of and the originary emergence from the 
event. Yet, as we have seen with the Japanese expression of koto ba, the meaning(s) of the 
word spring in abundance as flower petals. This means that there is no such thing as the 
meaning, but always a series of related meanings dependent on the context in which they 
are employed. Each saying discloses a certain signification while concealing others, and it 
is in this interplay that the event shows itself in concealment through the failure of words. 
The failure [Ver-sagen] of the saying [Sage] is its own most accomplishment [vollbringen] 
in its completion and wholeness. 
In On the Way to Language Heidegger takes issue with Humboldt’s treatise On the 
Diversity of the Structure of Human Language and its In Influence on the Intellectual 
Development of Mankind in order to show why we need to take a step back from a 
subjectivistic understanding of language. Heidegger argues that this treatise, “in an open 
and covert pro and con, has ever since determined the course of all subsequent philology 
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and philosophy of language”.444 Heidegger specifically looks to De Interpretatione where 
Aristotle suggests: “[t]he letters show the sounds. The sounds show the passions in the 
soul and the passion in the soul show the matters that arouse them.” 445 In view of this, 
Heidegger’s central critique of Humboldt’s understanding of language is its subjectivistic 
underpinnings, which he considers the continuation of the Aristotelian paradigm. 
Humboldt sees language as the chief source of human subjectivity that through which 
human beings posit their inner selves. Humboldt entertains the idea that language is a 
“human achievement” because of human beings’ “inner mental activity”.446 According to 
Heidegger, in following Aristotle’s way of thinking, Humboldt finds the very basis and 
essence of all language in the articulated sound. The sum total of articulated sounds, 
which express the inward thoughts and feelings of their speakers render language as the 
instrument by which they perceive and express their life-worlds. Language allows for the 
inwardness of the existence of a people to take specific forms, which, in turn, is expressed 
through the articulated sounds. Humboldt calls the totality of these sounds and expressions 
the outward form through which the relevant understanding of the world is expressed. 
According to that view, language is a product of the labour of human mind. It is a 
subjective mechanism, where the subject finds its “voice” in the language that speaks the 
mind of its people, which belongs to the nation and the race of that very people.447 
																																																								
444 (On the Way to Language, 116) 
445 (On the Way To Language, 116); Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione, trans. J.L 
Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 44 (16a3). 
446  Underhill argues that Humboldt’s engagement with language is a result of Leibniz’s 
philosophical influence on him, but also his close relation to Hamann and Herder. In that 
framework, Humboldt’s account of language grapples with two theories of language, namely, the 
“vehicle theory” and the “mirror theory” that were popularized in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 
former, which is a position considered by Descartes as well, language appears as an instrument 
that allows human beings to express their ideas. In the latter, language appears as the reflection of 
the mind, and in specific, of thought. James W. Underhill, Humboldt, Worldview and Language 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 58. 
447 Wilhelm von Humboldt, On Language. The Diversity of Human Language Structure and its 
Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 27, 30, 37, 41. 
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Humboldt writes, “Language is the outer appearance of a spirit of people.”448 The ways in 
which the words are deployed are the articulated and vocalized expressions of the intellect 
of its people. Consequently, ideas get transmitted through signs, because language is the 
organ of “thought”. In that regard, language is regarded as the expressive activity of 
intellect, that is, of human subjectivity.  
For Humboldt, the link between language, mind, self-cultivation and education (or 
formation) [Bildung] is particularly important. In that regard, he advocates the 
humanization of the most isolated corners of the world in light of enlightenment ideas.449 
In contrast with his account, Heidegger places the human being in the interplay between 
being and language, yet does not assign a primary role to the human beings. He rather 
renders the human being as the receptive end of that correlation. This is the first foothold 
of his critique of subjectivism. The other one is the fact that subjectivism is bound to see 
the core matter of language in terms of “meaning”, but not the coming to appearance (and 
disappearance) of meaning through the “truth of being” via place. Insofar as “meaning” 
and its communicative transportation is what is at stake language remains a human 
“possession”.  
The key question in that regard is the following one: how can we dwell in 
language so that we do not conceive of it as a mere container of meaning, the expression 
of human subjectivity –i.e., the reflection of the spirit, self-expression of the subject, or 
the worldview of a people– but as the event itself? The problematic aspect of Humboldt’s 
account is that, if we see language as the labour and product of human intellect, we also 
consider the way in which human being makes sense of the world as the only meaning of 
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449 Wilhelm von Humboldt, On Language. The Diversity of Human Language Structure and its 
Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind, trans. Peter Heath, 35. 
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the world, thus, human being appearing as the sole meaning-giver. This is precisely what 
leads to the technological objectification of the earth, which gets in the way of dwelling 
and resulting in the shrinking of the boundaries of the fourfold.  
In order to be able to dwell, we also need to acknowledge the concealing nature of 
aletheia. This would allow us to make sense of the world beyond mere human ideas, 
projects, wills, and calculations. This, indeed, is a topological issue insofar as it is 
concerned with the place of the human being and how we orient ourselves in the world. In 
terms of our relation to language and aletheia, we must seek for the opening, the “rift”, 
that will show us the “failure” of language, and our being, which will bring us back to our 
proper place in which we may dwell.  
In that framework, Ziarek suggests that Heidegger’s topographics of language 
opens up another dimension of topology of language450, summoning us to pay attention to 
Heidegger’s distinctive ways of writing. His topographics of language shows forth the 
silence that breaks out from the happening of language. In that regard, Ziarek states how 
Heidegger moves from “language as symploke to topology”451 in his application of 
“topographics of language”. There is a two-fold issue: first, the topology of language 
encompasses the way in which human existence stands in the clearing of being and how it 
attends the way-making of language, which takes place beyond human makings and 
productions, simply determining and attuning them. Second, dealing with language in a 
topographical way may awaken us to acknowledge the silent “way-making” of the words 
in the writings of literary and philosophical writers. The “topographics of language”, 
which can underpin the ways in which the situated essence of language is in-scribed into 
the signs, allows us to break open into the clearing by abandoning the sign as the sole 
																																																								
450 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 
160. 
451 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger, 67. 
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image of the word. We are invited to think without and beyond images. That is to say, we 
must be able to think even in instances where the image and representation of the 
appearance of phenomena are lacking, and thus we must avoid associating phenomena 
with images when the matter of investigation is not an entity. This would be the way of 
thinking from the event.  
Heidegger’s topographics of language comes to the fore as he pays a particular 
attention to George’s use of the colon:  
 
So I renounced and sadly see: 
Where word breaks off no thing may be. 
 
The colon that follows the word “see” initially suggests as if the poet aims to provide an 
explanation. Grammarians call such a mode of speech “direct discourse”.452 However, 
what next line of the stanza does not provide a statement. This is because George does not 
simply write “is”, but “may be”. Heidegger argues: “What follows the colon does not 
name what the poet renounces; rather, it names the realm into which the renunciation must 
enter; it names the call to enter into that relation between thing and word which has now 
been experienced.”453 In that regard, a topographical reading of Heidegger’s claims brings 
us again to the ancient Greek notion of the limit or boundary [peras]. If the limit indicates 
the commencement of the boundary that brings the place to the openness, and if the colon 
carries us into the realm that it renders open, then, the colon appears as the “relation”, that 
is, as “the between”, which discloses the space of the “there”. This is where the limit 
experience of language takes place. Indeed, our experience cannot be solely situated at the 
colon, but it starts from the colon. Now, this does not mean that the entire meaning of the 
poem is dependent on the use of the colon. The poem cannot event come to a bodily 																																																								
452 (On the Way to Language, 63) 
453 (On the Way to Language, 65) 
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existence without the “signs”. However, the use of the colon here has the potential to 
change our approach to language. The colon does not allow us to read the poem as a text 
that merely describes a state of affairs in a fancy, artistic way. Such an attitude to the text 
fades if we manage to encounter the “rift” that grounds the poem in its entirety. The colon 
discloses the space in which we can experience the occurrence of language by appealing 
us to read the poem by heeding the event that un-folds. Our dwelling in the topos of 
language – or as we can indeed say, in language as topos – commences not in or at, but 
from and by (à partir de) the limit. In other words, the limit is where the way-making 
movement of language commences. In this way, we have the chance to focus on the core 
matter of the “words”. Heidegger applies the same topographic mode of “thinking” in 
pondering the relation between being and language. He writes:  
 
The being of language: the language of being454 
 
This formulation serves like a “guideword”, which is not designated to tell us what the 
being or language “is”, but only to signal the way in which their “relation” needs to be 
thought. We should not reason that the expression “the being of language” is to provide 
information about the substance of language, which would imply a representational mode 
of thinking. What we are seeking is not the “origin” or the “cause” of language. For 
instance, even the idea of “way-making movement”, which we considered the essence of 
the happening of language, does not amount to “the being of language”. Now, the second 
part of the formulation following the colon invites us to encounter the “same”, yet not 
“identical” expression in an inverted way.455 The colon invites us to make sense of the fact 
that “being” is not an entity, just as language does not signify mere “discourse”.  																																																								
454 (On the Way to Language, 94) 
455  This “twisting” move is also suggestive of the idea of “overcoming [Ver-windung] of 
metaphysics. 
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First, both “being” and “language” must be considered in their verbal forms (Sein 
and Sagen-Sprechen) in their presencing and co-responding to one another: being as the 
event, and language as the saying as that which situates the human being in its dwelling 
place, the neighbourhood between thinking and poetizing. The “topographics of language” 
mentioned by Ziarek here beckons us to examine the topological spacing that the colon 
yields. The use of the colon is unusual, that is, unfamiliar and uncanny, as it emerges from 
the hollow expanse of language. Instead of “designating”, it gestures towards the relation, 
that is, the original emergence of meanings in and from silence. The colon derails us from 
our commonplace mode of reflection in which we consider the words as the carriers of 
meaning. Yet, by refusing to bring the words into a mere “equation” of identity, it leaves 
each section of the expression open to the “difference” of one another in their sameness. 
The openness that is disclosed by the un-defined element of the “statement” is precisely 
what also de-limits and thus bounds them. In a certain sense, the colon functions as the 
“in-bound” of the two-way movement of the “thinking” and “poetizing” that is at issue, 
putting them into interplay, letting them entering into their respective fields by enveloping 
one another. In that context, Ziarek talks about the “dis-humanizing” [Entmenschung] 
effect of language, which is an idea that requires us to understand Aristotle’s zoon echon 
logon differently.456 Human beings do not possess language, but rather, they become 
“owned” [eignet] and “appropriated” [geignet], and “attuned” [stimmt], therefore 
“determined” [be-stimmt] by language. Here, Heidegger “de-structs” the possessive nature 
of the equation, and transforms it into a relation of mutual “belonging” [gehören], where 
the true possibility of listening [zuhören] becomes possible. However, this is possible only 
insofar as we think language as that which situates the human existence in its dwelling 
place, and not as that something by which human beings produce meanings.  																																																								
456 Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 
16-17. 
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Within that context, Ziarek writes: “Language is ‘of’ the event, necessitating 
human participation in carrying itself into signs, while not being limited to or explainable 
through human language. In this fundamental sense, language is not human for Heidegger, 
that is, it is not human in its essential occurrence (Wesung).”457 The “essential occurrence” 
of language is both its “failure” and “accomplishment” (its concealment as that which is 
concealed), the latter in the sense of its coming to completion and fullness. The word 
arrives at the sign in abundance of ways, and as such, there are many “ways” of saying the 
“same” matter. Here, the etymological relation between saying [sagen] and failure 
[versagen] is particularly important.458 Each time the word “fails” [ver-sagt] to present 
itself as an object, being itself comes to manifest itself in concealment. This is where the 
source of the word lies in its leap into the site of being. Each time the word fails to come 
to the signs, it changes its course, “folding” into “manifold” of meanings.  
One question that we can raise here is the following one: just by looking to the 
etymological background of the “sign”, can we actually undergo an experience with the 
“word”? It is clear that Heidegger does not endorse the view that mere etymological 
explanations can allow us to find a different relation to the words and language.459 The 
experience [Er-fahrung] that is at stake in the sense of “journeying” becomes possible 
once we acknowledge that the word can hint at a context of interrelated meanings and 
connotations. We must journey through different appearances of the words. Looking to the 
etymology of words is the same as following the footmarks on an abandoned path. The 
footmarks do not provide us with the directions, but they can give us some hints 
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Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger, 74. 
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concerning our positioning and help us to see understand the topography of the place 
where we are walking. Let me explain with an example. 
In Turkish, the root of “ko(n)-”, meaning “to land, to be situated”, evolves into 
“konuşmak”. In attempting to show forth the “same” matter in different ways, each time 
the stem can come to “de-signate” different meanings, such as “konu” (subject, matter, 
topic), “konut” (house), “konum” (position), “konumlandırmak” (situate). The same root 
word “kon-” is capable of designating both “to situate and place” and “to speak”, yet in the 
difference between “to speak” and “to situate”, this double meaning remains implicit. 
When I say, “to speak”, it can only bespeak something related to discourse and language, 
though we cannot hear the meaning of “to situate and place”. One meaning that it 
discloses conceals the other one. This “folding” movement “un-folds” the place of the 
word, which brings us to the site of being in which the event appears in silence. As such, it 
invites us to think, not the “meaning”, but the “un-folding” of “meanings” in their 
particular and correlated movements. This is where we can conceive that “the being of 
language” is the same as “the language of being”, which bring into view the two-fold 
relation between un-concealment and concealment (a-letheia). In “folding”, “un-folding”, 
and even “en-folding” in the sense of “enveloping”, language makes manifest, just as all 
becoming manifest is language.  
Heidegger concludes the essay by writing: 
 
An "is'" arises where the word breaks up. 
 
To break up here means that the sounding word turns into soundlessness, back to 
whence it was granted: into the ringing of stillness […] This breaking up of the 
word is the true step back on the way of thinking.460 
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The occurrence of “breaking up” at issue here is beckoned by the colon, which appears as 
the “inbound”, as that which situates us at the boundaries of language. Just as in basketball 
one must in-bound the ball to re-start the game after the ball goes “out of bounds”, our 
thinking must also recognize the limit experience of language entering into and from it. 
Such an experience can be possible insofar as we “situate” ourselves within the 
boundaries of the interplay between speaking, saying and silence. Silence allows human 
beings to journey the site of intelligibility in its entirety, for it is via silence, which is the 
infinite openness of language, human beings may “enter” into the boundaries of language. 
To be able to “hint” at the silence without talking about the silence would be “authentic 
saying”461, which is the essence of the “method” of language as “situating-discussing”. 
Human beings must learn to listen to the ways in which language itself speaks, before they 
endlessly discourse on it.  
 
III. 6 The Obstruction of the Way of the Event: Gestell as The Framework 
 
I have shown that the “situating” nature of the “discussion” brings us to the “way” of 
language and the “way-making movement” of the event. The silent “way-making” of 
language must be granted in order to be able to “situate” our existence in the nearness of 
the originary occurrence of being, that is, the word’s gesturing the world (by the 
simultaneous and two-fold placing and displacing). The silent beckoning of words call us 
to “thinking” and “poetizing”, instead of “calculating” and transporting meanings from 
one domain to another as signs. Now, while such a mindfulness of language allows us to 
make an issue of the relation in which we stand to being, the essence of modern 
technology appears as the “obstruction” of the “way-making” movement of language and 
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the event. Therefore, here I will address Heidegger’s critique of the essence of modern 
technology, and the technicization of our relation to things. As such, in this section I set 
out to explain how the “way-making” of language to which we have arrived in the course 
of our “situating-discussion” is set in opposition to “the framework” [Gestell] as the 
essence of modern technology. 
Heidegger’s critique of technology takes its most elaborate form in the late 1940s 
and onwards. It is important to note here that Heidegger’s more sophisticated thinking of 
language and place, and his critique of technology develop simultaneously, which is also 
the period of his thinking where the topology of being and language becomes explicit.462 
Here, I will flesh out Heidegger’s critique of technology based on the topological link 
between language and technology. The key idea is the necessity of identifying the role of 
the “machination” [Machenschaft] of the world (a term that is specific to the mid-1930s) 
that transforms all things and the constituents of the fourfold (sky, earth, immortals, 
mortals) into manipulable objects.  
In the essay “The Turning” (1949), Heidegger argues: “Language first gives to 
every purposeful deliberation its ways and its byways. Without language, there would be 
lacking to every doing every dimension in which it could bestir itself and be effective.” 463  
Heidegger’s words here direct our attention to the place-related basis of our relation to 
things the role that language plays in that regard. We enter into each realm by traversing 
language, which determines the horizon of our understanding and makes things a matter of 
experience for us. Our understanding of the essence of modern technology too develops 
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out of our relation to language464, while the framework can also determine our relation to 
language in a destructive way. The two-way connection between language and the 
framework requires a topological scrutiny.  
First, let me focus on the background of the word “technology”. We can break 
down the expression into two components and examine each one separately. In the first 
part of the expression, we find the notion of techne. Although we usually understand 
“craft” and “art”, the background of the notion suggests a richer set of implications. In 
“Building Dwelling Thinking”, Heidegger claims: “The Greek word for ‘to bring forth or 
to produce’ is tikto. The word techne, technique belongs to the verb's root tec. To the 
Greeks techne means neither art nor handicraft but rather: to make something appear”.465 
Here, it is evident that Heidegger considers the “essence” [Wesen] of techne (namely, via 
its temporal-spatial unfolding) in the same line with other ancient Greek notions such as 
logos, aletheia, poiesis, and physis. Similar to the notion of poiesis, he suggests that we 
should make sense of techne merely as production. The craftsman’s task in “making” is to 
follow the basic happening of the nature as physis466 as the self-manifestation of the 
emergence of all things. There are certain “technologies”, which do not fix our relation to 
things, and they nevertheless bring out the physis without oppressing it. For instance, 
Heidegger states: “And certainly a sawmill in a secluded valley of the Black Forest is a 
primitive means compared with the hydroelectric plant in the Rhine River”467. The 
hydroelectric plant transforms the natural flow of the river. Its streaming becomes an 																																																								
464 One of Heidegger’s most elaborate discussions on the relationship between technology and 
language is the following one: Martin Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological 
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by means of physis has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a 
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endlessly orderable supply of energy. The crucial point here is not only the environmental 
problems that arise from our unethical use of technology. The more challenging problem 
is our relation to modern technology, a point to which I will turn in brief. With their 
current relation to modern technology, human beings manipulate, organize, and “enframe” 
physis, the very natural growth and emergence of all things. Now let me focus on the 
second component of the expression of technology, namely, logos. 
In his 1934 lecture course titled Logic, Heidegger had attempted to show the 
connection between language as logos and logic.468 In the 1950s, Heidegger challenges the 
“logic” of modern technology. After delineating what is peculiar to logic, Heidegger 
discusses the ways in which the technical understanding and application of logos 
transforms how we experience our being in the world. In other words, the core of his 
account is regarding the technical application of logic, as well as the logical arrangement 
of techne. Therefore, as I have explicated in the second chapter, his position is not against 
the philosophical discipline of “logic”. Philosophical studies of “logic” may inform us 
about the formal laws of reasoning, yet the kind of thinking that seeks to undergo an 
experience with the open-bounded site (topos) of being as language (logos), need to think 
beyond the confines of the technical interpretation and application of logic. 
Now, let us briefly look to the abovementioned lecture course. Examining it will 
help us to clarify the technological application of “logic”. Heidegger spells out four 
characteristics of logic by elucidating the most fundamental principles of Aristotelian 
syllogism469. These are assembly, analysis, regulation, and, form consideration. For the 
concerns of my discussion, the regulative and the formative aspects of logic stand out as 
the most significant ones. There are three basic principles of logic, which link up with 
																																																								
468 (On the Way to Language, 8) 
469 Martin Heidegger, Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, trans. Wanda 
Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna, (Albany: SUNY press, 2005), 3. 
		 229	
those four functions: (1) the principle of identity as the same-selfness of the 
representations, (2) the principle of non-contradiction, and (3) the principle of reason as 
the consequential ordering of reason that constitutes the information. Heidegger argues 
that consequential “method” of reasoning leads to the notion of “form consideration”. 
What logic allows us is to disregard the content of assertions, in rendering the formal 
consistency of its subject matter the actual meaning of being-true. “Logic looks only at the 
forms of the proposition […] it is the science of the forms of the fundamental structures 
and fundamental rules of the proposition”.470  
The calculative mode of thinking, which is the core of our technological relation to 
the world, takes this process of logical ordering of reason as its model, and it only 
functions by formulating and objectifying its subject matter. As such, it always operates in 
a field of symbolized representations. In terms of its relation to language, the science does 
not only understand “words” as “signs”, but even further, it formalizes and formulates 
things as formally referable symbols. For instance, we could use the symbol A to refer to 
the line “Carrying the day’s events, the cloud drifts along” in the poem that Ueda 
examined. In this way, we may symbolize the topic of the poem “as something” to which 
we can refer as such. Now, the topic of the poem has become an object, ready to be 
transported for the purposes of information and communication. In this instance, language 
no longer appears as the site in which we can “think” the poem itself.  On the other hand, 
if the content of the poem still matters to us, we could never simply refer to it as “A”. The 
reason is that each time we read the poem it may disclose a different perspective of that 
which it speaks. It may open up a new horizon of thought, because that which it brings to 
the fore via the way-making movement of language is not exhaustible.  
																																																								
470 Martin Heidegger, Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, trans. Wanda 
Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna, (Albany: SUNY press, 2005), 4. 
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It is within this context that Heidegger states that science does not “think”. Insofar 
as science reasons via the form consideration, the experience [Er-fahrung] of things as 
things never appears as a possibility.471 It is obvious that Heidegger does not understand 
“thinking” in the sense of abstract reasoning, systematic analysis, and such. As far as 
Heidegger’s concerns go, “thinking” signifies undergoing an experience with that which 
concerns us. Instead of objectifying and regulating what matters to us, we should let it 
transform and overwhelm us in the course of our journeying with it. However, especially 
for natural sciences, language appears only as a means of demonstration. We use symbols, 
and formulas for experimenting, calculating, and then communicating the outputs of our 
research. As such, language does not show up as the site in which the experience of being 
itself can transpire, but only as the space of “logistics” of formulas and definitions.472 
Insofar as sciences doe not discern the thing as the thing, but only as the “object” of 
analysis, the earth and its entities turn into “human-stuff”, either in the sense of “for-
human” or “of-human”. In that regard, insofar as disciplines included in the “humanities” 
understand themselves as “sciences” and appeal to the technical application of logic as the 
basis of their methodologies, they end up objectifying the human being, and lose contact 
with precisely what defines the core of “human”, namely, its relation to logos. 
In light of the discussion on techne and logos, the essence of modern technology 
appears to be the following: the systemic regulation of the “way” of logos473. Within that 
																																																								
471 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New 
York: Harper Row, 1968), 8. 
472 While I could not undertake it in my dissertation, it would be interesting to make a comparison 
of Hume and Heidegger in terms of their understanding of the object (or the thing) and the 
responsibility of the science in that regard. While Hume thinks that things are only about the sum 
total of their empirical qualities and there is no thing as such beyond these qualities, for 
Heidegger, the sum total of the empirical qualities of a thing will never tell us what the thing is, 
because what makes the thing that it is, is its being, which is neither a sensuous or non-sensuous 
“quality”. So, according to Hume what science can do at best is to examine these empirical 
qualities, while would give us an idea about the object. For Heidegger such vision of science is not 
sufficient because it is meta-physical.  
473  “But above all, technology itself prevents any experience of its nature. For while it is 
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context, Heidegger’s main issue with the modern technology is not our use of 
technological devices, but the methodological “framework” [Gestell] that “frames” and 
fixes our relation and nearness to things. This, in turn, leads human beings to produce 
further “machination” that enclose humans in their technological relation to things. As 
such, human beings accept technology as the only way of relating to phenomena. In 1934, 
Heidegger comes to name the threat that the modern technology poses to humanity as 
“organized uniformity”474. Already as of 1933, Heidegger wrote in On the Origin of The 
Work of Art what follows: 
Ge-stell, as the essence of modern technology, comes from letting-lie-before 
experienced in the Greek manner, logos, from the Greek poiesis and thesis the 
putting in place of Ge-stell- which now means the summoning of everything into 
assured availability, there speaks the claim of ratio reddenda, i.e., of logon 
didonai. 475 
 
Framing the emergence of language, which is capable of disclosing the world to us, results 
in a new language called the “technological language”. The “technological language” is 
the space of logistics of signs and symbols, encompassing an ongoing “transportation” of 
meanings, a process in which language turns into the tool of exchange of information. In 
the following rich and dense passage, Heidegger explicates the tension that results from 
such a formalization of language: 
 
[…] ‘Natural language’ of which one must talk in this context is posited in 
advance as a not-yet-formalized language that is being set up to be framed in 
formalization. Formalization, the calculated availability of Saying, is the goal and 
the norm. The ‘natural’ aspect of language, which the will to formalization still 
seems forced to concede for the time being, is not experienced and understood in 
the light of the originary nature of language. That nature is physis, which in its turn 
is based on the appropriation [Ereignis] from which Saying arises to move. 																																																																																																																																																																						
developing its own self to the full, it develops in the sciences a kind of knowing that is debarred 
from ever entering into the realm of the essential nature of technology, let alone retracing in 
thought that nature's origin.” (Poetry, Language, Thought, 114–115). 
474 (Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 153) 
475 (Off the Beaten Track, 34) 
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Information theory conceives of the natural aspect of language as a lack of 
formalization. 476 
 
Therefore, Heidegger’s aim is to alert us to the fact that when the nature of language is 
framed, the words no longer beckon, but only signify and designate without any 
experience of the “way-making” and journeying. In such a way of showing, there is no 
space to be traversed between the word and the sign, and the sign is taken as the ultimate 
representation of the object. Let me explain with an example. Today people sometimes 
communicate by using “smileys” or animations on their smart phones. The images are pre-
chosen, pre-designed, and framed on the phone’s screen –which itself is a frame– to 
represent and express certain emotions and ideas. Making use of language in such a way, 
we way not even need “dictionary words”. In order to express oneself, one can simply 
“attach” or “copy-paste” a generic image. With today’s smartphone technology, it is easily 
possible to have a “conversation” without saying any words, but only exchanging the 
symbolic representations of “emotions”. In such a use, language does not even appear as 
the tool of communication, but as the digitally arranged space of logistics in and through 
which images that represent the attached symbol of objectified feelings or emotions are 
transported back and forth. An extreme technization of logos through turns language into a 
platform of logistics.477 So, the question is the following one: what is it that allows for 
such “framing” of the nature of language? This requires a closer examination of the 
“essence” of modern technology. 
Just as the primary significance of language for Heidegger is not the linguistic 
process of signification, the essence of technology is nothing that can be technologically 
																																																								
476 (On the Way to Language, 132) 
477 (On the Way to Language, 25, 32)  
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grasped either.478 The key concept in that regard is “the framework” (or “en-framing”) 
[das Gestell], which for Heidegger denotes the essence of modern technology. The 
“framework” [Gestell] is the obstruction and manipulation of the event, rendering 
phenomena only as stuff to be planned, organized, regulated, used and infinitely 
exploited.479 It denotes the kind of comportment toward our being in the world where we 
make sense of phenomena only within the frames of “frameworks”. Likewise, “Within 
Framing, speaking turns into information”.480 As such, it is the complete objectification of 
all phenomena. “The framework” [Ge-stell] leads human beings to make sense of 
everything only in terms of human representations [Vor-stellung], wills and concerns, 
where the “world” in which we exist turns into a representable object detached from us. 
Because of its capacity to fix and control the meaning of beings, the “framework” appears 
as the interruption of the “way-making movement” of language and the event. In other 
words, it conceals the very potential of un-concealment (a-letheia). Accordingly, 
Heidegger thinks that the primary danger that the essence of modern technology poses 
does not only consist in its moral, ecological, sociological, economical consequences, but 
rather in that it gets in the way of the way-making of the event.  
In On the Way to Language, Heidegger suggests that the “metaphysical-
technological explanation gets everywhere in the way, and keeps us from considering the 
matter proper”. 481  The technical regulation of logos provides techno-logy with the 
																																																								
478 Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When we are seeking the essence of 
‘tree,’ we have to become aware that that which pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that 
can be encountered among all the other trees. Likewise, the essence of technology is by no means 
anything technological. (Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 4) 
479 Shrinking designates another significant essence of the word Ge-stell. Namely, when Ge-stell 
happens, our experience of time and space gets shrunk. “All distances in time and space are 
shrinking” (Poetry, Language, Thought, 163) 
480 (On the Way to Language, 132) 
481 (On the Way to Language, 98) In the original, it reads: “weil überall das metaphysisch-
technische Erklären dazwischen führt und uns aus der sachgemäßen Besinnung herausdrangt” 
Martin Heidegger, GA: 12 Unterwegs Zur Sprache, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1985), 193. (My emphasis) 
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“methodology” to manipulate phenomena, which brings us to a significant implication of 
techne. “Methodology”, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, now comes to mean the 
very instrumentalization and obstruction of the “way-making” movement. This also leads 
to the standardization of thinking where a new way of thinking remains constantly 
repressed, as “one” has to think “this-way” or “that-way”, but never freely traversing the 
topos of thinking as such. When all the ways of thinking are “pre-determined” by the 
“signs” of a calculative mode of transportation, place remains constantly enclosed, instead 
of being “open-bounded”. Accordingly, techne of modern technology no longer denotes a 
sense of bringing forth and making manifest, but rather signifies a ceaseless process of re-
fabrication in following the most effective laws of production by way of circulating the 
procedures of “designation” and the “de-sign” of existence. As such, “methodology” 
becomes the servant of technology. In effect, modern technology, in that sense, is the very 
manipulation of logic, thus, of logos as language and being. Heidegger calls the situation 
in which human beings find themselves a “challenge” [herausfordern]. 482  The 
manipulative attitude towards techne and logos, namely, the constant exploitation of the 
gathering and situating of language, brings us to the notion of Be-stand, namely “standing-
reserve”, which shows how language is treated as a readily manipulable object.483 Be-
stand should be examined in relation to language as logos.484  
The essence of modern technology (Ge-stell) is a mode of disclosure, and what it 
reveals is: Be-stand, which means the infinite stocking of phenomena as manipulable 
																																																								
482 (Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 14) 
483 Martin Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language”, trans. Wanda Torres 
Gregory, Journal of Philosophical Research, Volume XXIII (1998): 130. 
484 The overall move in Heidegger literature is to make the connection between technology and 
dwelling with regards to one’s nearness to where one dwells. See: Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger 
and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 195; Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 2006), 297. (However, if one’s dwelling place is language, Be-stand too must be thought 
with regards to language.) 
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objects. We can translate the word as “standing-reserve” as well.485 If we investigate the 
etymology of the Bestand, we observe that it derives from the German verb bestehen, 
which means, “to remain in force”, “persist”, “continue to exist”. In bestehen, we note the 
verb stehen, which means, “to stand”. I have claimed that Heidegger conceives of the 
modern technology as a “standing in the way”. The way-making movement of saying 
relates the “words” and the “signs”, also “being” and “beings”, through the occurrence in 
the open-bounded that human beings inhabit (language). The “way” is the way of the word 
(tao), namely the way in which phenomena come to manifest themselves through the 
event. On the other hand, Ge-stell fixes the way that through which things can come to 
occur. It stops the happening of the way and thus of the place. In other words, the 
framework enframes the “between”, the topos of the disclosing-gathering activity of place, 
and as such, the neighbouring regions are concealed and disconnected insofar as the 
relation remains broken off.  
Being the “standing-reserve”, the framework “remains in force” on the way, and it 
does so by transforming the nature (physis) into infinitely available raw material. The 
essence of modern technology functions on the basis that such a relationship with the 
nature can be maintained ad infinitum. The relation between “the framework” and the 
“standing-reserve” is two-way. As a manner of annihilation of all finitude, “standing-
reserve” [Be-stand] provides the framework [Ge-stell] with infinite control of the way, 
while the framework provides the standing-reserve with the infinite power of “fixing in 
place”. As a result of Gestell, the very counter-occurrence and the opposite of the event, 
humans appear only as the makers (and planners) of the earth. Where the earth itself turns 
into an “object”, there remains no possibility for dwelling, as the “framework” obstructs 																																																								
485  It is worthwhile that Heidegger contrasts Be-stand with Gegen-stand, namely “object”, 
implicating that when object is transformed into standing-reserve, human beings no longer have an 
objective distance to the products of modern technology. (Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, 17) 
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the way to the site. The extreme danger in that relationship is that the fate of nature and all 
other beings is left to the accurateness of technological representations and projects of 
humans, insofar as nature is only acknowledged as a source of raw material to provide for 
the human beings ad infinitum. This is why Heidegger thinks that the technological 
understanding of being is “meta–physical”. It no longer recognizes the limits of physis as 
limits, and as such, it does not even recognize dwelling as an issue. In this very state of 
being disconnected from the boundaries of the nature as physis, where the happening of 
being and language occurs, one’s relation to physis transforms itself to a relation of 
limitless manipulation of the earth.486 The “framework”, then, can be seen as the ultimate 
counter-movement of the event [Ereignis], in that it obstructs the happening of the way. In 
other words, the way that stretches between the “openness of being” and the self-
manifestation of being itself gets blocked. It is in this sense that the issue of the 
framework is topological, as it concerns the relation between the way and place, and its 
obstruction. The “framework” detaches the dwelling-place of human beings from the 
world of dwelling (fourfold) in a way that human beings can no longer have any relation 
to the world beyond their own. This results in the annihilation of any possibility of 
dwelling, because inasmuch as dwelling means being in the open-bounded, where there 
are no boundaries human beings lose the experience of place and being situated in place. 
Here, let me underline a significant point. Once we discover “methodologies” with 
which we can manipulate techne and logos, technology, as the technical formulation and 
regulation of logos, can constantly re-produce its own “laws” of operation. This is so 
because it precisely trans-forms itself into a technology of the formation of new 
techniques and industries, which in turn re-produces and re-inforces the very same 
techniques through which it functions. For instance, the “methodology” helps us discover 																																																								
486 Martin Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language”, trans. Wanda Torres 
Gregory, Journal of Philosophical Research, Volume XXIII (1998): 137. 
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the laws of computation via the technical manipulation of logos, applying these logical 
rules in the process of making machines that can fabricate computers. In turn, we use 
those very computers in order to write books where we criticize the ways in which the 
laws of computation determine our ways of thinking: human beings remain “stuck” in a 
technological way of being.487 This means that if the essence of modern technology is to 
prevail, it must do so by establishing a self-enclosed system that constantly maintains the 
obstruction of the possibility of a different relation to technology. In other words, the 
“framework” prevails because in “enframing” it leaves no space for an opening. The 
“framework” is the constant technical interpretation and application of things, not only 
prevalent in the production of technical devices, but in our ways of being, thinking, and 
saying.  
Heidegger expresses his concerns as follow: what if “calculative thinking may 
someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking”?488 The question 
does not ask whether we should continue using technological devices or not. Doing so 
would not only be attempting to go against the natural course of the history, but we would 
also completely submit to the reigning power of the “framework”. This means that 
Heidegger’s thought aims to offer a new relation, a way of “resistance” –whose nature I 
shall explicate in brief– in and through which we can resist the technological 
understanding and experience of being, while avoiding a techno-logical solution to the 
question of the framework. The kind of resistance that is at issue does not imply defiance 
or rejection, but on the contrary, it implicates the necessity to encounter what threatens us. 
Human beings cannot “transform” the way in which modern technology claims them, 
because its essence is not anything that human beings –individually or collectively– make 																																																								
487 “Whether he as an individual knows it or not, wills it or not, self-asserting man is a 
functionary of technology” (Off the Beaten Track, 220). 
488 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John. M, Anderson and E. Hand Freund (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1996), 56. (From here on: Discourse on Thinking) 
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or produce.489 We can ask whether this is a justifiable claim. To what extent can 
philosophy help us in confronting the essence of modern technology? In that regard, there 
are several important points that need to be fleshed out to explain why rejecting or defying 
modern technology would also be a technological approach.  
A “methodological” “account” that seeks to “overcome” the essence of modern 
technology reinforces its very essence as the “framework”. We calculate how to 
“overcome” the modern technology and submit ourselves to a technological framework in 
which we try to “regulate”, “arrange”, and “fix” our understanding of it. Yet, we cannot 
have a pre-defined “formula” against the “framework”. Hermeneutically, we cannot see 
our way out of modern technology, for we are defined by the historical horizon of 
understanding in which we are situated. The ways in which we may attempt to overcome 
the essence of modern technology should not be of a calculative mode of thinking, 
“reckoning” in terms of another “means-ends” scheme. In that sense, the obstructive 
counter-spacing that the essence of modern technology causes is the opposite of 
movement that takes place in the happening of the “hermeneutic circle”, which was also 
central for the “situating-discussion”. In that context, Heidegger offers a two-way 
solution: 
 
Still we can act otherwise. We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use 
also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them any time. We can 
use technical devices as they ought to be used, and also let them alone as 
something which does not affect our inner and real core. We can affirm the 
unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, 
and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature. 490 
 
																																																								
489 “No single man, no group of men, no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and 
technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry, can brake or direct the progress 
of history in the atomic age. No merely human organization is capable of gaining dominion over 
it.” (Discourse on Thinking, 52) 
490 (Discourse on Thinking, 52) 
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This means that while we say “yes” to using technological devices, we must also say “no” 
to the essence of modern technology. Heidegger’s suggestion indicates a circular, 
“hermeneutic” response to the issue at hand, in the sense of “situating” ourselves in the 
back and forth movement of thinking, neither being completely determined by “yes” or 
“no”. In other words, if we are to find a space in which we can act “against”, that is, in 
“facing” the framework, this should emerge from the between of “yes” and “no”. Let us 
consider the feasibility of Heidegger’s suggestion with an example, which could also 
reveal the current technological situation of human beings.  
Heidegger’s mutual “yes” and “no” cannot be separated from technological 
devices that we use in our everyday lives. For instance, a smartphone with Internet 
connection is no longer only a phone, and in what ways the smartphone is to be used is not 
evident. Similarly, social media networks, games and apps that one is encouraged to use 
on the smartphone are capable of transforming the nature of “utility” and “necessity”. One 
can nowadays use the smartphone as a mini-computer while never making any phone 
calls. Another point is that the smartphone requires constant dependency to energy 
resources that one implicitly or explicitly treats as infinite reserve ready to be exploited. In 
addition, one must maintain continuous awareness of the device’s battery, the recent 
updates of the applications downloaded on the smartphone, regardless of the fact of 
whether one actually needs to use the device or not. As such, the smartphone imposes 
itself on the individual as an object that needs to be used always. Once one decides to 
leave the device to itself, it quickly becomes unusable. The smartphone with Internet 
connection, in that regard, is not the same tool as the sewing machine. In using the latter, 
one has a very clear purpose: sewing. Its “machine-ness” never becomes an issue, because 
it is designed to serve to a very specific end. On the other hand, once one starts using 
smartphones to the extent of taking advantage of all its offerings, one finds oneself 
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entangled in a system that entirely designs how one must live. In order to read e-mails and 
respond to them, the researcher has to have or find a Wi-Fi connection, a power outlet to 
charge the battery of the phone or the laptop. It is very much possible to think that one 
day, we will be ultimately surrounded by such devices, applications and systems such that 
saying “yes” to using them will imply that saying the simultaneous “no” that Heidegger 
mentions will not be possible. Using the products of modern technology may one day 
mean that we submit to the way in which it can transform us, and therefore let it define the 
essence of human being. This is why, the double  “yes” and “no” that is at issue remains to 
be a challenging one. The essence of modern technology advances in a direction where the 
between of the “yes” and “no” appears to shrink along with space and time. 
Now, the key idea is the following: the saving of human beings’ essence is not 
something that human beings can make or produce. Heidegger admits the fact that he has 
no readymade solutions to the issue.491 What Heidegger attempts to do is to prepare our 
readiness for a change in our relation to things in the future. The double and simultaneous 
“yes” and “no” that Heidegger spells out does not intend to find an immediate solution, 
but allows us to find the way to the openness where we can prepare the readiness to 
confront the situation in which we find ourselves. Therefore, it aims to raise our awareness 
to the fact that we must remain on the way of thinking, in order to discover a “bypath” by 
which we can find the “way”. It is within that context that we should understand 
Heidegger. As such, saying merely “yes” would be surrendering to the framework, while 
saying “no” would mean wiling against it and submitting to the technological framing. 
Insofar as what is at stake is “the saving of man's essential nature, the relation between the 																																																								
491 “SPIEGEL: You do not count yourself among those who, if they would only be heard, could 
point out a path? 
 
HEIDEGGER: No! I know of no path toward a direct change of the present state of the world, 
assuming that such a change is at all humanly possible. But it seems to me that the attempted 
thinking could awaken, clarify, and fortify the readiness we have already mentioned.” Der Spiegel 
(31 May 1976): 206. 
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way, place and their connection must be preserved. Therefore, the issue is keeping 
meditative thinking alive”. 492  Heidegger’s answer in terms of the “preservation 
[Verwahrung] of what’s original”493 is “releasement”, or “letting-be”, [Gelassenheit] 
which is a manner of both confronting, but at the same time remaining in a relation with 
that which challenges us. Thinking is not attempting to provide a solution, but accepting 
the challenge and trying to respond to it. In that vein of thinking, I will discuss this issue 
of “letting-be” in the next and closing section of the chapter. 
 
III. 7 Releasement into the Region: Gelassenheit as Letting-Be 
 
In the last section, I have explicated the contrast between the framework and the way-
making movement of language as the event. This required me to clarify Heidegger’s final 
ideas regarding the critique of modern technology. Consequently, in this section I will 
focus on examining Heidegger’s topological idea of the way and place of resistance 
“against” the framework, which needs to be understood on the basis of the question of 
dwelling as “in-dwelling” [In-ständigkeit]494. However, “in-dwelling” makes sense if and 
only if we understand what is at work with the following key notions: “the region” and 
“releasement” or “letting-be”.  
My line of thinking in this section is as follows: 1) the “releasement” (or letting-																																																								
492 (Discourse on Thinking, 56) 
493 Martin Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language”, trans. Wanda Torres 
Gregory, Journal of Philosophical Research, Volume XXIII, (1998): 142. 
494 Other translations of the German word “Inständigkeit” are “steadfast insistence” (McNeill and 
Powell) and “steadfastness” (Rojcewicz and Vallega-Neu). There are two reasons as to why I 
prefer to follow Bret Davis, Anderson and Freund’s translation as “in-dwelling”: First, the term 
“in-dwelling” helps to underline the topological essence of the necessity to resist the “framework”. 
What is at issue is precisely a “remaining” in the open region, that is, in the dwelling place 
disclosed by the “releasement”. Second, “steadfast insistence” risks sounding like a subjectivistic 
will on the part of human being. What situates the human being in the “region” is not one’s 
individual resolution, but the capacity to attune oneself to the happening of place itself, which is 
dwelling. Thus “in-dwelling” can also resonate with that non-subjectivistic and non-human aspect 
of the issue. 
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be) [Gelassenheit]495 is the way in which the essence of human beings is released in(to) 
thinking through “non-willing”. Heidegger puts forward the idea of “non-willing” [Nicht-
Wollen] as our “released” mode of meditative (mindful) thinking [besinnliches Denken], 
as a way of resisting the dominating effects of the framework. 2) The openness of being in 
which the essence of the human beings can dwell is the region [die Gegnet]. “Letting-be” 
or “releasement” [Gelassenheit] as a mode of being and thinking releases the human 
being into the openness of the “region”. 3) The way of dwelling in “re-sisting” the 
framework is “in-dwelling”, or “steadfast insistence”. It signifies the kind of dwelling that 
is required against the “framework” where human beings can attempt to maintain their 
access to the “way-making” of language.  
The notion of the “region” [Gegnet] has a significant role in Heidegger’s 
topologically oriented thought in the late 1950s and 1960s. The word is specific to the 
southern German dialects. In Heidegger’s thought, the “region” indicates the open site in 
which human beings may stand in a free relation to the essence of modern technology. 
“Free” here does not mean “independent” from or “indifferent” to it. On the contrary, it 
admits the necessity of a “confrontation”, which means a face-to-face situatedness in 
encountering what is at issue. The site of this relation is the “region”496, which can be 
																																																								
495 Bret Davis discusses several possible translations in English for the notion of Gelassenheit. 
Accordingly, Davis submits that “releasement” does not do justice to the nuances of the German, 
while “letting-be” which preserves the “lassen” in Gelassenheit, risks giving a sense of mere 
“allowance” or “letting go”. However, Davis remarks, Heidegger’s emphasis is also on the sense 
of “getting into, engaging with, getting involved with things” [Sicheinlassen auf] as “actively 
letting beings be themselves”. Thus, Gelassenheit is “engaged releasement”. In that regard, Davis 
emphasizes the double sense, namely the “positive” and “negative”, “yes” and “no” that is 
required in our relation to the framework. Bret Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to 
Gelassenheit. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), xxv-xxvii.  
496 In Turkish, there is a word whose etymology is interesting in that regard. The word “verimli 
arazi”, which is often used in the agricultural contexts, could be translated as “fertile land”. 
However, etymologically, the word  “verimli” literally says “self-giving”, deriving from the verb 
“to give” (ver-). When this is thought in relation to Heidegger’s constant emphasis on the German 
expression “Es gibt”, (it gives) in terms of the overflowing nature of being, I find that “the region” 
could be precisely thought as that “fertile and giving place”. As I understand it, “the region” is the 
site of tranquil creativity on the part of human beings where they are disturbed as little as possible 
		 243	
thought as the tranquil topos of thinking and, as Davis underlines, the place of non-passive 
“waiting” [warten] and not “awaiting” [erwarten]497, protected from the obstructing 
essence of the framework. The “region”, as the open place that lets beings be, both saves 
the way(s) of language as way(s) and safeguards them against the framing of the 
framework. The site in which human beings protect the essence of their existence is the 
region. The “way” of dwelling in the “region” is “in-dwelling”, which brings us to the 
notion of the “releasement” as “letting-be”.  
It is significant to mark that the discourse on “letting-be” and “the region” takes 
place in a conversation of three interlocutors, the “teacher”, the “scientist” and the 
“scholar”. In the text, Heidegger uses the same topological approach of “situating-
discussion” that took place between him and Tezuka. This can awaken us to the fact that 
Heidegger resists putting forward a readymade account of “letting-be”, but rather attempts 
to let the idea come to the fore following its own course. Now, Heidegger calls the 
appropriate attitude towards modern technology (and the technological mode of reflection) 
“letting-be” [Gelassenheit]. The term has a rich background, having been employed in 
various ways in the religious and philosophical history of German culture before 
Heidegger. In effect, Heidegger borrows the term from the German mystic thinker 
Eckhart, but uses it in a new context.498 Caputo explains the etymology of the word as 
																																																																																																																																																																						
by the essence of modern technology and where they find the possibility of a tranquil dwelling on 
the earth as mortals. 
497 Bret Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit. (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2007), 221. 
498 Caputo’s explanation of the mystical background of the term is highly worthwhile. As he puts 
it, “letting-be” originally means: 
“The ‘openness’' of the soul, on the other hand, consists in what Scheffler, following a long 
tradition in German mystical literature, calls ‘releasement’ (Gelassenheit), i.e., an unselfish 
surrender to God's will.” John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thinking (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 99. 
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follows: “The root of this word, lassen, means to let go, to relinquish, to abandon [...] But 
‘lassen’ also means to ‘let’ or ‘permit,’ and so it suggests openness and receptivity.”499  
Heidegger’s use of the notion of “letting-be” is related to his understanding of 
“willing” and “non-willing”500. In Heidegger’s thought, the true opposite of “willing” is 
not “willing-against” or “indifference”. The “non-willing” that Heidegger’s thought aims 
to elaborate is the kind of comportment which leaves [einlasst] “will” alone to itself. In a 
sense, Heidegger seeks to emphasize a sense of “acting”, which Bret Davis names 
“engaged waiting” which does not emerge from willing501 and avoids re-presenting [vor-
stellen] the world according to one’s own egoistic needs and desires. We should not 
consider the thing only as the object [Gegen-stand], as that which stands over and against 
us, but as Dinge, as that which gathers human being and being in the world. Therefore, the 
mode of thinking that does not represent things as mere objects is “non-willing”. “Non-
willing means, therefore: willingly to renounce willing.”502 In the dialogue, it is mentioned 
that the way in which the term “releasement” is employed is not the same as Eckhart used 
it in the sense of “casting off selfishness and letting self-will go”.503 It is evident that 
Heidegger aims to give an onto-ethical account of willing that does not derive from the 
“ego”, but from one’s situatedness on the earth. This point especially makes sense when 
																																																								
499 John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thinking, 119. 
500 (Discourse on Thinking, 79-80) 
It could be argued that Heidegger views the history of metaphysics as the history of “willing” 
which is uttered as “will to power” in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche’s “will for power” is the 
meaning of being(s), and therefore that which devalues “life” must be overcome. However, 
overcoming does not mean incorporating, but rather “reversing”. In reversing the same 
methodological structure, Nietzsche’s thought does not suggest an alternative to the history of 
metaphysics, but only devalues it.  
501 “Scientist: You speak without letup of a letting-be and give the impression that what is meant is 
a kind of passivity. All the same, I think I understand that it is in no way a matter of weakly 
allowing things to slide and drift along. 
 
Scholar: Perhaps a higher acting is concealed in releasement than is found in all the actions within 
the world and in the machinations of all mankind.” (Discourse on Thinking, 61) 
502 (Discourse on Thinking, 59) 
503 (Discourse on Thinking, 62) 
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considered within the context of Heidegger’s confrontation with Nietzsche. Unlike 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche thought that in human behaviour, the driving force is not a mere 
“will to live” (which is how Nietzsche reads Schopenhauer), but a sense of pleasure from 
expanding one’s power. The notion of creative willing played an important role in 
Nietzsche’s thought. For instance, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche said: “Yes, this 
ego and the ego’s contradiction and confusion still speak most honestly about its being; 
this creating, willing, valuing ego which is the measure and value of things”504 This 
willing and creating ego refuses to be attached values externally imposed from an “other” 
realm. It is interesting to read Heidegger in that context, as his aim is not to develop a 
notion of “willing” that is “before” or “beyond” the ego, but rather he seeks to find out 
about that which “situates” the ego in place. Only this can make “willing” meaningful and 
grant human beings their humanness. Such a mode of comporting oneself in the world 
means “non-willing”, as the openness to be appropriated and conditioned in and by place, 
and this is why it is related to the issue of dwelling.  
Heidegger calls the mode of being in and through which we can resist “the 
framework” by way of non-willing is “in-dwelling” [In-ständigkeit]. This could be simply 
understood as a mode of meditative “waiting” in order to withstand the advance of the 
domination of the framework without willing for or against it. As a result of “in-
dwelling”, one awaits by facing toward the future as to that which is to come [Zu-kunft, a-
venir (in Turkish, gelecek, literally “that-which–will-come”)]. One of the key concepts to 
be considered in order to understand “in-dwelling” is the ancient Greek kairos505, as 																																																								
504 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Adrian Del Naro, trans. Robert B. Pippin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21) 
505 McNeill deliberately brings into view the relationship between logos and kairos by Heidegger’s 
early interpretations of Aristotle. At first, kairos, as the “opportune moment of action” appears to 
be through and through “political” insofar as human actions have their place in a common world, 
which, in Heidegger’s thought is designates as “being-in-the-world” as “being-with”. However, it 
is precisely one’s capacity to not only act in accordance with the norm that bestows the particular 
significance to kairos and the topological essence of the issue is precisely what follows: One has 
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thinking the background of the notion can provide us with insights intp our situation with 
regards to the advance of modern technology. In the Christian tradition, the term means 
the “opportune moment” in attending one’s relation with God. Before Christianity, the 
term has been central to Sophists in relation to one’s capacity to adapt to the changing 
conditions of life and act accordingly. wqIt also indicates the right time and the right place 
to bring in the right judgment in rhetoric. Although the word kairos first strikes us as a 
temporal term in these religious and rhetoric contexts, its essence must be considered from 
a topological point of view.  
In Heidegger’s thought, the term kairos can be considered in relation to Aristotle’s 
understanding of circumspective-practical wisdom, phronesis. Schalow defines phronesis 
as “the moment of insight that ends the deliberation about what the right action is toward 
the right person in this situation, the basis of balanced judgment.”506 In that regard, kairos 
indicates this very appropriate situatedness in the moment that is a result of genuine 
readiness. In other words, in the occurrence of quantitatively calculable time [kronos], 
kairos is the qualitative “instant” [Augenblick], or the “moment” that within which one is 
timely situated in good place for receiving the manifestation of being. The poet’s saying 
of the word as well as the word’s own appearance in language emerging from its silent 
grounds both indicate this primordial and all-gathering “moment” [Nun]. In the context of 
one’s relation to the essence of modern technology, non-willing is closely tied to 
Heidegger’s simultaneous “yes” and “no”. As such, “in-dwelling” designates the situation 																																																																																																																																																																						
to stand in a free relation to the openness of one’s being in order to be able to perform a particular 
action in the particular time that it is “appropriate”, which, cannot be a technically guided action. 
This would be against the required openness in relation to one’s situation. McNeill, William. The 
Time of Life: Heidegger and Ethos. Albany: SUNY Press, 2006, 80-83. Also, considering 
McNeill’s explorations of early Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, 
one can defend the argument that his later notion of Gelassenheit already had its roots in the 
hermeneutic discussions of kairos and phronesis, especially in relation to the notion of Augenblick. 
See: McNeill, William. Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory. Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1999. 
506  Frank Schalow and Alfred Denker, A Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy 
(Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2010), 8) 
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in which one’s judgments and actions are appropriately situated in the journeying of the 
“moment”. The chief idea is that one should neither be “for” nor “against” the modern 
technology. Such phronetic attitude in the face of modern technology is “non-willing”, 
that is, the kind of willing that does not emerge from one’s egoistic desires, but as a way 
of comporting oneself toward the “future”, by means situating one’s being in the openness 
of the journeying of time.  
One of the biggest dangers of the attempt in confronting the essence of modern 
technology is to fall back into a sense of nostalgia for old techniques and technologies. 
The notion with which Heidegger attempts to resist that temptation is “in-dwelling” which 
does not signify a fatalist withdrawal from the world, just as it is not a persistent mode of 
willing seduced by the immediate transformation of things. It is that from which the 
“spatiotemporal” between emerges, where one can have a sense of direction and 
orientation in one’s “care” for the world, in facing and encountering both the past and the 
future in the “present”. It is a way of “being-with” and “moving-with” the time-play of 
being, and a way to place oneself in the presencing of the now [Nun] as the “moment”. 
This all-encompassing “now” is the situation where one admits both the “having passed” 
of the past and the “has yet to arrive” of the future, a simultaneous act of accepting the 
disclosure and the closure of being, as a way of keeping one’s being open to the self-
opening of the event. Indeed, such a manner of situating oneself in the moment, and 
letting things be what they have been, are, and may be in the future, is the meaning of 
non-willing as acceptance of the being-there of human existence as a “destiny”. In other 
words, it is an acknowledgment of human beings’ temporal “thrownness” into the event. 
Davis writes in connection with “in-dwelling”: “Along with Innestehen, this word 
(Inständigkeit) reflects Heidegger’s turn from understanding the “ek-sistence” of Dasein 
in any “transcendental” sense (i.e., as overstepping beings to posit a horizon) to that of a 
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standing-out-within the clearing […]”507. Dwelling in the open requires “in-dwelling” in 
the sense that it is a dwelling on, a steadfast in-sistence, and thus, an engaged, yet a non-
reactionary “re-sistence”. 
 The idea of “in-dwelling” and its kairotic and phronetic essence can also be 
thought in relation to the Chinese concept “Wu-wei” in the sense of “non-doing”, or 
“doing without force”. Given the fact that Heidegger endeavoured to co-translate Lao-
Tze’s Tao Te Ching in the 1950s with Hsiao, a project that was left incomplete, it is very 
possible to think that he was particularly familiarity with the notion.508 For the most part, 
the idea of “non-willing” and “non-doing” is traditionally foreign to the Greek and Judeo-
Christian thought, where the primary way of dealing with things is “praxis”. One, as the 
subject, is the master of things [pragmata], which are objects. In the age of modern 
technology, this gets translated into the ultimate maximization of utility by imposing 
human power upon the earth. Now, for Heidegger, “willing for willing” is the very 
characteristic of the essence of modern technology, which, again, is an idea that is central 
to his critique of Nietzsche.509 Heidegger’s meditative thinking requires a dynamic manner 
of waiting in the moment, which suggests that there is a harmony between movement and 
rest. From a topological standpoint, as May also argues, it should also be noted that one 
“waits” for no-thing else but the openness itself, which is not a phenomenon. Indeed, in 
the word “wu-wei” there is the wu, which means “nothingness” or “emptiness” in 
																																																								
507 Bret Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit. (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2007), 222. 
508 Hwa Yol Jung also mentions this idea when he writes: “Here Heidegger’s notion of serenity or 
releasement parallels the Taoist idea of wu wei and the Zen way of thinking and doing–the way of 
refraining from thinking and doing contrary to the natural and spontaneous way of thinking.” Hwa 
Yol Jung, “Heidegger’s Way With Sinitic Thinking”, in Heidegger and Asian Thinking, ed. 
Graham Parkes (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 233. 
509 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche. vol I-II, trans. David Farell Krell (New York: Harper One, 1991), 
127. 
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Chinese.510 The “non-doing” and “in-dwelling” indicate one’s willingness for non-willing 
in order to attain the openness by waiting for no particular “out-come”. The future [Zu-
kunft] as that which is to come must be allowed to move in its natural way of journeying. 
The notions of kairos, phronesis and wu-wei appear as similar modes of comporting 
oneself beyond calculative thinking, which help us in better understanding what is at issue 
with “in-dwelling”. In “letting-be” we have both being and doing, embodied in a tranquil 
way. The kind of “waiting” in the “in-dwelling” takes us to the key topological essence of 
the issue. 
The notion of “waiting” that is at matter here does not have a predefined “goal”, 
and it is neither simply teleological nor pragmatic. One does not wait for “something” 
“pre-defined” to arrive and transform us (and our relation to the framework). One waits by 
remaining receptive to the “journeying of place” and releases us to the site of “letting-be”: 
 
Teacher: Because waiting releases itself into openness ...  
Scholar: ... into the expanse of distance …  
Teacher: . . . in whose nearness it finds the abiding in which it remains.511 
 
Here, “waiting” is parallel to the “way-making” that brings “in-dwelling” to the 
“dwelling-place” as the openness [Offenheit], which itself is not a goal to be achieved. It is 
not something to be “reached” after some time or after we change our position in space. 
The openness is the nature of the “region” and as such, it is not something we can create 
or produce. In that sense, in order to be able to attain the openness of the region, we must 
also open ourselves toward it by way of “letting-be” (releasement). As such, the relation is 
two-way and mutual. “The region that regions” [die Gegnet] is the open site where the 
self-opening of being itself meets the openness of the clearing, as the there of being as 																																																								
510  (On the Way to Language, 18) Reinhard May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian 
Influences on His Work, trans. Graham Parkes (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 31, 51. 
511 (Discourse on Thinking, 68) 
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Da-sein, where two topoi envelop into one another. The mutual happening of place that is 
at issue is the act of “regioning”, which is the convergence of two distinct modes of 
“openness”. This is the meaning of “correspondence” [Ent-sprechen] that takes place in 
the open site of the event between human being and being.  
Davis explains the correspondence between being and human being by spelling out 
three significations, and what one might say, three moments in the “overcoming” of 
willing for willing 512: “1) not-willing, 2) deferred-willing, 3) proper-willing.” This 
translates into: “1) Willing not to will, 2) waiting in radical passivity for the arrival of an 
other beginning, 3) a non-willing corresponsive participation in the appropriating event of 
beyng.” The region is the place of the correspondence, which is also the place of the non-
willing. In that regard, we can interpret language as the “region” within which the third 
stage of “non-willing”, which Davis calls the “proper willing”, can take place. Now, 
although Davis astutely acknowledges Heidegger’s topological way of thinking 
“unconcealment” (aletheia) as the “clearing”513 and he highlights the ways in which 
Heidegger comes to bring into view the “region” as the site of non-willing and indwelling, 
he surprisingly provides no explication as to the place-related nature of “region” as such. 
What does the “region that regions” specifically amount to considered in topological 
terms? Where and how do we find the “open-region” that is being mentioned?  
 First, let me explain the reason why Heidegger does not choose to employ the 
commonplace word signifying “region”, namely “das Gegend”, but “that which regions” 
[die Gegnet]: 1) Heidegger aims to emphasize the happening of the region, and not the 
conception of region as a spatially enclosed domain or realm, 2) he wants to underscore 
the sense of “non-doing” that is at issue. The openness is no-thing that can be achieved by 
																																																								
512 Bret Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit. (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2007), 226. 
513 Bret Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit, 40, 198, 230. 
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human planning, organizing, producing. It belongs to the essence of the happening of the 
place and in that particular sense, of the nature itself as physis. It is the region itself that 
“lets-in” [einlasst] the human being, and as such, it not an opening arranged or opened up 
by human beings.514  
 
Teacher: It strikes me as something like a region, an enchanted region where 
everything belonging there returns to that in which it rests. 
 
Scholar: I'm not sure I understand what you say now. 
 
Teacher: I don't understand it either, if by "understanding" you mean the capacity 
to re-present what is put before us as if sheltered amid the familiar and so secured, 
for I, too, lack the familiar in which to place what I tried to say about openness as a 
region.515 
 
The teacher insists on the fact that this is not just any region, but is the region, namely the 
region of all regions. This should remind us of the other topological sites and topological 
occurrences that Heidegger mentioned in his thinking: the there [Da], way [Weg], 
dwelling-place [ethos], place [Stätte, Ort, Ortschaft], the way-making movement [be-
wëgung], the event [Ereignis], all of which implicate various instances of the situatedness 
of human existence in place, rendering language as “the between” [das Zwischen] and the 
relation of human beings and being. Now, Heidegger comes to argue that the region, as 
“that-which-regions” [die Gegnet], is the most sheltering region of all. This is because it 
“non-wills” against the framework, which is the most extreme objectification of the earth 
and the biggest obstacle for dwelling. This means, “region that regions” is the site in 
which the openness of human being and self-opening/unfolding of being can correspond 
[entsprechen] to one another, which is the shelter of human beings that in which they may 
engage in the resistant “waiting” as “proper willing”. In the “region”, “everything returns 
																																																								
514 (Discourse on Thinking, 62) 
515 (Discourse on Thinking, 65) 
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to itself”. The essence of the region is “open expanse”, and the essence of “regioning” is 
“gathering and re-sheltering for an expanded resting and abiding.”516 Within that context, 
it is peculiar that the scientist says that “he cannot quite re-present at all what abiding, 
sheltering and gathering” means.517 The teacher admits the fact that perhaps we cannot 
accurately “de-fine” it, because what is discussed as “the region” may not have a re-
presentable image. It is the place of no-thing. This definition of the nature of place 
immediately brings us to the issue of the nature of language.  
We experience the openness that the region provides in and as language where the 
situatedness of human existence in the open-bounded manifests itself. This, however, 
takes us back to the way-making movement of language. Because, the openness that we 
reach in thinking is the “releasement” that we find following the ways of language: 
 
Teacher: Above all when the occasion is as inconspicuous as the silent course of a 
conversation that moves us. 
 
Scholar: But that means, the conversation brings us to that path which seems 
nothing else than releasement itself... 
 
Teacher:  ... which is something like rest. 
 
Scholar: At this point, how movement comes from rest and remains let into rest 
suddenly becomes clearer to me.  
 
Teacher: Then releasement would be not only a path but a movement. 
 
Scholar: Where does this strange path go? Where does the movement proper to it 
rest? 
 
Teacher: Where else but in that-which-regions.518 
 
In this passage, it is evident that Heidegger ponders the way-making movement of 
language by considering the relation between the “movement” [Bewegung], “way-																																																								
516 (Discourse on Thinking, 66) 
517 (Discourse on Thinking, 67) 
518 (Discourse on Thinking, 70) 
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making” [Be-wëgung] and the way [Weg]. Dwelling, then, means remaining on the path of 
thinking, and first and foremost attempting to undergo an experience with language in the 
region that is protected by “in-dwelling”. The task of thinking is to dwell in that very 
mode of “in-dwelling”. The “releasement” releases the human being into the openness of 
the region [die Gegnet]. Heidegger stresses the significance of that by saying: “If, in 
accordance with Greek' story, and thought, we are aware of the nature of truth as a dis-
closure and recovery; then that-which-regions, we are reminded, is presumably the hidden 
coming forth of this nature.”519 This means that the showing that is at issue in the act of 
making-manifest through saying is fundamentally the “releasement” and the “letting-be”, 
which transpires from and toward the event. It is the act of “receiving” and “responding” 
to its “self-giving”, which also involves the two-way manner of that very movement.    
Let me recapitulate my line of thinking on the issue: it is possible to read 
Heidegger’s simultaneous “yes” and “no” indicative of the “between” which discloses 
different modes of dwelling in the age of modern technology. Saying merely “yes” leads 
to the calculating-metaphysical mode of being that enframes, manipulates, and regulates 
the earth endlessly. Saying merely “no” leads to pessimism and nostalgia that submits to 
empowering of the framework. The double “yes “ and “no”, however orients itself in the 
moment of that which constantly “comes” (future) and that which constantly “passes” 
(past). As such, it places us in the openness of “now” [Nun], which is also the “moment” 
of the event of the words. The “region” is the site of that “moment” that swings in “the 
between”. The openness that the releasement provides is the “bypath” that Heidegger 
mentions in confronting the framework and attempting to arrive at the “track” that leads to 
the “track” of the holy. This is possible only by accepting the challenge that the modern 
technology poses by “non-willing”, instead of disregarding and attempting to over-power 
																																																								
519 (Discourse on Thinking, 81) 
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it. On the contrary, instead of fighting one’s way through the obstruction that the modern 
technology brings out, which would be “willing-against” it, Heidegger wishes to “con-
front” the technological ways of thinking. A new way of thinking can only follow from 
the epoch of being in which we already are, being situated in “the between”, the moment 
where both the past and the future can appear in the same horizon. The topos of such “en-
countering”, where our own openness meets with the self-opening of being, is what 
Heidegger calls the regioning, “the region of all regions” [die Gegnet, die Gegend aller 
Gegenden]520. As such, “in-dwelling” is the way and medium of dwelling. Undergoing an 
experience with language via thinking and vice versa, then, is the true sense of “situating-
















520 (Discourse on Thinking, 35) 
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IV. Early Heidegger, Language and Dwelling 
 
Thus far I have examined and discussed the relationship between language and dwelling 
in Heidegger’s later thought between the mid-1930s and the 1960s. His ideas suggest a 
place-oriented and “onto-ethical” account of dwelling within and of language. Heidegger 
makes an issue of the “relation” in which one stands to language rather than merely 
putting forward a “philosophy of language” that objectifies language. Heidegger’s later 
thought attempts to place us in the nearness of the happening of language so that we can 
have a better sense of what it means to be the kind of beings that have language. 
Developing the mindfulness to undergo an experience with language is the meaning of 
dwelling in language, which is the most fundamental “action” in which human existence 
can partake. 
 At this point I would like to address the following question: what are the main 
differences and similarities between Heidegger’s later and earlier thought on the issue of 
“dwelling in language”? Looking into this matter can provide us with a better perspective 
to understand his early and late explorations. Heidegger’s early thought can be easily 
distinguished from his late thought in terms of its terminology, concentrations, and 
“methods” of thinking. Nevertheless, this should not imply that his early and later periods 
of thought imply two completely unconnected projects. It is rather that Heidegger’s later 
works that more appropriately orients his earlier writings. In light of these considerations, 
in what follows I aim to find the ground of comparison between the early and late 
Heidegger on the link between language and dwelling. I will try to find the traces of later 
Heidegger within the limits of Heidegger’s early thought, while also juxtaposing them, 
pointing out the contrasts. To that end, I will specifically focus on Being and Time 
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(1927)521, which is his most comprehensive work from the 1920s on the issue. However, I 
will also look into his other lecture courses from the early and mid-1920s, such as Plato’s 
Sophist, in order to point out the historical development of his ideas. 
 In Heidegger’s discussions on language and dwelling in Being and Time, the 
relation between “discourse” [Rede] and “world” [Welt] is the most significant focus, 
though its place-related underpinnings remain obscure. This is because Heidegger does 
not discuss the issue of discourse by first problematizing the “relation” in which Dasein 
stands to language. As I will explain in detail, for Heidegger, “discourse” is the 
ontological expression of one’s “understanding” of the everyday world. In “idle-talk” 
[Gerede], the world gets disclosed only via the average understanding and interpretation 
of it, where “discourse” fails to move beyond the limits of “mindless absorption”. In that 
framework, I set out to take issue with Dreyfus’s idea of “mindless absorption” to point 
out the idea that if human existence is to become authentic, a merely absorption in one’s 
practical doings does not imply a comprehensive notion of dwelling. Discussing Dreyfus’ 
position on the idea helps me to illuminate the significance of the fourfold as the later 
conception of dwelling.  
 There are certain hints of Heidegger’s later topology of language in Being and 
Time, which I bring to the fore by investigating the “groundless ground” of language as 
“silence”. I suggest that Heidegger’s explorations with regards to the “call of conscience” 
constitutes the basis of his more encompassing ideas related to the issue of standing in a 
poetic relation to language. This also provides us with better-founded insights concerning 
the nature of language in comparison with his explicit discussions of “discourse”.  
																																																								
521 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1985. (The English translation uses the seventh edition of Sein und Zeit. 
From here on: Being and Time) 
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In the first section, I thematize the relationship between “discourse” and the 
“world”, because “discourse” appears as the ontological expression of Dasein’s “being-in-
the-world” [In-der-Welt-sein]. In the second section, I examine the relationship between 
“existential spatiality” and place, especially engaging with Dreyfus’ commentary on the 
notion of “being-in-the-world”, where I critique his idea of “mindless absorption”. In 
relation to that, I highlight the relevant aspects of the Dreyfus-McDowell debate in order 
to explicate the significance of the “mindful” attitude towards things. This allows me to 
open up a topological discussion of the meaning of standing in an authentic and 
inauthentic relation to discourse, the world and language. In the third section, I discuss 
Dasein’s inauthentic relation to “discourse” and the world by looking to the notion of 
“idle-talk” [Gerede]. In the fourth section, I focus on “keeping silent” [schweigen], which 
makes possible “saying” [sagen] as the primordial ground of human Dasein’s authentic 
relationship to discourse. As such, in the third and fourth sections, I comparatively 
illustrate the relationship between “idle talk” and “silence” from a topological point of 
view, in specific with regards to the ideas of “ground” [Grund], “abyss” [Ab-grund] and 
“groundlessness” [Bodenlosigkeit]. In the fifth section, I examine the notion of ground in 
terms of the relation between silence and discourse. In doing so, I focus on the parallel 
between 1) being and nothingness, and 2) groundlessness, abyss and ground. In the sixth 
and final section, I conclude my discussion by engaging with Braver’s idea of “groundless 
grounds”, fleshing out the differences between “being-in-the-world” and the “fourfold” 
where two different contexts and modes of dwelling come to the fore. I take the latter as 
the more complete form of dwelling because, first, it does not take the human practices as 
the departure point in thinking the meaning of being situated, and second, thanks to the 
notion of “fourfold”, we can actually see the immediate relationship between the event 
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[Ereignis], language, and place, where the question of language precisely appears as the 
question of dwelling. 
 
IV. 1 Discourse and the World 
 
Although language is not one of the central focuses in Being and Time, it becomes an 
issue in the fifth chapter of the first division with regards to the “being-in” of Dasein and 
its existential structure. The issue is the explication of the existential structure of Dasein as 
“understanding” [Verstand] and the understanding of the world that belongs to Dasein, 
that which from which discourse [Rede] emerges as the ontological disclosure of the 
world. The link at issue is apophantic because “discourse” as logos is about “making 
manifest what one is talking about”.522 In other words, it is the act of uttering an 
understanding and interpretation of the world. As a result of his phenomenological 
approach, Heidegger examines the phenomena in their ordinary appearances. This is why, 
instead of starting with a general conception of language, Heidegger first traces back the 
ordinary manifestation of language in the factual world as discourse [Rede]. This is indeed 
closely tied to the question of “communication” [Mitteilung], which is largely overlooked 
in Heidegger scholarship523. Heidegger suggests: 
 
Attempts to grasp the ‘essence of language’ have always taken their orientation 
from […] ideas of expression or of ‘symbolic form’, of communication as 
‘assertion’, of the ‘making-known’ of experiences, of the ‘patterning’ of life. Even 
if one 'were to put these various fragmentary definitions together in syncretistic 
fashion, nothing would be achieved in the way of fully adequate definition of 
‘language.’524 
 																																																								
522 (Being and Time, 56) 
523 Jeffrey Powell L. “Heidegger and Communicative World”. Research In Phenomenology, 40 
(2010): 55. 
524 (Being and Time, 206) 
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Here, we see that Heidegger does not intend to downplay the significance of “discourse” 
and the topic of communication, but rather he draws our attention to the ways in which 
they must be re-examined on new grounds. He implicates that if we closely scrutinize our 
commonplace paradigms of understanding language, we can also have a better 
understanding of the way in which we make sense of discourse and communication. The 
reason why Heidegger endeavours to find another conception of discourse is related to the 
fact that he first wants to address the ontological underpinnings of our relation to the 
worldhood [Weltlichkeit] of the world, which for him is fundamental in looking into the 
existential structure of Dasein as the kind of being that appears as the site and clearing of 
the understanding of being. 
For Heidegger the notion of discourse [Rede] amounts to the ancient Greek notion 
logos: 
The Greeks had no word for ‘language’; they understood  this phenomenon 'in the 
first instance' as discourse, But because the ‘logos’  came into their philosophical 
ken primarily as assertion, this was the  kind of logos which they took as their clue 
for working out the basic structures of the forms of discourse and its 
components.525 
 
When Heidegger discusses the notion of logos in connection with the etymology of 
phenomenology526, he emphasizes the point that Greeks considered logos mainly in terms 
of its assertive qualities, namely as that through which we come to assert judgments. He 
aims to change the focus by underscoring the phenomenologically more factual 
appearance of logos as discourse. Heidegger suggests, “logos as discourse means rather 
the same as deloun: to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse.”527 
And then he adds, “Logos is a letting-something-be-seen”.528 Here, it is clear that 
																																																								
525 (Being and Time, 209) 
526 (Being and Time, 32) 
527 (Being and Time, 56) 
528 (Being and Time, 56) 
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Heidegger already has in mind the relationship between aletheia, phenomenology and 
logos, a threefold relationship that becomes clear through his discussion of discourse and 
it is clear that the does not understand discourse as the self-expression of the individual. 
Heidegger explains the relationship between logos and truth as aletheia in detail in 
the 1924–25 Marburg lecture courses, which are published under the title of Plato’s 
Sophist. Here, Heidegger brings up the link between language as logos and truth as 
aletheia in his examination of Plato’s Sophist dialogue and Aristotle’s notion of phronesis. 
For instance, Heidegger writes: “Alethein shows itself most immediately in legein. Legein 
(to speak) is what most basically constitutes the human being.”529 It is logos that 
constitutes the human being, not the other way around. It is not some anthropocentric 
production, but an ontological event that becomes manifest in human beings’ talking. 
For Heidegger, the ontological-existential meaning of discourse is the articulation 
of intelligibility (of the world). The vocalization of sounds (speaking) [Sprechen] is the 
action by which one expresses what one wants to make manifest (saying) [Sagen]. In that 
regard, there is a difference between language and discourse even in early Heidegger530. 
Heidegger argues: “Language is a totality of words-a totality in which discourse has a 
‘worldly’ being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world; this totality thus becomes 
something which we may come across as ready-to-hand.”531 As such, language has two 
characteristics, the first one being ontological, defined in terms of its own nature, and the 
second one being practical, in terms of human beings’ making use of it: 1) It is a holistic 																																																								
529  Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 17. (From here on: Plato’s Sophist) 
530 Powell disregards this point when he equals “discourse” with “language”, omitting the nuance 
between act of making manifest (discourse) and the world [Da] in which the act of making 
manifest appears (language) in the first place. In other words, discourse, which always is a 
communication, is that by which we come to acknowledge the being of language. Powell’s 
negligence is probably due to the fact that he prefers to start his examination of Heidegger’s 
language departing from early Heidegger, where Heidegger himself had not come to address 
significant distinctions that he made and clarified in his later thought on language. Jeffrey Powell 
L. “Heidegger and Communicative World”. Research In Phenomenology, 40 (2010): 59. 
531 (Being and Time, 204) 
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structure that allows one to articulate the facts of one’s very life-world via linguistic signs. 
2) It is a tool that human beings use in order to share and express the manifestness of 
beings, and communicate this understanding of the world in discourse.532 Therefore, an 
analysis of the notion of the world is necessary, in order to understand the apophantic 
relation between discourse and world, because every time Dasein attempts to say 
something, it actually speaks of its own approximate world, insofar as it understands and 
interprets the world being spatially captivated in its closest life context.  
According to Heidegger, human beings find themselves always already practically 
involved in the world. Simply by virtue of being in the world, they live in a certain 
understanding and interpretation of that world.533 Dasein understands its world because it 
has no other existential and hermeneutic possibility. In other words, in its “thrownness”534 
[Geworfenheit] into the world, its primary mode of being is making sense of things. 
Furthermore, the understanding that is at stake comes to take place through the way in 
which Dasein finds itself in the world, which is its existential characteristic of always 
being in a certain mood [Befindlichkeit]. Now, the understanding of the world that is at 
stake here is not necessarily a theoretical or conceptual recognition, but ordinary know-
how, namely knowing one’s way around in one’s doings in the closest world 
(environment) [Umwelt]. As such, with the most of the things and events around us, we 
have an immediate and practical “ready-to-hand” [Zuhandene] relationship.535 Only in 
cases where one’s ordinary know-how gets hindered, one has the need to take a step back 
and try to understand the issue by reflecting upon it. Heidegger calls such a theoretical 
relation to things “present-to-hand” [Vorhandene]. The latter gets activated when the 																																																								
532 In the later thought, Heidegger argues that the essence of language is to “say” through 
“speaking”, which can also be understood as discourse. Yet, “reden” has a more defined sense of 
“talking” in the sense of conversing or chatting, while “sprechen” designates the more general act 
of “speaking”. So, all “talking” indicates a “speaking”, yet not the other way around.  
533 (Being and Time, 115-116) 
534 (Being and Time, 174) 
535 (Being and Time, 103) 
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ordinary relationship with the things is disturbed. In that framework, the “environment” 
appears as the space of ordinary understanding and praxis. Now, in terms of language, the 
relation between the world and discourse is as follows: any understanding of the world is 
followed by an interpretation of it, depending on one’s practical concerns and interests 
(projections) in the world, and this interpretation of the world gets expressed through 
assertions [Aussage] in the course of communication. Communication is the “sharing… 
with” [teilen … mit] of these assertions that emerge from one’s interpretations of the 
world. The way in which these assertions are communicated is “speaking”.536 By way of 
“speaking”, one “says” something of the world. The act of speaking embodies a certain 
understanding and interpretation of the world that becomes explicit through assertions, 
and the mutual sharing of assertions lead to communication.  
Now, according to Heidegger’s line of thinking, one can articulate something qua 
something through assertions if and only if one already has a fore–understanding of what 
is spoken about. 537  Therefore, discourse always has to be an articulation of the 
understanding. This is why Heidegger argues, “discourse is existentially equiprimordial 
with state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] and understanding [Verstand].”538 Even if it is the 
individual that does the work of expressing, what one articulates is always the 
understanding of the world that is at issue to which she or he belongs by being there, 
which is determined on the basis of one’s practical doings where humans exist by always 
already having been directed “into” things. In terms of language, this does not mean that 
everyone speaks in the same way and uses similar expressions in expressing their views 
and opinions about things, but it means that within the boundaries of ordinary life, where 
one exists as “being-with” [Mitsein], one has the immediate capacity to be able to respond 
																																																								
536 (Being and Time, 203) 
537 (Being and Time, 199) 
538 (Being and Time, 203) 
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to things in the most ordinary and common (familiar) ways like the “others”, the “they”. 
The “they” talk about similar subjects and they do so in light of their shared, similar 
concerns. This is what catches Heidegger’s attention regarding the problem of meaning 
and understanding, and in particular in relation to the question of the “world”. Insofar as 
discourse is about the entities in the world, it is the understanding and interpretation of the 
world that determines the horizon of the discourse. Now, the question that we must raise is 
the following one: what is the nature of the worldhood of the world? How does the world 
come to determine the “about-which” of speech? 
 
IV. 2 Being-in-the-World, Existential Spatiality, Dreyfus 
 
We must closely scrutinize Heidegger’s concept of the “world” [Welt], because it is 
essential in comprehending how he thematizes Dasein’s relation to discourse. Heidegger 
analyses the existential structure of the kind of being for which the question of being 
appears as an issue, namely, Dasein. Dasein literally means “being-there”, here referring 
to the kind of being that primarily exists as “being-in-the-world”. Thus, we must first 
investigate the meaning of the “world” in Being and Time. Subsequently, I would like to 
address Dreyfus’ interpretation of existential spatiality and the notion of place, which will 
provide us with a perspective to make sense of the topics and issues that are central to 
Heidegger’s ideas in Being and Time.  
 In Being and Time, Heidegger’s understanding of the notion of “world” has spatial 
underpinnings, as it is initially investigated in terms of its space-related characteristics. On 
the other hand, Heidegger’s primary aim is to show how the spatial essence of the world is 
grounded in temporality, an approach whose success within the limits of Heidegger’s 
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early thought is uncertain.539 One of Heidegger’s most significant objectives in Being and 
Time is to propose “time” as the horizon of the question of being.540 Therefore, the trifold 
relation between spatiality, temporality and place is an important issue that needs close 
attention. Heidegger indicates that at its core his account of the world is not spatial, and 
furthermore he associates the spatialist approach with the philosophy of Descartes.541 
Heidegger provides a “temporal” (seen through later Heidegger’s lenses, the “journeying” 
of one’s being there) framework in which we can make sense of the authentic Dasein.542 
He first lays out the basis of the inauthentic mode of understanding the world, and then 
moves on to discussing one’s authentic being-there.  
The difference between the authentic and inauthentic modes of being there is that 
the former one implies getting stuck in a one dimensional “presence”, while the latter 
implies a mode of existence in and with the “presencing”. In other words, the major 
distinction is an original conception of “time” and temporality. In that sense, the 
topological interpretation of Being and Time must grasp the role of the, which is related to 
the later “event” and to the dynamic happening of Dasein’s situatedness in the world and 
discourse. The shift from the “spatial” to the “temporal” also signifies the movement from 
“space” to “place”, since in place the “timing” of time and “spacing” of space is already 
incorporated.  
																																																								
539 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
2006), 65-66. (This becomes an issue in particular in the third chapter of Malpas’ book.) 
540 (Being and Time, 38) 
541 (Being and Time, 94-95) 
542 In addition to Krell’s remarks on the issue, we can say that authentic Dasein is able to situate 
itself appropriately in the open-bounded (finite) “dispersion” [ekstasis] of physis itself. The 
situation of authentic Dasein, is neither mere “rest” nor “motion” but “rest in motion” and vice 
versa. From what Aristotle considers the origin of all decaying, time, Heidegger understands the 
relation in which we stand to the ekstasis of time as that which makes possible an authentic or 
inauthentic relation to place. This is because, it is out of place that the emergence of time and 
space happens, and place as topos (as the open-bounded), is where the time appears finite, yet it 
temporalizes from the future, which is open and indefinite. David F. Krell, Intimations of 
Mortality (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), 49-50, 
53. 
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Heidegger indicates four different ways of understanding the “world”, the three of 
which he identifies in the history of philosophy, and a fourth one that he brings up in 
ontological-existential terms. 543  These four notions of the “world” have two main 
characteristics. The first two are about “containment”, while the last two indicate 
“involvement”. The first and third ones are ontic designations, the first indicating the 
space in which the totality of things are located, the third one indicating the factual world 
where one’s ordinary life takes place. The second one is an ontological designation, 
implying the realm in which the being of present-to-hand entities appears, for instance, the 
world of a mathematician, or a sportsman. The final and the fourth notion of the world 
designates the “worldhood” of the world, which is the key notion that guides Heidegger’s 
subsequent discussions. It can also be understood as the happening of the “world”. 
In order to clarify what is at issue, first let me focus on the idea of “in-ness” [In-
Sein]. For Heidegger, “being-in” [In-sein] of Dasein, namely, the way in which Dasein is 
in the world is not the same as water is in(side) the glass. Dasein’s being “in” the world 
does not render Dasein as an entity merely located and encompassed inside another one.544 
Insofar as being-in for Dasein means a state of being, an existentiale, it also means to 
“dwell”. Heidegger argues: 
 
'In' is derived from ‘innan’-‘to reside’, ‘habitare’, ‘to dwell’ [sich aufhalten]'. An' 
signifies ‘I am accustomed’, ‘I am familiar with’, look after something. […] The 
entity to which Being-in in this signification belongs to is one which we have 
characterized as that entity which in each case I myself am [bin].  [...] ‘Ich bin’  ['I 
am'] means in its turn  ‘I reside’ or ‘dwell alongside’: the world, as that which is 
familiar to me in such and such a way.545 
 
																																																								
543 (Being and Time, p93) 
544 (Being and Time, 79) 
545 (Being and Time 80) 
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It is stated in the footnote of the English translation that Heidegger bases his interpretation 
on Grimm’s etymological investigations. This is where we see the verbal sense of the 
archaic “innan”, which according to Grimm precedes the prepositional meaning of the 
expression. Accordingly, it indicates a kinetic sense of “being-in”. Regardless of the 
correctness of this etymological connection, it is clear that Heidegger understands the “in-
ness” [Inheit] of human existence not in the sense of being contained in some other spatial 
phenomenon, but rather in the “onto-ethical” sense of inhabiting a particular life context. 
It is important to note that Heidegger here associates “being” with “dwelling” in a precise 
way so that we hear the infinitive “to be” [Sein] in the expression “I am” as “I dwell”. 
Accordingly, “I am” means “I am there” [Da], the “there” here referring to the world, and 
“being” referring to my dwelling in it. The world essentially signifies “worldhood” 
[Weltlichkeit], meaning the ontological character of the way Dasein is taken up in the 
world. 
 The nearest world of human existence is called “environment” [Umwelt]546, 
which is where the factual dwelling of Dasein takes place through its “dealings” 
[Umgang], meaning one’s ordinary everyday practices. As such, Heidegger designates the 
ontological character of the way in which Dasein goes about its dealings as practical, by 
going back to the Greek word pragmata meaning things, matters, deeds. Following that, 
Heidegger calls the “things” that with which we carry out our concernful dealings as 
“equipment”. 547  There is no single equipment, but always a totality of equipment 
constituting a holistic context. Dasein’s involvement with “things” in the everydayness is 
what situates Dasein in its “environment”. Therefore, there is no “neutral” space in which 
Dasein is located, but always a particular context determined by Dasein’s various actions, 
practices, and involvements where its “dwelling” takes place. In other words, Dasein is 																																																								
546 (Being and Time, 94) 
547 (Being and Time, 96-97) 
		 267	
not only spatially located in the world, but the worldhood of world appears as such with 
Dasein’s practical involvedness with and in it. Our immediate access to the utility of 
things constitutes the web-like structure of the world, while tools show up as useful things 
to the extent that they already belong to a contextual whole. As can be observed with the 
structure of “in-order-to” [Um-zu], this is one of the primary ontological conditions of the 
being in the world.548 One does something “in order to” do something else, as there is a 
totality of references in one’s dealings. Just as there is no single equipment, there is no 
single action or deed either. It is not the total sum of various practices that constitutes the 
world, but it is Dasein’s active participation in things that discloses the worldhood of the 
world, and our being there in the mode of  “existence”. 
Heidegger advances the notion of “being-in-the-world” as a critique of the 
Cartesian understanding of human being and its relation to the reality.549 The Cartesian 
line of thinking suggests that we can engage with the reality because we are thinking 
things [res cogitans], which is different from merely having a bodily being [res corporea] 
that takes space. Mere corporeal existence indicates sheer extension in the space with no 
capacity of rational thinking. Insofar as we are thinking (rational) beings, we can step back 
from our sensory experience of the world in order to cognize phenomena clearly and 
distinctly by our faculty of thinking. Only insofar as I think [cogito] as a rational subject, 
being conscious of my existence, I can conclude that I am [sum]. From this very 
elementary and unshakable knowledge, which for Descartes constitutes the basis of all 
philosophical-scientific knowledge, I can deduce the existence of the external world. For 
Heidegger, this relationship must be reversed. It is because I am, I can think. Yet, “I am” 
means, “I dwell”, that is, insofar as I find myself in the world, situated in a context, before 
I can come to doubt that very context. It is precisely because Descartes isolates his 																																																								
548 (Being and Time, 98) 
549 (Being and Time, 122) 
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existence from the world in an epistemological register, he can come to doubt his 
ontological being there. For Heidegger, we cannot doubt the existence of the world, 
because all questioning depends on the existence of the world and the meaningful 
presencing of things in the first place. That does not mean that the world is given before 
me as an object and that I find myself in some already pre-existing objective space, but 
insofar as I exist, I exist “in-the-world” as part of a particular life context which 
continually unfolds.  
 Kant famously states in the Critique of Pure Reason that the fact that philosophers 
still cannot provide a convincing proof of the existence of the outside world is a scandal of 
philosophy.550 In response to that, Heidegger believes that the real scandal is that such 
justifications are still sought: “The 'scandal of philosophy’ is not that this proof has yet to 
be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again.”551 There can 
be no grounds that can further ground the being-there of Dasein. “Such expectations, aims, 
and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of 
such a character that independently of it and ‘outside’ of it a ‘world’ is to be proved as 
present-at-hand.” 552  This is because, for Heidegger, the world is not some neutral 
extension [extensio] within which we are located as Descartes understands it. The world is 
precisely what embodies both my so-called mental and practical activities. The being there 
of the human Dasein, insofar as it is the being in the world, is the “proof” itself of the 
external world. This means that Dasein’s being-there always already provides the 
ontological “ground” and “horizon”, which excludes the necessity of an “epistemological” 
grounding of that very world. I will return to that point in the last section of the chapter 
regarding the issue of “groundless grounds”. 																																																								
550 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allan W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 121 (B XXXIX). 
551 (Being and Time, 249) 
552 (Being and Time, 249) 
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In that context, Dreyfus puts forwards a detailed reading of the notion of “being-
in-the-world”, which is one of the most influential commentaries in Heidegger scholarship 
on Being and Time. In the rest of this section, I take issue with Dreyfus’ commentary, 
because by discussing his explanation of “existential spatiality”, I aim to problematize the 
neglected aspects of the question of place and dwelling in Being and Time. To that end, 
the emphasis will be given to the connection between “praxis” and “being-in-the-world” 
via a comparison of “existential spatiality” and “place”.  
 The central argument of Dreyfus is that “skilful coping” determines Dasein’s 
relation to the things553. Skilful coping indicates our mindless engagement with things, a 
comportment toward things that bears no conceptual or theoretical reflection. Skilfully 
using tools and actively engaging in our ordinary dealings represent a non-conceptual 
mode of being in the world. As such, skilful coping exemplifies the way in which one 
appropriately relates oneself to the totality of significances, and thus, to the very way in 
which being comes to manifest itself through beings. Therefore, a proper understanding of 
being does not have to be theoretical, and authenticity is possible on the basis of such 
relation to objects. Rather than theoretical and disengaged cognition, it is skilful coping 
that enacts and incorporates one’s understanding of being.554  
According to Dreyfus, one’s practical involvedness in the world is an embodied 
way of making sense of our existence in the world555. Our understanding of being is 
embodied in our skills and actions, as our being there is always already put into practice. 
This differs from the Cartesian view, where the disembodied subject only tries to 																																																								
553  Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-In-The-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time 
Division 1 (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT press, 1995), 3. 
554 “Since he calls this more fundamental way of making sense of things our understanding of 
being, he claims that he is doing ontology, that is, asking about the nature of this understanding of 
being that we do not know-that is not a representation in the mind corresponding to the world-but 
that we simply are.” Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-In-The-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s 
Being and Time Division 1, 3. 
555  Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-In-The-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time 
Division 1, 3. 
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understand the world via disengaged theoretical reflection by detaching oneself from the 
ordinary world. According to Dreyfus, one does not need to theorize “about” being in 
order to know it. The best way to “know” the nature of any phenomenon is to skilfully use 
it. Likewise, the best way to “understand” the meaning of being is to be in such a way that 
being comes to manifest itself through one’s relation to things. 
 The distinction that Dreyfus suggests between the embodied being in the world 
and disengaged-theoretical reflection may remind us of the two protagonists of 
Kazantzakis’ novel Zorba the Greek.556 It can be helpful to point out their different ways 
of being in order to show the two-fold nature of the issue at hand in terms of Dasein’s 
relation to the things that are within the world. In the novel, Alexis Zorba is the character 
that understands the world without theoretically analysing it. His being in the world shows 
forth a kind of understanding of the world that requires first-order involvement in doing 
things. He possesses a strong sense of phronesis, the kind of practical wisdom that comes 
with experience and cannot be learned or acquired by reasoning. On the other hand, the 
young, clumsy, and introverted narrator is the personification of disengaged subject, 
mainly trying to make sense of the world from distance by detaching himself from first-
order experience. While the skilled, crafty and hard working Zorba experiences things 
with his body, the intellectual narrator, who describes himself as a writer that studies 
philosophical and religious concepts, tries to make sense of life “theoretically” by 
observing from afar.  
At the very outset of the story, Zorba is immediately drawn to the young narrator 
who has an alienated appearance, traveling to the island of Crete. The young writer seems 
to be “out of place”, lost in his ideas, his eyes sunk in his book. In the course of their 
adventure in Crete, the young narrator attempts to help Zorba to understand the world 																																																								
556 Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba The Greek: The Saint’s Life of Zorba, trans. Peter Bien, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2014.  
		 271	
from distance while he himself attempts to learn how to experience the world by being 
immersed in the very occurrence of things. Apparently, Zorba does not know how to think 
rationally, while the narrator does not know how to mourn, celebrate, drink, and dance. 
Zorba usually calls the narrator ironically the “bookworm”. At one point, Zorba shouts to 
the narrator in a state of complete rage: “You listen to what books say, but keep in mind 
who writes books: teachers! Ptui!557 To hell with them!”558 In the course of the plot, we 
see that both Zorba and the young narrator leaving behind their comfort zones and move 
towards one another, which can remind us of Gadamer’s idea of the “fusion of horizons”. 
Their strong friendship is a sense of sharing the place, where their respective horizons fuse 
into one another. 
Now, it can make more sense why Dreyfus prefers to envisage a Zorbaesque 
Heidegger that reflects via dancing, instead of reflecting “about” the meaning of dancing. 
According to Dreyfus, since Plato, philosophers have been theorizing about being, but 
they have forgotten how to be, which is the gist of Heidegger’s thinking. In this regard, 
however, we must conceive that there is no need to appeal to a strict split between theory 
and practice. In this regard, it is useful to consider what Heidegger argues concerning the 
envisioned dualism between the “theoretical” and the “practical”: 
 
‘Practical’ behaviour is not ‘atheoretical’ in the sense of ‘sightlessness’. The way it 
differs from theoretical behavior does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical 
behavior one observes, while in practical behavior one acts [gehandelt wird], and 
that action must employ theoretical cognition if it is not to remain blind; for the 
fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact that action 
has its own kind of sight.559 
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What this means is that just as theory is its own kind of practice, so does practice have its 
own kind of theory in the sense of “seeing”.  
In that regard, the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell on the nature of skilful 
actions is thought provoking, as it sheds light on the distinction between theoretical 
knowledge and embodiment. Dreyfus puts forward the primacy of mindless absorption as 
that which defines and constitutes the basis of our skilful practices. In view of this, 
McDowell argues that the true mastery of an action requires one must be able to provide 
the reasons and explanations. This, however, as he emphasizes, does not mean that he is 
advocating the primacy of the so-called mental over the corporeal.560  
Dreyfus and McDowell discuss the nature of our actions during the game of blitz 
chess. Dreyfus suggests that during the course of a game, the master player moves the 
pieces not by consciously thinking about his move. His move is a matter of embodied 
learning, which results in the kind of experience that leads the chess player to make the 
necessary move without conscious reflection. He argues, “to sum up: In all domains, 
masters learn primarily not from analysing their successes and failures but from the results 
of hundreds of thousands of actions.”561 One learns by customs, having been actively 
participated in focal activities. The conscious reflection is only activated in some cases 
where our primary mode of engaging with things and practices does not suffice. In 
contrast with that view, McDowell argues that mind is not a detached phenomenon and 
the “mental” does not conflict with the “bodily”. On the contrary, following a Kantian line 
of thinking, the so-called “mental” allows for its own kind of embodiment, which we call 
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experience.562 McDowell claims that the argument that the master player can move the 
pieces without theoretical reflection does not entail that he does not know the reasons why 
he has chosen to play so. “The chess master’s being drawn to make his move by the forces 
on the board is his cultivated rationality at work”.563 For instance, once the game is over, 
when asked why he had chosen the a4 opening but not h4, he will explain why it was 
useful or strategically more advantageous to start the game in this way and so forth. 
In endorsing the idea of mindless absorption, Dreyfus aims to avoid the 
representational mode of thinking that separates the “inner” from the “outer”, where the 
inner states of mind produces knowledge about the external reality via representations.564 
As such, he aims to do away with the epistemological (meditational epistemology) mode 
of inquiry that has been favoured by the philosophical tradition for centuries. Such a mode 
of disengaged theoretical reflection has been further solidified by the thought of Plato, 
Descartes and Quine, whom have been finally challenged by many 20th century thinkers 
such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and late Wittgenstein in different ways. However, 
McDowell contends that not only the structure of experience, but also the very way in 
which we make sense of the embodied has conceptual underpinnings. Embodied coping is 
not mere bodily absorption, but first and foremost it becomes cognizable to us as 
experience insofar as it is conceptual. Pre-conceptual acts never become a subject of 
experience and all embodied actions are already conceptual because “experience is an 
actualization of conceptual capacities”. 565  Therefore, we should not confuse the 
“conceptual” with the “theoretical”. Even my so-called non-theoretical understanding of 																																																								
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563 John McDowell, “The Myth of the Mind as the Detached”, in Mind, Reason, and Being in the 
World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, ed. Joseph K. Schear, 47. 
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the things has a conceptual background, insofar as my cognition becomes a matter of 
experience in and through experience, Whether or not I have a theory of the mental states 
of my experience of the world should not be associated with the idea of the absence of 
mental states. 
In Heidegger scholarship, Braver discusses the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, 
attempting to reconcile the dispute by showing the pros and cons of each perspective. 
First, Braver contends the idea that mere skilful coping is sufficient in explaining the 
relationship between mind and its place in the world. He identifies that Heidegger’s last 
word was not what Dreyfus took to be the central claim in his reading of the first division 
of Being and Time: 
 
Dreyfus is certainly right that Heidegger favours mindless coping over theoretical 
analysis, but we must remember that these are not the only options. Division II’ s 
authenticity presents something of an Aufhebung [sublation] of Division I’ s 
antitheses by marrying coping’s engagement to theory’s attentiveness. He 
consistently worries about familiar behavior’s tendency to lull us into autopilot, a 
state he calls fallenness and consistently connects to the unthematic absorption in 
the world that is Dreyfus’s highest state.566  
 
In that regard, Montero, for instance, having been trained as a ballet dancer, refutes what 
she calls the “principle of automaticity”, namely that “expert action is natural and easy”567, 
which underpins the main argument of Dreyfus. In view of this, Dreyfus makes an even 
stronger claim by saying that mindedness is the enemy of expert coping. Now, situating 
himself between Dreyfus and McDowell, Braver claims that our experience of the world 
could not be explained as a mere total of inferential facts either568. What matters first and 
foremost is that we find ourselves involved in the world, and the very nature of our being 																																																								
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the world is that we are in a holistic whole within which the primacy of the context comes 
to the fore. This view hints at the necessity to examine the place character of world, and 
differentiate place from space. 
 As Braver’s line of argument also implies, we require a mode of thinking that 
neither prioritizes neither “mindless absorption”, nor “states of mind” and theoretical 
analysis. Appealing to a hierarchy that opposes the practical-embodied to the rational-
representational does not help thinking. Braver gives an example that draws on our 
linguistic capacities: Sometimes it occurs to us that we not know how to respond to a 
question during the class, however this does not prevent us from trying to articulate an 
answer. Even if we are not exactly sure how to express ourselves, we start speaking with 
the expectation of being able to providing an answer, hoping to arrive at the thought that 
will explain the matter. Within the limits of our linguistic capacities, we let the thought to 
arrive to us.569 However, it is also obvious that we do not simply “wait”. If we do not 
possess the required competence on the subject, we can never provide a meaningful 
response. However, if the subject matter is something we have already mastered, we can 
simply let our thoughts flow, and as such we do not have to follow a prescribed procedure 
in explicating what is at issue. At that moment of, what we can call, “mindful absorption”, 
one’s engagement with the situation is neither “mindless” (because I am consciously 
searching for an answer), nor merely “theoretical” (because my vision in searching for an 
answer is particularly blurry). In releasing myself to the subject matter, I hope the 
situation in which I find myself contextualizes me appropriately. In light of these 
considerations, now we can look to the relationship between “existential space” and place. 
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In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes physical space from existential 
spatiality570, an idea that Dreyfus advances in his own account as well. “Existential space” 
signifies the subjective space in which we actively participate in our affairs in our closest 
environments. Here, Heidegger’s objective is to critique the Cartesian account of the place 
of the subject in the world. In this regard, Dreyfus makes use of the preliminary 
distinction between “existential spatiality” and mere “physical space”. As I have 
mentioned, for Dreyfus, Dasein can have an authentic dwelling it copes with things 
skilfully. In contrast, human existence becomes “worldless” its relationship with the 
environment [Umwelt]571 becomes a mere theoretical engagement. Existential spatiality is 
the space in which one skilfully copes with things, namely where one has an embodied 
being in one’s world. The neutral physical space indicates the Cartesian, uninhabited, 
geometrical space.572 Within that context, Dreyfus argues that “place” is something that is 
contained in existential spatiality. Namely, the “existential space” is the primary site of 
dwelling in which we exist, which contains precise places located in the existential space. 
It is within that context that the relation between space and place must be investigated. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger discusses that “ready-to-hand” things are not 
available to us as isolated objects. In our practical environments, there are no isolate 
“objects” [Res, Gegenstand], but “equipment” [Zeug]. Tools in a workshop constitute a 
totality and they necessitate the utility of one another. 573  For instance, when the 
screwdriver is missing, the other tools also may turn useless. Although some others tools 
can replace those that are missing, the place of the tool is irreplaceable. This means that 
the ready-to-hand availability of every tool brings something unique to its own situation. 																																																								
570  Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-In-The-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time 
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Following Heidegger574, Dreyfus underlines the importance of the notion of “place” in his 
commentary when he writes, “For example, each tool has a specific place in a 
workshop.”575 The usefulness of each tool is related to the “place” that they hold within 
the context of a relevant practice. The act of hammering holds a particular “place” within 
the context of carpentry, which is not linked to its spatial location in the workshop. 
Therefore the “location” of the tool does not amount to its “place”. In that line of thinking, 
for Dreyfus, the question of “place” does not become explicit at all on its own accord 
other than as the specific locality in existential space that is opened up within the context 
of one’s dealings. In what follows I will critique Dreyfus’ account on the relationship 
between space and place. 
Dreyfus’s thinking implies that “existential spatiality” amounts to what later 
Heidegger calls site or place [Ort, Ortschaft] that within which dwelling takes place. 
Dreyfus distinguishes the space-making and space-giving character of place from 
inhabited, geometrical space. This is similar to the understanding of the relationship 
between space and place that Heidegger addresses in his very late Art and Space essay.576 
On the other hand, acknowledging the distinction between “existential space”, meaning 
the site of onto-ethical dwelling and mere geometrical, inhabited space risks reinforcing 
the Cartesian dualism, separating the bodily dimension of practice from the so–called 
geometrical and disengaged, pure extension.577 Only inverting the Cartesian paradigm and 
prioritizing the “bodily” realm of space does not ground the relation between “existential 																																																								
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spatiality” and “geometrical-physical space”. In other words, in Dreyfus’ account what 
lacks is the event of place, which is due to his negligence of later Heidegger’s 
understanding of dwelling as the fourfold, which problematizes the happening of place. 
Dreyfus overlooks the necessity of an explicit notion of place by making sense of 
“existential spatiality” as the ultimate meaning of dwelling, bearing on the consequences 
of the incomplete account of space and place in Heidegger’s early thought. In Heidegger 
scholarship, it is Malpas who criticizes Dreyfus on the same issue.578 Malpas’ point is that 
Dreyfus’ distinction between “existential spatiality” and “objective spatiality” does not 
clarify the subject matter, but on the contrary, it renders the issue even more problematic..  
In Being and Time, Heidegger implies a way to consider the relationship between 
place and space, which can be connected to to his later account as well. He argues:  
 
Dasein takes space in; this is to be understood literally […] In existing, it has 
already made room for its own leeway [Spielraum]. It determines its own location 
in such a manner that it comes back from the space it has made room for to the 
‘place’ which it has reserved. 579 
 
As we have seen, later Heidegger argued that it is the “saying” [das Sage] that makes 
room for this “leeway”. The “way-making” of language was the primary occurrence that 
made space for the relation between human being and being itself in bringing them into 
their interplay and interaction. As Heidegger states above, it is not Dasein that makes 
space, but on the contrary, human Dasein takes space in, which results from its being-
there [Da-sein], in the world. The “space” that is at issue here with regards to the being of 
Dasein is not about “existential space”, which for Dreyfus is in each and every case is 
related to human beings’ actions and doings. Insofar as Dasein exists as the “there” of the 
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manifestation of “being”, it always and already exists in the “leeway” that makes room for 
the place that is at issue. The place does not appear only in terms of human equipment and 
skilful coping, but first and foremost in terms of the situatedness of human being in 
existence, in terms of its openness to the meaningful unfolding of things. “Existential 
spatiality” is derivative of that primary “leeway”, which can be understood as the very 
interplay of space in terms of the occurrence between “the there” and “existential space” 
in which the practical involvement with things may take place. Associating space and 
place with the mere location of tools is a subjectivist reading that obscures the link 
between “existential spatiality” and place. Place is not a particular location in space, and 
existential spatiality first needs the spacing that Dasein “takes in”, which, in Being and 
Time, is possible in terms of temporality.580  
 The spatial essence of the “leeway” can be understood by looking to Dasein’s “de-
severant” nature. Accordingly, Dasein’s spatiality has two sources: “de-severance” 
[Entfernung] and “directionality” [Ausrichtung].581 The former signifies the facticity of 
Dasein, that is, Dasein has the capacity to render pragmata ready-to-hand by bringing 
them closer its ordinary dealings. “Dasein, in accordance with its spatiality, is proximally 
never here but yonder; from this ‘yonder’ it comes back to its ‘here’”582. The reason is that 
Dasein’s place in the world does not mean a mere location in space, but its circumspective 
nearness to things. On the other hand, we must note that in making something ready-to-
hand, the falling [Verfall] as the essential structure of “care” [Sorge] appears. Being 
mindlessly absorbed does not reveal existential space, but first and foremost it yields to 																																																								
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the forgetting of the “yonder” [das Dort] of things. In making things ready-to-hand in the 
here [das Hier], the “presencing” (the taking place of temporality as the later 
“journeying”) itself gets omitted for the sake of the “presence” (spatiality). Mindless 
absorption, when temporally understood, results in the falling. 583   For Heidegger, 
“inauthenticity” does not mean anything like being no longer mindfully present in the 
world, but rather it amounts a quite distinctive kind of being-in-the-world –a mode of 
being in which one is overly fascinated by the “world” and the being there of others in the 
world.584 Where do we see a hint of the shift from “existential spatiality” to “place” in 
Being and Time? It is when Heidegger argues that existential spatiality is grounded in 
Dasein’s “being-in-the-world”, which can be disclosed insofar as there is the “there”. 
“Dasein its disclosedness”.585 
Despite his negligence of the notion of place, Dreyfus derives the idea of authentic 
dwelling from Dasein’s absorption in its ordinary dealings. We must bear in mind that in 
Heidegger’s early thought, a genuine possibility of “dwelling” does not emerge on the 
basis of the “spatiality”, but “temporality”, which is indeed related to the issue of “care” 
[Sorge] as the meaning of Dasein’s being in the world. Dasein always exists in moving 
towards its future, which is the essence of its “thrownness”. It is thrown into infinite 
amount of possibilities, but among them there is only one definitive possibility, which 
defines all others: the death. In turn, “being-towards-death” [Sein-zum-Tode] can be 
authentic if and only if Dasein exists in “anticipatory resoluteness”.  
Here, the notion of “resoluteness” [Entschlossenheit] is particularly significant as 
it is directly related to the notion of “disclosedness” [Erschlossenheit] of things. Authentic 
dwelling becomes possible in the “resolute” acknowledgment of its own most possibility 
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where Dasein can try to become its own self by daring to die its own death, or else it can 
get lost in the sphere of the everydayness. Resoluteness brings Dasein to its unique 
disclosedness, and as such, into its proper “way” that arrives at the clearing [Lichtung]. In 
other words, in following its proper access, or “leeway” to being-there, one’s existence 
can unfold possibilities of a unique mode of being in the world. The possibility of 
authentic dwelling, then, is not to be found in one’s spatially determined “being-in” but in 
its “being-towards”, “Being-towards-death” releases Dasein from the boundaries of its 
“close world” [Um-welt] to the “world” itself in the manner of bringing it back to itself. 
As Heidegger writes: “Inauthentic understanding projects itself upon that with which one 
can concern oneself, or upon what is feasible, urgent, or indispensable in our everyday 
business”586, Yet, Dreyfus claims, “What is near is that with which I am currently 
absorbedly coping”.587 This view holds true with regards to the fact for Heidegger 
“nearness” is not a spatial issue, since we cannot decide whether phenomena are “near” 
only based on their proximity in space. According to Dreyfus, what is near is that with 
which we are practically “coping” in a skilful way. However, the fact that the nearest is 
where we have concernful dealings does not mean either that all absorbed coping deliver 
authentic dwelling. In that line of thinking, Braver argues: 
 
Certainly, Division I of Being and Time sets up a contrast between the absorbed, 
engaged use of tools and detached theoretical “just staring at” objects, with a clear 
preference for the former. However, this initial opposition does not exhaust 
Heidegger’s treatment of the matter; Division II emphasizes phenomena that knock 
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It is the das Man, that is, “the they”, human subject that is swamped in the ordinary 
understanding of things who is absorbed and mindless. In Being and Time, the source of 
the possibility of a different relation to the world is anxiety [Angst], which provides the 
possibility of freeing oneself from the ordinariness of “the they” [das Man], as its basic 
topological character is that it displaces us from where we find ourselves in the midst of 
things, from the ordinary interpretation of pragmata. Anxiety is not the same as having a 
fear of height, or being afraid of the spider on the wall. “Anxiety is anxious in the face of 
the ‘nothing’ of the world; but this does not mean that in anxiety we experience something 
like the absence of what is present-at-hand within-the-world. 589  With anxiety, we 
encounter the groundless grounds of our involvement in the world. Nevertheless, it is 
precisely out of this confrontation with the “no-thing” character of our being in the world 
the possibility of dwelling arises. Anxiety dis-places us from the boundaries of the 
“environment” and thus re-orients in the journeying between the here and the yonder, 
where the world may appear in its wholeness and completion. The experience of anxiety 
shows forth the possibility of engaging with one’s close world and dwelling occurs neither 
when we are absorbed in nor detached from the world, but when we come to learn to re-
inhabit the world.  
 
IV. 3 Groundlessness of Discourse: Idle-Talk 
 
Thus far, I have discussed the meaning of discourse and brought into view the relation 
between “existential spatiality”, “being-in-the-world” and place by challenging Dreyfus’ 
idea of mindless absorption. In this section, I am primarily concerned with the nature of 
our relation to discourse in the world, because this is the idea that is particularly 
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significant in Heidegger’s early thought on language. Heidegger’s discussion of the nature 
of human being’s inauthentic relation to discourse has implicit, yet strong topological 
underpinnings that are not sufficiently documented in Heidegger scholarship. My primary 
aim is to make them more discernible. I do not argue that in Being and Time Heidegger 
has a complete account of topology of being and language or that his later topology is 
entirely built on the ideas that appear in Being and Time. That being said, fully 
understanding the way in which Heidegger makes an issue of the inauthentic form of 
discourse, namely, idle-talk [Gerede], requires a place-oriented thinking. Doing so can 
also pave the way for a topologically sympathetic reading of early Heidegger, where some 
hints of his later account can be discovered.  
First we should clarify the meaning of inauthenticity. Heidegger argues that in 
submitting and surrendering itself to the world, Dasein can come to have an encompassing 
sense of “concern” [Sorge] for its ordinary being there to the extent of coming to evade its 
own self.590 This state of finding oneself surrounded by the ordinary everydayness 
designates the “falling” [Verfall] of human Dasein. It is important to remember that, for 
Heidegger, this does not indicate a moral decay of the individual, but rather it signifies an 
ontological tendency of human existence in general. Heidegger writes: “Idle talk, curiosity 
and ambiguity characterize the way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its 'there'-
the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world.”591 In other words, it is through these three 
existential characterizations of its being there that we can have a clue as to how Dasein 
discloses its world and environment.  
 “The one” or “the they”, namely “anyone” [Das Man] designates the inauthentic 
characterization of Dasein’s average being in the world. As such, there are two modes of 
being for Dasein in the everydayness: 1) “One” deals with one’s affairs in the same way 																																																								
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everyone else does, that is, Dasein chooses to be like anyone [das Man], or 2) one exists 
by making one’s being there one’s “own” [Eigene], which indicates an authentic 
[eigentlich] way of comporting oneself toward things. “Authentic” does not mean 
“original” or “novel” in the sense of “never seen before”, but it simply denotes taking 
responsibility for one’s existence by responding to one’s own and unique being-there. 
That is to say, one can choose to respond to her or his own being there in a way that only 
she or he can do. In this way, one’s existence may manifest a unique access to the clearing 
of being [Lichtung]. In each and every case, it is through my “being-there” that I have the 
possibility of an authentic understanding of being in the world [Jemeingikeit]. If the 
utmost possibility of authenticity lies in dying one’s own death, it means that authenticity 
is the proper way in which one journeys towards its own absence in the world. As such, it 
is a way of abandoning mere absorption and containment with an eye to embracing one’s 
finite being. Now, let me explain how this is tied to the question of discourse and 
language. 
For Heidegger, “idle-talk” [Gerede] denotes our inauthentic relation to discourse. 
In Being and Time, the notion primarily appears as the “groundlessness” 
[Bodenlosigkeit]592 of discourse. If discourse means the linguistic articulation of the 
world, an inauthentic manner of relating oneself to discourse is the constant “uprooting” 
of the way in which human Dasein understands, interprets, and makes manifest its own 
being-there. It is useful to mention that although “idle-talk” is the groundlessness of 
discourse, it is still grounded in discourse. In other words, “idle-talk” simply refers to a 
mode of discourse that is grounded in one’s absorbed being in the everydayness. 
Underscoring the ontological underpinnings of this state of being, Heidegger argues, “In 
no case is Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been 
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interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world-in-itself’, so that it just beholds what it 
encounters.”593 Only insofar as idle-talk lures Dasein in an ontological way, a genuine 
relationship to discourse in the everydayness can also be possible. Idle-talk is not 
something we can do away with at will, it simply happens, and it happens all the time.594 
In that sense, idle-talk manifests a certain understanding of the world; however, it does not 
show the authentic possibilities of human existence. What it can show forth is the average 
understanding of the there [Da] (world).  
According to Heidegger, remaining in the average understanding and interpretation 
of the world implies an “uprooted” mode of dwelling. “Idle–talk, which closes things off 
[…] belongs to Dasein’s understanding when that understanding has been uprooted”.595 
The  “uprooting” character of idle-talk, which is “constant”, leaves human Dasein without 
a ground, while still giving the illusion of being grounded. “Proximally and for the most 
part Dasein is lost in its ‘world’.”596 It is lost, because it situated itself only in the midst of 
things, and as such moved away from the possibility of having a horizon of things its 
being in the world. 
It is necessary to note that the uprooting character of idle-talk is linked to the issue 
of “truth of being” as aletheia. As I have discussed, Heidegger suggests that legein of 
logos makes manifest and gathers. In the course of communication, we try to make an 
issue manifest for the other. That is the meaning of letting the other see what one has 
disclosed for oneself. Communication [Mitteilung] is the “sharing” of what has become 
manifest for us “with” the other [teilen … mit].597 However, here we need a distinction 
between the two senses of “disclosing” and “making manifest”. This distinction is already 																																																								
593 (Being and Time, 213) 
594 This is the dilemma that a spatial reading of Being and Time faces. In effect, Heidegger 
attempts to determine time as the horizon of being precisely for this reason, as to attempt to find a 
way out of one’s spatial absorbedness in one’s life–world.  
595 (Being and Time, 214) 
596 (Being and Time, 264) 
597 (Being and Time, 197) 
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observable in Heidegger’s 1924–25 lectures, in his exposition of the way in which 
Aristotle deploys the notion of aletheuin [un–concealing, making manifest, disclosing] in 
The Nichomachean Ethics.598 Accordingly, there are five ways of disclosing beings: (1) 
know–how, (2) science, (3) circumspection, (4) understanding, and (5) perceptual 
discernment. All of these various ways of disclosure are related to logos.599 However, 
there is a difference between “logos” and “legomenon”. While in the former, one can 
originally make something manifest, in the latter, one can simply reiterate something that 
has already become apparent. Heidegger argues, “in ordinary conversation one adheres to 
what is said, and, in hearing what is said, real knowledge is not necessarily achieved each 
time”.600 In legomenon, we apply the signs as ready-to-hand substances, disregarding the 
interval between the words and the signs. Legomenon, which denotes “the spoken” word, 
is derives from the legein of logos, namely the self-manifesting and gathering character of 
discourse. Heidegger designates the latter use of logos as, “where we are not able to 
appropriate everything originally” and “that had lost its original position”.601 The original 
positioning of the words require the emergence of different meanings, indicating the 
manifoldness of the contexts from which they appear. On the other hand, the basic 
determination of the being of human beings in Aristotle’s “zoon logon echon” does not 
indicate the human existence’s ability to partake in “legomenon” and communication. 
“Anyone” [das Man] can communicate; yet this everyday mode of “sharing with” of 
discourse does not show us what is peculiar about language.  
 “Communication”, in that narrow sense, could be extended to include most 
animals and organisms on earth that can simply communicate by vocalized sounds, 
signals, and other senses. However, what gives human beings their “humanness”, that 																																																								
598 (Plato’s Sophist, 12) 
599 (Plato’s Sophist, 16) 
600 (Plato’s Sophist, 18) 
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which makes them the peculiar kind of beings that they are, is not only their ability to 
communicate (sharing …  with) their biological and psychological desires and needs 
(which other organisms can do in their own ways too), but to “bring forth” things in their 
being. This second kind of making manifest is no longer mere “legomenon”, but logos in 
the sense of disclosing the thing as the thing by recognizing their properness to our 
understanding. Idle-talk, on the other hand, conceals the disclosure of the being of beings 
as our inauthentic relation to discourse. 
 Now, within that context, the “lostness” of human existence in its inauthentic 
relation to discourse does not lie in the mere coveredness of entities, but on the contrary, it 
lies in the average uncoveredness of them. “One” [das Man] simply believes that one has 
already understands things. This designates the kind of comportment towards beings as if 
everything has already come to full disclosure in the average understanding of the world. 
What gives rise to inauthenticity is not that in the ordinary life one does not know about 
this or that, but that one thinks that one already knows and understands everything about 
it, while only having a very little understanding of it.602 In other words, it is not the 
“ignorance”, but the “ignorance of one’s ignorance” that manifests uprootedness, which 
essentially conceals the possibility of the disclosure of being(s) itself. Heidegger italicizes 
the following statement in order to emphasize this very point: “Because Dasein is 
essentially falling, its state of being is as such that it is in ‘untruth’”.603  
The essence of discourse lies in making the meaning of beings manifest, even in 
the ordinary use of language. Discourse is the articulation of the “being-there” of human 
beings, which in each and every case is “being-there-with” [Mitdasein]. In the inauthentic 
																																																								
602 Indeed this is not a new perspective, as Plato has already demonstrated in the Republic the very 
same idea with the Cave analogy. 
603 It is evident here that Heidegger was already making use of the Greek notion “aletheia” as the 
truth as unconcealment in his discussion on discourse and the authenticity of human Dasein. 
(Being and Time, 264) 
		 288	
way of understanding one’s world, one understands its “there”, the openness of making 
sense of the world, only in a superficial [durchschnittlich] way, and it can only disclose 
beings determined by the “average” intelligibility of its “there”. Heidegger puts it as 
follows: “‘idle talk’” is the possibility of understanding everything without making the 
thing one's own.”604 In order to be able to have an authentic relation to discourse, one has 
to avoid adopting formulas, stereotypes, and generalizations through discourse. This can 
become an issue by first and foremost problematizing one’s “being-there” not as mere 
“coping”, but as dwelling. To that end, what one needs is a simultaneous and two-way 
movement of “distancing” and “nearing”. One must move away from the boundaries of 
the everyday, not necessarily in order to live as a hermit, but in order to bring oneself back 
to one’s ordinary world in an authentic way. What that means is that an authentic mode of 
being is possible within the limits of one’s ordinary being there, however only insofar as 
one can make sense of the extraordinariness of existence (that simply things are). As such, 
one may find the interval in and through which one no longer merely copes with things, 
but where one can actually stand in a disclosive relation to things. It is within that 
“leeway” that one’s dwelling can transpire. In terms of Gadamer’s philosophy, it would 
mean to have a horizon in one’s doings, so that one would not be limited to the cultural 
norms and values of a particular life-world, but actually manage to see “beyond” what has 
become available “here”. In that sense, the space opened up by the horizon would signify 
a movement from “here” to “yonder”, and this very movement would be the appropriate 
inhabiting of the world in the “there” [Da] as the between. In such a mode of being, one 
neither merely submits to nor reactively contradicts the norms and traditions of one’s life 
world, but rather one could incorporate and enact one’s existence within the limits of 
ordinary being-there.  
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On this note, Dreyfus acknowledges the ways in which Heidegger makes an issue 
of the authentic and inauthentic relation to the everydayness. According to Dreyfus605, 
idle-talk [Gerede] appears as the “misuse” of the ontological structure of our ordinary 
being in the world. This means that Dreyfus wants to show that the ordinary use of 
language still can be authentic without needing to be idle-talk. Although Dreyfus’ 
argument is correct, the following point needs to be acknowledged. If “falling” is an 
inherent ontological possibility of “being-in-the-world” of Dasein, and if such falling 
emerges from the ontological tendency to “flee” the authentic possibilities of dwelling, 
then, absorbed-mindless human Dasein could not escape from inauthenticity. Its 
ontological nature leads Dasein to settle in the conformity of the average publicness. With 
this idea, we can identify the following idea: in Being and Time, mere settledness in one’s 
closest world does not spontaneously result in authentic dwelling, but on the contrary, 
more often it denotes a sense of “fleeing”. “Fleeing” does not annihilate the “inness” of 
Dasein’s being in the world, but it gets in the way of Dasein’s authentic disclosure of the 
world, just as the proximal “in–ness” does not necessarily mean “nearness”. The following 
passage from Being and Time is worth considering: 
 
By this time we can see phenomenally what falling, as fleeing, flees in the face of. 
It does not flee in the face of entities within–the–world; these are precisely what it 
flees towards– as entities alongside which our concern, lost in the “they”, can 
dwell in tranquillized familiarity. When in falling, we flee into the “at–home” of 
publicness, we flee in the face of the “not–at–home”: that is, we flee in the face of 
the uncanniness which lies in Dasein..606 
 
This is a key idea also in Heidegger’s thinking in the mid-1940s, becoming an important 
issue essentially in The Ister lectures, which I have discussed in the first chapter regarding 
																																																								
605  Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-In-The-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT press, 1995), 227. 
606 (Being and Time, 233) 
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the relation between nearness and distance. The loss of the possibility of dwelling, namely 
“fleeing”, that takes place in the uprootedness of “the they”, can also be observed in 
Heidegger’s discussion of “curiosity” [Neugier]. The idle chatter constantly strives to keep 
everything in one’s sight and tries to “see” the “new” all the time. “The they” is caught up 
in the incessant need for the new, and thus can never “dwell on” things. One “seeks 
constantly to run away from the awaiting in which it is nevertheless ‘held’, though not 
held on to.”607 In already “looking away” from what has become present, one “abandons”, 
and thus in a certain sense “flees” in a mode of “distraction”. Distraction here should also 
be understood topologically, in the sense of being “derailed” from one’s “way”, namely 
“the leeway” in and through which “existential spatiality” becomes possible in the first 
place. As Heidegger states, “[t]he distracted not-tarrying becomes never-dwelling-
anywhere. […] In never dwelling anywhere, Being-there is everywhere and nowhere.” 608  
In that regard, let me highlight a point that is not sufficiently emphasized in Being 
and Time. In his 1924-25 lecture courses, Heidegger argues that as a result of the 
inadequacy of our relation to language in everydayness, ordinary discourse tends to 
conceal the meaning of phenomena. 609  We make phenomena manifest within the 
boundaries of average intelligibility. In Being and Time, Heidegger mentions “poetical 
discourse” as a higher use of language. He suggests: “In poetical discourse, 
communication of the existential possibilities of one’s “state–of–mind” [Befindlichkeit] 
can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence”610. Existence 
here means the temporal wholeness of the “being-there” of human beings, which in every 
moment is journeying towards its absence in the world. In poetical discourse, what comes 
to the fore is the basic fact that human beings find themselves thrown into the world. 																																																								
607 (Being and Time, 397) 
608 (Being and Time, 398) 
609 (Plato’s Sophist, 11) 
610 (Being and Time, 205) 
		 291	
However, it is not useful to dualistically contrast “poetical” or “ordinary discourse”. It is 
essential to learn to stand in a poetic relation to ordinary language, so that poetic discourse 
may discover and make manifest the limits everyday discourse, while ordinary discourse 
may overcome the average understanding and interpretation of the world. The reason why 
this point does not become obvious in Being and Time is that Heidegger does not 
undertake an analysis of human Dasein’s poetic relationship to language, which is indeed 
linked to the fact that the question of place and language do not become explicit on their 
own terms.  
Now, one of the key issues that Heidegger leaves undecided in Being and Time is 
whether Dasein is capable of posing the question of the meaning of being authentically. Is 
Dasein simply stuck in the average understanding of being because of its superficial 
relation to “beings”? We can try to provide an answer to these questions on the basis of 
Dasein’s relation to discourse. Human Dasein partakes in familiar and everyday practices 
and when it comes to speaking one’s own language, it understands and speaks about 
“anything” effortlessly. However, it is particularly this “fluency” in discourse that can 
threaten the authenticity of human Dasein’s relation to language. In such fluency, beings 
may manifest themselves only in a mode of mere presence, which may lead human 
existence to forget the necessity of engaging in a constant confrontation with one’s 
understanding of the world by making language an issue. For instance, Dreyfus states: 
“Once one has been socialized into a community's practices, as long as one dwells in those 
practices rather than taking a detached point of view, words are simply heard and seen as 
meaningful”611. However, inasmuch as Dasein understands every single thing that it hears 
and sees, all that it “fluently” understands by absorbedly coping amounts only to the 
average interpretation of the world. This is also a view that Wrathall develops against 																																																								
611  Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-In-The-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT press, 1995), 219. 
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Dreyfus. Wrathall’s critical remark on this issue shows that he acknowledges the 
significance of Heidegger’s later thought regarding our poetic relation to language: 
 
Heidegger wants us to break out of our ordinary facility with language in order to 
actually have an experience with language itself. Our everyday speech is so 
habitual, so commonplace, and so familiar that language itself escapes notice, 
indeed, is nearly invisible. As a result, to gain insight into it, we need to be able to 
attend to it, experience it, and reflect on it, and this might require that we somehow 
defamiliarize ourselves with it. 612 
 
Within that framework, in what follows I will show that such a poetic experience of 
language is possible only by experiencing the boundaries of discourse by keeping silent. 
This is where we find the onto-ethical possibility of confronting the limits of “idle-talk” 
and avoid mere absorption in idle chatter.  
 
IV. 4 The Abyss of Discourse: Silence 
 
In Being and Time, the openness and the interval that allows human existence to stand in a 
poetic relation to language appears as “keeping silent”, which can be appropriately 
grasped with a topological scrutiny. This is because “keeping silent” signifies a distinct 
mode of approaching discourse, which embodies an authentic understanding and 
interpretation of the world. In Being and Time, it is the discussion of the ontological 
meaning of silence that connects early Heidegger and later Heidegger on the issue of 
language. 
 Dasein’s authentic relation to discourse and language appears in the second chapter 
of the second division on the issue concerning the “call of conscience” (sections 55-58). 
The idea of silence and keeping silent appears as the “abyss” of discourse, which needs to 																																																								
612 Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 138. 
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be distinguished from the “groundlessness” of discourse as “idle-talk”. The former term 
designates the site in which we may experience the limits of discourse, where an 
understanding of the happening of discourse as such appears. The latter designates the 
uprooted mode of being stuck in discourse, where our experience of it becomes concealed. 
According to Heidegger, discourse has two components: “hearing” [Hören] and 
“keeping silent” [Schweigen].613 “Keeping silent” shows up as the ground of the authentic 
ontological possibility of making things manifest. In that sense, it is the opposite of “idle-
talk” that uproots and leads the human Dasein to understand the world inauthentically. In 
this regard, the topologically relevant contrast here is concerning the “uprooting” 
character of “idle-talk” and the “grounding” character of “silence”, both of which are 
place-related designations of human existence’s relation to discourse.  
In Being and Time, the issue of authenticity does not appear in moralistic terms, 
but within an existential framework614, as the appropriate way in which one makes an 
issue of “being-towards-death”. The inauthentic Dasein is absorbed in a superficial 
understanding of the world and lives with the “forgetfulness of being”, without ever 
acknowledging it. It is simply stuck in “idle-talk”. “Keeping silent”, which resembles the 
later notion of “releasement” [Gelassenheit], is the way in which human Dasein can resist 
“idle-talk”. in Being and Time, “reticence” [Verschwiegenheit], or “keeping silent”, 
provides the topological connection to the ground of language as silence (or stillness). The 
idea of the ground of language as silence is also what middle and later Heidegger 
endorses, as I have also shown in the third chapter.615  
																																																								
613 (Being and Time, 204) 
614  Heidegger discourages reading Being and Time in these lines of thinking. See: Martin 
Heidegger, Mindfulness. trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum, 2006),  
367. 
615 “Language is grounded in silence.” (Contributions to Philosophy, 401) 
		 294	
The idea is that “keeping silent” can be understood as a more adequate mode of 
“showing” compared to “speaking-at-length” [viel–sprechen]616 about them. That said, it 
must be noted that “keeping silent” does not mean “speaking little” or that one can make 
an issue manifest simply by not saying a word. “Keeping silent” is the act of incorporating 
“silence” via “listening”. In “keeping silent”, one can “hear” what remains unintelligible 
to inauthentic Dasein who is absorbed and lost in abundance of things to express. In other 
words, inauthentic Dasein speaks too much, while not saying anything. In the 1924–25 
lecture History of the Concept of Time, as well as in Being and Time, Heidegger argues for 
the same point: (1) Silence is the key constituent of discourse, (2) Silence is not mere 
muteness, or lack of utterance.617  Accordingly, “keeping silent has been characterized as 
an essential possibility of discourse. Anyone who keeps silent when he wants to give us to 
understand something, must ‘have something to say’”618. Here, it appears again that 
“having something to say” differs fundamentally from simply participating in “discourse” 
by being talkative. “Idle-talk” is the superficial manifestation of “discourse” [Rede]; the 
absence of a clear sight to discern whether what one talks about actually says (shows) 
something. “Keeping silent”, on the other hand, only truly emerges when both the 
possibility of staying silent and talking-at-length occurs as two distinct possibilities. The 
ability to step back from “idle-talk”, whose essence is “talking-at length”, to “keep silent” 
is the way and journeying from discourse to silence, where an original experience of being 
in language takes place.  
 An authentic relation to language requires one to situate oneself between “silence” 
and “discourse” by “keeping silent”. This requires one to remain constantly open to both 
speaking and silence by corresponding to the situation appropriately. The possibility of 																																																								
616 (Being and Time, 208) 
617 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, trans. Thedore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1985), 267. 
618 (Being and Time, 342) 
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authentic discourse, then, roots from “keeping silent”, which is the taking place of “the 
between”, and not from talkativeness or mere muteness. “Silence” is not the lack of “idle-
talk” or “discourse”, but these three elements should be regarded in a unity as various 
manifestations of language619. 
It is significant that “remaining-silent” and “hearing” reappear in the later sections 
of Being and Time, though, not within the context of the ontological nature of discourse. It 
is “conscience” [Gewissen] that appears as the site 620  of the transition from the 
inauthenticity to authenticity. In that regard, there is an explicit link between conscience 
and authentic discourse. Accordingly, in the sections 55–57, Heidegger delivers his 
discussion of the “voice of conscience” [Stimme des Gewissens] within the context of 
human Dasein’s “being towards death”. Due to its ontological structure, the “call of 
conscience” is neither a ready-to-hand nor present-to-hand entity, as it shows up through a 
mode of disclosure, emerging from human Dasein’s temporal finitude. “Conscience gives 
us something to understand, it discloses”621. Heidegger goes on to argue that the “voice of 
conscience” occurs as a “call” [Ruf]. In the everydayness, human beings are not attentive 
to the crucial concerns of existence, in that they “fail to notice” [übersehen], or in the case 
of hearing and listening, they “fail to hear” [überhören, hinhören] that which actually 																																																								
619 Later Heidegger makes this relationship much clearer. In the 1950s, Heidegger argues that 
listening and saying are not two opposites as it is often thought to be. Listening is not detached 
from saying, as much as saying is not separable from listening. Heidegger argues: “But speaking is 
at the same time also listening. It is the custom to put speaking and listening in opposition: one 
man speaks, the other listens. But listening accompanies and surround, not only speaking such as 
takes place in conversation. The simultaneousness of speaking and listening has a larger meaning. 
Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a 
listening not while but before we are speaking.” (On the Way to Language, 123) 
620 Brogan also considers Dasein as the “site” in which the authentic Dasein and inauthentic 
Dasein, namely “the they” get into a dialogue. More specifically, the inauthentic Dasein is the 
“site” in which the authentic Dasein can come to appear; therefore they remain in a two-fold 
relationship. This must be understood as follows: The inauthentic Dasein prepares the possibility 
of a “genuine existential communication” insofar as “the They” collapses having lost its refuge in 
“idle-talk” and gossiping around. In other words, it is derailed from its common and habitual 
dwelling place. Walter Brogan, “Listening to Silence: Reticence and the Call of Conscience in 
Heidegger’s Philosophy”, in Heidegger and Language, ed. Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2013), 34-36.   
621 (Being and Time, 314) 
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matters. This means, in the everydayness human beings see or hear the “surface” of 
things. In other words, ordinary Dasein is ontologically prone to overlook the most 
decisive matters of existence such as death. This is not because ordinary affairs are 
superficial engagements per se, but because inauthentic Dasein can only superficially 
relate to them. Therefore, absorption in idle-talk provides no access to an authentic 
relation to language. As such, in idle-talk there can be no “dwelling”, but only a mere 
“containment” in the presence of speaking. 
Now, as I explicated, mere “speaking” [sprechen] does not always imply “making 
manifest”. Conversely, in “calling” [Ruf], the conscience makes manifest without speech. 
The call of conscience speaks “no-thing”. It conveys “no-thing” and it comes from “no-
where”. It gives no information regarding one’s existential situation, and it provides no 
guidelines as how to act. In listening to the “call of conscience”, one takes a step back 
from discourse where “hearkening” shows up. As such, speaking and listening come into a 
“dialogue” in the manifestation of the call of conscience, which says no-thing.622 It is a 
dialogue, because in hearkening, “the Self, which the appeal has robbed of this lodgement 
and hiding-place, gets brought to itself by the call.”623 
Though the “call” transmits “no-thing”, the call of conscience is a ground–
breaking event, one that brings Dasein to encounter its being in its entirety. In other 
words, the “call of conscience” brings the human Dasein into a unique “situation”, a “state 
of mind”, where Dasein encounters its own nothingness in its journeying toward death. As 
such, the “call of conscience” shows forth “nothingness” [Nichts] itself, which is related to 																																																								
622 Schalow also indicates the importance of acknowledging the two–fold relationship between 
saying and listening: “While Heidegger maintains that the call of conscience provides the first clue 
to Dasein's participation in the disclosive power of language, scholars often overlook the dialogic 
power of this silent voice. For in saying ‘nothing,’ the call of conscience illustrates that hearing 
precedes saying, and hence it is only by first ‘listening’ that human beings acquire the power to 
speak”. Frank Schalow, “Freedom, Finitude, and the Practical Self: The Other Side of Heidegger's 
Appropriation of Kant”, in Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, ed. François Raffoul and David 
Pettigrew (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 38. 
623 (Being and Time, 317) 
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the idea of the “abyss” of discourse. If “no-thing” can be designated as that which refuses 
to be conceived of as a being, the site of the call of conscience can also be described as 
“no-where”. It grounds discourse, yet it does not speak. The “call of conscience” does not 
have its origin in a “physical” or a “metaphysical” realm: it is ou-topos. The place of the 
call appears to be linguistically inhabitable, precisely because it arises in the mode of “no-
speech”. All that it can manifest is “hearkening”. As such, the topos of discourse is 
bounded and delimited by “outopos”, that which does not exist as a “location”, but 
capable of “situating” the place. The “no-place” of discourse or the place of no-speech 
envelops and gives place to discourse if and only of it is “hearkened”, because it does not 
appear on its own terms. It can be grasped as a “void” that encircles things, which, in the 
call of conscience appears in the midst of things as “no-thing”. As such, it draws Dasein 
that hearkens to its “no-place”, which is an uninhabitable site of dwelling. Yet, the fact 
that it is uninhabitable does not mean that we cannot define it in terms of its place-
character and dwelling. The “ground” [Grund] of discourse appears as the abyss [Ab-
grund], “no-ground”. It is the privation of ground, in the sense that it cannot be grounded 
by something else, and as such it is not a ground, yet it “gives” the “ground”: it constitutes 
the boundaries of the place precisely by virtue of not being a place.624 
 Speaking from his far-Eastern experience on the relation between language and 
nothing(ness), Kotoh reminds us that Heidegger’s 1936–38 Hölderlin lecture courses 
																																																								
624 The 18th century German philosopher Hamann, who also considered language as logos in 
opposition to reason, talks about the abysmal essence of logos. Hamann remarked on his 1784 
letter to Herder: “If only I was as eloquent as Demosthenes, I would have to do no more than 
repeat a single word three times. Reason is language—Logos; I gnaw on this marrowbone and will 
gnaw myself to death over it. It is still always dark over these depths for me: I am still always 
awaiting an apocalyptic angel with a key to this abyss”. (Johann Georg Hamman, Hamanns 
Schriften, ed. Friedrich Roth, vol VII, (1821-1825), 151.) In addition, Heidegger himself noticed 
Hamann’s designation of language as an “abyss” [Abgrund] in his later thought, in the 1950 essay 
“Language”. (See: Poetry, Language, Thought, 189) 
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illustrate Heidegger’s grasp of the relationship between language and silence.625 Kotoh 
argues:  
 
It is not logos, but the silence as the “basic mood/voice” [Grundstimme] that 
encounters the wonder of the presencing of being.” 
 
His concluding remarks are very worthwhile considering:  
 
One should listen […] belongingly to the sound of silence, which constantly 
emanates from the depths of the indescribable, and continue to let this be the 
source of one’s own language.626 
 
Within that context, Tetsuaki Kotoh goes on to show that “silence”, as the actual 
ground of pure manifestation of reality, connects Heidegger’s thought of language with 
the Zen tradition.627 What he accomplishes by considering Heidegger’s later thought can 
be achieved in Heidegger’s early ideas as well.628 Silence, as the abysmal ground of 
discourse, is the opposite of idle-talk that uproots. In other words, idle-talk is the ground 
that uproots, while the silence is the abyss that grounds. Let me clarify with an analogy: 
keeping-silent is not the absence of light, but it is the open window through which the 
sunshine can enter and illuminate the house. Idle-talk is the curtain, which covers the 
window glass that does not allow sunshine to shine upon the room. It is in that context  
“keeping silent” and “idle-talk” appear in terms of the act of grounding and 
groundlessness.  																																																								
625 Tetsuaki Kotoh, “Language and Silence: Self–Inquiry in Heidegger and Zen”, in Heidegger and 
Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 210. 
626 Tetsuaki Kotoh, “Language and Silence: Self–Inquiry in Heidegger and Zen”, in Heidegger and 
Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes, 211 
627 Tetsuaki Kotoh, “Language and Silence: Self–Inquiry in Heidegger and Zen”, in Heidegger and 
Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes, 201-213. 
628 This is what Brandon Absher achieves in his article focusing on Being and Time. Brandon 
Absher, “Speaking of Being: Language, Speech, and Silence in Being and Time”, The Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy, vol. 30, n° 2 (2016): 204-231. 
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The significance of the issue of “keeping-silent”, which is the event of discourse 
between silence and expression, which appears within the context of the “call of 
conscience”, indicates that in early Heidegger too a genuine understanding of language 
requires us to go beyond the limits of a linguistic discussion. The core matter of language 
does not come into view through an analysis of elements such as syntactic, sematic, or 
even phonetic structure. The matter at hand is not to find out how language, as a mode of 
presence, grounds being in disclosing the world, but rather, how “no-thing” grounds 
language via silence. 
 
IV. 5 The Ground of Groundlessness and The Groundless Ground 
 
After having examined the topological essence of the “groundlessness” of discourse as 
“idle-talk” and the abysmal ground of language as “silence”, I would like to address the 
issue of “ground”. It is important that we must make sense of the notion of “ground” not 
only as a noun, which has metaphysical connotations such as origin, cause, and 
foundation. We must rather consider the essence [Wesen] and the very happening of the 
notion of ground in its verbal sense as “grounding”, which is indeed related to the issue of 
the happening of place that situates.  
In the previous section, I have mentioned that “groundlessness” [Bodenlosigkeit] is 
not the same as “abyss” [Ab-grund], and this idea requires further examination. I have 
shown that, while the former has an uprooting character, the latter provides the ground 
itself. The groundlessness of discourse, namely, “idle-talk”, occurs in the mode of 
“fleeing” from the core of the matter. In fleeing, one leaves the site of an appropriate 
understanding and interpretation. In a certain sense, mindless absorption in the world does 
not result in a genuine engagement with the world; on the contrary, insofar as it operates 
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through an average understanding of the world, it abandons the world without having 
appropriated it. As one has only superficially understood the world, one can also only 
superficially respond to it. The “groundless ground” as the abyss [Ab-grund] is “silence” 
that occurs from “keeping silent” [schweigen], while the ground of groundlessness 
[Bodenlosigkeit] is “idle-talk”.  
In light of these considerations, I will elaborate on the notions of “ground” and 
“groundlessness” by looking at Braver’s account. In his analysis of Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein in his work titled Groundless Grounds, Braver deals with the ontological and 
epistemological implications of the limits of language and our being in the world. His 
main thesis is what he calls “original finitude”629. From an epistemological standpoint, he 
puts forward the argument that in the course of philosophical reflection, at one point the 
act of providing further justification must come to an end630. From an ontological point of 
view this implies that we cannot ground why we happen to be the kinds of beings that we 
are. Where the epistemological and the ontological arguments conjoin is that we find 
ourselves already placed in holistic structures and contexts that constitute our finitude. 
Likewise, in communication, one’s words are meaningful on the grounds that they are 
employed in ways that are recognizable to the others who share the same background 
practices. Human existence and its being in the world is through and through holistic and 
contextual. 
I argue that there are three different notions of “ground” in Braver’s work. First, in 
his examination of Wittgenstein, Braver appeals to an epistemological notion of ground. 
Accordingly, the ground provides the basis and the justification of an argument as well as 
a form of life. Second, regarding early Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, the notion 
																																																								
629  Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger (London & 
Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 2012), 9, 179. 
630 Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, 208. 
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of ground appears in relation to the average “being-in-the-world” of human Dasein. It 
designates the holistic nature of the structure of its being-there and equipmentality. Third, 
in Heidegger’s later thought, being itself appears as the “groundless ground” in a 
topological way. Braver looks into (1) and (2) simultaneously, however, both of them 
emerge from the more significant understanding of the ground as the third one: being and 
language as the “groundless grounds” do not only indicate the contextual limits of giving 
arguments, or the fact that human existence is contextually grounded in everyday actions. 
The “groundless ground” implicates that the meaningful manifestation of being itself 
appears to human understanding as “no-thing”. It is “nothing” [Nichts] in the sense that it 
is not a thing, not just any being [Seiende] or any occurrence, and as such, the fact that 
“there is” being [Es gibt] is situated in and grounded by the abyss [Abgrund] of being. 
Likewise, silence, appears as the groundless ground of language.  
Let me bring into view how “ground” can be distinguished from mere 
“foundation”. Descartes, who is considered the father of modern philosophy, argued that 
one must first provide the foundations upon which all thinking and scientific explanation 
could be built. This epistemic position is called “foundationalism”, which has been 
vigorously confronted both by Heidegger and Wittgenstein, and their critique against 
Descartes’ foundationalism is also endorsed by Braver.631 In searching for the most basic 
foundation of philosophical and scientific truth, Descartes attempted to prove the very 
existence of the external world itself. He thought that he provided that foundation with the 
formulation cogito ergo sum. By way of methodological scepticism, Descartes sought 
after the most elementary and undoubtable “ground” of knowledge concerning existence. 
According to him, the only thing that he could not doubt was the fact that he has been 
																																																								
631  Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger (London & 
Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 2012), 189. 
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doubting, which appears as the ground of all his thinking.632 Upon that elementary and 
unshakable “ground” of knowledge of self-consciousness, one could build other kinds of 
knowledge.633  
As Braver’s epigraph from Heidegger’s treatise on Schelling 634  draws our 
attention, Heidegger regarded being as that very groundless ground which orients us in the 
world as “existence”. This means that being itself cannot be grounded by some other kind 
of being or beingness, precisely because being is not just any entity [Seiende]. What can 
ultimately ground being “is” no-thing. This can be read in two ways: first, nothing can 
ground being in the sense that being in its happening (event) is the foundation itself. 
Second, that which can ground being is precisely nothing itself [Nichts] by virtue of not 
being something. It is the limit of being, in the sense that it is that from which being 
commences. In other words, it is the abysmal ground of being.  
In the 1929 essay “What is Metaphysics”, in criticizing the scientific way of 
engaging with the question of nothingness, Heidegger suggests that “nothing” is not mere 
nullity and it does not mean the mere absence and complete negation of things.635 In this 
work, Heidegger talks about “profound boredom” and an ontological sense of “love for 
the being there in the world of someone” as two sensations that can disclose the being in 
its wholeness. However, that which reveals “nothing” is anxiety [Angst]. The relation 
Heidegger sees between anxiety, being and discourse is noteworthy: “Anxiety robs us of 
speech. Because beings as a whole slip away, so that just the nothing crowds round, in the 
																																																								
632 René Descartes, Meditations, Objections, Replies, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Doncald 
Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 13 
633 Here, one should be aware of the onto-theological justification that Descartes provides in the 
Meditations by bringing in the argument of the existence of God. René Descartes, Meditations, 
Objections, Replies, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Doncald Cress, 25-26. 
634  Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger (London & 
Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 2012), 173. 
635 (Basic Writings, 95, 98)  
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face of anxiety all utterance of the ‘is’ falls silent”636 When anxiety robs us of discourse, 
this is when we are summoned to encounter the matter of language by moving away from 
our average familiarity with it. As such, our absorbed mode of being in the language is 
“distracted” where a mindfulness of language can arise. Yet, it is through this very interval 
that one is urged to heed the “call of conscience” and resituate oneself in and towards 
language via the interval between silence and speech. 
 In the previous section I argued that silence occurs as the abyss of the 
manifestation of discourse. In relation to the relationship between silence and speech, 
Heidegger makes explicit the connection between nothing and being:  
 
For human existence, the nothing makes possible the openedness of beings as 
such. The nothing does not merely serve as the counter concept of beings; rather, it 
originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such.637  
 
In this passage, Heidegger brings into view that “the nothing” is the primary characteristic 
of the way in which being makes itself manifest, because the nature of being itself is “no-
thingness”. Likewise, an authentic relation to discourse appears through “keeping silent”. 
Yet, neither nothing is mere nullity in the sense of absence of beings, nor keeping silent is 
mere muteness in the sense of voicelessness, or not speaking anything. Being is the 
ground, yet the ground of being is nothing. As such, the ground [Grund] of being is an 
abyss [Ab-Grund], not in the sense of a lack of ground, but as the limit and the horizon of 
the ground that from which and meaningful unfolding of things can come to be. Being, 
then, is not the emanation and manifestation of no-thingness, but it is simply the limit 
between no-thing and beings. Just as it is the case in the relationship between being, no-
thing and nothingness, “keeping silent”, as the dynamic between, constitutes the boundary 
																																																								
636 (Basic Writings, 103) 
637 (Basic Writings, 104) 
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between silence and discourse, just as discourse appears as the region of language within 
which one can speak in terms of particular entities.  However, an authentic “saying” of 
things requires the back and forth movement between silence and speech by way of 
“keeping silent” as “hearkening”. The grounding of language, then, is the “keeping silent” 
that inter-relates silence and speech. Dwelling commences precisely at that limit where a 
phronesis of language can come about. With this idea in view, we can now consider the 
relationship between distinct modes of dwelling that exists in Heidegger’s early and late 
thought. 
 
IV. 6 Being-in-the-World and the Fourfold 
 
The main issue of the concluding section is a juxtaposition of “being-in-the-world” and 
“fourfold” as two manifestations of dwelling. As I have shown, these two notions 
designate Heidegger’s early and late answers to the question of the meaning of dwelling. 
In both accounts, the idea of holism plays a major role. However, it must be asked 
whether the kind of holisms that are at work depart from same or similar concerns. To that 
end, remaining in dialogue with Braver’s account, I will also mention the differences 
between Heidegger and Wittgenstein’s understanding and application of holism. 
Braver states: “Heidegger and later Wittgenstein embrace holism, according to 
which an object or word derives its nature and meaning from its place within a network, 
all other members of which likewise draw their sense from their interrelationships”.638 
Braver calls this “the primacy of the whole”639. Indeed, in Being and Time Heidegger 
defended a holistic view of Dasein’s being in the world. The totality of significances and 
																																																								
638  Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger (London & 
Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 2012), 81. 
639 Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, 106. 
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the web-like structure of tools, human actions and projections showed that the everyday 
human life is organized in such a way that there is a holistic unity, a context within which 
all constituents are through and through inter-relational. Likewise, in late Wittgenstein we 
learn that language is a holistic life form. There are no singular and solipsistic meanings; 
all meaning and different linguistic uses belong to the holistic unity of the system in which 
they have their particular use and place. 
In Heidegger’s early account of dwelling as “being-in-the-world”, everyday being 
there of Dasein also has a holistic nature. That said, there also different kinds of holisms at 
work which need to be distinguished from one another. Accordingly, 1) early Heidegger’s 
idea of “being-in-the-world” embodies a theory of holism, which can be discussed in 
epistemological-contextualist terms. 2) Later Heidegger’s idea of the “fourfold” also has a 
holistic structure, however it cannot be fully understood within an epistemological 
framework because, first, it is neither about cognition nor the relationship between 
cognition and action, and second, the notion of the “world” that is at issue gathers and 
situates human beings in a larger context of interrelations beyond human. In other words, 
the fourfold emplaces human existence in the cosmos itself.  
Now, the first kind of holism in Being and Time concerns the ontological structure 
of the world in the everydayness, as well as Dasein’s spatiotemporal relation to its 
practical world. While later Wittgenstein’s thought of language is similar to early 
Heidegger’s account of “being-in-the-world”, the second kind of holism that is at issue is 
not related to human practices, and the contextual, inter-referential nature of tools and 
such. The first kind of holism is about Dasein’s relation to its closest environment 
[Umwelt] and its attempt to find an authentic relation to that world. In the early work, 
discourse appears as the relation between understanding and articulated speech. In the 
later work, language, not discourse, appears as the topological relation between human 
		 306	
beings and being itself, gathering them in the same movement of the event [Ereignis]. 
Now, although it is true that both early and late Heidegger prioritized the primacy of the 
whole, the most significant novelty in the later account is the non-hierarchical “interplay” 
between the whole and its parts. The very interplay, the movement between the sky, earth, 
mortals and immortals is what constitutes the wholeness of the world.  
What comes to the fore here again is precisely the definition of “place” and its 
topological relation to “movement”. I claim that if Heidegger’s early account of dwelling 
in language cannot be thought of as topological, this is not only because he does not have 
a clear notion of place, but also because the notion of language that we can find is an 
underdeveloped one, as he does not explicate the “movement” [Bewegung] that takes 
place between keeping silent, understanding and discourse. As such, “discourse” in its 
entirety never appears as the place that gives space and opens up different worlds of 
meaning, but only as a close space of articulation and an ontological construction that 
tends to result in “idle-talk” [Gerede]. For later Heidegger, the place of the thing does not 
simply mean its location in the overall whole. Likewise, Malpas puts forward a broader 
definition of place, as he suggests: 
 
The idea of place that is invoked here is not, it should be stressed, the idea of that 
in which entities are merely “located”; rather, in the terms I used immediately 
above, place is that open, cleared, yet bounded region in which we find ourselves 
gathered together with other persons and things, and in which we are opened up to 
the world and the world to us. It is out of this place that space and time both 
emerge.640 
 
The definition of place that Malpas gives is different from Wittgenstein’s understanding of 
place when he talks about the “place” of the word in a sentence. The meaning of the world 
																																																								
640 For example, Malpas draws our attention to the relation between the parts in that more 
dynamic-active sense of movement. Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 221. 
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could only be understood by looking at the way in which the word is used in the larger 
context641. It cannot be figured out solipsistically, but only by looking at the way in which 
the word is related to the other elements of the sentence. This is what constitutes the 
context of discourse. However, this is not the only meaning of “context” in Heidegger’s 
later thought. 
To that end, we must re-examine the meaning of the word “context” so that we can 
have a better understanding of the issue when we argue that human existence is through 
and through holistic and “contextual”. Etymologically, the word “context” derives from 
the Latin contextus meaning, “joining and fitting together” of different textures. The verb 
in the word “texture” is texere, which means to “weave” and “make”, and is also related to 
the Greek techne. Different cognates of the word derive from the Indo-European root 
tekht- meaning to carve, cut, and build mainly of wood.642 Though at issue here is an act 
of fitting different joints together, it is also apparent that, as the verb “to weave” suggests, 
there is a sense of intertwining and becoming a singular whole.643 Distinct components of 
the context do not remain as separate joints; therefore the context is more than the mere 
jointure of eclectic parts. The context appears in its singular unity, and that unity is not 
brought about by the addition of some extra binding element either, but by the very action 
of the “con-joining” itself. The verb texere, which means to weave, should awaken us to 
the topological underpinnings of the notion of “context”. To weave derives from the Indo-
European root webh-, and it means “to move to and fro” 644, which is the basic motion in 
the act of knitting as well. “Context” first and foremost can be seen as the happening of 																																																								
641 (The Philosophical Investigations, 59) (139. Proposition) 
642  Ernest Klein, Klein’s Comprehensive Etymology Dictionary of the English Language 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 757.  
643  As I have discussed earlier in the thesis, the issue is indeed closely related to Heidegger’s 
discussions of the conception of “der Fug”, as well as die Fuge (conjuncture), fügen (to enjoin), 
der Fügen (junctures), sich fügend (compliant), die Erfügung, as the topic of “gathering” becomes 
significant in his thought in 1930s (mainly in The Origin of the Work of Art and Contributions to 
Philosophy) and also in 1940s (Anaximander’s Saying).  
644 Ernest Klein, Klein’s Comprehensive Etymology Dictionary of the English Language, 823. 
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contextualization, which means the dynamic act of intertwining and interlacing of distinct 
textures. That being said, as Heidegger comes to acknowledge later in his thought in the 
1940s, the singular unity of the context essentially emerges from the “disjointure” [Un-
fuge].645  
In this line of thinking, we should not understand “to be situated in a context” in 
terms of mere locatedness in space. Being situated in a context first refers to a sense of 
“interaction”. To be an active part of a context means to partake in the “weaving” motion. 
As such, it requires movement, but not a movement that merely correlates separate 
entities, rather as a singular “emergence” that gathers. In the emergence of the context, 
parts are inherently integrated in the single unity of the whole, thanks to the dis-jointure 
that exists between the parts. The oneness that manifests itself results from the constant 
inter-action that keeps the constituents of the context together. For instance, if we leave a 
person in the hallway of a restaurant, this does not mean that she or he belongs to the 
context of the restaurant. One must dine, cook, serve, clean, or eat in order to be able to 
partake in the happening of the restaurant. Therefore, mere locatedness in the restaurant 
does not make one a part of the place. Just as belonging to the place comes with 
interacting with it, place is where various actions, relations, and interactions occur. That 
said, the possibility of this interaction depends on the “dis-jointure” and the “rift” between 
what is present and presencing itself. Every context provides space for an occurrence to 
take place, and it remains as a whole precisely because it allows for an action to occur, as 
its contextual nature depends on that very action. Namely, the occurrence is what keeps 
different parts of the context in relation. If and only if things are situated in the happening 
of the place, that is, where they have the possibility to interact, then, they can be in 
relation and get correlated. Heidegger gives an example in the late essay Building 
																																																								
645 (“Anaximander’s Saying”, Off the Beaten Track, 268.) 
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Dwelling Thinking to explain the relationship between the bridge, the river and the banks 
of the river. Heidegger writes: 
 
The bridge swings over the stream ‘with ease and power.’ It does not just connect 
banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses 
the stream. The bridge expressly causes them to lie across from each other. One 
side is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the 
stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With the banks, the bridge 
brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind 
them. It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighbourhood.646  
 
In this passage, Heidegger explains how the bridge discloses a context by gathering the 
stream, the banks, and the landscape in the same occurrence by connecting the banks of 
the river. As such, it opens up a world of relations and interactions.  
Now, in terms of the primacy of the whole and the holism that is at issue, Braver 
writes, “Perhaps the most holistic phenomenon, although also the one I can make the least 
sense of, is the fourfold”.647 Indeed, the idea of the fourfold [Geviert] strikes us as the 
most significant notion of Heidegger’s thought from the late 1940s and onwards regarding 
the nature of dwelling. In light of the definition of “place” suggested by Malpas that I 
have mentioned before, we can say that the fourfold fulfils two qualities of it: 1) openness, 
in the sense of opening up of a world, and 2) boundedness, in the sense of providing the 
horizon and the finitude so that place does not turn into a mere open field without 
limitations and boundaries. The experience of the place as the open bounded, then, is 
primarily the experience of the limit. Heidegger argues: 
 
Only things that are locations in this manner allow for spaces. What the word for 
space, Raum, Rum designates is said by its ancient meaning. Raum means a place 
cleared or freed for settlement and lodging. A space is something that has been 																																																								
646 (Basic Writings, 354) 
647  Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger (London & 
Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 2012), 208. 
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made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely within a boundary, 
Greek peras. A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks 
recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presenting. That 
is why the concept is that of horismos that is, the horizon, the boundary.648 
 
It is very important to note that in the text, Heidegger fleshes out the relation between 
space, place and limit in the very context of the nature of the notion of fourfold. I 
discussed the notion in the first chapter with regards to the topological essence of 
language as the happening of place, as that which makes possible the dynamic relation and 
the hermeneutic movement between being and human beings. I started with the notion of 
the fourfold because it provides the more comprehensive meaning of dwelling in 
Heidegger’s thought.  
 Now, Braver writes: “The fourfold represents something like the ‘logical space’ 
organizing our lives and projects”649 Here it is not clear what “logical space” here should 
indicate as an expression, thought the more problematic claim is that the fourfold 
“organizes our lives and projects”. In the idea of fourfold there are no indications of an 
“organization”, because it is neither an established system nor a mechanism that is simply 
out there, and definitely not something that “functions”. On the contrary, as I have 
discussed in the third chapter, in the age of the domination of the “framework”, the 
happening of fourfold is obstructed. Essentially, the fourfold is a description of the limits 
and relations of dwelling. Therefore, the idea of original finitude that Braver highlights as 
the “finitude without a contrast —or at least not the unavailable contrast with 
infinitude”650— is essential in making sense of the fourfold.  
Following the line of thinking in which Braver compares and discusses Heidegger 
and Wittgenstein, it initially appears that Heidegger and Wittgenstein agree on a holistic 																																																								
648 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 152) 
649 Lee Braver, Heidegger’s Later Writings: A Reader’s Guide (London: Continuum, 2009), 100. 
650  Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger (London & 
Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 2012), 9. 
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approach in inquiring into the meaning of phenomena. In other words, they both think that 
philosophy must recognize the holistic nature of the cosmos, as well as language that 
expresses it. It is also helpful to read Wittgenstein and Heidegger within the context of the 
issue of overcoming of metaphysics. Their thinking imply that today we lack a holistic 
understanding and experience of thinking and being in the world. As Braver puts it, we are 
living lives “where glens and dales are bulldozed for Starbucks and McDonalds”651, and as 
Heidegger puts it, “nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for 
modern technology and industry.”652 Again, as Braver deliberately claims, “one need not 
be a Luddite to acknowledge that something important is being lost.”653 Questioning the 
ways in which we exist in the world must also lead us to questioning the ways and 
frameworks in which we think. In that regard, Wittgenstein draws our attention to 
epistemological inconsistencies of the philosophical tradition, which derive from not 
properly understanding what we can and cannot do with language. He states: “Once I have 
exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am 
inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’”654 In some cases, further theorizing will not 
make the issue at hand more manifest than it already is. One must rather attempt to 
develop the phronesis of language in thinking so that one knows how to act with language 
by correctly “reading” our situation in language. 
In Heidegger’s later thought, the primary holistic context in which humans exist is 
not the human world. The idea of the fourfold provides a larger context of dwelling, which 
contextualizes the human being in the happening of place via language. It is the event of 
language that emplaces the human existence in the circular dance of the fourfold, in that 
human being finds itself situated as a member, but not the maker or planner of the 																																																								
651 Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, 239. 
652 (Discourse on Thinking, 60) 
653 Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, 239. 
654 (The Philosophical Investigations, 91) 
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cosmos.655 In that regard Heidegger writes: “When and in what way do things appear as 
things? They do not appear by means of human making. But neither do they appear 
without the vigilance of mortals.”656 This vigilance can exist insofar as human beings have 
the capacity to respond to that which is beyond them, which requires them to acknowledge 
their mortality. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger’s account of discourse is connected to the notion of 
“being-in-the-world” as the essence of dwelling. As his understanding of dwelling 
develops from “being-in-the-world” to the “fourfold”, so does his understanding of the 
core matter of language shifts from the place of discourse in our ordinary dealings to the 
poetic manifestation of language via silence. However, his account of the “call of 
conscience” and “keeping-silent” already heralds the change in focus that materializes in 
his later thought, where the investigation of poetry and art become the central matters of 
thought. That said, it is already having examined Heidegger’s topology of language from 
the 1940s and onwards that allowed us to identify the implicit topology in the early 
work.657 In this way, like Hölderlin’s Ister, which follows Antigone in its ethos, we have 






655 Capobianco draws attention to Heidegger’s Heraclitus lecture course from 1943 and finds a 
fundamentally topological designation of being as cosmos. As we have discussed, he endorses the 
primacy of the self-manifesting of being-itself against human beings’ making sense of it. See: 
Richard Capobianco, “Heidegger on Heraclitus: Kosmos/World as Being Itself”, Epoché, vol 20, 
Issue 2 (Spring 2016): 465-476. 
656 (Poetry, Language, Thought, 179) 
657As Braver beautifully remarks, “The early discussion is like a musical theme that appears in a 
composer’s youthful sonata, only becoming fully developed into a symphony later on”. Lee 
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